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THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

IN THREE VOLUMES
VOLUME TWO

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
C. F. CLAY, MANAGER
LONDON : FETTER LANE, E.C.4

NEW YORK : THE MACMILLAN CO.
BOMBAY
CALCUTTA } MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.
MADRAS
TORONTO : THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.
TOKYO : MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA

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THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1783–1919

EDITED BY

SIR A. W. WARD, LITT.D., F.B.A.

AND

G. P. GOOCH, M.A., LITT.D.

VOLUME II

1815–1866

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CORRIGENDA

VOLUME I

p. vi, l. 4. *For* "whole" *read* "earlier part."

p. ix, l. 15. *For* "Junto" *read* "Junta."

p. x, l. 5. *Insert:* Book I. From the Peace of Versailles to the Second Peace of Paris, 1783–1815.

p. 25, l. 8 from bottom. *For* "Vera Cruz" *read* "Santa Cruz."

p. 33, l. 8. After "at Cologne," *read* "(1673), in which, till its collapse, an English Embassy took part. In the meantime, while."

p. 107, l. 16. *For* "Corsica" *read* "Minorca."

p. 278, ll. 18 and 19. *For* "Talleyrand as Plenipotentiary," *read* "Talleyrand; no change occurred."

p. 279, l. 13. *For* "Talleyrand" *read* "Le Tourneur."

Ib. l. 14. *For* "Talleyrand becoming Foreign Minister" *read* " representatives of the extremists."

p. 280, l. 16 from bottom. *For* "12th" *read* "11th."

p. 353, l. 6. *For* "12th" *read* "17th."

p. 354, n. 2. *Delete* last four words and *add*: "Limits of space preclude notice of the expeditions to South America in 1806–7."

p. 358, l. 12. *For* "James" *read* "John."

p. 361, l. 3 from bottom, and p. 364, l. 9 from bottom. *For* "15" *read* "18."

p. 452, l. 9. *After* "Mauritius" *read* "; she also acquired."

p. 527, l. 5 from bottom and p. 528, l. 1. *For* "Democrats" *read* "Republicans."

PREFACE

BESIDES those charged with the responsibilities or engaged in the work of the Cambridge University Press—which has recently suffered a very heavy loss in the death of Mr A. R. Waller, for eleven years Secretary of the Syndicate—we have to thank more friends than can be enumerated here for their aid in the production of the present volume. Use has again been made of the generous loan of the Wallace Papers, already acknowledged in the Preface to our first volume. We have also to thank the relations of the late Sir Andrew Buchanan, G.C.B., and more especially Mr Henry Mellish of Hadsock Priory, Worksop, for allowing us to peruse two volumes of Sir Andrew's private correspondence in the years 1863–4, when he was our Ambassador at Berlin—one of them consisting of letters from his predecessor Lord Bloomfield, then at Vienna, and the other of miscellaneous correspondence. The former, in particular, is full of interest. They have, also, favoured us with the loan of Sir Andrew's letters concerning the Russian repudiation in 1870 of the Black Sea obligations of the Treaty of March 30th, 1856, privately printed for the use of the Foreign Office. Through Mr G. M. Trevelyan's kind intervention, access has been granted us by the present Earl Grey to the Howick Papers, throwing light on the period 1830–4, dealt with in Mr Trevelyan's *Lord Grey of the Reform Bill*. Among leading authorities on the subject of this work who have continued to interest themselves in its progress, we desire again to express our obligations to the Right Hon. Lord Sanderson, G.C.B., to the Right Hon. Sir Ernest Satow, G.C.M.G., whose most valuable *Diplomatic Practice* has, we are glad to say, already reached a second edition, to Professor Sir C. H. Firth, F.B.A., and other friends. No continued aid or encouragement would have been more valued by us than that of the late Sir George Prothero, in whom the study of History in this country has lost one of its chief guides and controllers.

We have, as before, to thank Miss A. D. Greenwood for undertaking the complicated task of compiling the Index to this Volume, and Miss M. Pate for her unwearying assistance in preparing it for publication.

We trust that this portion of our History will be found to have adhered to the principles which guided the conception and com-

mencement of the work. We have consistently sought to avoid duplication or repetition, wherever this could be accomplished without marring the cohesion of the particular chapters or sections. The special interest attaching to the question of the responsibility for the outbreak of the Crimean War, as affecting the judgment of contemporary and subsequent British policy with regard to Russia and the Near East, seemed, however, to warrant the inclusion in a chapter of this volume of a recapitulatory section covering some of the ground already dealt with in the preceding chapter. Moreover, it appeared to us desirable that, while the causes of the Crimean War should be discussed in their connexion with our general Foreign Policy in the preceding period, its relations to the origins of that War, and to its course should be treated consecutively by the same hand.

The unavoidable delay in the issue of our Second Volume has, we fear, caused inconvenience to some of the writers of Chapters and Sections included in it. We have every reason for expecting that the publication of the Third and concluding Volume will follow with greater speed.

A. W. W.
G. P. G.

October, 1922.

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CHAPTER I

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE CONTINENTAL ALLIANCE 1816–1822

"ENGLAND," wrote Vattel in the middle of the eighteenth century, "has the honour to hold in her hands the balance of power, and she is careful to keep it in equilibrium." This had been the instinct of British statesmen before the time of William III, and their avowed policy ever since; and the insular position of England, unassailable herself and aiming at no conquests on the Continent, had enabled her to play with success the part of the *Puissance Médiatrice* of Europe—to quote Montesquieu's phrase. It was this policy, aiming of course primarily at the security of Great Britain and her empire, which inspired Pitt and his successors in their implacable struggle against French imperialism, and the efforts of the British Government to reestablish a "just equilibrium" in Europe after the downfall of Napoleon.

The peace settlement of 1814–1815, whatever may be said of its justice, did in fact establish a reasonable Balance of Power, secured in the first instance by the Treaties of Paris and of Vienna. The suggestion put forward by Castlereagh at Vienna, that the settlement effected by the Treaties should be placed under the general guarantee of the Allied Powers, did not, indeed, bear fruit; but Article VI of the Treaty of Alliance of November 20th, 1815, supplied the nucleus of an international system by providing for meetings of the Sovereigns or their Ministers at stated intervals, for the purpose of debating and taking action on any subjects of common interest. A month earlier, the Emperor Alexander I of Russia, by the Act of the Holy Alliance proclaimed at the great review held near Châlons on September 26th, had sought to give a high moral sanction to the Alliance, and to extend its scope by embracing in a league of Christian fraternity all States willing to join it. In considering the attitude of Great Britain towards the Continental problem during the succeeding years it is important to distinguish between these two conceptions of the Alliance: namely, the Quadruple Alliance, based upon the Treaty of Chaumont as modified by that of November 20th, 1815, and the shadowy "Universal Union" which the Emperor Alexander's idealism sought to

establish on the basis of the Act of September 26th. For the moment, it suffices to say that under none of these instruments was any permanent machinery established for the peaceful settlement of international disputes comparable with that which the Treaty of Versailles instituted in the League of Nations in 1919. The Council of Ambassadors in Paris, indeed, met regularly, and efforts were made later to invest it with something of the character of an international court of appeal; but its mandate was primarily to watch over the affairs of France, and the attempt to give it general powers was successfully resisted, notably by Great Britain. For the rest, the task of restoring and maintaining peace fell upon the old diplomacy, working through the traditional channels; though attempts were made—notably by Castlereagh—to infuse into it a new spirit of mutual goodwill, diplomatic agents being conceived no longer as representing the interests of their Sovereign alone, but as charged also with the duty of watching over the general "European" interests as defined in the Treaties[1].

The task with which diplomacy was confronted at the beginning of 1816 was, indeed, formidable enough, though it may seem child's play compared with that which it was called upon to face in 1920. The Treaties of Paris and Vienna covered only the territories affected by the vicissitudes of the great War, that is to say, a large part of Europe and the colonial possessions of the Powers concerned in it; and, even within these comparatively narrow limits, owing to the hurried winding-up of the Congress of Vienna, the settlement had not been complete. The organisation of the German Confederation, which was considered in some sort as the key-stone of the European arch, was delayed owing to the acrimonious dispute between Austria and Bavaria on the question of exchange of territory—a dispute complicated by the further question of the succession of the Hochberg line in Baden—and by the no less acrimonious dispute between Austria and Prussia, which had disturbed the harmony of the great Congress, as to the garrisoning of the Federal fortresses. Even more dangerous, though intrinsically less important, was the claim of Eugène Beau-

[1] The status and rights of diplomatic agents were finally fixed by the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. By his circular of January 1st, 1816, Castlereagh announced that "in order to provide a suitable succession of diplomatic servants properly qualified to discharge the functions of Secretary of Embassy and Secretary of Legation," the Prince Regent intended to nominate from time to time "to such of the Ambassadors or Envoys, as the emergency of the service might point out, one or at the utmost two attachés to be domesticated in his family." This was the beginning in Great Britain of the trained diplomatic service. F.O. 115. 25. Archives, No. 2.

harnais, ex-Viceroy of Italy, to compensation at the cost of Naples under the Treaty of Fontainebleau; for this claim was supported by his kinsman the Emperor Alexander, and strenuously resisted by Austria, in pursuit of her general policy of protecting Naples and resisting any increase of Russian influence in Italy[1]. Lastly, Spain, angered by her exclusion from the councils of the Great Powers, was delaying her accession to the Treaties, pending the settlement in her favour of her claim to the reversion of the Italian duchies assigned to Marie-Louise, ex-Empress of the French.

Apart from such unsettled questions as these, there were innumerable seeds of trouble in the practical application of the terms actually agreed upon. The question of the suppression of the Slave Trade, in which the British public alone was deeply interested, though settled in principle at Vienna, was more difficult to carry out in practice, and was the subject of an interminable diplomatic correspondence[2]. The restoration of the "legitimate" Sovereigns, moreover, had, in many cases, not led to the results intended and expected—the stilling of revolutionary unrest. British statesmen, especially, regarded with dismay reactionary follies which not only brought the Alliance into discredit at home, but, by reviving old and creating new discontents, tended everywhere to keep alive that revolutionary spirit which they regarded, not unnaturally, as the principal menace to the world's peace. They had fought the Revolution, which for them meant sheer militarism and the ruin of European society as established upon acknowledged rights; firm believers in the superiority of British institutions, and inclined to regard them as a universal remedy for political ills, they had no sympathy with attempts to revive obsolete privileges and to restore ancient tyrannies. They watched with special solicitude the progress of the Constitutional experiment in France, the success of which seemed at the outset to be imperilled by the violence of the Ultra-royalist party which the elections of 1815 had made dominant in the Chamber of Deputies.

In addition to all these subjects for anxiety which were the immediate concern of the Allied Powers under the Treaties, there

[1] Castlereagh pointed out that Metternich had signed a Protocol with Prussia and Russia at Vienna demanding "50,000 souls" from Naples within a month of a Treaty guaranteeing the possessions of His Sicilian Majesty. To A Court, January 1st, 1816 (draft). F.O. Sicily, 74. The writer is indebted for this and for several other references to the F.O. Records to Professor C. K. Webster, who kindly allowed him the use of his typescript copies.

[2] It occupies 229 volumes of the Foreign Office Records (F.O. 84) covering the period from the Conference of London, in August, 1816, to December, 1837.

were other questions, outside the Treaties, which loomed increasingly large. The long-continued struggle between the Spanish Colonies and the mother country threatened to draw the United States into a contest between the New World and the Old. The attack by Brazil on the territory of the River Plate, and the occupation of Montevideo, so embittered relations between Spain and Portugal as to threaten a new Peninsular War, which might easily involve all Europe[1]. Relations between Great Britain and the United States were clouded by mutual suspicions of aggressive designs in Latin America; by boundary disputes and the beginnings of the controversy as to the sovereignty over the Oregon territory; and by a series of difficult questions arising out of the late War and the interpretation of the terms of the Treaty of Ghent (1814). But more perilous to the world's peace than any of these questions was the situation created by the stubborn refusal of Turkey to carry out the terms of the Treaty signed with Russia at Bucharest in 1812, and the enigmatic attitude of the Emperor Alexander towards this refusal.

It was, indeed, precisely this enigmatic attitude of the Tsar, not towards the question of Turkey only, which kept the European chanceries in a flutter of excitement and apprehension. His talk was of peace; but he maintained his huge armies in being and concentrated, for the most part, on the western and the Balkan fronts of his empire. He preached unctuously the gospel of fraternity and mutual trust; but his agents were meanwhile carrying on dark intrigues in every Court and country in Europe; and it is not surprising that to Austria, most timid of Powers, he seemed, to quote Baron Vincent, to be "disguising under the language of evangelical self-abnegation schemes of far-reaching ambition." British Envoys abroad shared this view of his designs, and the despatches sent home by them were filled with evidence of Russian machinations. The perplexity lay in the nature of these machinations; for while, for instance, Count Capo d'Istria was urging on the Neapolitan Government the doctrines of pure Liberalism, and Alexander himself was reproving the violence of the Ultras in France, Baron Tatishcheff, the Russian Ambassador at Madrid, was earning the distinction of the Golden Fleece by subservience to the views of Ferdinand VII and his reactionary camarilla. The evidence, though imperfectly pieced together, seemed to apprehensive minds, to point to but one solution. Intrigues in Naples, in

[1] The question was ultimately compromised in 1828, through the mediation of reat Britain, by the establishment of Uruguay as an independent republic.

the Ionian Islands, in Spain—whence came rumours of a projected Russian occupation of the Balearic Islands—the sudden resolve of the Tsar to put an end to the scandal of the Barbary pirates: what could it all mean but that Alexander was meditating a separate alliance with the Bourbon Powers and the establishment of Russian sea-power in the Mediterranean, so as to protect the flank of the armies which he had destined for the invasion of Turkey? The publication, in January, 1816, of the text of the Holy Alliance heightened these alarms; for it was read at Constantinople as a sort of European excommunication of the Sultan, who, as a Mohammadan sovereign, could have no place in a Christian league.

Amid these rumours and alarms Castlereagh kept his judgment clear. He had stated the object of British policy to be "to bring back the world to peaceful habits"; and he perceived that this could only be done by keeping the Alliance together, and therefore by continually insisting on the common interests of the Powers, as infinitely more important than those "points of secondary policy" which threatened to divide them. He understood Metternich's fear and suspicion of Russia, which, to a certain extent, he shared; but he believed that the best way of curbing Alexander's ambitions was, not to attempt to form combinations against him, still less to meet intrigue with counter-intrigue, but to make an honest appeal to the better side of his nature, and perhaps to his vanity, and so, by holding him to the solemn engagements he had entered into at Paris, to keep him securely "grouped." It was this which led him to wish to moderate, in the case of Austria more especially, "that *cri de bureau* against Russia, which must in a measure exist in all Governments towards a State so powerful as Russia has lately become[1]." "Local cabals," such as those which the British Minister reported from Naples, might easily shake the Alliance, which remained "indispensable to Europe, in order to conduct France to a stable order of things." "We ought not," he said, "to be too susceptible in our minor relations to the hazard of the great machine of European safety, which if it does not consist of the four Powers is shaken to its foundations[2]."

In a letter to the British Minister in Berlin, dated December 28th, 1815, Castlereagh very clearly defined his attitude in these matters. The tension between Austria and Russia was a peril to the Alliance,

[1] To Lord Stewart, July 9th, 1816. F.O. Austria, 125.
[2] To A Court, January 1st, 1816. F.O. Sicily, 74.

and he desired "to guard our missions abroad against the danger of accelerating, if not producing, a conflict for influence between the two States." It was possible, he said, that the existing state of European relations might pass away with the danger which had given birth to them; but it was the duty of Great Britain to retard a return to "a more contentious order of things," while the comparative safety due to her insular position enabled her to pursue "a more generous and confiding policy." In the actual state of Europe, it was the province of Great Britain "to turn the confidence she inspired to the account of peace, by exercising a conciliatory influence between the Powers, rather than put herself at the head of any combination of Courts to keep others in check." The necessity for such a system might recur; but this necessity should no longer be problematical when acted upon. "The immediate object to be kept in view is to inspire the States of Europe, as long as we can, with a sense of the dangers which they have surmounted by their union, of the hazards they will incur by a relaxation of vigilance,...and that their true wisdom is to keep down the petty contentions of ordinary times, and to stand together in support of the established principles of social order[1]."

The substance of this letter was embodied by Castlereagh in a Circular, dated January 1st, 1816, sent to all British Ministers abroad with directions to communicate it to the Governments to whom they were accredited, and to request that these Governments should send similar instructions to their agents at foreign Courts. The Circular contained a suggestion not mentioned in the earlier letter, namely, in the event of the failure of other means of keeping the peace, "to combine the Powers of Europe against that State whose perverted policy or criminal ambition shall first menace the repose in which all have a common interest[2]." It was a revival of the idea of armed guarantee which he had suggested at Vienna six months before.

The immediate object of Castlereagh was to ease the dangerous tension that was arising between Austria and Russia owing to their rival activities in Italy and the Near East, and he saw well that the fault lay on both sides. In the great issues at stake, the preservation of peace and the curbing of Russian ambitions, there was—as Lord

[1] Castlereagh's *Letters and Dispatches*, 3rd Series, vol. III. p. 104.

[2] Quoted in Cathcart to Castlereagh, St Petersburg, February 10th to 22nd, 1816. F.O. Russia, 103. The Circular itself I have been unable to find in the F.O. Records.

Stewart put it—"complete identity of principles and aims between Great Britain and Austria[1]," and to the end Castlereagh studied to preserve relations of the most perfect confidence with Prince Metternich. But this by no means blinded him to the peculiar dangers arising from the defects of Metternich's character and the tortuous methods of his diplomacy[2]. It was "the succession of subordinate questions to which the Austrian policy has given birth" which had caused "much of our late diplomatic embarrassments"—"Parma, the Valtellina, Simplon, the proposed Italian league, her contradictory engagements with the Allies and the Court of Naples on Eugène's point, her exchanges with Bavaria and, as a consequence, the existing claims upon Baden." In all these "small questions of contest" Austria appeared as the assailant, and so gave to Russia the character of protectress of the lesser States, and consequently multiplied those Russian ties in Italy and Germany of which Austria was so naturally jealous[3]. Great Britain desired to see Austria predominate in Italy, "liberalised however in some of its views and better adapted to the prejudices of the country"; but it was at the same time essential, there as elsewhere, not to appear to separate British interests from those of Russia[4]. The diplomatic problem involved taxed all Castlereagh's skill. From St Petersburg Lord Cathcart reported that, though the Emperor Alexander had approved the British Circular of January 1st, and commanded similar instructions to be sent to his agents abroad, his irritation against Austria had not abated. Apart from his personal dislike of Metternich, which at Vienna had led to an open breach, he complained of his domineering policy in Italy, was annoyed by the negotiations proceeding at Turin for a separate Austro-Sardinian alliance, and continued to champion the claims of Beauharnais on Naples[5]. Meanwhile, Lord Stewart reported from Milan that Russian emissaries continued to arrive in Italy; that great alarm was felt at the concentration in Bessarabia of 130,000 Russian troops under Bennigsen, which seemed like a meditated attack on Turkey; and that some sensation had been caused by the Emperor Alexander's publication of his "Sacred Treaty" (the Holy Alliance), with the Austrian Emperor's name heading the list of signatories—which "operated as

[1] To Castlereagh, Vienna, June 23rd, 1816. F.O. Austria, 127. No. 51.

[2] "With all my partiality for the Austrians I know by experience that they are fond of insinuating alarms, to strengthen their local influence." To A Court, January 1st, 1816. F.O. Sicily, 74.

[3] To Stewart, July 9th, 1816. F.O. Austria, 125.

[4] To A Court, January 1st, 1816. F.O. Sicily, 74.

[5] Castlereagh to Stewart, April 16th, 1816. F.O. 7. 25.

a shock of thunder on the Emperor Francis, who is under the most lively apprehension that he will be considered as religiously mad by *his* faithful subjects, as his Imperial brother[1]."

Castlereagh himself looked upon Russia as the Power in Europe which, without essentially exposing herself, was most capable of mischief[2]; he knew that she would "never omit to cultivate by intrigue in Italy, in Spain, in truth in every Court of Europe to be used according to circumstances[3]"; but, at the moment, the important question was whether the Emperor Alexander had "any immediate dangerous purpose in doing so." This he did not believe to be the case. To seek for sinister meanings in the Act of the Holy Alliance was idle; the engagements taken in it were "perfectly laudable and innocent"; though they were "clothed in language not suited to diplomatic transactions[4]." To Lord Stewart, who reported Metternich's alarms from Vienna, he pointed out the favourable effect which his Circular of January 1st may have had on the Emperor's mind, insisted that the true interests of Russia must dictate to him a pacific policy, while the solemn pledge he had taken in the face of the world was "an additional obstacle to a different course." The important thing, however, was not to raise up comparatively unimportant questions which might give him an excuse for adopting another system[5].

Such a wise and conciliatory policy was above all needed in the question of Turkey. Stewart wrote from Milan that the "increased reports of the march of Russian troops and the alarm at Constantinople" made it urgent that Great Britain and Austria should come to a confidential understanding as to the Instructions to be given to their representatives at St Petersburg and Constantinople, in order to avert war[6]. Castlereagh had, in fact, already defined his policy in Instructions to Bartle Frere, British Minister at Constantinople, which he forwarded to Stewart under flying seal, in order that they might be communicated to Metternich. This policy was to induce the Porte to conduct its discussions with Russia in such a way as to avoid giving that Power any just, or even plausible, motive for war. Peace, he urged, was of more importance to Turkey than any or all of the points

[1] Stewart to Castlereagh, Milan, February 12th, 1816. F.O. 120, Archives, 14; also in F.O. Austria, 126. No. 20.
[2] To Stewart, July 30th, 1816. F.O. Austria.
[3] To A Court, Letter *cit.* of January 1st, 1816.
[4] To A Court, March 26th, 1816. F.O. Sicily, 74.
[5] To Stewart, June 4th, 1816.
[6] Stewart to Castlereagh, February 7th, 1816. F.O. Austria, 126. No. 16

on which it was at issue with Russia, and it would be better for the Porte to make some sacrifices than to risk a war which, once begun, might—in view of "the imposing state of military power in which Russia finds herself placed"—be pushed to extremities, and in which Turkey could not expect the armed assistance of Great Britain, Austria and France, all of whom were "too exhausted with the fatigues and expenses of the war to feel disposed to come to her aid." This view of a "complying policy" was not to be communicated to the Russian Minister; but Frere was to offer good offices in concert with the Austrian and, if possible, the French and Prussian, Ministers. There was reason to believe that the Emperor Alexander, for his part, would not prove intractable. He had told the Ottoman Minister in Paris that, if the Porte behaved reasonably towards the Serbians, which was a point of honour with Russia, the Turkish Government would find him disposed to be conciliatory on the question of the Asiatic frontiers[1].

In commenting on these Instructions to Stewart, Castlereagh dwelt on the principle that, while the Austrian and British Ministers should act in concert, they must be careful not to appear as adversaries of Russia, "or as separating their actions from those of the French and Prussian Ministers, who must feel an equally strong interest that a Turkish Question should not be suffered to perplex the present politics of Europe[2]." In these sentences is summed up the whole of Castlereagh's policy in the Eastern Question—as it was soon to be called—from first to last. Great Britain and Austria were equally interested in maintaining the Ottoman Power as a barrier to any undue Russian expansion; therefore, they could and must act in concert. But the supreme need for all was peace; and peace could only be preserved by preventing the situation in the East from developing in such a way as to make a Russian attack on Turkey inevitable; for such a war could not possibly be localised. Castlereagh's diplomacy in the Eastern Question during these anxious years was, therefore, directed to restraining the "somewhat volcanick" temper of Metternich, to applying a friendly pressure to the Porte in favour of the just demands of Russia, and to persuading the Emperor Alexander that his reputation as the peace-maker of Europe would suffer from "the old tarnished expedient of a war of ambition against the Turks," which would ruin all his endeavours, since "the principle

[1] To Bartle Frere, January 29th, 1816. F.O. Turkey, No. 86.
[2] To Stewart, January 29th, 1816. F.O. Austria, 125.

of acquisition, once acted on, might relax all existing ties, and open interminable questions[1]."

Of these tasks, the most difficult was that of bringing the Turks to reason. They had been absurd enough—as Castlereagh put it—during the Congress of Vienna to refuse the mediation of Austria, France and Great Britain on the points at issue with Russia, though the settlement of these would have been followed by a collective guarantee of their territorial integrity[2]. They stubbornly refused to budge an inch in the matter of the Treaty of Bucharest, impervious alike to the threats of Russia and to the persuasions of the other Powers. They had recently added to the difficulty of the situation by sending reinforcements to the Dey of Algiers, whose piratical navy was being dealt with by American war-ships, though the European Powers—and notably the Emperor Alexander—had declared their intention of no longer tolerating these marauders. What with Count Stroganoff's threatening language at Constantinople, and the concentration of Russian armies on the frontiers, the situation seemed full of peril; and such it remained six years later, when, in the spring of 1821, the insurrection of the Greeks created a situation yet more imminently perilous.

Scarcely less disturbing than the problems of the Near East were those raised by the proceedings of the Court of Spain, and by the equivocal attitude of Russia towards them. In relation to these the position of the British Government was one of singular complication and difficulty. Great Britain was bound by recent Treaties of Alliance with both Spain and Portgual; and Spain and Portugal-Brazil were carrying on a War on the River Plate, which at any moment might spread to the Iberian Peninsula. Yet even this difficulty was not so serious as that created by the revolt of the Spanish-American Colonies and the failure of the Court of Madrid either to suppress it or to come to terms with them. With the virtually independent Latin republics of the New World a considerable British commerce had developed, which the Spanish Government persisted in treating as contraband; and British ships trading with Latin-American ports had become the prey of Cuban and other pirates sailing under the Spanish flag. The British squadron in the West Indies had orders to

[1] To Rose, April 4th, 1817. F.O. Prussia, 106.

[2] *Ib.* For this, and the relations generally of Turkey and Russia after the Treaty of Bucharest, see Sir Robert Liston to Wellington, March 25th, 1815. F.O. Congress, Turkey. Misc. Archives.

protect British trade; the result being that Great Britain and Spain, allies in Europe, were actually at war on the other side of the Atlantic. The breaking-up of the Spanish empire, moreover, raised larger and more dangerous problems than those involved in the relations between Great Britain and Spain, important though these were from the point of view of the balance of Europe. For several years, there was complete uncertainty as to the political form that would be taken by the communities of Latin America; and this uncertainty encouraged strange ambitions. It was a comparatively small matter, though disturbing to a generation whose nerves were on edge, that Bonapartist exiles in the United States were discovered to be planning a filibustering expedition into Mexico, in connexion with a plot for the establishment of a great Hispano-American confederation under Joseph Bonaparte, as King of the Indies—a title which he had not formally abdicated[1]. The Great Powers themselves were casting covetous eyes on the rich inheritance. The United States, their appetite for annexations whetted by the Louisiana purchase in 1803, were bringing to bear on Spain the pressure which resulted in the enforced sale to them of the Floridas. Royalist France, though the Dictator Pueyrredón's offer of the crown of Buenos Ayres to Louis-Philippe, Duke of Orleans, had needs been rejected, was beginning to hope for compensations in Latin America for the colonial empire she had lost. Last, but not least, Russia—still an American Power, with shadowy claims extending over the coast-lands of what are now British Columbia and the States of Oregon and Washington—was showing a disposition to intervene actively in the affairs of the New World, nominally in the interests of peace and the monarchical principle. The Tsar's present of frigates to Spain—ships which turned out to be unseaworthy—caused a momentary jubilation at Madrid and a corresponding, but somewhat more lasting, *malaise* in the European chanceries. Lord Stewart, echoing the alarms of Vienna, wrote in a flutter to Castlereagh that the news of Tatishcheff having, on the pretext of taking action against the Barbary pirates, arranged for the establishment of a large Russian garrison in Minorca pointed to Russia cherishing "plans of active operations in the territory of Buenos Ayres[2]."

[1] Villanueva, *Resumen de la Historia de América*, 253, quoted in J. B. Lockey, *Pan-Americanism*, p. 91. Cf. Bagot to Castlereagh, October 6th, 1817, *Castlereagh Corr.* 3rd Ser. vol. III. p. 379, and June 2nd, 1818, *ib.* p. 440, with enclosure.

[2] Stewart to Castlereagh, Vienna, January 27th, 1817. F.O. Austria, 134 (No. 14), and February 14th, *ib.* 135 (No. 22).

Amid all these confusing cross-currents Castlereagh, as usual, steered a perfectly straight course. So early as 1812, he had made it clear that the policy of Great Britain was, if possible, to effect a reconciliation between Spain and her Colonies, but that she was only prepared to promote such a reconciliation on certain conditions: namely, that the grievances of the Latin-Americans should be remedied by the concession to them of the full rights of Spanish subjects, and that they should have free commercial intercourse with all nations, "Spain, as the parent State, enjoying a fair preference in this portion of her dominions[1]." From this position he never budged, and all his subsequent despatches on this subject are but variations on the same theme. It was not till the eve of the Congress of Verona, in 1822, that the obstinacy of the Spanish Government and the danger of a concerted intervention of the autocratic European Powers forced him to modify his attitude and to foreshadow, in the Instructions which he did not live to carry out, the policy afterwards followed by Canning. From first to last, there was no question in his mind of demanding exclusive commercial privileges for Great Britain; already when, in 1815, Spain offered such privileges in exchange for British armed mediation, he had rejected the offer as invidious. Nor did he contemplate any colonial expansion at the cost of the Latin-Americans. To John Quincy Adams, the American Minister in London, who questioned him as to a rumour that Great Britain was in treaty with Spain for the purchase of certain of her American territories, he disclaimed any intentions of aggrandisement in that quarter, and stated firmly that this was the "fixed policy" of Great Britain; adding merely that, if the United States did not observe the like principle, it would become a new question for Great Britain to consider what course she should adopt[2].

By thus clearly defining the attitude of his Government which, while safeguarding British interests, desired also to do equal justice to all, Castlereagh strengthened the position of this country as the *Puissance Médiatrice* in this as in other matters; and, in consequence, at the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 the Powers recognised that she was the only one of them which could mediate between Spain and her Colonies with any hope of a satisfactory outcome. But the mediation contemplated by Castlereagh was in the nature of the good

[1] Instructions to Wellesley. Webster, "Castlereagh and the Spanish Colonies, I." *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, 1912, XXVII. 87.

[2] Castlereagh to Wellesley, January 10th, 1817. F.O. Spain, 196.

offices of an impartial friend; "armed mediation," such as the Spanish Government desired, he refused to consider, holding that "in no circumstances could British power be prostituted to impose upon unwilling subjects such a Government as that of Spain." For the same reason, his offers of mediation were always conditional on the Court of Madrid accepting the principles which he had laid down as essential to a settlement. He followed the same course in the case of the abortive offer to mediate between the United States and Spain made by him in 1817, assuring Adams that in any such mediation "Great Britain would keep liberal principles towards the South American States in view and aimed at no exclusive advantages[1]." Subject to these conditions, moreover, Castlereagh was not averse from a collective mediation of the Powers. Indeed, when, in 1817, it was proposed to have recourse to this, he at once saw its advantage from the point of view of the world's peace. "Whatever may be their sentiments upon this difficult and complicated measure," he wrote, "it is much better that they should be avowed openly in discussion, than to be suffered secretly to operate to disturb the general harmony[2]." What, however, Spain wanted was not mediation, but the moral and material support of the Allies to back her extreme claims; and in taking up this position she had the support of Russia and France. With this policy Castlereagh would make no compromise; he pointed out its folly, since "we had sufficiently experienced in our own American Colonies the difficulty of such a contest[3]." During the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, when the question of mediation was again raised without result, he wrote to Wellesley at Madrid, commenting on "the false notions" of the French and Russian Governments with regard to the question: "the idle menace they were disposed to keep alive at the expense of inevitable disunion, at least in appearance, between the mediating Powers." The failure of the Spanish Government to accept the only conditions on which mediation could be undertaken had once more suspended the whole question. It did not appear that France and Russia had ever proposed a separate alliance with Spain, but they had sought to establish an influence at Madrid, had encouraged the Spanish Government in its follies, and made Spain hate and withdraw from us. They had flattered Spain with the promise that they would

[1] Castlereagh to Bagot, November 10th, 1817. F.O. America, 120. Private and Confidential.

[2] To Wellesley, August 28th, 1817. F.O. Spain, 196 (No. 39).

[3] To Wellesley, January 10th, 1817. *Ib.*

"manage our scruples" and so obtain for her a "coercive *appui*." They had failed, because "they find us always upon a principle[1]." It was the principle which led ultimately, through the logic of events, to the Monroe Doctrine and to the recognition by Great Britain of the independence of the Latin-American States.

From the first Castlereagh had studied to spare the susceptibilities of the United States in this question as in others. He well understood the importance for the future of a cordial cooperation between the two branches of the English race; and he impressed upon Charles Bagot, the new British Minister at Washington, the desire of his Government, "laying aside all unpleasant recollections, to smoothe all asperities between the two nations, and to unite them in sentiments of good will as of substantial interest[2]." The task was no easy one; for the War had left the Americans in a mood of suspicion, which was increased by the close association of Great Britain with the "Holy Alliance," and by talk about monarchical intervention, and of her own ambitions, in the New World. Moreover, the Treaty of Ghent, signed, after months of wrangling, on December 24th, 1814, had left open the very questions about which the War had been fought—neutral and belligerent rights, and the claim of Great Britain to impress American citizens of British birth—besides other questions arising out of the British contention that the War had abrogated the "liberties" conceded to the Americans by the Treaties of 1783 and 1794, viz., the fishing rights on the coasts of British North America, and the somewhat extensive facilities accorded to American trade with the East Indies, the West Indies, and the British dominions in North America. The negotiations on these and other subjects between the two countries are dealt with elsewhere (see Chapter III, *infra*). Here it will suffice to say that, in conducting these negotiations, Castlereagh followed his accustomed policy of subordinating minor issues to the great end he had in view, using always moderate and conciliatory language, and making concessions whenever these did not conflict with principle and seemed to him a price worth paying for a good understanding. A weaker man, yielding to the clamour of a badly informed public opinion, might again and again, during these critical years, have plunged Great Britain and America into a fresh war. Castlereagh simply ignored this clamour, and succeeded in laying firm the foundations of the peace between the United States

[1] To Wellesley, November 27th, 1818. F.O. Spain, 209. Private and Confidential.
[2] To Bagot, November 10th, 1817. F.O. America, 12. Private and Confidential.

and the British Empire which has remained unbroken ever since. The Convention of October 20th, 1818, did not settle all outstanding questions; but it disposed of the most immediately dangerous among them in the spirit of give and take. The claim of the Americans to a "right" to fish in British territorial waters and to land on British territory was not admitted; but they were given certain permanent liberties in these respects on the coasts of Newfoundland and Labrador. The boundary between the United States and Canada, unscientifically fixed by the Treaty of 1783, was defined anew, and the difficult Oregon question was deferred by opening the territories to the west of the Rocky Mountains for ten years to the enterprise of both nations, without prejudice to the question of their respective sovereign rights. The Convention, like all compromises, was violently criticised on both sides; but Castlereagh refused to listen. "It is of less moment," he said to the American Minister, Richard Rush, "which of the parties gains a little more or a little less by the compact, than that so difficult a point should be adjusted, and the harmony of the two countries, so far, made secure."

This harmony had been exhibited in a more striking way by the friendly agreement, for mutual disarmament on the Great Lakes, which was concluded in 1817 by an interchange of Notes without any formal treaty. This arrangement had been made possible by the peculiar ties of sentiment and interest which, in spite of two wars, still bound the English of the Empire and the English of the United States together; after all, as Richard Rush put it, these wars had involved national humiliation to neither side—"a Roman I am vanquished by a Roman." It was otherwise with the question of disarmament between the European Powers. All professed to desire it, indeed their economic position was such that they were bound to desire it; but all hesitated to set "a salutary example" in this respect. The Emperor Alexander, while deprecating the suspicious excitement which had followed his publication of the Act of the Holy Alliance, pointed out, in a letter to Castlereagh of March 21st, 1816, that, in order to ensure confidence, a more general Act should follow, involving a general reduction of armanents[1]. In his reply, dated March 28th, Castlereagh expressed the Prince Regent's anxiety "to accelerate the period of confidence and disarmament," and drew attention, once more, to the Circular of January 1st, in which he had laid down the principles upon which such a period might be established[2]. Exactly

[1] Copy in F.O. Russia, 105. [2] *Ib.*

two months later, Castlereagh forwarded to Lord Cathcart, the British Ambassador at St Petersburg, a confidential Memorandum pointing out what Great Britain had herself done in this matter. The British Government had been engaged in reducing its naval and military forces "to the lowest scale compatible with the ordinary duties incident to the British possessions." The British army, indeed, could not be compared with that of 1792, because of the great expansion of the Empire; but the navy had been reduced to a strength little in excess of that of 1792. The Memorandum pointed out the difficulty of carrying out disarmament by a general negotiation "in view of the difference of means, frontiers, positions, etc." and suggested that much would be accomplished if "a great Power like Russia" would in some degree reduce her military force; certainly, "an exclusive system of precaution on His Imperial Majesty's part might retard the general tendency of the public disposition of Europe to peace[1]."

Unhappily, in this matter the mediating voice of England was suspect. If she had decreased her navy, it was because she had swept all rivals from the seas; and, since she was an island Power, the strength of her army was no standard by which to measure the reasonable size of those of the Continental States. The difficulty was increased by the fact that the loudest apostle of peace continued at the same time to boast that he was the master of the biggest battalions. Alexander had been the first to suggest a general disarmament; but, as for himself, he obstinately refused to disarm[2], giving as his reason the agitations of the times, which threatened fresh overturns. "There are countries," he wrote to Castlereagh, "where there is an obstinate desire to revive immediately institutions which have perished of old age, where too little effort is made to consult the new spirit of the peoples, who ought to be led back gradually to a stable and peaceful order of things. It seems as though there were a wish to work for generations which have passed away, or for that which is about to pass away, without considering that it is above all necessary to ensure the good disposition of that which has most interest in the present, because it is preparing for the future." He lamented the tendency to agitations which obstructed the restoration of order, the result of

[1] Confidential Memorandum of May 28th, 1816 (draft), in Castlereagh to Cathcart of the same date. F.O. Russia, 108.

[2] "He is fond of his army, and proud of it....He would have pleasure in the task of adding to it, and consequently is tenacious of it, etc., etc." Cathcart to Castlereagh, St Petersburg, July 12th, 1816. *Castlereagh Corr.* 3rd Ser. vol. III. p. 262.

the prestige among the general public of phrases oft repeated[1]. To General von Steigentesch he explained that, if he kept a huge army in being (though its size had been much exaggerated), this was not because he had any intention of attacking Austria or Turkey, but because he had to watch Germany—where Bavaria was playing a Napoleonic game and the "factious" were everywhere troubling the peace of Europe—and France, where the revolutionary spirit was stronger than the Government, and the *émigrés*, with the Comte d'Artois at their head, were disgusting everyone[2]. In view of the fact that the Emperor boasted, on other occasions, that his army numbered not 800,000, as was supposed, but more nearly 1,000,000 men, these protestations were not very reassuring. Castlereagh, however, refused to share the exaggerated alarms of Metternich; the best hope of securing peace, and so ultimate disarmament, lay, he perceived, in keeping the Alliance together by allaying mutual suspicions and smoothing away asperities. He defined his policy with regard to disarmament in a letter to Lord Clancarty, Ambassador in Berlin, on August 6th, 1816. The pacific disposition of the Emperor Alexander, he argued, ought not to be called in question because of the mere circumstance that he maintained huge armies in being.

> But as the reduction of his army involves that of other States or, in this view, essentially bears upon the relief the finances of Europe so generally require, everything that can form an inducement to the Emperor to let it down should be attended to.
>
> For this purpose I place in the first rank of importance the closing as early as possible the several questions that are yet open in Europe, or the opening as few as possible for discussion whilst the public mind of all States is yet agitated by the fear of the French Revolution or the military temper to which it has given birth. This, with a frank and conciliatory system of diplomacy, holding fast the principles of the Alliance which now happily exists, is likely to bring the motives of internal economy to bear with the most effect upon the military expenditure of Russia....This is the progressively operating system to which I look for bringing down the force of that great monarchy, and with it that of the other States, to a standard more consonant with their common interests[3].

The main source of anxiety to the British Government was not, however, the over-grown power of Russia, which was a menace only

[1] "Le prestige des mots qu'on a tant employé en impose au vulgaire." To Castlereagh, March 21st, 1816. F.O. Russia, 105. One is irresistibly reminded of the phrase "self-determination" and its consequences.

[2] Steigentesch to Metternich, St Petersburg, April 8th, 1816. F.O. Austria, 127. Enclosed in Stewart to Castlereagh, June 10th, 1816.

[3] F.O. Germany, 3.

in circumstances which were still problematical, but France, the fertile breeding-ground of those infectious phrases which were the cause of all the world's distempers. The second return of Lewis XVIII, "in the baggage-train of the enemy," for which British statesmen were primarily responsible, had not increased the prestige of the restored monarchy, and this had been still further lowered by those who loudly proclaimed themselves its most ardent champions. The *émigrés* had come back from their second exile with redoubled fury against all that savoured of the Revolution, and set to work to ruin the policy of conciliation which appealed to a worldly-wise King not anxious to set forth again upon his travels. To the Lower Chamber an overwhelming majority of "Ultra-Royalists" had been elected, to whom any sort of compromise with the evil thing was anathema; and they were backed at Court by a violently reactionary camarilla inspired and led by the King's younger brother, the Comte d'Artois. The British Government cannot be acquitted of a share of responsibility in encouraging this temper at the outset; for they had urged the proscription of the traitors of the Hundred Days. "The King cannot be considered safe upon his throne," Lord Liverpool had written, "until he has shed traitor's blood"; and the ungenerous and impolitic crime of the execution of Ney must be laid at the door of the British Cabinet. But, when the proscription threatened to grow, especially in the south, into a reactionary reign of terror, they recognised the danger to the peace of France and of Europe. Reaction was no part of their policy, and least of all violent reaction. They had saved France from dismemberment, because they believed that a strong and contented France was essential to the health of the European body politic. They had restored the monarchy, because they sincerely believed that under the restored monarchy, limited by constitutional safeguards, France would have the best chance of becoming contented and strong. They agreed, then, with Decazes that the task of the French Government was "to royalise the nation and to nationalise the monarchy." But this task seemed hopeless, so long as the Throne was surrounded by a ring-fence of foreign bayonets, and, seemingly under their protection, the Royalists continued to outrage every sentiment of a country which was still at heart the France of the Revolution and of Napoleon. The object of the British Government, then, was to encourage such a condition of things in France as to make the speedy withdrawal of the Allied army of occupation possible; and in this they had the support, at least, of

Russia and Austria. They approved of the rescript which the Emperor Alexander, in the spring of 1816, sent to Lewis XVIII, urging him to restrain the extravagances of the Comte d'Artois and his followers; and when, in September, the King summoned up courage to dissolve the *Chambre introuvable* and to modify the electoral law with a view to securing a more moderate parliament, they showed themselves willing to negotiate with the Duc de Richelieu on the subject of reducing the army of occupation.

The matter was, indeed, complicated by Austria's distrust of Russia, whom she suspected of trying to steal a march on the other Allies in order to lay the foundations of a separate Franco-Russian alliance; and, so early as September, the British Government had to interfere in order to prevent Austria from recording, on her own behalf, in the Protocol of the Council of Ministers, an opinion in favour of the evacuation of France. The view of Great Britain, which prevailed, was that all decisions on this point must be come to in common, and that no such decision should be taken without consulting the Duke of Wellington, as Commander-in-chief of the Allied Army. At this time, indeed, the opinion was expressed that, if the Allied troops were withdrawn, the Bourbon monarchy would not survive a month, and, in Castlereagh's view, the question of evacuation must be postponed until the effects of the new electoral law had become apparent, and the situation in France should be such as to give guarantees for the payment of the indemnities. Partial payment was met by a corresponding reduction in the Army of occupation; but, when the Duc de Richelieu urged the withdrawal of the remainder, declaring that France would not take advantage of this to become a fraudulent bankrupt, the Duke of Wellington interposed his veto. A few months later, however, he perceived that the continuance of the occupation, the burden and humiliation of which were exciting an ever-growing resentment among the French people, would create a danger greater than that against which it was intended to guard; and, in October, 1818, he reported that, if the Allied troops were to remain in France, it would be necessary to concentrate them between the Scheldt and the Meuse, since in their present scattered disposition they were in danger of being overwhelmed in the event of a popular rising[1]. It was this advice, rather than any belief in the temper of the French people or the stability of the restored monarchy, which

[1] Draft Memorandum laid before the Cabinet. F.O. Congress Cont., Aix-la-Chapelle, September to December, 1818.

determined the British Government to support the principle of the immediate evacuation of France, subject to a satisfactory arrangement being made for the payment of the balance of the indemnity. By agreement with the other Allies, the task of negotiating such an arrangement was entrusted to the Duke of Wellington; and, since the proposal met the views of the French Government, it presented little difficulty. The expedient adopted was to call in the aid of the "money-changers," the debt of France to the Allies being taken over by the great financial houses of Baring and Hope of Amsterdam, at a discount which gave them a handsome profit, and floated by them on the market in the shape of French *rentes*. This matter having been decided in principle, it was resolved to summon a meeting of the Allied Powers for the autumn of 1818, in order to give a formal sanction to the transaction, to settle the matter of the evacuation of France, to determine the future relations of France and the Alliance, and, incidentally, to discuss any outstanding questions of common interest.

The Conference assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle on September 30th, 1818. The Emperors of Austria and Russia, and the King of Prussia, were present in person. The Emperor Alexander, as usual, acted as his own Minister; but he was assisted by his Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, and his Minister-adjunct for Foreign Affairs, Count Capo d'Istria. Austria was effectively represented by Prince Metternich, Prussia by Prince Hardenberg and Count Bernstorff. Castlereagh and Wellington were the representatives of Great Britain; while the Duc de Richelieu, though not admitted to the Conferences, attended on behalf of France. The character of this august assembly thus differed essentially from that of the Congress of Vienna. At Vienna, though all important decisions were arrived at in the inner council of the Great Powers, the lesser States had at least had a shadowy representation which, on the Committees dealing with particular questions, had occasionally become substantial. The meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle consisted of the Great Powers of the Alliance only; and, though the lesser States were consulted in questions immediately affecting their interests, they had little enough voice in the decision. That this was so was due to the deliberate policy of Great Britain. On the eve of the Conference Richelieu had suggested that King Ferdinand VII of Spain should be invited to attend, with a view to a settlement of the Spanish-American question, and, on August 24th, the Spanish Chargé-d'affaires at St Petersburg had broached the same subject to the Tsar, who promised to consult his Allies. The idea

broke down on the opposition of Castlereagh. To receive one Power to the exclusion of others, he said, would be to break the existing agreement; to open the Conference to other Powers would be to turn it into a Congress, which the Allies had decided to be inexpedient, since it would tend to raise dangerous expectations by throwing doubt on the finality of the settlement of 1815[1]. This, in effect, defined the conservative policy which Great Britain was henceforward to pursue in her relations with the Continent—the policy of standing on "the Treaties," as the only stable foundation of peace.

The immediate business for which the Conference had been summoned—the evacuation of France and the question of the indemnities—was disposed of in the first two sessions, an agreement on these matters having, in fact, been reached beforehand. The question of the future relation of France to the Alliance was more difficult to dispose of. The Duc de Richelieu pressed for the inclusion of France in the Alliance, the conservative force of which, he argued, would be increased by her adherence. But it was not belief in any repentant temper of the French people that had led the Allies to consent to loosen their fetters. The Emperor Alexander declared roundly that nine-tenths of them were "corrupted by bad principles and violent party sentiments," and to the sympathetic ears of Metternich denounced the request of Richelieu as a rank piece of stupidity. In this matter the opinion of the British Cabinet agreed with that of the other Allies; for Castlereagh and his colleagues recognised the precarious tenure of the restored monarchy in France, and believed that the continued existence of the Quadruple Alliance was essential to the maintenance of peace; they recognised, too, the paradox involved in making France a party to a Treaty which was primarily directed against herself. Yet, were she to be altogether excluded, she would almost certainly become the nucleus of another alliance, and so imperil all that had been gained by the European Concert. It would, of course, have been possible to frame a new treaty, in addition to that of Chaumont, which should have included France. But the popular temper in England was rising against the whole policy of continental entanglements, and Castlereagh well knew that such a treaty would have no chance of being sanctioned by the House of Commons. In these circumstances, the Cabinet suggested an ingenious expedient for overcoming the difficulty. This was to introduce

[1] F.O. Aix. Protocol 18. In Castlereagh to Bathurst, No. 20.

France into the Alliance, not on the basis of Chaumont, but on that of Article VI of the Treaty of Alliance of November 20th, 1815, which was an addition to the provisions of the earlier Treaty and more general in its scope, since it provided for the consultation of the Sovereigns or their Ministers in all questions of common interest. It was true that the British Government had a fundamental objection to anything in the nature of a general union, and that this suggestion, if acted upon, might therefore establish an awkward precedent. But, since the Treaty primarily concerned France alone, it would not be necessary to invite other Powers to join, and in any case it would obviate the risk of any Great Power remaining outside and possibly forming other combinations as a counterpoise to the Alliance[1].

The question of the admission of France to the Alliance thus raised at the Conference the wider question of the form which the Alliance itself was in future to assume. The Emperor Alexander was bent on realising his dream of a universal union. His first care on coming to Aix was to dispel the sinister rumours that he was meditating a separate understanding with France, and if possible to persuade his Allies that his huge armaments were quite consistent with the most pacific intentions. To Castlereagh and Wellington, he protested that his army was the army of Europe and that it could not be otherwise employed than for repressing, jointly with Europe, any attempt to shake the system of which his empire formed only a part[2]. Castlereagh was impressed with the Tsar's evident earnestness; but this very "exaltation of mind" seemed to him dangerous, since it might hurry him into committing himself to proposals which it would be impossible to accept. To forestall such a danger the best plan was to make the views of the British Government perfectly clear from the outset. Therefore, while Nesselrode and Capo d'Istria were still at work elaborating the Emperor's views on "the future colour to be given to the Alliance," Castlereagh presented to the Conference a proposal based on the compromise suggested in the Cabinet Memorandum already referred to. This was at once approved by Metternich, and with somewhat more reserve by Hardenberg and Bernstorff. It fell, however, far short of the Emperor Alexander's ideas. He agreed, indeed, with the proposal to renew the disciplinary Treaty

[1] Cabinet Memorandum on the approaching Conferences, September 4th, 1818. F.O. Cont. Congress, Aix. No. 34.

[2] Castlereagh to Bathurst, October 3rd. No. 2.

of Chaumont; but, while the others desired to keep it in the background, he wished to publish it to all the world as a warning to sinners. On the other hand, he was little satisfied with the suggestion to widen the Alliance merely by the admission of France under Article VI of the Treaty of November 20th, 1815, a poor substitute for that union of all consecrated by the Holy Alliance, "the work not of any man, but of Providence."

His views, on which in conversation he dilated "with a religious rhapsody," were embodied in the confidential Memorandum on which his Ministers had been at work, which was presented to the other Allies on October 8th. It was a long document, full of pious sentiment, in which "the empire of Christian morality and the Rights of Man" were exalted against the return of revolutions and the principle that might is right. It laid down, as it were *ex cathedra*, that the system of Europe was a general association which had for *foundation* the Treaties of Vienna and Paris, for *conservative principle* the fraternal union of the Allied Powers, for *aim* the guarantee of all recognised rights. It proposed to safeguard and perfect this system by preserving the Quadruple Alliance as against danger from France, and by the formation of a general Alliance, consisting of all the signatories of the Treaty of Vienna, which should have as its object the guarantee of the state of territorial possession and of sovereignty *ab antiquo*. The Quadruple Alliance, it was argued, was held together, as yet, only by the sentiment of the parties to it; but, if it formed part of a wide European association, no Power could break away from it without being isolated. The Quadruple Alliance should, therefore, be widened into the General Alliance, which should be proclaimed a single and indivisible system by all the Signataries of the Treaty of Vienna appending their signatures to the Declaration in which, at the close of the Conference, the Great Powers would announce to the world the results of their deliberations. Such a system, the Memorandum concluded, would guarantee the security of Governments by putting the rights of nations under a guarantee analogous to that which protects individuals. The Governments, for their part, being relieved of the fear of revolutions, would be able to offer to their peoples Constitutions of a similar type; so that the liberties of peoples, wisely regulated, would spring without effort from this state of affairs, once recognised and publicly proclaimed[1].

[1] *Mémoire confidentiel du Cabinet russe*, September 26th, to October 8th. In Castlereagh to Bathurst, October 19th. No. 13.

These proposals were welcomed by the other autocratic Powers of the Alliance with a certain enthusiasm. Metternich had begun to perceive that the Holy Alliance could be made to serve as an effective curb for the Tsar's erratic ambitions, which had kept Austria in a state of nervous tension. Prussia, anxious about her new acquisitions on the Rhine, welcomed the principle of a general guarantee. British Ministers, on the other hand, now saw the inconveniences and the dangers inherent in a plan to which they had at one time been willing to subscribe, at least so far as the guarantee of territorial possession was concerned. In Great Britain public opinion was growing more and more opposed to a system which seemed to threaten liberty everywhere. Moreover, as Castlereagh pointed out to the Emperor Alexander, "the British Cabinet had now to deal with a new Parliament and a new people, intensely bent on peace and economy," and to embark on a fresh policy "for eventual exertion" would imperil the sanction already obtained from Parliament for their continental engagements. In the Cabinet Memorandum of September 4th, it had been laid down that the treaty between the Powers must rest "upon the sanction received in the address of both Houses, of May, 1816"; that its provisions "hardly admitted of being reinforced"; and that any attempt to renew them would lead to serious differences of opinion. The Cabinet, in fact, so far from desiring to undertake further international obligations, was rather disposed to withdraw from those already incurred. In reply to a letter of Castlereagh, written before the presentation of the Russian Memorandum, Bathurst had composed a long despatch in which he expressed great doubts as to whether it would be in any way advisable to proclaim to Europe, by any new Act, that it was the intention of the Powers to hold continued meetings at stipulated periods. "We admit," he wrote, "that Article VI of the Treaty of Alliance contemplated such meetings, and we are satisfied that under the circumstances as they now exist, when the Allied troops are to be withdrawn from France, it may be of the utmost importance to make the people of that country feel that they are still under a sort of surveillance. We are therefore of opinion that the Allied Powers should fix a period at which to hold another meeting. This would not be liable to the objections which we think would result from a succession of such meetings being now proclaimed as part of a permanent system....When the French Government has proved that it can maintain the peace, there will be no further need of them; and, though the mind might anticipate

further circumstances under which such meetings might be productive of many advantages, one may likewise contemplate those under which they might be likely to lead to great embarrassment. Article VI could hardly have been accepted under present circumstances. We do not wish to abrogate it; but we do not think it would be politic to reinforce it by any new declaration of a general nature[1]."

This letter is interesting, as showing the attitude of the Government at the moment—an attitude undoubtedly influenced by the growing opposition, inside and outside Parliament, to "Continental entanglements." The particular question with which it was concerned, however, had already been settled when it reached Aix. To the Russian Memorandum the British Plenipotentiaries, dismayed by "the abstractions and sweeping generalities in which it was conceived," thought it inexpedient to send a written answer. Instead, Castlereagh and Wellington had a series of conversations with the Tsar, the objects of which were, to decide how far his intention of openly proclaiming the renewal of the Quadruple Alliance could be reconciled with a "self-respecting entry" of France into the Concert; to devise means for giving as little offence as possible, by the holding of future Conferences, to the Powers not in the Alliance, and, generally, to persuade Alexander and his Ministers to "descend from their abstractions" so as to prepare the present Conference for some practical conclusions. This task was facilitated by the attitude of Parliament, upon which Castlereagh was able to throw the onus of obstructing the complete realisation of the Tsar's ideal, and he succeeded almost at once in persuading Alexander to agree to something closely resembling the compromise suggested by the British Government. The Emperor declared that he wished to adhere closely to the Quadruple Alliance —"our sheet-anchor"—but that he did not object to admitting France under the limitations named. He added, however, that such admission must be accompanied by a declaration proclaiming that the Alliance remained unbroken, as well as by "a digested plan of military concert, to be at once acted upon in case of necessity." In order to help the British Government out of any parliamentary difficulty, he would not ask for a new treaty, but would accept a protocol or declaration as sufficient[2].

Bathurst had announced it as the view of the British Government

[1] Bathurst to Castlereagh, October 20th, 1818. F.O. Continent. September to December, 1818.

[2] Castlereagh to Liverpool, October 19th. No. 13.

that it would be impossible to issue a new declaration of a general nature. But Castlereagh had already accepted the principle of issuing such a declaration before he received Bathurst's letter; and, in any case, he well knew that something must be conceded to Alexander's views, if the Alliance was to be preserved. He was, however, determined that, if there was to be a declaration, it should be such as his Government could approve; and he commissioned Friedrich von Gentz, the Secretary to the Conference, to draw one up "in the spirit of our own view of the question." This, of course, was not the spirit of Alexander's view. For Alexander, the Holy Alliance, if not in operation, was in being; and Castlereagh reported that he clung to his idea of a general league of States, "all being bound to march, if requisite, against the first Power that offended, either by her ambition, or by her revolutionary transgressions[1]." To Castlereagh it seemed that even the blessing of peace would be too dearly bought by subjugating Europe to an international police in which the most powerful element would be the huge armies of Russia, who, under this system, would have "an almost irresistible claim to march through the territories of all the Confederate States to the most distant points of Europe to fulfil her guarantee." To admit such a claim—which was actually put forward in 1820, in connexion with the revolutionary troubles in Spain—seemed to Castlereagh impossible. He saw equal danger, though in a different way, in the whole conception of a general union. Great Britain adhered to the Treaties, which she regarded as the legal foundation of the European order, and to the Alliance, whose scope and objects were defined in them. It was quite another thing for her to commit herself to an indefinite league and to bind herself beforehand to take common action in circumstances which could not be foreseen, and therefore could not be provided for in definite agreements. Yet, if the Emperor Alexander's mind was to be held "within the principles that could be maintained in Parliament," it was necessary to humour him—"to present something which would at once keep within our line, and at the same time present the subject somewhat in the tone of his own ideas." This was done by Castlereagh in a Memorandum (in reply to that of Russia) of which the opening reads like intentional irony. "The benign principles of the Alliance of the 26th of September, 1815," it ran, "may be considered as constituting the European System in the matter of political conscience. It would, however, be derogatory to this

[1] To Liverpool, October 19th, No. 13.

solemn Act of the Sovereigns to mix its discussion with the ordinary diplomatic obligations which bind State to State, and which are to be looked for alone in the treaties which have been concluded in the accustomed form."

This passage sums up the whole policy of the British Government, by which, in the end, the fate of the Alliance was determined. Whatever view might be held as to the "benign principles" of the Holy Alliance, in the councils of Europe the Treaties "concluded in the accustomed form" were alone to determine decisions. Nor were some Treaties to be esteemed more sacred and binding than others, whether they bound States collectively or were peculiar to certain States. Even the Treaties of Vienna and Paris, which constituted the "great chart" of the European Territorial System, "contained no engagements beyond the immediate objects which were made matter of regulation in the Treaties themselves." There was no obligation on the Powers, collectively or individually, to resent their breach, though they had the right to do so, since the territories regulated by them were the subject of "no special guarantee, to the exclusion of others which rest for their title on earlier treaties of equal authority[1]."

The avowed object of the Treaties signed at Chaumont and at Paris on November 20th, 1815, the Memorandum continued, was the restoration of Europe and the prevention of renewed danger from France. But these Treaties did not contemplate that a mere change of Government in France, however brought about, would constitute a *casus foederis*, which would only arise in the event of such a change directly threatening the peace of the Allies; and it could not for a moment be admitted that States have a right to intervene in the internal affairs of other States to prevent change whether legal or illegal; for how could foreign States be safely left to judge what was "legal" in another State? The only safe principle was that of the law of nations: namely, that no State has the right to endanger its neighbours by its proceedings, and that if it does so, provided they use a sound discretion, their right to interference is clear. This was the right under which eventual interference in France was contemplated under Article III of the Treaty of November 20th. The Allies were presumed to have a common interest in judging this question soundly whenever it should arise; but, until it arose, none of the Contracting Parties was engaged to more than an eventual

[1] This was aimed at the rumoured Russian designs on Turkey.

concert and decision. "The problem of a universal Alliance for the peace and happiness of the world" was, as it had always been, "one of speculation and hope"; but it had never been, and probably never could be reduced to practice, though the Quadruple Alliance, "formed upon principles altogether limited," had in practice gone nearer to the realisation of the ideal than had ever before been possible, since it had enabled the Powers "to interpose their good offices for the settlement of differences between other States, to take the initiative in watching over the Peace of Europe, and finally in securing the execution of its treaties." But this was a very different thing from "the idea of an *Alliance Solidaire*, by which each State shall be bound to support the state of succession, government, and possession within all other States from violence or attack, upon condition of receiving for itself a similar guarantee." Such an idea implied the previous establishment of a system of general government able to enforce upon all kings and nations a rule of internal peace and justice, without which the whole principle of collective intervention was inadmissible; for "nothing would be more immoral or more prejudicial to the character of government generally, than the idea that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the support of established power, without any consideration of the extent to which it was abused." The idea of a general and unqualified guarantee must, therefore, be abandoned. But, as for the actual Alliance, the beneficial effect of the four Powers consulting and mediating would be much increased by adding France, which would not render it too numerous for effective concert and would add to it immense moral weight[1].

The result of this uncompromising statement of the British point of view was that the support which Austria and Prussia had been inclined to give to the Emperor Alexander's plan was withdrawn, and that the debates on the future of the Alliance resulted in a compromise, based on Castlereagh's original proposals, and embodied in two instruments signed on November 15th, 1818. Of these the first, in the form of a Secret Protocol, renewed the Quadruple Alliance for the specific purpose of watching over France, and was communicated in confidence to the Duc de Richelieu. The second, a "Declaration," to which France was invited to adhere, enunciated the intention of the Powers to maintain the intimate union, strengthened by the ties of Christian brotherhood, contracted by the Sovereigns; declared

[1] Memorandum of Lord Castlereagh. Enclosed in Castlereagh to Liverpool. No. 13.

the object of the union to be preservation of peace on the basis of the treaties; and stated, in conclusion, that no "partial reunions" should take place concerning the affairs of other States without their invitation and, if desired, their presence[1].

The debates at Aix-la-Chapelle, and their outcome, show that the British Government—which at the time was loudly accused of subservience to the tyrants of the "Holy Alliance"—regarded the Alliance as the necessary instrument, not of reaction, but of peace, and its essential functions not as dictatorial, but as mediatory. There was, indeed, as yet no decisive indication that the Alliance, as limited by the Treaties, was likely to become a danger to Constitutional liberty; for the Emperor Alexander, though alarmed by the revolutionary agitation in France and Germany, and disillusioned by the outcome of his own Constitutional experiment in Poland, still used the language of Liberalism; nor was it till two years after the closing of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle that, in the celebrated interview with Metternich at Troppau, he confessed his error and committed himself frankly to the policy of reaction. The events of these two years were scarcely less alarming to the British Government than to the autocratic Powers. The questions left over by the Treaties of Vienna and Paris were, indeed, finally settled by the Treaty of Frankfort, signed on June 20th, 1819, which completed the work of the great pacification. But the keystone had hardly been set in the arch, before the whole edifice seemed to be imperilled by the sapping of its foundations. The *malaise* caused by Russian intrigues, notably in Italy and Spain, has already been mentioned; but the chief source of anxiety was again France. Castlereagh watched with misgiving the successful efforts of Marshal Gouvion St Cyr to recreate a national army on the basis of conscription[2], which seemed to argue an intention on the part of the restored monarchy to consolidate its power by an appeal to the traditional French passion for military glory. Had not the Ultras loudly proclaimed that the Bourbons would never be safe till they mounted on horse-back? Force was given to these alarms by the rapid growth of the "Tricolour" parties in the Chambers. The twenty-five members of the Liberal Opposition in 1817 were increased to ninety as a result of the elections in May, 1819, and among those returned was the Abbé Grégoire, ex-Conventional and one time Constitutional Bishop of Blois, who had once

[1] Text in Hertslet, *Map of Europe*, I. 573. No. 88.
[2] To Gordon, January 19th, 1819. F.O. Austria.

declared that "Kings are in the moral order what monsters are in the physical." Metternich, whose secret agents in Paris earned their pay by painting the situation in the darkest colours, had already declared that a revolution could no longer be avoided[1], and even Pozzo di Borgo, whose liberalising activities as Russian Ambassador at the Court of France had excited Metternich's alarm and wrath, thought the situation so critical that he advised an intervention of the Alliance for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear on Lewis XVIII to dismiss Gouvion St Cyr; while the Russian Cabinet recommended the acceptance of Metternich's proposal to revive the Conference of Ministers at Paris[2]. These proposals broke down on the opposition of Castlereagh, who rightly believed that any threat of intervention would merely strengthen the military party. Reaffirming the British principle of non-intervention, he declared that it was no part of the functions of the Quadruple Alliance to correct the "internal eccentricities" of France, and that, as for any danger of these developing into acts of external aggression, the Alliance was in his opinion most effective when operating by "the silent force of its inactivity[3]."

It was the firm adherence to this principle which henceforward determined the relation of Great Britain to the European Alliance, and led ultimately to her breach with the autocratic Powers. The events of the next few years offered plentiful opportunity for the exercise of her vigilance in this matter. The revolutionary agitation in Germany, culminating on March 23rd, 1819, in the murder of Kotzebue, gave Metternich an excuse for initiating the policy of collective repression which was proclaimed in October by the Carlsbad Decrees and formulated in the Vienna Final Act of May 15th, 1820. These measures constituted an attempt to apply within the group of sovereign States forming the German Confederation the principles of mutual guarantee and supervision which it was sought to apply to the whole of Europe, and they were therefore little likely to meet with the approval of the British Government. Metternich had pointed out, in his presidential address at the Vienna Conference, that the German Confederation was an integral part of the European States system as established by the Final Act of 1815, and that not only the rights of the Confederation as a whole, but also those of its constituent States, therefore depended

[1] Gordon to Castlereagh, February 11th, 1819. F. O. Austria, No. 10.

[2] Gordon to Castlereagh, May 26th, 1819. *Ib.* No. 17. Metternich denied that he had made any such proposal. *Ib.*

[3] Memorandum of September on the Russian proposal of intervention in France. F.O. Drafts to Lord Stewart, May to December, 1819.

on the guarantee of the Treaties. It followed that a principle once admitted as applicable to a part of the European States system might be logically extended to embrace the whole; and the policy consecrated by the Carlsbad Decrees was, therefore, rightly denounced as a menace to the liberties of all Europe. Castlereagh well understood this, and protested against the Decrees as involving an unjustifiable interference with the rights of sovereign and independent States; while to Prince Lieven, the Russian Ambassador in London, he pointed out the folly of giving the impression to the world that the Governments were contracting an alliance against the peoples[1]. In this matter, however, British action ended with a protest; for there could be no question of any effective interference with the discretion of the German Governments. The important thing was to make it clear that Great Britain would not tolerate any general extension of the principles proclaimed in the Decrees.

The question was raised in a more acute form by two events which happened early in 1820—the military revolt in Spain in January, which forced Ferdinand VII to accept the ultra-Liberal Constitution of 1812; and the assassination, on February 13th, of the Duc de Berry, heir-presumptive to the French Crown. These events, and especially the latter, produced a profound effect upon the mind of the Emperor Alexander, whose "Jacobinism" was already fast waning, and who now believed more firmly than ever that the world's salvation depended on the Holy Alliance being made effective as a disciplinary force. His views were embodied on April 19th, 1820, in a Circular Note of the Russian Government to the Powers of the Quintuple Alliance, which ended by proposing that the Ministers of the Five Courts should hold a common language at Madrid, as preliminary to a concerted, or at least to an authorised, intervention for the purpose of restoring the authority of the Crown. This was precisely the proposal which, when revived at the Congress of Verona in 1822, led to the definitive breach of Great Britain with the Alliance. Fortunately, for the moment, Great Britain was at one with Austria and France in rejecting it. For Great Britain, apart from her objection to helping to impose upon the Spanish people a system of Government generally admitted to be intolerable, resistance to the Russian proposal was a matter of principle. Austria and France, on the other hand, objected to it for very practical reasons; for the "authorised intervention" which the Emperor Alexander had in mind was his

[1] For an account of this conversation see F. de Martens, *Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie*, vol. IV (1) pp. 269–271.

own, and this would have involved the march of a huge Russian army through the Habsburg dominions, and its establishment in the south of France in readiness to play the part of European police in Madrid or in Paris, as circumstances might require.

In the case of the suggested intervention in Spain, then, the issue was clear, and British statesmen could be in no doubt as to their attitude. It was otherwise with the situation created by the military revolution in Naples, by which, in July of the same year, the King of the Two Sicilies was likewise forced to accept the Spanish Constitution of 1812. From the point of view of the British Government, the claim of Austria, as an Italian Power, to intervene in order to abate a nuisance which she considered a menace to the peace of her own dominions stood in quite a different category from the claim of the Emperor Alexander to intervene everywhere in the supposed interests of abstract right. The Austrian claim, moreover, had a legal basis; for, by taking the oath to the new Constitution, King Ferdinand IV had broken the Secret Treaty concluded by him with Austria on June 12th, 1815, by which he had bound himself not to allow any changes in the political system of his dominions inconsistent with their ancient monarchical institutions or with the principles adopted by His Austrian Majesty for the internal administration of his Italian provinces. It was clear, then, that Austria had the right to intervene on her own account, if she saw fit; and, had she been content to act on her own initiative, the attitude of the British Government would have been one of benevolent neutrality; for, whatever view the Tory Cabinet might hold as to the Bourbon régime in the Sicilies, they certainly had no sympathy whatever with reform by means of military *pronunciamientos*. Castlereagh made their attitude perfectly clear in his reply to an attack on the Holy Alliance delivered by Sir James Mackintosh in the House of Commons on February 21st, 1821. He agreed that the principle of interference put forward by the Allies went further than was consistent with sound policy, but said that it was impossible for Great Britain to interfere against every act of injustice, while her exhaustion made it imperative to keep in touch with the European Concert. The Carbonari, he said, were aiming at upsetting the existing settlement of Italy, and the Neapolitan Constitution had not been freely granted, but enforced in haste. It was for this reason that Great Britain was justified in leaving Austria a free hand[1].

[1] Hansard, *Parl. Debates*, New Series, IV. 837 *seq.*

Metternich, however, had special reasons for insisting that whatever action Austria might take should be backed by at least the moral weight of the Alliance. The Liberal agitation in Italy had been fomented by Russian agents; the Neapolitan revolutionists loudly proclaimed that they had the moral support of the Emperor Alexander; and it was therefore, from his point of view, of the utmost importance to secure the public approval of the Tsar for any action Austria might adopt, in order to make it perfectly clear that in future revolutionary disturbers of her peace would not be able to reckon upon his august patronage.

Reports from St Petersburg encouraged Metternich to hope that Alexander, who had renounced his Jacobin errors, would come to a separate understanding with his brother of Austria in the matter of Naples—an arrangement which would have served his purpose better than a Conference, at which other and more awkward questions might be raised. The Emperor Alexander, however, who was now thoroughly alarmed by the widespread revolutionary agitation, was less than ever disposed to give up his plan of making the Holy Alliance a reality. In the attitude of Great Britain towards his principle of collective intervention he saw "all the egoism of an exclusive policy," in flat contradiction to the Declaration of 1818, which, in his view, had superseded the Treaties of the Quadruple and Quintuple Alliances and consecrated the principle of a "general association of all the Powers" of which the function was "to guarantee the principles of public law—that is to say, to guarantee their state of possession and the legitimacy of thrones[1]." In view of the critical state of affairs, not in Naples only, he, therefore, considered that another Conference should be summoned on the model of that of Aix-la-Chapelle. In this opinion he was supported by France, where the Duc de Richelieu had succeeded Decazes as Prime-Minister, on the ground that the revolutionary troubles in Spain and Italy were precisely the contingencies contemplated in the agreements made at Aix with a view to concerted action.

Metternich, on the other hand, argued that, the right of Austria to intervene in Naples having been generally admitted, it was unnecessary to summon a Conference, of which the moral effect would be weakened by Great Britain not having a "free hand." It would,

[1] Report of Lebzeltern, Austrian Ambassador in St Petersburg, July 25th, 1820, and copy of Golovkin's despatch of July 15th. F.O. Austria, Domestic, September to December, 1820.

he said, suffice if the Allied Courts were to refuse to recognise the Revolutionary Government in Naples, declare all its acts null and void, and through their Ministers support such coercive measures as the Austrian Government might judge it necessary to employ[1]. The reply of Russia to this suggestion was favourable. That of Great Britain was an unequivocal negative. The suggested Concert, said Castlereagh, amounted to a hostile league against Naples, and by adhering to it Great Britain would become a principal in the resulting war. This she had no intention of doing, and she refused to interfere in the internal concerns of Naples herself, or to encourage others to do so. If Austria believed her vital interests to be imperilled by the Revolution in Naples, Great Britain was prepared to stand aside and leave her to act; and, in that event, a Conference of Ministers at Vienna would be useful, since it could receive the report of Austria and take care that nothing was done "incompatible with the present system of Europe[2]."

This pronouncement forced Metternich to fall back on the idea of a Congress; and, since Castlereagh had declared his readiness to take the question into consideration so soon as the Austrian Government should have defined the purposes for which it was to be summoned, he believed that, if the Conference were once assembled, it would be possible to secure for Austrian action in Italy that united "moral support" which was all that he needed. Unfortunately for him, the "proposition" in which he defined the objects of the Conference put forward principles in flat contradiction of those maintained by Great Britain, and scarcely less distasteful to France. In the matter of Naples, he argued, the interests of Austria were also those of all Europe, for all the Powers were interested in the preservation of the Treaties, and therefore in concerting measures for the suppression of any revolutionary movements by which the system established by the Treaties might be endangered. The business of the Conference, which it was proposed to assemble at Troppau, would therefore be to define the principles on which the Powers would intervene in Naples, and proceed at once to their application. In defining these principles, as he himself understood them, he argued that revolutions were of two kinds—legitimate when initiated from above, illegitimate when enforced from below. In the first case, intervention by a foreign Power should not be allowed; in the second case, the Powers should

[1] Castlereagh to Stewart, September 16th, 1820. F.O. Cont. Circ. Desp.
[2] Castlereagh to Stewart, July 19th, 1820. F.O. Cont. Circ. Desp.

bind themselves never to recognise changes brought about in this way, and should undertake to abolish such as had actually taken place in their own States.

To this proposition Castlereagh replied by refusing to accept any such basis for the Conference. Metternich affected to see in this an intention to break up the Alliance; but Castlereagh denied that any such intention was implied in the refusal of Great Britain to take action which she was not bound to take by the Treaties on which the Alliance rested. These Treaties were those of Chaumont and Paris, of which the terms were perfectly clear, and to which the Declaration of Aix-la-Chapelle had added nothing. By her treaty obligations Great Britain was prepared to abide, and she recognised that there were innumerable subjects outside their actual scope which might from time to time equally call for cordial agreement among the Powers, though unpledged beforehand to any particulars concerning them. In conversation with Prince Eszterházy, the Austrian Ambassador in London, he made the limits of British acceptance of the ideal of European solidarity perfectly clear. "If it is desired," he said, "to extend the Alliance so as to include all objects present and future, foreseen and unforeseen, it would change its character to such an extent and carry us so far, that we should see in it an additional motive for adhering to our course, at the risk of seeing the Alliance move away from us without our having quitted it[1]."

The rift in the councils of the Alliance thus indicated was still further widened by the proceedings of the Conference of Troppau, which assembled on October 29th, 1820. At this august meeting, neither Great Britain nor France was represented by a Minister Plenipotentiary, Lord Stewart, British Ambassador at Vienna, being merely instructed to watch the proceedings on behalf of his Government. In all the circumstances, this was not displeasing to Metternich, since the inferior status of the representatives of the two Constitutional Powers gave an excuse for excluding them from the innermost councils of the three Powers who were "less fettered in their forms." The result of this exclusion was the issue of the famous preliminary Protocol of Troppau, which affected to give a solemn sanction to the principle of intervention:

States which have undergone a change of government, due to revolution, the results of which threaten other States, *ipso facto* cease to be

[1] Observations de Milord Castlereagh sur un passage d'un rapport de M. le Prince de Metternich, etc. Report of Eszterházy, October, 1820. F.O. Austria, Domestic, September to December, 1820.

members of the European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees of legal order and stability. If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other States, the Powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the Great Alliance.

In vain Metternich tried to minimise the significance of this pronouncement by pointing out to the British Government that it was really not in conflict with that Government's own principles, since it did not contemplate collective intervention in the internal affairs of another State if these exercised no external influence[1]. Castlereagh refused to abandon the position he had taken up. In a despatch of December 4th to Lord Stewart he renewed the undertaking that in the Neapolitan question Great Britain would remain neutral, but protested against "a revival of those discussions with regard to the establishment of a general system of guarantee, not merely territorial but political, which at Aix-la-Chapelle were laid aside by common consent from the extreme difficulties in which the whole subject was involved." The British Government, he said, "would dissuade the Powers from attempting to reduce to an abstract rule of conduct possible cases of interference in the internal affairs of independent States." The French Revolution, he maintained, was an exception "from its overbearing and conquering character," and the policy pursued in this case could not be applied to all revolutions[2].

This protest had the effect of inducing the autocratic Powers, who had signed the Protocol without even showing it to the French and British representatives, to withdraw their signatures, and to declare solemnly that the instrument was no more than a draft, to the principles of which they hoped to secure the adhesion of their dissentient Allies. This hope was dashed by a despatch to Lord Stewart, dated December 16th, in which not only the provisions of the Protocol, but its whole underlying principle, were subjected by Castlereagh to a destructive criticism. He denied that "the wide and sweeping powers claimed for the Allies by this Protocol" had any basis in the Treaties. This being so, was it proposed to extend the league by inviting all other States to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the Alliance? What would be the position of States which should refuse this invitation? The system proposed would have a disastrous

[1] To Eszterházy, Troppau, November 24th, 1820. F.O. Austria, Domestic.

[2] F.O. Cont. Circ. Desp., 1821 (No. 32). This despatch re-stated with greater mphasis principles already formulated by the British Government, notably in the Circular Note of May 5th, 1820. In view of the importance of this particular document, as the acknowledged origin of Canning's later policy, it has been thought well to reprint it in full in Appendix A to the present volume.

effect on the relations between the Sovereigns and their peoples; it would have a hardly less disastrous effect on the relations of the Powers to each other. The rights claimed under the Protocol were, presumably, to be "reciprocal between the parties." Were, then, the Great Powers of Europe prepared to admit the principle of their territories being thrown open to each other's approach upon cases of assumed necessity or expediency of which not the party receiving aid, but the party administering it, was to be the judge? As for Great Britain, any Minister who should recommend the King to sanction such a principle would render himself liable to impeachment. The extreme right of interference between nation and nation was based on the law of self-defence and could never be made "a matter of written stipulation or be assumed as the attribute of an Alliance." Great Britain objected to the whole principle on which the Protocol was based; namely that of the right of this, or of any other Alliance to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign States; and this objection was not susceptible of being removed by any modification in the terms of the instrument. For this principle appeared to lead immediately to the creation of a species of General Government in Europe, with a superintending Directory, destructive of all correct notions of internal Sovereign authority: and Great Britain could not consent to charge herself, as a member of the Alliance, with the moral responsibility of administering a general European police of this description[1].

This letter reached Lord Stewart at Vienna, after the break-up of the meeting at Troppau, and in his reply, dated January 4th, 1821, he remarked on the great impression it had made. All the Cabinets, he said, were now expressing their disapproval of the Protocol, Count Capo d'Istria asserting that the fact must precede the principle, which meant that the affair of Naples must be settled before the debate on general questions was reopened. It was soon clear, however, that this attitude had been merely adopted in the hope that, by keeping the question of the general guarantee in the background, Great Britain might be induced to hold, in the particular case of Naples, a common language with the other Allies at the adjourned Conference at Laibach. This hope proved equally idle. At the Conference of Laibach, where, pending the arrival of Lord Stewart, Great Britain was represented by Sir Robert Gordon, various attempts were made to devise a formula which would commit the British Government openly to the policy of intervention in this particular case, while leaving the question of the general principle open. To all these subtleties, Gordon opposed

[1] F.O. Cont. Circ. Desp., 1821 (No. 32).

an attitude quite unequivocal. Great Britain, he said, could not and would not in this matter hold a common language with the coercive Powers[1]. The arrival of Lord Stewart altered nothing in the outlook, and the other Powers, giving up all hope of bringing Great Britain into line on ground outside the Troppau Protocol, decided to return to its principles, since there seemed nothing to be gained by abandoning them. At the subsequent meetings of the Conference, they therefore began again to put forward "all the Emperor Alexander's arguments and sentiments on the questions of the universal guarantee and the measures adopted at Troppau." Stewart countered this by placing on record, in the journals of the proceedings, a declaration that in these matters Great Britain was not at one with the Allied Sovereigns; and, when this proved ineffective, he read to the assembled Ministers the Circular Note and despatches in which Castlereagh had condemned the Troppau Protocol and defined the British attitude. This announcement caused the utmost dismay and bitterness, Metternich declaring that it would have been better if Great Britain had stayed away from the Conference altogether. It was now at last clear to the other Powers that they could not carry Great Britain with them, and they decided to act without her. On March 29th, Stewart reported to Castlereagh the nature of the closing acts of the Conference. Austria received a mandate to intervene in Naples, and the declaration accompanying this was, he said, unobjectionable from the British point of view. But the Three Powers—Austria, Prussia and Russia—had in addition issued circular despatches and Instructions to their Ministers in Naples, in which they enlarged on the terms of the Troppau Protocol in words which they could not but know would be displeasing to France and Great Britain. "In short," he concluded, "there can be little doubt from the complexion of these instruments that a Triple Understanding has been created which binds the parties to carry forward their own views in spite of any difference of opinion which may exist between them and the two great Constitutional Governments[2]." In another letter of the same date he wrote: "the first acts of Troppau framed an Alliance between the three Courts which placed them in an entirely new attitude from us, and they have now, I consider, hermetically sealed their treaty before Europe."

It is clear that as a result of the Conference at Laibach the avowed split in the Alliance, which from 1832 onward was to place the two

[1] Gordon to Castlereagh. Letters in F.O. Austria, January to February, 1821.
[2] To Castlereagh. Vienna, March 20, 1821. F.O. Austria 7, 159.

Western Powers in more or less general opposition to the three autocratic monarchies—the "Holy Alliance," as the term came to be used—might have been anticipated by several years. That such was not the case was due to the development during the succeeding months of two questions which split the Alliance, so to speak, on new lines of cleavage. Of these, the more immediately pressing was that which at about this time first became known as the Eastern Question. It emerged, during the Conference of Laibach, when, on March 19th, the news reached the Emperor Alexander of Alexander Hypsilanti's invasion of Moldavia, followed a month later by that of the national uprising of the Greeks in the Morea. These events had a double effect. They once more drew together the two Powers, Austria and Great Britain, which were most interested in preventing the disruption of the Turkish empire; and, incidentally, they braced up the loosening bonds of the European Alliance, which both Powers recognised as the best means for avoiding any isolated action of Russia. The second question was raised by the attitude of the Government of France towards the continued revolutionary unrest in Spain, of which the immediate consequences were the drawing apart from each other of the two Constitutional Powers and the ranging of France for a while in line with the policy of the autocratic Powers, and the open breach of Great Britain with the Continental Alliance at the Congress of Verona.

On the face of it, there was a close analogy between the claim of France to intervene in Spain and that of Austria to intervene in Naples. The troubles in Spain had never ceased to grow since the Revolution of 1820; and in France, where the Ultra-Royalists were now in the ascendant under the able leadership of the Comte de Villèle, there was a strong agitation for intervention, in order to suppress a revolutionary licence which threatened to infect France herself, and to rescue King Ferdinand from a humiliating position which was felt to cast discredit upon the whole House of Bourbon. But, from the British point of view, there was a world of difference between an Austrian intervention in Naples and a French intervention in Spain. So far as the interests of Great Britain were concerned, the Treaty of Utrecht had not become obsolete; and it was not to be supposed that, after pouring out blood and treasure to drive Napoleon from the Peninsula, she would calmly acquiesce in its occupation by his successor. She held, moreover, a powerful weapon in reserve. Already the Spanish Colonies in America were *de facto* independent; and,

though British Ministers did not think the time ripe for recognising their independence *de jure*, they were prepared to take this step rather than risk the possibility of an attempt of the European Alliance to subdue them or of their falling under the domination of France. In view of this attitude of Great Britain, the French Government recognised the perils involved in any isolated action and, before attempting to interfere in Spain, decided to appeal for a mandate to the Powers of the Alliance.

Before the close of the Conference of Laibach it had been decided to hold another meeting of the Powers at Verona in the autumn of the following year. Metternich hoped to have by this time persuaded Castlereagh into a general acceptance of his views. This hope was belied; for the British statesman never departed from the attitude which he had taken up towards the system of universal intervention championed by the Continental Powers. But in the Eastern Question he and Metternich stood on common ground, and it was obviously expedient that they should act together. The fact that the Emperor Alexander was at Laibach when the news of Alexander Hypsilanti's adventure reached him had, for the moment, saved the situation; for Metternich was able to persuade him, in the interests of the peace of Europe and of the principles enunciated by the Troppau Protocol, to repudiate publicly all sympathy with the insurgents. But, after the close of the Conference, the far more serious rising in the Morea, and the failure of the Turks to suppress it, opened up the Eastern Question in a dangerous form. Opinion in Russia had from the first been excited in favour of a Christian revolt against the Turks; it was violently agitated by the news of the barbarous execution of the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople. The Emperor Alexander, once more among his people, could not but be influenced by this sentiment, apart from other reasons for desiring a Turkish war, of which not the least was the hope of restoring the *moral* of his army, which he had found to be undermined by revolutionary intrigue. Sir Charles Bagot, who had recently been transferred from Washington to St Petersburg, reported to Castlereagh that the Tsar had asked him what course Great Britain would take in the event of war and the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire. It was clear that Alexander was wavering, and that but little was needed to make him yield to the sentiment of his army and his people and unsheathe the sword for a holy war. In these circumstances, it became clear that, since the interests of Austria and Great Britain were identical in this matter, Metternich and

Castlereagh ought to sink their differences and agree upon a common course of action. It was, accordingly, arranged that they should meet at Hanover, whither in October, 1821, Castlereagh accompanied George IV on his first visit to his German capital. "Had the occasion been of an ordinary character," wrote Castlereagh to Sir Robert Gordon, "and involving the form of government under which any portion of Europe was to subsist (as that of Naples lately did), I should have felt as you have done about an interview with Prince Metternich, that it might lead to more noise and jealousy than it was worth encountering...but the question of Turkey is of a totally different character, and one which we in England regard, not as a theoretical, but as a practical, consideration of the greatest moment."

There was, however, nothing to prevent the use of theoretical considerations for practical ends; and Castlereagh perceived that, however much he might object to its principles when applied elsewhere, the Emperor Alexander's idea of a universal union of guarantee could be put forward as a most convincing argument for dissuading him from an isolated intervention in Turkey. Once again, it was necessary to keep the erratic autocrat "grouped"—to use Castlereagh's earlier expression; and the best way to "group" him was to humour him by appealing to his idealism and reminding him of his solemn engagements to Europe.

The principle involved was defined by Metternich in a Memorandum signed at Hanover on October 22nd. The policy of Austria, he said, was the maintenance of peace on the basis of existing Treaties. Therefore he would press the Porte to yield on those points in which Russia's treaty rights were clear; but the question of war he refused to consider. "There exists," he said, "an explicit engagement on the part of Russia that the Emperor will on no ground separate himself from the conservative principles of the Alliance. It is to this declaration that the Emperor of Austria has attached the moral guarantee which he has been invited by his august ally to accord to him." On October 28th, Castlereagh wrote to Sir Charles Bagot in much the same sense. The Emperor Alexander's question as to the eventual attitude of Great Britain in case of war he refused to answer. However great his own sympathy with the cause of the Greeks might be, he said, the peace of Europe was of paramount importance; and he could not reconcile it with his sense of duty "to embark on a scheme for new modelling the position of the Greek population at the hazard of all the destructive confusion and disunion which such

an attempt would lead to, not only within Turkey, but in Europe. The nature of the Turkish power was fully understood, when the existing state of Europe, including that of Turkey, was placed under the provident care and anxious protection of the General Alliance."

The language of this last sentence is susceptible of two interpretations. On its face, it reads like a recantation of all that Castlereagh had urged against the idea of a General Guarantee; it even seems to extend the scope of the Alliance so as to guarantee not only the Treaty of Vienna, which all had signed, but all other existing territorial treaties[1]. Certainly, Castlereagh, in writing thus, again had in mind the necessity of humouring the Tsar by "presenting the subject somewhat in the tone of his own ideas." But the word "guarantee" was carefully avoided, and the sentence may be read as implying no more than that the Allied Powers had agreed to act in concert for the purpose of preserving the peace of Europe; while the inclusion of Turkey under this understanding was only a re-affirmation of the principle which Castlereagh had laid down at Aix-la-Chapelle, namely, that from the point of view of the Concert all treaties, whether general or particular, and whether signed before or after the Acts of Vienna, should be regarded as equally sacred. In any case, the appeal to Alexander's idealism succeeded; and the Tsar, giving up the idea of a separate intervention in Turkey, agreed to send representatives to the Conferences which met at Vienna in September, 1822, to prepare the ground for the great Congress at Verona in October.

Castlereagh—or rather the Marquis of Londonderry, as he now was—intended himself to be present at these Conferences, and he drew up, for his own guidance, the Instructions which, after his death, were handed over unaltered by the new Foreign Secretary, George Canning, to the Duke of Wellington. These Instructions are of peculiar interest, as showing that Castlereagh was contemplating a modification of British policy in various directions precisely on the lines afterwards pursued by Canning; and they are therefore worth quoting at some length, since they mark the beginning of a new orientation of Great Britain's foreign relations.

According to these Instructions, the subjects of general interest to be discussed at Vienna were the question of Turkey, both external and internal; the affairs of Spain and of the Spanish Colonies; and the affairs of Italy. Other questions, of special interest to Great

[1] *Camb. Mod. Hist.* x. 34.

Britain, were the Slave Trade, and the recently issued ukase of the Emperor Alexander asserting sovereignty over the West coast of North America down to 51 N. lat. and declaring the Behring Sea a *mare clausum*—claims resisted by Great Britain and the United States alike[1].

In the Turkish Question, the principles laid down were those already mentioned—the maintenance of peace between Turkey and Russia, and British neutrality in the struggle between the Greeks and the Turks. But the Instructions point out that, owing to the paralysis of the Ottoman naval power and "the progress made by the Greeks towards the formation of a Government," the character of this neutrality must be modified. "So long as the force of the insurgents was directed by the mere will of the leaders, the principle of neutrality led to no other consideration than that of giving an equal rule of accommodation to the parties; but by the erection of a Government admitting of formal acts being done on the part of that Government, we are more positively brought to deal with them *de facto*, upon matters of blockade and other questions dependent upon the law of nations."

> Considering the course pursued by Great Britain now for so many years towards the local Governments exercising dominion in South America, and her avowed neutrality as between the Greeks and the Turks, it may be difficult for this country, if a *de facto* Government shall be actually established in the Morea, and the western provinces of Turkey, to refuse it the ordinary privileges of a belligerent...but it must be done with caution and without ostentation, lest it should render the Turks wholly inaccessible to remonstrance....Should an intervention be suggested between the Turks and the Greeks, directed either to submission upon amnesty and assurances of protection...or to the creation of a qualified Greek Government: in either case, care must be taken not to commit this country to any immediate or eventual concert of this nature, that shall go beyond the limits of good offices. Engagements in the nature of guarantee are to be considered altogether inadmissible.

This represents the first step, characteristically cautious, on the path that was to lead to Navarino and the Treaty of London.

So far as Italian affairs were concerned, the Instructions state that the attitude of the British Minister must necessarily vary from that of his colleagues at Vienna, "as we are no parties to the acts taken by the Allied Cabinets. We acquiesced in their measures, and reserved to ourselves the right to interfere when we saw occasion, but we did not agree to charge ourselves with any superintendence of the system decided on." The British Minister was, therefore, only

[1] See *Camb. Mod. Hist.* VII. 370.

to keep himself informed, and to take care not to do anything inconsistent with the European system and the Treaties.

It was in the matter of Spain and the question of the Spanish Colonies that the Instructions were most significant of new developments. So far as revolutionary Spain herself was concerned, the principle of non-intervention was uncompromisingly upheld; there was to be "a rigid abstinence from any interference in the internal affairs of that country." But in the matter of the Spanish-American Colonies, as in that of Greece, a fresh development of policy was foreshadowed. "If Spain shall not...reestablish her authority within a given time," the Instructions ran, "other States will acknowledge them sooner or later, and it is to the interest even of Spain herself to find the means of restoring an intercourse, when she cannot succeed in restoring a dominion." The British Minister was therefore to call attention to the intercourse between Great Britain and the Spanish Colonies, which it was impossible to interrupt. "The question resolves itself into one rather of the mode of our relations, than as to whether they shall or shall not subsist, to the extent in matter of right as regulated by the law of nations." The recognition given to the South American States might be of three kinds: as independent *de facto*, as was already the case; by the accrediting to them of diplomatic agents; and as independent *de jure*, so as to create a certain impediment to the rights of the former occupant. There was as yet no fair pretence for calling on Great Britain to recognise their independence *de jure*; but it was now a question of how long it would be before it would be necessary for her to accredit diplomatic agents to their Governments. An attempt was to be made to obtain a concert in this matter, but in such a way as to leave Great Britain independence of action[1].

Lord Londonderry did not live to carry out these Instructions. During the trying parliamentary session of 1822 he had complained that the combined functions of Foreign Secretary and Leader of the House of Commons were too much for him, and that he would have to give up one or the other. The King and the Duke of Wellington both expressed concern at his overwrought condition. He was suffering from gout, and the lowering drugs prescribed still further depressed his spirits. There were clear indications that his mind was giving way, and his razors were removed; but a pen-knife had been

[1] These Instructions are misplaced in the F.O. Records. They are bound up with the Correspondence preliminary to the Congress of Vienna (1814). F.O. Continent, France, 6.

forgotten in a drawer, and with this he cut his throat on August 12th, 1822. The news of this tragedy was hailed by many of his political opponents and by the mob with indecent joy, the baser sort not hesitating to assert, without any shadow of proof, that the suicide had been due to terror at some hideous and undefined charge. It was a coarse and violent age, and even the presence of death could not silence the clamour of vituperation to which Castlereagh had been exposed during his life. Byron, especially, disgraced himself by a heartless and ignorant attempt to justify his action in continuing his attacks on the Minister whom he stigmatised as "the most despotic in intention, and the weakest in intellect, that ever tyrannized over a country[1]." The genius of Byron, unfortunately, kept alive even his most vulgar and pitiful doggerel, and the legend which mainly owed its origin to him, flourishing in congenial soil, rapidly obscured the memory of the great services which Castlereagh had rendered to the British Empire and to the cause of European peace.

The mists of legend have now been dissipated, and we can see the man and the statesman as he really was. As a man, all the evidence shows him to have been singularly lovable. Friends and foes alike describe him as one of the most beautiful of human beings; and, though in public his demeanour was cold and impassive, in personal intercourse his manner was so persuasive and fascinating that, to use an expression current in his Irish home, he could "whistle a bird off a tree[2]." It was this quality, the outcome not of calculated art but of innate kindliness of disposition, which contributed so largely to his success as a manager of men, not only as leader of the House of Commons but in the councils of the European Alliance. His influence was increased by the elevation and transparent honesty of his character; he was an affectionate husband—so much so as to excite the merriment of the cynical wits at the Congress of Vienna —and a faithful friend; he had no patience with the game of diplomatic intrigue, and himself steered a straight and an open course. For personal popularity or unpopularity he cared not a jot. When in 1821 he accompanied King George IV on his visit to Ireland, the Dublin crowd, in the exuberance of its welcome to the great Irishman who had effected the Union and restored peace to Europe, embarrassed his movements in the streets by attempting to chair him. His comment was characteristic:—"I am grown as popular in 1821

[1] Preface to Cantos VI, VII and VIII of "Don Juan," *Works* (ed. 1855), VI. 78.
[2] Marchioness of Londonderry, *Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh* (1904), p. 65.

as unpopular formerly, and with as little merit; and of the two unpopularity is the more convenient and gentlemanlike[1]."

This does not mean that, as a statesman, Castlereagh was indifferent to the power of public opinion. He despised its manifestations only when he knew that they were based on a false conception of the facts, and he understood the importance of this opinion being properly instructed. During the negotiations in Paris in 1815, for instance, he wrote urging Lord Liverpool to supply the Press more freely with authentic information, as its attitude, based on inadequate knowledge of the situation, was causing trouble. To his brother, Lord Stewart, he wrote on February 24th, 1820,

> I wish you distinctly to understand that, in proportion as events in Paris and here give to our general position a more serious character, our Allies may expect to see us more determinedly wedded to the position upon which alone we feel the smallest hopes of rallying the national sentiment, if necessary, to exertion. Pitt, in the early years of the late war, neglected the necessary caution in this respect. He was thereby weakened for the first ten years of the war by a decided schism of public opinion, whether the war was of necessity or brought on by bad management. In all the latter years of the war, profiting by experience, we never exposed ourselves to a question of this nature, and we were supported in the war under all its accumulated burdens, by the whole energy and power of the nation. This is our compass, and by this we must steer; and our Allies on the Continent may be assured that they will deceive themselves if they suppose that we could for six months act with them unless the mind of the nation was in the cause[2].

The difficulty which Castlereagh had to face in the task of holding the mind of Parliament and of the nation to the cause, especially after the conclusion of peace, was that which always confronts those who are charged with the conduct of foreign affairs in countries with democratic institutions; it was necessary to instruct public opinion, but it was impossible fully to instruct it, in every case, without betraying the confidence of Great Britain's Allies or in other ways risking a quarrel with them. It was Castlereagh's necessary reticences that excited the suspicions of an implacable Opposition and roused it to fury. He met these onslaughts with calm and unmoved dignity, and for the best of reasons; they actually helped his diplomacy, for they enabled him to reinforce his own arguments in favour of moderation in the councils of the Alliance by urging the necessity for humouring the British people and Parliament.

[1] C. Litton Falkiner, *Studies in Irish History*, p. 178.
[2] Marchioness of Londonderry, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

Personal magnetism counts for much in the management of men, but it was not the possession of this quality alone that gave Castlereagh his great influence in Parliament. Yet he was no orator, in days when studied oratory was still expected of politicians. He had difficulty in expressing his thought, whether in speech or writing, and his mixed metaphors and Irish "bulls" occasionally excited merriment. The secret of his influence, then, must be sought in something else; and what this was is clear from the testimony of his contemporaries. "Lord Castlereagh," said Wellington, "possessed a clear mind, the highest talents, and the most steady principles, more so than anybody I ever knew—he could do everything but speak in Parliament; that he could not do"; and again, "Lord Castlereagh could neither speak nor write, but he was completely master of all our foreign relations, and knew what he was about." The judgment of Wellington, who was at one with Castlereagh in politics, may be suspected of bias. That of Brougham, the most brilliant orator of the Opposition, is even more emphatic. "He possessed," he said, "a considerable fund of plain sense, not to be misled by any refinement of speculation, or clouded by any fanciful notions. He went straight to his point. He was brave politically as well as personally." To a generation of Englishmen which is suspicious of oratory, these appreciations will be enough to account for Castlereagh's power as a speaker. His power as a writer was due to the same characteristics. The vast number of despatches and other official documents which he left behind, and of which the drafts are all in his own handwriting, show his indefatigable industry. They show also that he did not write easily. The writing is sometimes almost illegible, and the corrections and erasures are innumerable. These were not, however, due to confusion of thought, but to the effort to find the clearest possible expression for thoughts that were clear. The effort was almost always successful. Castlereagh's finished despatches are models of lucidity, and in this respect they contrast favourably with those of Metternich, who was esteemed a master of diplomatic style, but whose facile pen was employed as often as not in weaving webs of verbiage of which the object was not to enlighten, but to confuse and entangle counsel. The two statesmen, indeed, may be taken as typical of the old and the new school of diplomacy respectively. Metternich, with his parade of lofty sentiment and his unblushing chicanery, represented the diplomatic standards of the eighteenth century. Castlereagh, contemptuous of "abstractions" and "sweeping

generalities" whether revolutionary or reactionary, approaching international problems from the point of view of practical commonsense, and recognising that these problems were the affairs not of princes only but of peoples, stood on the threshold of the new age as a pioneer of the new diplomacy. And the effectiveness of this new attitude was not in doubt. "In mind honest and penetrating," Thiers wrote of him, "in character prudent and firm, capable at once of vigour and address, having in his manner the proud simplicity of the English, he was called to exercise, and did exercise, the greatest influence[1]."

On the evening of Castlereagh's funeral, Richard Rush, the American Minister at the Court of St James's, entered in his journal an appreciation of the dead statesman which is perhaps the noblest and most touching tribute ever paid by the representative of one nation to the Foreign Minister of another. After speaking of Castlereagh's great part in European affairs, Rush continues:

> In relation to that portion of English statesmanship which has to deal with American affairs, and it is no unimportant portion, I must appeal to the preceding pages to attest the candid and liberal spirit in which he was ever disposed to regard them. Let those who would doubt it consult the archives of the two nations since the end of our revolutionary war, and point out the British statesman, of any class or party, who up to the period of his death, made more advances, or did more in fact, towards placing their relations on an amicable footing....His sentiments were all of a lofty kind. His private life was pure, and all who knew him in those relations loved him. In society he was attractive in the highest degree; the firmness and courage of his nature being not more remarkable than the gentleness and suavity of his manners. He was buried in Westminster Abbey between the graves of Pitt and Fox. The diplomatic corps all went to his funeral; and not one among them could gaze upon his pall, without having his memory filled with recollections of kindnesses received from him. If anything intrinsically unpleasant ever arose in the transaction of international business with them, he threw around it every mitigation which blandness of manner could impart; whilst to announce or promote what was agreeable, seemed always to give him pleasure. His personal attentions to them were shown in ways which appeared to put out of view their coming from an official source, by the impression they made on the heart.

[1] Quoted in Marchioness of Londonderry, *op. cit.*

CHAPTER II

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF CANNING

I. INTRODUCTORY

THE successor of Castlereagh had also been his predecessor at the Foreign Office. In 1809 the two men had quarrelled, had left the Cabinet, and had terminated their differences in the field. They had been reconciled and had sat in the Cabinet once more, until Canning resigned in December, 1820. The resignation had nothing to do with foreign politics, yet it certainly tended to give Canning a more detached view of them than if he had retained office. It is not, indeed, surprising that both contemporaries and later historians have puzzled over the characters of the two men. The men themselves may stand for different types—Castlereagh inarticulate, sober and serene, Canning brilliant, eager and epigrammatic; the one endowed with great talents, but with a suspicion attaching to him of mediocrity, the other with a touch of genius and a suspicion of charlatanry. The one a man who won all his triumphs behind closed doors, the other an orator who had charmed not only Parliament but the general public outside. Yet the differences are greater and less than is usually supposed. In general political ideals there was no great divergence; yet in detail there was a good deal of it. For example, Canning had advocated, in 1809, that Prussia should enter into a Germanic Federation and be equalised in power to Hesse, Württemberg, and Saxony. As a great military and despotic State she might, he said, become a serious danger[1]. In 1815, Castlereagh ignored this apprehension, and argued that she had become a "military democracy," whose tendencies were not to be feared, as her popular opinion would restrain her military ambition. Both men believed in the Balance of European Power; but Canning certainly had more insight into the nascent forces of nationality, and his handling of both Portuguese and Spanish national movements in 1807–9 and his well-known sympathy with Poland suggest that he might have attempted different solutions from any reached at the Congress of Vienna. It is also curious that, while Castlereagh did not there approve movements in favour of Constitutions, Canning

[1] F.O. Russia, 65/69. Canning to Lord G. Leveson-Gower, May 16th, 1807.

openly advocated such. But these problems were decided by the time Canning took the Seals in 1822, and he made no attempt to unsettle them.

It should not be forgotten that Lady Canning, whose insight makes her a valuable guide to her husband's policy, expressed the view that "a change of measures in our foreign relations was marked and decisive" on Canning's accession to power[1]. Elsewhere, she explains this by quoting Canning's own phrase, "Away with the cant of measures, not men!" A further extract is still more illuminating: "If the distinction must be taken, men are everything, measures comparatively nothing. I speak of times of difficulty and danger, when ordinary rules of conduct fail." The application is not really difficult[2]. For, while Castlereagh, Canning and Wellington held the supreme direction of foreign affairs in succession, and while each approved of the famous State-paper of May 5th, 1820, it is certain that their methods of execution varied in each case, according to their respective temperaments, characters and capacities. In point of fact, Canning, so early as 1818, had begun to perceive that the method of Congresses had serious disadvantages; in 1820, he had almost openly disapproved of them. Like Castlereagh, he had adopted the principle of non-interference, laid down on May 5th, 1820; but he accepted it in a different spirit. Castlereagh had made the great discovery that the business of Europe was the more easily transacted when half-a-dozen men sat round a table and tried to understand one another, and this discovery he was not anxious to abandon. At last, his principles had led him to declare his differences with both Metternich and Alexander. "If they will," he said, "be theorists, we must act in separation." But, even then, his well-known predilections for diplomacy by conference had induced foreign statesmen to disbelieve in his actual determination to separate from them. It is, at any rate, a very striking fact that Wellington himself, a devoted admirer of Castlereagh, should have written thus to Canning from Verona (November 5th, 1822): "I must inform you, however, that there is a very general feeling in the *corps diplomatique* assembled here that England separated herself from the Allies during the affairs of Naples

[1] See Canning's speech of June 29th, 1814. (Cf. below, p. 111 note.) Canning did not approve of Great Britain erecting or guaranteeing Constitutions in foreign countries, but thought she might give the Constitutional movement some encouragement. For Castlereagh's view *v.* Webster, *British Diplomacy*, 111, 174, 181–3.

[2] See the very valuable pamphlet entitled "An authentic account of Mr Canning's policy with respect to the constitutional Charter of Portugal." This was published in 1830 anonymously by Lady Canning.

very unnecessarily, that they experienced no inconvenience from such a separation, and that they will probably experience none from that which it is possible may take place in this question of Spain[1]." Whatever the explanation, such was the diplomatic atmosphere at the time that Canning took office.

Canning held fast to the view, expressed so early as the end of 1818 in the Cabinet, that the use of Congresses had begun to wane. Castlereagh laid down the doctrine of non-intervention in the State-paper of May 5th, 1820. This was not published until 1823, and then only in a very much truncated form. But, on March 20th, 1821, Canning, who was no longer in office, had laid down the basis of this doctrine in the Commons[2]:

Let us not, in the foolish spirit of romance, suppose that we alone could regenerate Europe....Here the spirit of monarchy was at war to crush every principle of freedom, said the one party; and there, said the other, the spirit of democracy was labouring to destroy all monarchies. We ourselves had in our constitution enough of democracy to temper monarchy, and enough of monarchy to restrict the caprices of democracy. Where then was the necessity for our incurring these risks, which other countries, not possessed of a tempered constitution, like our own, might laudably encounter?...A way to a settlement [was] not to be taught perhaps by foreign example, much less to be opened by foreign arms. The price at which political liberty is to be valued and the cost at which it is to be obtained, constitute the nicest balance and one which only those immediately interested in the calculation are competent to decide. It was impossible to contemplate the struggles now going on in different parts of the world without anticipating struggles between the contending principles, peril, arduous and of doubtful issue....But to these struggles it is not our duty to be parties....It might be a case of difficulty to maintain this perfect equilibrium: the course we had to pursue was on a path which lay across a roaring stream; attempts might be made to bear us down on the one side or the other. Our duty, however, and our interests equally prescribed to us to persevere in an undeviating path, to preserve our resources entire

[1] F.O. Continent, 139/48, November 5th, 1822. As regards future policy in Spain, he adds that he thinks this is not Metternich's opinion, nor that of the Emperor Francis. Clearly, however, both agreed that the separation in the past had not inconvenienced the Holy Alliance. There is a curious confirmation of this from Castlereagh himself. After speaking of Troppau and Laibach, and subsequently of the transactions of Naples, he writes: "On which occasions the line of France and that of Great Britain, was materially distinguishable from that of the other three Powers, and without any practical inconvenience resulting therefrom." Castlereagh to Strangford, private. F.O. Turkey, 78/105, March 29th, 1822.

[2] On July the 27th, 1823, Canning told Eszterházy that he had avoided condemning interference by Austria in Naples in 1821 (when he was out of office). He did not mean to say that interference was never, but that it was not always, justifiable. *Berichte aus London* (Wiener Staats-Archiv).

until the period should arrive, if ever, when we might exercise our only legitimate right to interfere, from being called upon to quell the raging floods that threatened to distract the balance of Europe.

This last passage is the most notable of all, because it is a threat, though a partially concealed one, that Great Britain may have to interfere in the end if the parties on both sides render the situation so disturbed as to make war the only resource. Moreover, as he said in 1818 in the Cabinet, when she does interfere, she must do so "with a commanding force[1]." Now, Great Britain could not have a commanding force if the chief Powers remained united. Hence, Congresses, with their real dangers of producing "Areopagitic" actions or utterances, and their collective menaces to liberty or democracy, were to be avoided. For this purpose Canning preferred and attempted to deal directly and individually with States or nations. It was not easy, however, to separate the three Eastern, or despotic Powers, popularly termed the "Holy Alliance." Prussia was hopeless —"a downright grenadier with no politics but the drumhead and cat-o'-nine-tails." She would always follow the Austrian or the Russian despot. But Alexander could be separated from Metternich, and both from France. When the body of States was thus resolved into its original elements, the moral force of public opinion could be brought to bear upon each State separately or, if need was, on all collectively. It was in his method of mobilising this opinion and of shaping it to his ends that the originality of Canning consisted.

Canning did not intend that, in future, the protests of Great Britain, even if she stood alone, should be unavailing. Europe should be convinced that Great Britain was in earnest, and she should be convinced that public opinion, not only in but outside this country, was a force to be reckoned with. If disregarded by the despots, democracy would be strengthened, at the same time that it would be tempered and restrained, by the example and support of Great Britain. His speeches were directed to that end, and their echoes remained at least as long in the chanceries of Europe as in the ears of the British public. It is impossible to view his actions without concluding that, though the principles were still the same as those of Castlereagh, the means and the spirit of their application were

[1] There were some serious differences between Canning and Castlereagh in the Cabinet in October, 1818, concerning the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (Castlereagh, *Desp.* XII. 56–7); but it subsequently appeared that these were due to a misconstruction of one of Castlereagh's despatches. (Cf. below, p. 112.) Canning, however, always maintained that he was only carrying out the principles of Castlereagh's State-paper of May 5th, 1820 (see Appendix A).

wholly different. If Castlereagh had discovered that you can achieve much by conversation with statesmen in private, Canning had discovered that you could achieve much by expositions to the public. It was Castlereagh's State-paper of May 5th, 1820, which opened the breach between Great Britain and the three despotic Powers; it was Canning's appeal to the public that made the gulf impassable.

II. THE CONGRESS OF VERONA

The first direct problem which Canning had to solve was that of Spain; for it was this with which the Congress of Verona was ultimately most concerned. The situation was serious and even critical. Early in 1820, Spain, like Portugal and Naples, experienced a revolution against its absolutist Sovereign, who was compelled to grant a Constitution. In Spain things went from bad to worse, because power fell into the hands of the Liberals, who were supported by the Army, but whose administration was ill-directed and foolish. Ferdinand VII, moreover, showed every sign of discontent with their rule and every desire to dispense with it, even by appealing against his own subjects to his French kinsman for aid[1]. France could hardly remain indifferent to events, and the ultra-Royalist party, led by the Duc d'Angoulême, began to clamour for an opportunity to show the world that the noblemen of France were still ready to pay the tax of blood. A pretext was found to mass French troops on the Pyrenean frontier, in order to form a *cordon sanitaire* for preventing yellow fever (and Constitutional principles) from crossing into France. This threatening movement produced hot words from the Spanish Liberals and hot replies from the French loyalists. Opinion was greatly excited in reactionary circles throughout Europe. Alexander of Russia, a relatively recent convert to reaction, wished to prove his sincerity by suppressing liberalism in Spain. Metternich, who had so recently repressed it in Naples in obedience to the decisions of the Holy Alliance, found a difficulty in opposing such intervention in the abstract, but had no intention, in fact, of letting a Russian army march across Germany. Lewis XVIII, on the other hand, was equally opposed to its crossing France. Hence, at the moment of Castlereagh's death, it seemed as if the question of armed intervention in Spain were not a pressing one, and would not form an important part of the negotiations at the approaching Congress of European Powers.

[1] A secret correspondence passed between Lewis XVIII and Ferdinand, in June and July, 1822, when the latter assured the former that he would get rid of the existing régime whenever he could.

The Instructions for the Congress of Vienna (transferred in October, 1822, to Verona)[1] had been drawn up by Castlereagh on the assumption that, as regards the European part of the Spanish question, "there seems nothing to add to or vary in the course of policy hitherto pursued." The three points were "solicitude for the safety of the Royal Family, observance of our engagements with Portugal, and a rigid abstinence from interference in the internal affairs of" Spain. The question was not considered urgent, though the Plenipotentiary was instructed to find out the views of France as he passed through Paris on his road to Vienna. These Instructions were sanctioned by King and Cabinet, and Wellington was appointed Plenipotentiary before Canning became Foreign Secretary. The latter was therefore unable, and in point of fact had certainly not desired, to alter the original Instructions. An opportunity, however, now arose for adding to them, in view of the fact that Wellington's report showed that Spain was in serious danger.

The Duke reported, on September 21st, that 100,000 French troops were now on the frontier ready to move in a short time, and that, despite denials, he was inclined to believe that conspirators against the existing Liberal Government in Spain had been encouraged from the French side. He found Villèle (the Prime-Minister) seriously contemplating the possibility of war, and a strong party in the French Cabinet determined on active interference, with the intention of occupying Madrid and of relieving Ferdinand both from danger to his person and from the necessity of being a Constitutional monarch. While, however, he thought Villèle, Lewis XVIII, and his brother Charles, desirous of avoiding war, if possible, he reported their unmistakable purpose. Villèle observed that "his whole policy in relation to Spain was founded upon French interests, and...entirely unconnected with anything the Congress might determine." He said that he was resolved not only to ask no assistance from any other Power, but to oppose any endeavour to force it upon him, "if the assistance given was to be a body of troops to be passed through France." This communication indicated, therefore, that intervention, if it took place, was likely to be French rather than European. The announcement did not alarm Canning. He much preferred that one country should intervene rather than four, and saw in this process a way of breaking up the European Concert.

[1] Mr J. E. S. Green has an able essay (*Royal Hist. Soc. Trans.* 3rd Series, vol. VII. pp. 103–29) on the Instructions for Verona. But his contention that Canning deliberately obscured the issue in Parliament seems overdone.

Canning's views on the Spanish crisis were simple. He thought both King and Cortes "equally bad," and the Spanish Constitutionalists "very foolish." He had no special reverence (though some of his Whig friends thought he had) for the Constitution of 1812, which the Liberals were trying to restore. As such, like that of Naples, it was "little worth maintaining in itself," being ultra-democratic and therefore unsuited to the historic tendencies of Spain. He was, therefore, in practice and on principle opposed to the Whig policy of interference and of "guaranteeing the Constitution" of Spain against outside intervention. Great Britain, he said, was for non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States, and the doctrine of guarantee was incompatible with such a policy. A guarantee had been given to the Polish Constitution in the past by the three Partitioning Powers, and the result of that guarantee "is known and was inevitable." It was the extinction of Poland. Such guarantees meant perpetual interference from outside, which was exactly what he wished to avoid[1].

If, however, Canning was against intervention in the democratic, he was even more against it in the despotic, sense. For the latter danger was more immediate, more pressing and more detrimental both to British interests and to his ideas of the Balance of European Power. "The European police system" was one of his bugbears, and he was determined to put a stop to it. He had already had some experience of collective pressure. The Austrian and Prussian Chargé d'affaires (apologising for the absence of the Russian, whose Instructions were similar), followed at a short interval by the French, called on him (see his letter of September 27th) in order to present a joint remonstrance (or virtually such) against "what the Allied Governments appear to have considered the precipitate departure of Sir William A'Court on his mission to Madrid." They suggested that it would excite rumours among "the disaffected party," give rise to reports of "disunion among the Allies" (which was just what Canning wanted), and so forth. Canning treated this demand "as lightly as possible," and drily remarked that Sir William A'Court had already left for Madrid. It, however, induced him to give this memorable Instruction to Wellington, which he afterwards quoted with great effect in Parliament:

But if, as I confess I see reason to apprehend in the late communications both from Paris and Vienna, there is entertained by the Allies a determined

[1] *V.* F.O. France, 27/284, to Sir Charles Stuart *passim*; F.O. Spain, 72/268, to Sir Wm. A'Court, especially February 9th, 1823, and December 29th, 1823; Stapleton, *Pol. Life*, I. 428 *sqq.*; *Canning's Speeches*, V. 49.

project of interference by force, or by menace in the present struggle in Spain, so convinced are His Majesty's Government of the uselessness and danger of any such interference—so objectionable does it appear to them in principle, and so utterly impracticable in execution—that, if the necessity should arise, or (I would rather say) if the opportunity should offer, I am to instruct your Grace at once frankly and peremptorily to declare, that to any such interference, come what may, His Majesty will not be a party[1].

Wellington[2], after proceeding to Vienna, eventually went on with the rest of the Congress to Verona. On October 18th, he reported "all notion of what is called a European army, or any [collective] offensive operation against Spain" as "at an end." But French intervention remained, and, on the 20th, Montmorency presented three celebrated queries to the Congress:

(1) If France recalls its Minister and breaks off diplomatic relations with Spain, will the other Powers do the same?

(2) If war breaks out between France and Spain, what moral support will other Powers give to France "to inspire a salutary fear among the revolutionaries of all countries"?

(3) What material support will the Powers give France, if war breaks out, "while admitting a restriction which France declares, and they themselves will admit, to be absolutely demanded by the general disposition of opinion"?

Alexander at once accepted these stipulations, and offered to conclude a treaty with France. He was ready either to mass a Russian army in Piedmont for attacking the Jacobins in France, or to march to Madrid if the French army in Spain were defeated. Wellington and Metternich threw cold water on both schemes. Eventually, however, the Austrian and the Prussian Representatives alike accepted Montmorency's propositions, but apparently on the understanding that no Russian army should pass through Germany, and in the belief that no French army was likely to intervene in Spain. On the 30th Wellington submitted a Memorandum declining to accept Montmorency's views, and stating verbally that "the exact ground of complaint and the exact cause of war" must be known before an answer could be given, and that "we could never stipulate to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain in any manner." He also refused "to promise the good offices of

[1] F.O. Verona, 78/46, September 27th, 1822. Quoted in Wellington's *Desp., Corr. and Mem.*

[2] Mr J. E. S. Green, *Royal Hist. Soc. Transactions*, 4th Ser. vol. I. pp. 59–76, has made an ingenious attempt to support an old thesis with new documents, *i.e.* that Wellington contrived to hoodwink Canning at Verona. The evidence is insufficient; see *Eng. Hist. Rev.* (1920), vol. xxxv. p. 574, note by Miss Larkland. But extracts from despatches of the Austrian Representative in London show that both Wellington and the King criticised Canning's actions and utterances in private.

His Majesty between that country (Spain) and France in any other case than that of a simple and specific request to that effect on the part of France, unaccompanied by any 'treaty or any declaration of the Allies hostile to Spain'"—a decision highly approved by Canning. The British plan was to regard the whole matter as an external quarrel between France and Spain, with all notion of collective menace or action removed. When this attitude became clear to the other Allies, they perceived that there was a breach impending. They must act in separation, and in preparing their collective menace to Spain that separation was already so marked that they did not trouble to consult Wellington on the details. Metternich recognised the breach and did not summon him to a number of conferences with the other Powers.

The question of European Spain had exceeded all others in importance, and, as no agreement was now possible at Verona, the Congress hastened to its end. By November 12th, Wellington reported Montmorency's views to be at variance with those of the British Government. On November 19th, the other Allies (except Russia) had already prepared their despatches to Madrid. They consisted of a *procès verbal*, signed by all three Powers[1]. This defined the *casus foederis* in which the three Powers considered they would aid France against Spain to be: (1) an armed attack on France by Spain, or official provocation to rebellion of subjects of France, (2) the deposition or trial of the Spanish King, or similar attempts on his family, (3) the passage of a formal governmental act affecting the rights of legitimate descent of the Royal Family of Spain. Other and unforeseen cases might be considered. These were to be communicated by the Signatory Powers to Spain in similar but separate despatches, and their diplomatic representatives were to be recalled. On the 20th, Wellington formally declined to authorise any similar despatch to the British Minister at Madrid, saying drily that his suggestions would be confined to allaying the ferment caused by the receipt of these despatches. He made a formal and energetic protest against interference in the internal affairs of other States, and declined to hold "a common language with his Allies on this occasion[2]." On the last day of November, Wellington

[1] In fact, the breach between these three Powers (Austria, Russia and Prussia) and France was already apparent; but, so late as December 14th, 1822, Metternich implored Montmorency not to let France act alone and to induce his Government to content itself with moral remonstrance alone.

[2] *Wellington's Speeches*, 1854, vol. I. p. 115—Speech, April 24th, 1823; see also Wellington, *Desp., Corr. and Mem.*, I. 557–9, and F.O. Verona, 78/46 *passim*; Metternich to Neumann, December 2nd, 1822, Particulière. *Congress-Acten*, Vienna Archives (letter given to me by Prof. Webster).

quitted Verona for England. "He left," wrote Metternich, apparently on December the 2nd, "discontented with us all" and saying "all of us were wrong." On the way back he stopped at Paris and again put forward a project of British mediation between France and Spain, the other Powers withholding the despatch of their communications to Spain pending the decision on this proposal. But, on December the 24th, this mediation was declined by France, though she accepted the good offices of Great Britain as to the suggestion that Spain might *moderate* her Constitution.

It was clear now that the issue had been narrowed. The Holy Alliance had confined their intervention to threats and generalities; Great Britain had separated herself from them, but France had separated also. She alone was to be feared from the point of view of immediate and practical action. The French difficulty remained but the great effects produced on the moral union of the European Concert by this shock should not be forgotten. On December the 26th Montmorency in his official report stated that the measures conceived and proposed at Verona "would have been successful if Great Britain had thought herself at liberty to concur in them." Canning wrote at a later stage: "The history of all I could tell them in two words—or rather in the substitution of one word for another—for 'Alliance' read 'England,' and you have the clue of my policy[1]." The Spanish Government, he said in Parliament, "felt comfort and relief when they learnt that the Congress at Verona had broken up with no other result than the *bruta fulmina* of the three despatches from the Courts in alliance with France." So far so good—but the French danger continued. It was now a dispute "between kingdom and kingdom, not on general principles but in the old intelligible accustomed European form." This was a form far more congenial to Canning. It was no new thing for France and Great Britain to quarrel; in this there was nothing "Areopagitic."

III. THE FRENCH INVASION OF SPAIN

The situation was not clear at the end of December. Montmorency was already at variance with Villèle. Of the former's ideas we know less than we should, but Villèle appears to have thought him too "European" in his views. The renowned Chateaubriand had appeared as Second Plenipotentiary at Verona half way through the Conference, and had at once begun denouncing Montmorency

[1] To Frere, August 8th, 1823.

He was using his great influence both in public and in private for war, partly to glorify the Legitimist Monarchy, partly to revive and unite the Bourbon dynasties and do away with the Pyrenees. He soon became Foreign Minister, and described his policy as at once and equally "*toute française*" and "*toute Européenne*"—a phrase which Canning declared he did not understand. A Legitimist crusade in Spain apparently was to cure both French and European ills[1].

Canning sought at once to narrow the causes of dispute. Lord Fitzroy Somerset was sent to convey Wellington's advice, given in his capacity as a Spanish grandee, to the Spanish Government, and urging moderation on them. He obtained from the Ministry assurances as to the personal safety of the King, thereby depriving France of one pretext for war, and even a sort of promise to modify *some* of the democratic features in the Constitution. Unfortunately, the three Allied despatches and the separate French despatch had already reached Madrid, and contributed to inflame opinion there. On January 24th, 1823, Canning made a last appeal direct to Chateaubriand to avert war. It reached France just before the opening of the Chamber on the 28th.

The French King's Speech on that day seemed to prove that the die was cast. He announced the recall of the French Minister from Madrid, and added these ominous words: "Let Ferdinand be free to give to his people institutions which they cannot hold but from him, and which, by securing their tranquillity, would dissipate the just disquietude of France. Hostilities shall cease from that moment." Here was Legitimacy naked and unashamed, denying the principle of free institutions and making their very existence a *casus belli* against Spain. Not a day was lost by Canning in protesting against a "principle which struck at the roots of the British Constitution...." The British Government could not countenance "a pretension on the part of France to make her example (of a Constitution *octroyée* from the Throne) a rule to other nations; and still less could it admit a peculiar right of France to force that example specifically on Spain, in virtue of the consanguinity of the reigning dynasties of the two kingdoms. This recognition of such a right would, on the contrary, suggest recollections and considerations which must obviously make it impossible for Great Britain to be the advocate of pretensions

[1] Neither the memoirs of Chateaubriand (*Congrès de Vérone*) nor those of Villèle really explain the causes of French policy, and the MS. justification of Montmorency has perished. Bois le Comte's account cannot be accepted for he did not attend at the secret conferences.

founded on it[1]." Canning neglected no means to avert war. He again urged moderation on Spain, and even suggested the expediency, though not the necessity, of modifying her democratic tendencies. He wrote privately to Chateaubriand and to the heir to the French Throne, suggesting that ultra-Royalist utterances in France might provoke public opinion in England, just as public opinion had been there provoked into a great enthusiasm for war against the French Republic in 1793 after the execution of Lewis XVI, and again in 1808 against Napoleon after he had deposed the Spanish King. But all was in vain. On March 17th the Duc d'Angoulême left Paris to command the Army, on April 6th he crossed the Bidassoa, and war began. It is unnecessary to dwell on the results of the War. In the end, and contrary to Wellington's expectation, the French army reached Madrid with ridiculous ease, the Cortes arrested the King and carried him with them to Cadiz, whither the French followed them. Ferdinand was released from his imprisonment on the demand of the French on September 30th, after signing a general amnesty. This he promptly violated by shooting and imprisoning hundreds of his opponents, and governing with such incompetence and tyranny that even Angoulême had to remonstrate with him. French troops actually continued to occupy parts of Spain until 1827. It is this fact which explains a great deal of Canning's later policy. "If the Pyrenees had fallen, he would maintain the Atlantic."

Canning had carefully considered the possibility of war if France invaded Spain. He said he "had an itch for war"; but he had rejected it on several grounds. Great Britain was isolated, she had an enormous debt, and she could not organise an expeditionary force in time to resist Angoulême. Hence, British intervention would not have been immediately effective. None the less, Canning made it clear that, if Portugal was attacked by France, Great Britain would intervene. It was now, however, that he began to show his peculiar art of using public opinion to attain his ends and to influence both France and Europe. On April 14th, 1823, he spoke in the Commons of the "extraordinary" King's Speech in the French Chamber, "not a man in the House thought of it with more disgust and horror than he did," adding that subsequently the French Government had in some sense disavowed it. In an even more daring utterance, he

[1] F.O. France, 27/284. To Sir Charles Stuart, especially February 18th, 1823. After the French King's Speech, Canning removed the passage declaring neutrality in case of war from the draft of the British King's Speech. He also published, on April 21st, 1823, the fact that Spain had promised Great Britain not to revive the *Pacte de Famille* with France (Sep. Art. of Treaty of Madrid, July 5th, 1814).

declared that "he earnestly hoped and trusted that she (*i.e.* Spain) would come *triumphantly* out of this struggle." This occasioned great qualms in both the Russian and the Prussian Court and remonstrances from them in private letters, which Canning did not show to the Cabinet, and treated with the utmost contempt. On April 30th he referred again in a speech to "the injustice of the course pursued by the French Government," contrasting it with that of Great Britain, who had "assumed the attitude and the attributes of justice, holding high the balance, and grasping, but not unsheathing the sword." "I wish," wrote he to Bagot, July 14th, 1823, "you could have seen their *ultrageous* faces...at the first interview I had with them after the 30th April. Since that time I have had pretty much my own way; and I believe you may consider my politics as those of the Government, as well as of the country[1]."

Canning's Whig opponents now began to perceive with astonishment that, though he might regard them as irresponsible, he looked on them as playing England's game against the Despots. He alluded to himself as a "Liberal, yes, a Radical Minister," and jestingly reminded them that from his own despatches had come the strongest condemnation in the House of the French King's speech. In the course of one of these debates on Spanish policy, it is said that Canning feared that if a very large majority voted in his favour, it would encourage the "Absolute Powers," and therefore "actually prevailed upon some of his Whig acquaintances, whom he saw quitting the House in disgust, to remain and vote against him[2]." Lord Holland and Sir James Mackintosh were speedily converted, and Sir Robert Wilson, though the most vigorous of all revolutionists, wrote of the new era as "the golden age coming on the heels of the iron." But Canning went a step further, in first conciliating, and then using, the Opposition in Parliament to influence affairs in Europe. His attitude, both consciously and unconsciously, directly and indirectly, was intended to stimulate public opinion to the view that "the time for the Areopagus and the like of that has gone by," and it appealed beyond the walls of Parliament to the Press and to the people, and to the people not only of England, but of Europe. He went down directly into the midst of the people, and in his famous speech at Plymouth

[1] Bagot, *G. C. and his Friends*, II. 180.

[2] Even if this story is not true, it illustrates an important tendency. Le Marchant's *Memoir of Earl Spencer* (1876), p. 211 note. The evidence is from Lord Portman, then present as M.P. for Dorset. Canning also had private and friendly correspondence with Sir R. Wilson, Lord Holland and J. G. Lambton (afterwards Lord Durham).

in the autumn of 1823, he pointed with pride to the warships floating above the town, "reposing on their shadows in perfect stillness," and reminded his audience of how the power of one of those stupendous masses could awake, "how quickly it could put forth its beauty and bravery, collect its scattered elements and awaken its dormant thunder. Such as is one of these mighty machines when springing from inaction into a display of its might—such is England herself while, apparently passive and motionless, she silently concentrates the power to be put forth on an adequate occasion." This was appealing to the public in a way on which neither Castlereagh nor Wellington would have dreamed of venturing. By this time, everyone saw that the breach between Great Britain and the Allies was widening rapidly. France, no less than Europe, was now to perceive that Canning was in earnest. In October, 1823, Canning's words were almost bellicose and, as he did not believe in menace without action, his tone itself was ominous. The date was, in fact, one at which he was informing France in private, as he had previously hinted in public, that an attempt on her part upon the Spanish Colonies in America would be followed by war with England. What made this transaction doubly memorable was the immense enthusiasm aroused by the public speech. It was in this way that Canning played on the diplomats by stimulating public opinion to the point desired, and thereby obtained the pressure necessary to carry his views.

IV. THE SPANISH COLONIES

The whole question of the Revolt of the Spanish Colonies, and of their ultimate Emancipation, is one of infinite perplexity and takes us far back into the days of Castlereagh's Ministry. For Castlereagh's share in the recognition of Spanish America is by no means negligible, and until recently has been little understood by historians. So far back as 1812, this policy was formulated, and, as eventually developed, it meant two things. Great Britain was ready to mediate between Spain and her Colonies; but she was prepared to insist on the maintenance of a relatively free commercial intercourse between herself and these Colonies, though not demanding exclusive advantages for British trade, as against that of other nations. For different reasons, France and Russia had displayed an extremely undesirable interest in these Colonies in 1817, and Castlereagh, using the support of Metternich, had transmitted to them a very welcome Memorandum

(August 28th, 1817), in which he insisted that there should be no mediation "with menace" between Spain and her Colonies, and disclaimed any idea of the use of armed force[1]. Similar negotiations took place in 1818, and Castlereagh then made some very pointed remarks to Tsar Alexander (November 24th, 1818). The relaxation of the Navigation Laws in 1822 led to visits of insurgent ships to British ports, and even before this Castlereagh seemed almost ready for recognition of the independence of the Colonies. He avowed that it was purely "a question of time and circumstance."

The United States stole a march on Great Britain in March, 1822, by actually recognising the *de jure* independence of certain Spanish American Colonies. Castlereagh's last utterances, and even his Instructions for Verona, show that he had proceeded so far that it is surprising he should not have recognised them forthwith. His death left the decision to Canning, and Canning had other views.

During the Congress of Verona, Canning had been forced to take drastic measures to protect British commerce in Spanish American waters. He had also, in December, 1822, practically decided to maintain commercial agents in Spanish America. But he hesitated to take the final plunge of recognition, and in this respect he seems to have differed from Castlereagh. Neither of them was anxious to recognise republics in the New World, if it could be avoided; but there can also be no doubt that Canning thought Castlereagh had gone too far and too fast. It is fairly easy to see why[2]. We know that he looked up the precedents in the American War of Independence, and decided that it was much easier to find convenient precedents for recognition of a revolted colony by a mother-State during war than for recognition by a neutral. We know also that one of Canning's bugbears was the formation of a General Transatlantic League of Republics against a European League of Monarchies. Now, on October 12th, 1822, the monarchy of Brazil cast off its allegiance to the mother-State of Portugal, and Canning promptly admitted that its independence was "inevitable." It was, however, obviously difficult for him to embarrass Portugal by recognising Brazil, as this might have weakened Portugal at a crisis. It was even more difficult to embarrass Spain in the same way. Canning had recently complained of the Spanish

[1] See C. K. Webster, *Eng. Hist. Rev.* (1912), vol. xxvii. pp. 81–3 *sqq.*

[2] F.O. Continent, 139/38, November 2nd, 1818. Castlereagh had written to Bathurst of the "Latin American insurgents (some of whom, as at Buenos Ayres, are now organised in the form of a political state)"; Canning underlined the last two words and wrote in the margin "In 1818!"

inability to suppress piracy in the Caribbean Sea, and at the end of October, 1822, he had not only demanded "satisfaction" from the Spanish Government and threatened reprisals, but sent a squadron to suppress the privateers and even, if necessary, to land in Cuba. The Spanish Cortes behaved well, offering a handsome apology and promising compensation on a large scale. They also began to negotiate with Buenos Ayres on the basis of independence. This last action, probably, solves the mystery of Canning's attitude. The fact that the Spaniards had thus made the *amende honorable* to Great Britain and to their revolted Colonies, at the moment they were threatened by France, made Canning wish to defer the question of recognition; and he did so, until the autumn of 1823. Then his hand was partially forced by the occupation of Cadiz by the French armies.

The first enemy to the New World was Russia, which possessed Alaska and was an American Power. Alexander had already shown his hand. Late in 1821 he published a ukase by which he claimed not only Alaska but much of what is now Canadian and United States territory, extending as far to the south as the 51st parallel of latitude (*i.e.* so far as the southern part of what is now British Columbia), and announced that all ships and cargoes approaching within 100 Italian miles of the shore would be confiscated. This cool appropriation of trade as well as territory affected the interests and claims of both Great Britain and the United States[1]. It led at first to joint, and ultimately to separate, remonstrances on their parts, and was not finally withdrawn till 1826. But its effect at the time was most important in confirming British suspicions and in awakening the flamboyant republicanism of the United States. The latter naturally resented extravagant claims by the arch-despot of the Holy Alliance and feared that they implied the extension, not only of his principles, but of his actual territorial power, to the Continent of North America.

Canning was not, in fact, afraid of the Tsar's pretensions, for he knew their emptiness. Alexander was not dangerous, for Canning held that he could not act alone. The actual danger to the New World lay in the conjunction of the theoretic pretensions of Russia with the practical interference of France. It was the latter which Canning feared. French bayonets had restored the Spanish King to his European Throne, they might also restore him to his American sovereignty. Any such attempt, however, Canning was determined to prevent. Even if Alexander's action had not caused him to move, the French

[1] F.O. Continent, 139/46. Canning to Wellington, September 11th, 27th, 1822.

advance to Cadiz in September, 1823, raised a new and dangerous prospect. Chateaubriand was known to favour the establishment of Bourbon Princes in the New World. It was obvious that the fall of Cadiz might enable a French expedition to set out to the West Indies with that purpose in view, possibly with the blessing of the King of Spain, and certainly with the encouragement of the Tsar. Cadiz fell on September the 30th, 1823, and action became necessary. Canning determined to act, and in the first days of October appointed Commercial Consuls to various South American States[1]. This step was clearly prompted by a desire to stabilise our commercial relations but was not definitely political in its bearing. But the explanations Canning had with the Prince de Polignac in October, 1823, were of a different and more important character.

The essential point of the Polignac conferences was that Canning informed France that any French attempt to restore Spanish dominion or to establish French authority in the American provinces would be followed by war with Great Britain. He had anticipated this possibility in a Cabinet Memorandum of February, 1823, expressing his opinion that Great Britain should fight. Polignac surrendered, and published his surrender in the following form: "She (France) abjured, in any case, any design of acting against the (Spanish) colonies by force of arms[2]." She also "disclaimed, on her part, any intention or desire to avail herself of the present state of the colonies, or of the present situation of France towards Spain, to appropriate to herself any part of the Spanish possessions in America or to obtain for herself any exclusive advantages." This constitutes, perhaps, the most important utterance and certainly one of the most decisive stages in the revolt of the Spanish American Colonies. For the declaration meant that, for once and all, Great Britain disclaimed any desire to acquire them herself, and warned any other European Power that she would fight them if they attempted to do so.

Canning's own position, as expressed in the Polignac Memorandum, was that Great Britain conceived any attempt of Spain to recover her Colonies to be entirely hopeless, and that she disclaimed any exclusive

[1] *The Papers of Sir Woodbine Parish* (1910), the first Consul-General to Buenos Ayres, contain Canning's Instructions to him, dated October 10th, 1823, pp. 426–33. All these papers are now in the Record Office.

[2] Conference between Prince de Polignac and Mr Canning, October 9th, 1823. Extracts were published in March, 1824. *Brit. and Foreign State Papers*, 1823–4, London, vol. XI. p. 49. For some curious details see F.O. France, 27/284, Canning to Sir C. Stuart, October 8th, 13th, 17th, 31st; November 9th, 1823; the suppressed passages are given in Appendix B to the present volume.

commercial advantage for herself. She did not desire to precipitate recognition, but could not make that recognition dependent upon that by Spain, and would consider any "foreign interference by force or menace in the dispute between Spain and her Colonies as a motive for recognising the latter without delay." He also said that Consuls had been sent to these several Colonies as a commercial measure, and that this had been settled in principle in December, 1822. Further, Great Britain "could not go into a joint deliberation upon the subject of Spanish America upon an equal footing with other Powers whose opinions were less formed upon that question, and whose interests were less implicated in the decision of it." In answer to a suggestion of Polignac's that the European Governments should "concert together...to endeavour to bring back to a principle of Union in Government, whether Monarchical or Aristocratic, People, among whom absurd and dangerous theories were now keeping up agitation and disunion," Canning declined to discuss "abstract principles." He added that "his Government could not take upon itself to put it (the establishment of a form of monarchical government in any of these provinces) forward as a condition of their recognition[1]." This Memorandum is the Charter of South American liberties, and the fact that it is signed by Canning is the reason why Spanish Americans still consider him the most notable of European statesmen[2].

V. THE MONROE DOCTRINE

While it is not easy to exaggerate Canning's services to South and Central America, his claim to have originated the "Monroe Doctrine" has not withstood the assaults of time. It was not indeed one which he would himself have made, and is due to the rash zeal of his admiring biographer. He was certainly the first of European statesmen to see that the United States were "now confessedly the leading power" in the two continents of America and the first to admit to Americans that he recognised the fact. What he did not recognise was the right of the United States to construct watertight compartments between America and Europe.

[1] It seems tolerably clear from Canning's conversations, as reported by Neumann to Metternich (*e.g.* February 7th, 21st, 1824, *Wiener Staats-Archiv*), that Canning preferred monarchical institutions in the New World, and even did something to further them, but would not make any public declaration on the subject. Cf. Appendix B.

[2] The Polignac Memorandum was not published till March, 1824; but its substance was known to most diplomats, notably to Austrian, on October 12th, though it did not apparently reach Washington in time to influence Monroe's Message of December 2nd, 1823. The suppressed parts are given in Appendix B.

While he held that Russia could not act alone, Canning fully understood the difficulty of the position. Great Britain had to resist, not only the practical intervention of France, but the moral pressure of the Holy Alliance, which might demand a Congress. He seems to have considered that the best method of preventing this was to associate the United States with Great Britain in a joint declaration deprecating the assembling of a Congress for Spanish America and contradicting the utterance of absolutist doctrines by the Russian Tsar and his Austrian and Prussian allies. Such a declaration would have been peculiarly to Canning's taste, as associating the republic of the United States and the Constitutional monarchy of Great Britain in a moral bond, and thus tempering democracy with monarchy, and at the same time bidding defiance to the "Areopagitic" spirit of the Holy Alliance. Accordingly, on August 16th, 1823, he approached Richard Rush, the United States Minister in London, with proposals for a concerted declaration.

Canning always maintained that, in the half-dozen conversations he held on this subject with Rush, he was "only sounding"; and this description seems in fact to be correct. It would have suited Canning best to make this joint declaration just about the date of his Conferences with Polignac, had Rush had sufficient authority to conclude anything in time. But on September the 26th the negotiation went so far that Rush offered on his own authority to sign a joint declaration, if Canning would recognise the Spanish American republics forthwith. Canning offered a recognition in the future, but declined it for the present, and informed him that British Consuls had been accredited to certain Spanish American States, which amounted in fact to commercial recognition. This Rush held to be insufficient and, with the interview in question, all direct influence of Canning on the message of President Monroe ceased. Canning proceeded to deal with France direct, and did not communicate the results of the Polignac interview to Rush until the end of November. It is clear, therefore, that Canning had dropped the negotiation at the end of September, as he then despaired of United States cooperation[1].

Canning's abandonment of his request for a joint declaration did not end the matter from the United States' point of view, for his original suggestions deeply influenced the attitude of the Powers. He had stated quite plainly that, while he considered the recovery of the

[1] F.O. America (Domestic), 5/181–2, January-December, 1823, *passim*. All this evidence is brilliantly analysed in Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 1898.

Spanish Colonies "entirely hopeless," he did not wish to impede "amicable negotiation" for arranging matters between them and the mother-country. He had stated, also, that recognition of the Colonies was a question of "time and circumstance," and that, while Great Britain desired the possession of no portion of them, she could not "see any part of them transferred to any other Power with indifference." Finally, in the middle of September, Canning enquired whether, since "the United States...were the first Power established on that (the American) Continent and now confessedly the leading Power...could Europe expect this indifference" (on the part of the United States)?

These suggestions and utterances were of very great significance for the United States, and for both President Monroe and John Quincy Adams, his Secretary of State, who was to be the real inspirer of policy. It was highly gratifying that Canning acknowledged the United States as the "leading Power" in America, but the other suggestions were less agreeable. There was, first, the difficulty about recognition, which Canning was not yet prepared to accord. There was the further difficulty, that acceptance of Canning's propositions would prevent the United States from increasing its territory. Adams desired, not indeed the annexation, but the possible incorporation, of both Texas and Cuba, and thought that both territories would ultimately fall to the United States. By the acceptance of Canning's self-denying territorial ordinance the United States would be excluded from these ambitions. That, at any rate, was a second reason and a good one, for not making a joint declaration with Great Britain.

The third reason was, perhaps, more important still. The joint declaration would unite the world and bring America into Europe. That was just what Adams wished to avoid. Jefferson's warning against "entangling alliances" sounded fresh in American ears. "The ground that I wish to take," wrote Adams in his Diary, "is that of earnest remonstrance against the interference of the European Powers by force with South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe; to make up an American cause and adhere inflexibly to that." In this spirit the Monroe Doctrine came to birth. It is now known beyond power of dispute that Adams, far more than Monroe, drew up the famous Presidential Declaration of December the 2nd, 1823. It is significant that the two ex-Presidents, Madison and Jefferson, urged the acceptance of Canning's view, but that Adams prevented it. Probably, the main reasons of the refusal of

the United States to join in the Declaration were two. First, the fear of Great Britain as "the natural enemy," though much mitigated, was not extinct. Second, and perhaps more important at the moment, the fear of Russia was very much alive. Adams did not fear France, for he knew (even before he heard of the Polignac Memorandum) that the British fleet would form a barrier between her and Spanish America. The case of Russia was different; she might intervene as a land Power in America, and her ruler was the most influential of despots, whose lectures on the beauties of absolutism might injure the cause of republicanism. Adams wished to exclude Europe as far as possible from America, and to effect this purpose the despotic Declaration must be met by a counter-declaration. "As the Holy Alliance had come to edify and instruct us with their principles, it was due in candour to them and in justice to ourselves, to return them the compliment." In other words, Adams meant to give abstract principle *in return for* abstract principle.

Monroe's Message, as actually delivered (December 2nd, 1823), contained three important principles.

> The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as future subjects for colonization by any European Powers.

The second fundamental principle was stated as follows:

> With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the Governments, who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States[1]....It is impossible that the allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent, without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold interposition, in any form, with indifference.

There were thus three principles—the assertion of the idea that the two American Continents were in practice already apportioned

[1] This applied to Powers other than Spain. The Monroe Message expressed the view that she could never recover her Colonies, but declared a policy of strict neutrality as between Spain and them.

and staked out; the perfect equality of America with Europe and their complete separation from each other; and the interest felt by the United States in everything touching on the Western Hemisphere. Now the importance at this moment of all three principles depended on whether the United States was prepared to assert and support these principles by force, or would appeal to force to support them. On this point the answer is quite clear. When a State speaks of "evidence of unfriendly disposition," etc., it usually means war under certain contingencies. In this case it did not. Wirt, who surpassed most men in commonsense, asked Adams in the Cabinet whether he intended to fight if the Holy Allies committed acts of direct hostility against South America. Adams replied evasively—that his declaration did not commit the United States to "absolute war," and that Great Britain was more committed than the United States (a most illuminating phrase). Subsequently, it was explained over and over again in Congress in the heated debates of 1825–6 that the United States would in such cases not necessarily fight. Hence, the conclusion is clear, that the Monroe Doctrine was a vague statement of policy, a lecture, a doctrine, an ideal; it was not a rule of action that the Government was prepared to enforce. It had no juridical value, and its statement of principles did not pledge the Government to execute its menaces. Therefore, it was not the Monroe Message, but the Polignac Memorandum, which averted armed intervention in the New World.

None the less, the impression made in Europe by the Monroe Doctrine was momentarily great. The British Opposition thought that it had been issued in concert with Canning. Chateaubriand, Metternich, Alexander, and the King of Prussia thought the same thing. Canning himself admitted that they (the United States) have "aided us materially." The Congress for settling (or rather for embroiling) the affairs of South America, which the Holy Allies had sought to hold, was "broken in all its limbs before." But Monroe's Message gave Canning moral support and enabled him to administer the *coup de grâce*. Great Britain declined to join the Congress, and the Holy Alliance felt it useless to invite the United States. The Congress, indeed, met at Paris, but in a very doleful mood—and without Plenipotentiaries; and, at the end of March, 1826, this last real attempt to revive "the Areopagus and the like of that" feebly flickered out.

VI. THE RECOGNITION OF THE SPANISH AMERICAN REPUBLICS

The question could not end here. Canning's great fear was that the United States would head a "General Transatlantic League" to prevent Europe from cooperating with America, or America from cooperating in Europe. Hence, his future policy was to break down the barrier of partition that the Monroe Doctrine might erect between the two Hemispheres[1]. He lost no time in making clear his views to Rush. How could America be closed to future British colonisation, when America's geographical limits were actually unknown? "If we were to be repelled from the shores of America, it would not matter to us whether that repulsion was effected by the ukase of Russia excluding us from the sea, or by the new Doctrine of the President excluding us from the land. But we cannot yield obedience to either." Rush found no answer to these queries. The Monroe Message hastened Canning's decision to recognise the new republics. So early as July 23rd, 1824, he concluded a Commercial Treaty with Buenos Ayres (the States of the Rio Plata—afterwards the Argentine Republic), which paved the way for political recognition. In December, Bolivar destroyed the last Spanish royalist army at Ayacucho, in Peru. The reign of Spain in the New World was over, except in certain islands; and it was on Cuba, Canning feared, that both France and the United States were casting greedy eyes. His remedy for this and for other dangers was full political recognition of the Colonies possessed of established Governments. France was still occupying Spain with her forces, and French intrigues multiplied. Canning circulated three separate Memoranda to the Cabinet, the most important being written by himself but signed by Liverpool[2], in which he advocated recognition on the triple ground of the necessity of developing the commercial resources of Mexico and Colombia, of permanently checking French aggression in the New World, and of preventing America's

[1] It is not possible to go into details here on the subject of Canning's views on the Oregon boundary question; but they were obviously influenced by the desire to ignore the Monroe Doctrine and permit future colonisation on the part of Great Britain in British Columbia; see, on Astoria, F.O. America, 5/129, 165–8; on Oregon, F.O. America, 191–2; E. J. Stapleton, *Correspondence*, II. 73. In an Instruction to Huskisson and Stratford Canning, May 31st, 1824, F.O. America, 5/191, Canning speaks of "the very extraordinary declaration of Monroe. If the American Commissioners raise it, the British are to say that His Majesty's Government reject it in the most unequivocal manner and to say that whatever right of colonising the unappropriated portions of America has been hitherto enjoyed by Great Britain, may still be exercised in perfect freedom."

[2] See as to this the present writer's article in *The American Historical Review* (1906), vol. XI. p. 780, note 2.

attempts to attach the new republics to her chariot. The struggle was hard, and Canning offered to resign over it. On December 17th, 1824, he wrote to Granville at Paris: "The deed is done. The nail is driven....Spanish America is free, and if we do not mismanage our affairs sadly she is English. The Yankees will shout in triumph, but it is they who lose most by our decision." The great danger of the time, a danger which the European system would have fostered, was "a division of the world into European and American, Republican and Monarchical, a League of worn-out governments on the one hand, and of youthful and striving states, with the United States, on the other. We slip in between and plant ourselves in Mexico. The United States have gotten the start of us in vain; and we link once more America to Europe. Six months more and the mischief would have been done." What mischief? Evidently that of division between the two Hemispheres, which would have prevented the policy of non-intervention being applied to the New World, have lost Cuba to Spain, and have encouraged France to attack the American continent, and the United States to form a Transatlantic League. This is evident from Canning's Cabinet Memorandum of November 30th, 1824, in which he states that one motive for recognition is to prevent the resources of Spain from being incorporated with those of France; but the "other and perhaps still more powerful motive is my apprehension of the ambition and ascendancy of the U[nited] S[tates] of Am[erica][1]...." "If we hesitate much longer...all the new states will be led to conclude that we regret their friendship upon principle, as of a dangerous and revolutionary character, and will be driven to throw themselves under the protection of the U[nited] S[tates], as the only means of security." It is therefore in this large sense that we must understand what Canning meant when he redressed the Balance of the Old World by creating the New. The recognition of the New World was intended by him to be a victory of opinion and a victory of fact. The first was highly important, for it excluded a whole Hemisphere from the "Areopagitic" spirit of the Holy Alliance. It was certainly, as such, successful; for, when the news of British recognition reached Madrid, it awakened violent protests not only from Spain, but from Austria, Russia and Prussia, who formally regretted a step which "gave a final blow to the interests of

[1] Vansittart papers, British Museum Add. MSS. 31,237, f. 288 *sqq*. Cf. an interesting letter of Neumann to Metternich, February 7th, 1824 (private), in which he says that Canning persuaded the Cabinet by showing the danger from the United States (*Wiener Staats-Archiv*).

Spain in the New World, and tended to encourage the revolutionary spirit which it had been found so difficult to restrain in Europe." It was a victory of fact, for French menaces to the New World were now idle. Recognition was the solemn ratification by Great Britain of the principle already indicated in the Polignac Memorandum, that France must disclaim all hope of territorial aggrandisement in the New World. On the last day of 1824, the official formalities for political recognition were finally completed, and the fact of it was made public in the King's Speech shortly afterwards by Lord Eldon (speaking for the King). Strangely enough, these two had been its strongest opponents.

The significance of this recognition in the American Continent itself must also be noted; for it was Canning's bid for South American support against the United States, and his method of breaking the ring-fence which Monroe had sought to set up. He carried his policy much further than is usually perceived[1]. Not only did he set himself most definitely to establish commercial relations with the new republics, but he tried to bring them into, and make them part of, the European political system. They had, in his view, everything to gain by this. The policy of "non-intervention" would protect them against the United States as well as against France or Spain, while Great Britain sought nothing except free commercial intercourse with them. Their true friend, he held, was Great Britain; for she had no political ambitions in regard to them. How far his designs reached we do not know, but his hint of our "planting ourselves in Mexico," and his reflexion that the western coast of Canada could not be ceded to the United States owing to the future Pacific trade, are notable enough in their way. Other steps were prompted by the growing appreciation of Great Britain displayed by the New World. Monroe's Message had given the United States the initial advantage; but the publication of the Polignac Memorandum in March, 1824, turned Latin-American eyes to Canning. His Commercial Treaty with Buenos Ayres (July, 1824), and finally his political recognition of Buenos Ayres, Colombia and Mexico (December, 1824), completed their satisfaction. Bolivar himself, more than once in 1824, expressed

[1] *E.g.* F.O. America, 5/209. Canning to Vaughan, February 18th, 1826: "The avowed pretensions of the United States to put themselves at the head of the confederacy of all the Americans, and to sway that Confederacy against Europe (Great Britain included) is *not* a pretension identified with our interests, or one that we can countenance or tolerate. It is however a pretension which there is no use in contesting in the abstract, but we must not say anything that seems to admit the principle."

the view that Great Britain and the United States protect us (*i.e.* the Spanish American Republics). It gradually began to be obvious that Great Britain's protection was the more avowed and certain. But the process took time. The truth began to emerge when Bolivar summoned a Congress at Panama in 1826, to discuss the question of the union of the Latin-American States and of a joint invasion of Cuba by the New Republics. Canning had already offered in 1825 to guarantee Cuba to Spain, as the price of her recognising the new States. The United States now took the line of remonstrating against an attack by the Spanish Colonies on Cuba and even indicating that it might resist such an attack by force. Canning saw his opportunity, and instructed the British Representative at the Conference that the British Government did not deny the right of the new States to attack Cuba, and had uniformly refused, though "regretting" such an attack, to join with the United States in remonstrating against it (March 18th, 1826). He added gravely, "Neither England nor France could see with indifference the U(nited) S(tates) in occupation of Cuba[1]." The truth was now coming out in acrimonious debates in the American Senate. The United States was not disinterested about Cuba, and was apparently prepared to go to war with any Spanish American States for its possession. But the United States was not prepared to go to war with a foreign Power, if other parts of America were invaded from over-sea. Canning, on the other hand, was; and, in addition, was disinterested about Cuba. These relations seem to have greatly affected opinion in Latin America, and E. J. Dawkins, the British Representative at Panama, wrote to Canning (October 15th, 1826) as follows: "The general influence of the United States is not, in my opinion, to be feared. It certainly exists in Colombia, but it has been very much weakened even there by their protests against an attack on Cuba, and by the indiscretions they have committed at Madrid." There is some prejudice in this view; but it cannot obscure the fact that Spanish American opinion praised Canning to the skies, and that he endeavoured characteristically to turn this popularity to advantage. He had already recognised the independence of Brazil, thus planting a monarchy in the midst of republics. He now sought to mediate in a boundary dispute between Brazil and Buenos Ayres, and even offered to "guarantee" the navigation on the River Plate to Brazil, if both sides demanded it. His Instructions in Greek policy

[1] Canning to Dawkins, F.O. Colombia, 18/50. Panama Congress; cf. F.O. Argentine, 6/12–15.

on October 13th, 1825, show a further advance in his conception of the future of the new States. "The Porte cannot doubt that all the inhabitants of both Americas, to a man, are in their hearts favourers of the Greek cause, and might at no distant period become active cooperators in it." This is "not the language of intimidation, it is that of truth[1]."

Considering that the United States had been beforehand in recognising the Spanish Colonies, there can be no doubt that Canning had played his cards well. Adams became President in 1825; but his influence over the Spanish American States was no longer what it had been when he had drafted Monroe's message. A prosaic and practical test is the best proof of this. In 1829 the United States had Commercial Treaties with Central America, Colombia and Brazil. Britain had Commercial Treaties with the last two, and also with Mexico and Buenos Ayres, which were commercially the more advanced[2]. In 1827, also, opinion had veered round to Canning. On January 3rd, 1828, Clay addressed a Note to the republic of La Plata that Monroe's Declaration must not be regarded "as conveying any pledge or obligation, the performance of which foreign nations have a right to demand"; for, he said, Congress and not the President had the right to declare war. Clay's utterance was cold comfort in comparison with the proud words uttered by Canning: "I looked to America to redress the inequalities of Europe. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that, if France had Spain, it should not be Spain with 'the Indies.' I called the New World into existence to redress the Balance of the Old" (December 12th, 1826). The phraseology was perhaps excessive, but it had a real meaning and effect, and an effect which is not recognised today. For the time being, Canning's policy had nullified the effect of the Monroe Doctrine, and it had made impossible the moral influence of the Holy Alliance and the active intervention of European Powers in the New World. The later developments of the Monroe Doctrine lie beyond our present sphere of comment; but they must not blind us to the fact that, when Canning died, it was towards Great Britain and not to the United States that the Latin republics looked as to a mighty, a distant, a disinterested, and a powerful Protector. The best proof of this is that Canning continues, as observed above, to be

[1] F.O. Turkey, 78/133. Canning to Stratford Canning, October 13th, 1825.

[2] F.O. Colombia, 18/43. Canning to Dawkins—further Instructions, March 18th, 1826. These seem to contemplate as a possibility the conclusion of a treaty, apparently political, with Buenos Ayres, Colombia, and Mexico; cp. F.O. Mexico, 50/19.

regarded by South Americans as the only European statesman who laid down a permanent policy for the New World[1].

VII. THE QUESTION OF PORTUGAL AND BRAZIL

In the war of opinion that was being waged Portugal's example was even more important than that of Spain. She was championed by Canning on grounds that were disconcertingly conservative, for our Defensive Alliance with Portugal reached back into the seventeenth century. Yet the defence of Portugal against attack in Europe was but one part of the problem. The peaceful separation of Brazil from Portugal which was effected by Canning stands in marked contrast to the bloody and costly struggle of Spain and her Colonies.

The real causes of Portuguese disturbances are to be sought in the Napoleonic Wars. When Canning was Foreign Secretary in 1807, the Regent of Portugal dropped down the Tagus under the protection of a British squadron, just as Junot and a French army were entering Lisbon. Canning wrote that the Regent would "convey to the New World the hopes and fortunes of the Portuguese monarchy and the means of founding it anew in augmented strength and splendour." Unfortunately, the Portuguese Royal House, once comfortably installed in Brazil, showed no desire to return to Europe. The situation, like all Portuguese situations, curiously resembled (and curiously differed from) that of Spain. The Spanish Colonies were lost to the mother-country because her monarch went to France, Brazil was lost to Portugal because her monarch came to Rio de Janeiro. In 1820 a revolution of a democratic character broke out in Portugal, and King John VI decided to return home from Brazil. After some delay he finally quitted Rio de Janeiro, leaving his son, Dom Pedro, as Regent and "Perpetual Defender" of Brazil, with instructions to proclaim her independence, if that step became absolutely necessary. Dom Pedro evidently thought so; for in September, 1822, he proclaimed himself "Constitutional Emperor," and in October Brazil declared her independence of Portugal. King John at once began a correspondence with his son, in which Portugal took her stand on the word "sovereignty," and Brazil on that of "independence." The dispute went on until 1825, and though a tedious was, at least, a bloodless warfare.

[1] F.O. America, 5/129, Castlereagh to Bagot, 1818 and 5/165 to Stratford Canning, 1822; Canning's chief papers are in 5/173, 179, 181, 184–6, 194 (Monroe Doctrine, etc.). See also W. C. Ford, "J. Q. Adams and the Monroe Doctrine," *American Historical Rev.* vol. VII. p 680.

King John's prestige had been weakened in Portugal by these events, and in February, 1823, an absolutist and reactionary revolt against him took place, which was joined by his second son, Dom Miguel. John claimed protection from Great Britain, which Wellington desired to give (July, 1823). But Canning refused and only consented to send a British squadron, which might be useful in protecting the King's person, but could not cause undue interference in internal and Constitutional affairs. On April 24th, 1824, a more serious development took place: King John was assaulted in his palace by a revolutionary movement engineered by the unfilial Dom Miguel. He fled, but after a few days returned to his palace, and again asked for British (or, rather, Hanoverian) troops to be sent to Madrid, asserting that Dom Miguel's intrigues had been favoured by the French. Canning at once approached the French Government and, after masterly negotiations, secured a written declaration that French troops would, under no circumstances, enter Portugal. His triumph was greater than in the Polignac Conference; for in that case menace of tone had been used to obtain a pledge of non-intervention from France. On the present occasion, mere dexterity sufficed.

British influence continued in the ascendant at Lisbon. Before the end of 1824 the supreme power was grasped by Palmella, the most pro-British of Portuguese Ministers. The pro-French party were expelled from the Cabinet, and the French Minister, de Neuville, felt it expedient to ask to be relieved of his duties. Canning's influence was now supreme and, it must be conceded, was in this case at least applied by him to noble ends. He used it to effect the peaceful separation of Brazil from Portugal, and sent Sir Charles Stuart to Brazil for the purpose of negotiating this result. Finally, on August 29th, 1825, a Treaty was signed between the two States, King John retaining the imperial title, but recognising Dom Pedro as Emperor of Brazil and Brazil as an independent State. It seemed that the horizon promised fair; but, towards the end of April, 1826, news reached Brazil that King John had died, on March 10th. Nothing had been said about the Succession, and Dom Pedro, as the eldest son, was technically King of Portugal and Emperor of Brazil. He had sense enough to decline the former honour, and agreed to the following terms. He abdicated in favour of his seven-year-old daughter, Donna Maria, and arranged that Isabella, his sister, should act as Regent for Donna Maria, and that the latter should be affianced to

her uncle, Dom Miguel. The arrangement was not altogether happy. Dom Miguel wished to be an absolutist King, and the public were shocked at his finding his way to the Throne by marrying his niece. Ultimately, the scheme was cancelled, but, in order to secure the popularity of the new régime, Dom Pedro decided to grant a Constitution to Portugal—which was to be the cause of much trouble in the future[1].

In the Brazilian Foreign Office of today hangs a large picture representing Sir Charles Stuart in a pink uniform receiving the Portuguese constitution from Dom Pedro, Emperor of Brazil. Sir Charles had remained in Brazil to facilitate the negotiation of a commercial treaty with Portugal, and was about to return to London. The Emperor Pedro, however, expressed his wish to send the Constitution to Lisbon "through his hands as Portuguese Plenipotentiary." Stuart, though startled and without Instructions, accepted the mission, after having divested himself of his British diplomatic office. Canning, when he learnt the news, approved Stuart's action and defended it to other Governments. In private, however, he regretted it, for he knew that it might result in inducing Portuguese Liberals to think that Great Britain would offer to guarantee the Constitution, and might suggest to Continental Powers that she had inspired its original concession. He, therefore, at once recalled Sir Charles Stuart from Portugal, in view of the ambiguity of his position. It was time, for Sir Charles had already tendered advice to the Regent on some points, and to that extent had gone beyond the wishes of the Home Government.

Canning made a skilful use of the fact that the Constitution had been *octroyée* by the Sovereign. The despotic Powers, he argued, had been to blame for "having put down the Constitutional systems (however little worth maintaining) of Naples and Spain—not on the ground of their intrinsic worthlessness, but simply and declaredly because they were not *octroyées* by the Sovereign[2]." No such objection, he proceeded to observe in a Circular to the Powers, could apply to the present Constitution of Portugal. Both the French and Austrian Governments received this communication in a friendly

[1] Most of the Brazil-Portugal papers are published; but there is some valuable unpublished material in Castlereagh, and in F.O. Portugal, 63/227, 231, 237–9; Canning's despatches to Lord Ponsonby, F.O. Buenos Ayres, 6/12–13.

[2] F.O. Portugal, 63/306, June 28th, 1826. This is the correct text. Stapleton has published a garbled version; but the real text is valuable as giving Canning's true view; *v.* also F.O. Portugal, 63/252, 273, 284, 310–24; 97/301.

spirit. Austria, which at the time sheltered Dom Miguel, undertook not to let him loose to oppose his brother's decrees in Portugal; France promised not to interfere. Canning, therefore, had a free hand. But he insisted, in a published despatch, that England disclaimed "all authoritative interference" in Portugal. The decision is with the Portuguese Ministry, and "for them and for them only to form." He did not, however, conceal his own view that "the best chance of a safe and tranquil issue...will be found in the acceptance (as immediate as may be suitable with the importance of the measure) of the charter of Dom Pedro, coupled (as it is) with his abdication of the throne" (July 17th, 1826).

So far, then, we are on perfectly clear ground. Canning had not inspired the grant of the Constitution, he had even regretted its despatch to Portugal by the hands of Sir Charles Stuart, and he had dissociated Great Britain from all appearance of dictation or interference in the matter. But new conditions now arose; for opponents of the Constitutional régime in Portugal fled across to Spain and began to organise reactionary bands on the border. In October, Canning, without consulting the Cabinet, ordered the British Minister to leave Madrid if the Spanish Government did not give up these deserters. For the time being, Spain collapsed, and Canning, who visited Paris in October, found that the French once more disclaimed interference on their own part. But, towards the end of November, it became evident that the Spanish Government was either deliberately or unconsciously, and in any case culpably, negligent in the matter of the Portuguese refugees. Incursions were made from Spanish territory into Portugal by bodies of men who were provided in Spain with arms, clothes, ammunition, and organisation. Consequently, on December 3rd, Portugal formally appealed for assistance according to her treaty rights[1]. What followed can be told in Canning's words:

On Friday precise information arrived. On Saturday His Majesty's confidential servants came to a decision. On Sunday that decision received the sanction of His Majesty. On Monday it was communicated to both Houses of Parliament, and this day (12 December, 1826)—at the hour at which I have the honour of addressing you—the troops are on their march

[1] Canning's own view of the situation, immediately previous to this appeal, very well explains his later action. See F.O. Buenos Ayres, 6/13, to Ponsonby, November 27th, 1826: "Whatever might have been the risk (and it was considerable) of introducing a representative constitution into Portugal, the danger of retracting it, after it had been introduced, would have been tenfold more formidable."

for embarkation....Let us fly to the aid of Portugal by whomsoever attacked; because it is our duty to do so; and let us cease an interference where that duty ends. We go to Portugal, not to rule, not to dictate, not to prescribe constitutions—but to defend and preserve the independence of an ally. We go to plant the standard of England on the well-known heights of Lisbon. Where that standard is planted, foreign dominion shall not come[1]!

It was natural that this haughty utterance should leave a profound effect; and the words were followed by deeds. On December 25th 4000 British troops sailed up the Tagus, whose shores were lined with shouting crowds. The supporters of Dom Miguel vanished helplessly out of sight, and for a time peace ensued. Europe was deeply impressed. It is not, however, very easy to see why. Castlereagh himself in 1821 informed the Portuguese Government that he would defend them against attack, if their frontiers were violated; but he declined to meddle with or to guarantee their internal institutions. Canning had followed the same course in 1822. England had always given the same pledge to defend Portugal's territorial borders, and had in the past sometimes supported it with arms. Why then did foreign Powers object, still more why did Wellington object, as he is known to have done?

The rest of Canning's speech must serve as an explanation. It contained the famous passage about calling the New World into existence, which might displease both France and Spain and the Holy Alliance, but which, after all, dealt only with a *fait accompli*. The Powers and the reactionaries in all countries seem to have detected in this speech a note of menace which was new and alarming. "May God prosper this attempt at the establishment of Constitutional liberty in Portugal!" This observation, though it came from a Constitutional Minister, was regarded with horror by the despotic monarchies. The fact is that the tables had been turned. In 1823, despotic doctrines were threatening to extend to the New World, and French arms had restored despotism in Spain. In 1826, Constitutional doctrines had reached Portugal from America, and had been defended in arms by Canning. It is true that he had defended the territory, and not the Constitution, of Portugal; but the two were, not unnaturally, regarded as inseparable. Hence the consternation of the despots. Not only was the New World free, but the New World had endowed

[1] Lord John Russell, who was present, told a friend that a beam of light fell on Canning as he spoke these words, and that his face seemed as if inspired.

a European State with a Constitution. This was bringing America into Europe, with a vengeance[1]!

The turn of events had certainly tended to force Canning from the position which he had endeavoured to maintain. He had sought to hold the balance between the conflicting principles of despotism and liberty and, while holding high the balance, to grasp, though not to unsheathe, the sword. Now, the sword was unsheathed and the balance turned against the despots. The Holy Alliance, said Canning, "had converted an umpire into an adversary." In case of hostilities, also, he warned them. "England could not avoid seeing ranked under her banners all the restless and dissatisfied of any nation with whom she came into conflict." Yet he still held to the old principles and warned Portugal that she was not justified in attempting to precipitate Constitutionalism "by forcing upon one nation (*i.e.* Spain) the principles or practice of another" (*i.e.* Portugal). What had really happened was this: the propaganda of despotism had failed, the propaganda of Constitutionalism was advancing apparently to assured victory in the New World, in the awakening Constitutional Opposition in France, in the rising Liberal tide throughout Europe. Canning had made opinions more powerful than arms, and his words rang through Europe like a trumpet. The Congresses were no more; the "Areopagitic spirit" was confined within due bounds; and the British Minister had raised his country to a position such as she had never surpassed, and had seldom equalled, in her history.

VIII. THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE

The Greek Insurrection strained to the limit the resources of European diplomacy, for it introduced a wholly new element into the fermenting unrest of the Continent. To the conflict between the Holy Alliance and Liberalism and nationality in Western and Central Europe it added the complications of oriental intrigue and of religious fanaticism. It is curious that, though the Serbs had revolted twice since 1800, their Second Rebellion in 1813 had hardly stirred the waters of European diplomacy; while the Greek Insurrection lashed them into frenzy. In their last and victorious revolt, the Serbs achieved

[1] Portuguese affairs occupied Canning in the last days of his life. He had come to see that the Constitutional régime in Portugal could hardly last, that "the use of continued physical force" by Great Britain "was not desirable," and that Dom Miguel's Regency was "perhaps the least of evils." At the moment of Canning's death a scheme for that purpose was being worked out by Great Britain conjointly with Austria. See F.O. Portugal, 63/318. Dudley to Sir Wm. A'Court, May 14th, 16th; August 24th, 1827.

their own freedom by their own arms, though Russia turned towards them a sympathetic eye. In fact, the situation in Serbia seems to have been anomalous. Miloš Obŕenović, the successful rebel, was recognised as supreme Knez (or Ruler) by the Sultan in 1817, but was associated with a Turkish Pasha, who ruled conjointly with him at Belgrade, and maintained Turkish garrisons in certain Serbian fortresses. Above all, and here the contrast with Greece was great, hostilities had ceased in 1815 and Miloš very wisely declined to renew them or to look outside and favour any cooperation with rebellious Greeks. Hence, the Great Powers seem to have regarded the Serbs as a people whose successful revolt had improved their position under the Sultan, but without showing any of the objectionable features attaching to revolts in general or to democratic and liberal ones in particular. On the other hand, it can be shown that Castlereagh did seriously believe that the Greek Insurrection was due to the same movement as had produced revolutions at Naples, Lisbon and Madrid in 1820[1]. Thus, he wrote[2]:

> The insurrection throughout European Turkey, in its organisation, in its objects, in its agency, and in its external relation is in no respects distinguishable from the movements in Spain, Portugal and Italy....Whatever may be the views of the Turkish Power, it is, at least, exempt from the revolutionary danger. The cause of the Greeks is deeply and inevitably tainted with it.

This may explain why, in a later despatch, he suggested that "a negotiation on the frontiers might encourage the Greeks in their resistance," and added in pencil the marginal note: "Delete this if it should ever be published[3]."

It would, however, be unjust to Castlereagh to suggest that his policy was wholly influenced by these singular reflexions. On October 14th, 1820, his Instructions to Liston suggest that he was prepared for cooperation of the Powers as regards the Græco-Turkish question[4]. This was indeed before a grave crisis had occurred. The Russian Embassy took a very strong line, and, in July, 1821, actually withdrew from Constantinople. Yet, about this time, Castlereagh wrote that "conjoint representations" to Turkey, "since the period of the General Peace...have invariably failed of producing a beneficial

[1] The idea was apparently first expressed by Lord Stewart (afterwards Lord Londonderry); F.O. Austria, 7/159, Stewart to Castlereagh, May 30th, 1821.
[2] *Memoirs and Despatches*, XII. 444, December 14th, 1821.
[3] F.O. Turkey, 78/105. Castlereagh to Strangford, July 9th, 1822.
[4] F.O. Turkey, 78/97. Gen. Instructions to Sir R. Liston, October 14th, 1820.

effect[1]." In October, 1821, remembering the embarrassments caused him by the joint declarations of Troppau and Laibach from which he had dissented, Castlereagh instructed Strangford to pursue a similar course with regard to Turkey: "I am fully satisfied, if the time should come when it may be advisable, that the Greeks should be made acquainted by some authentic act with the sentiments of the Allied Courts, that a joint declaration should be avoided[2]." It was above all desirable "to avoid those general reasonings, which might tend...to give this transaction a more general character than it is convenient to assign to it." He saw "no practical inconvenience" in "divergence" between Austria and Prussia on the one hand, as they have no deliberative assemblies to manage. They can therefore take the course which suits them best, without being exposed to any of those inconveniences which might to a certain degree arise in France but must inevitably here....His Majesty's Government in taking its own decision has expressly disclaimed any desire to influence theirs[3].

Castlereagh's idea was that, though it was desirable to have general cooperation in attempting to avert war between Russia and Turkey, the methods and actions of each Power must vary according to its circumstances. One of his last actions was to send a very strong remonstrance as to the Turkish massacre at Scio, stating that the "tidings of it has inflicted a sensible wound on the King's mind and filled the British nation with horror and disgust," and threatening to withdraw the British Mission if there were a repetition of "transactions for which no human offences can furnish a pretext[4]." His Instructions for the Congress of Verona show (see above, p. 43) that he still hoped to preserve peace between Turkey and Russia and that, though our attitude was one of neutrality as between Greece and Turkey, Great Britain might be forced to recognise the Greeks as *de facto* belligerents.

It was at this point that Canning took up the reins. He issued Supplementary Instructions on September 24th, 1822, to Wellington at Verona, which clearly strike a new note. Wellington was to press for the extraction of a promise of future good government from the Porte and for an amnesty to the Greeks of the most comprehensive kind[5]. "We cannot interfere on behalf of the Greeks beyond

[1] F.O. Turkey, 78/97. Gen. Instructions to Sir R. Liston, July 13th, 1821.
[2] F.O. Turkey, 78/97. Castlereagh to Strangford, October 28th, 1821.
[3] F.O. Turkey, 78/105. Castlereagh to Strangford, March 29th, 1822. (Private and confidential.)
[4] F.O. Turkey, 78/105. Castlereagh to Strangford, July 9th, 1822.
[5] F.O. Continent, 139/46. Canning to Wellington, September 24th, 1822.

this, but, if the Turks granted our demands and Greece refused them, we cannot force them upon the latter." He then adds, in defence of Turkey:

> Whatever might be our wishes, our prejudices, our sympathies, we are bound in political justice to respect that national independence which, in case of civil commotion, we should expect to be respected in our own.... Nor was it for a Christian government which rules...over a population of millions of Mahomedans, to proclaim a war of religion.

Canning was thus assuming that we naturally sympathised with Greece, but must none the less preserve a strict neutrality. He carefully avoids any suggestion that the Greek Insurrection had any connexion with the democratic or Liberal uprisings elsewhere; and, in these two respects, his attitude differed markedly from that of Castlereagh. In two other respects, however, they were identical. Canning favoured individual rather than collective pressure on the Porte, and he recognised the Greeks as belligerents in March, 1823. This last step brought him into conflict with Metternich, who ascribed it to the Jacobin promptings of Canning's heart. It has been seen that the policy had already been suggested by Castlereagh.

Canning's attitude on the Greek question has been much misrepresented. Greek literature was probably better known to him than it has been to any British statesman, not excepting even Gladstone or Lord Derby, and he had written a youthful poem on the miseries of Greek slavery under the Turks. These facts should not blind us to the further fact that he was not greatly influenced by sentiment. In his early days in Parliament, he had declared that he would not scruple to ally with the Grand Seignior against the French, even though "he had a long beard and a long gown." At the Foreign Office in the years 1807–9, he had pursued a strong Turcophil policy. Now, he was not blinded by a romantic feeling for Greece; he laughed at the pretensions of "Epaminondas and Co."; he said that no one in England would dream of going to war "on account of Aristides and St Paul," and he noted in a despatch that the War had been marked on both sides "by disgusting barbarities." But he had no sympathy with Castlereagh's strange opinion that the Greeks were allied with democrats of other countries, and were a species of Balkan Carbonari, whose success might endanger the stability of government in Naples or Spain. He was frankly an opportunist, and intended to be guided by events. If the recovery of Greece by Turkey proved hopeless, then some new method of government would have to be tried. In

the meantime, British commerce was not to suffer because the Turks could not protect it, and the recognition of the Greeks as belligerents was not intended as anything either more or less than a protective commercial measure. "Belligerency was not so much a principle *but* a fact." If the choice lay, as it did, between treating the Greeks, who had acquired "a certain degree of force and stability" in government, as pirates or belligerents, we must treat them under the latter category.

During the year 1823, the Greeks continued to maintain themselves; Byron awakened their hopes and facilitated their loans by lending the support of his name and of his sword, and was followed to Greece by a host of lesser volunteers. A vast Philhellenic sentiment manifested itself throughout Europe, notably in France, where it was favoured by Chateaubriand, and in Great Britain by Erskine, Sir Robert Wilson, and the advanced guard of the Whigs. Canning replied to all remonstrances as to the collection of subscriptions, the raising of volunteers and the holding of public meetings in favour of Greece by demonstrating with vexatious conservatism that, in similar circumstances, similar demonstrations had taken place in the eighteenth century[1]. He made great efforts to influence the Sultan in the direction of peace and amnesty, but without any success.

The real danger was the attitude of Russia. She had not only endured great provocation from the Turks; but she naturally sympathised with the members of her Church in Greece. It is immensely to the credit of Alexander that he refused to go to war and, under the influence of Metternich, decided to treat the Greek case as merely a part of the general settlement of a Europe which was to be governed by the Holy Alliance on the principles of moral solidarity. In doing this Alexander always asserted that he was opposing the wishes of the large majority of his subjects. He endeavoured, therefore, not unnaturally, to gain as much by diplomacy as he had lost by not going to war. In a Circular of January 12th, 1824, he invited the Powers to unite in a Congress which should force the Turks to accept a scheme for the settlement of Greece. This scheme would have formed three Principalities out of Greece and have left all of them dependent upon Russia, which already exercised an important influence over Serbia, Moldavia and Wallachia. By dividing these little Balkan States Russia hoped to control them. The scheme was doomed to failure.

[1] F.O. Turkey, 78/113. Canning to Strangford, July 12th, 1823. Military officers were, however, informed that, if they enlisted on the side of Greece, they would be struck off the active list.

Metternich was not averse from Congresses, but could not actually assent to a scheme which might give to Russia the hegemony of Greece, if not of the Balkans. Hence, while he did not openly dissent from it, he at times indicated a faint approval. Canning objected both to Congresses and to Russian penetration of the Balkan peninsula. When the Turks uttered vehement protests and a Greek deputation to Canning announced their refusal to accept the Tsar's proposals, Canning announced that Great Britain would agree to no proposals not accepted by the Greeks. He sent his cousin, Stratford Canning, to Petrograd as Special Plenipotentiary to discuss this question. He laid down two conditions as essential before Great Britain could enter a Congress: (1) the resumption of diplomatic intercourse between Russia and Turkey, (2) the renunciation of the use of force by all parties to the negotiation. Stratford passed through Vienna on his way, whence he sent back highly amusing accounts of Metternich to his cousin. He found Metternich partly favourable to Russian designs and ardent for a Congress on the basis of moral solidarity. In point of fact, Canning could hardly have consented to a Congress on Turkey, unless it had been very narrowly defined; for any admission of general principle would have forced him to consent to a Congress on the Spanish Colonies, which was then being advocated. To this Canning was resolved to refuse assent under all circumstances. On the whole, it would appear that Metternich blundered. For to him the Spanish Colonies meant nothing and the Eastern question everything. Hence, his policy should have been to let Canning have his way in the former, in the hope of promoting joint Austro-British action in the latter. As it was, a breach ensued. Canning wished to gain time, to avert the Græco-Turkish Conference, while Metternich desired to force his hand and to cause it to be held[1]. When Metternich discovered from Stratford Canning that he would be unable to do this, he wrote in abusive terms to Eszterházy about the Foreign Secretary, and instructed the Ambassador to explain to Wellington his deep disappointment, and to state that "we regard England as lost to the cause that we ought all to consider as always forming the basis of our existence[2]." The basis is apparently that of "moral solidarity"—in other words, a general maintenance of the Congress-system, which Canning had abandoned. Metternich wrote that the attitude of Canning caused a necessary *rapprochement*

[1] *Wiener Staats-Archiv.* Metternich to Neumann, November 30th, 1824.
[2] *Ibid.* Metternich to Eszterházy, February 10th, 1825. (Secret.)

between Russia and Austria[1]. Eszterházy reported that Canning had asserted, on October 8th, 1825, that "the interests of Austria and Great Britain were the same; but he did not see how they could act together when they set out from different principles[2]." Thus it was really because of Spanish America that Austro-British cooperation as to Greece broke down.

When he reached Petrograd, Stratford found it impossible to obtain assent to the only conditions on which Great Britain would enter a Conference. Subsequently, he was appointed to succeed Strangford in the Constantinople Embassy, and his Instructions show what George Canning thought[3]. He ascribed the failure of the Conference to the premature disclosure of Alexander's plan[4], to the refusal of both belligerents to accept it, and to the fact that those of the Powers who had entered into the idea of cooperation "had neither defined the limits, nor adjusted the principles, nor taken into consideration the consequences which were likely to result from its failure." He went on to say that "to suppose that Greece can ever be brought back to what she was in relation to the Porte is vain. With how much less than complete separation and independence, Greece herself would be satisfied, we have not the means of pronouncing, but if it is wished, we would endeavour to ascertain. We do not obtrude our services." Great Britain was "free from all engagements, direct or constructive, with respect to the affairs of Turkey or Greece." He advised Turkey strongly to make peace, and offered, not only the good offices, but also the "single intervention," of Great Britain for the purpose. It is clear, therefore, that Canning was now endeavouring to act alone[5], though "mediation" rather than "intervention" was his aim.

There is, consequently, a change in policy at the end of 1825. During the early part of the year, Canning was "marking time" to avert a Congress; during the latter part, he desired to act alone and to force

[1] *Wiener Staats-Archiv.* Metternich to Eszterházy, January 1st, 1825.

[2] *Ibid.* Eszterházy to Metternich, October 8th, 1825. The reference is to the refusal of Metternich to recognise the Spanish Colonies; in a separate letter of October 12th Canning describes Austria as "in principle, and in fact, the ally of Turkey."

[3] F.O. Turkey, 78/133. George Canning to Stratford Canning, Instructions dated October 12th, 1825.

[4] It came out in the Press early in 1824. Some persons said Canning had disclosed it deliberately. It was, however, first published in Paris.

[5] This is made clear by his rebuke to Lord Strangford, now transferred to Petrograd, who had been advocating a "collective menace" to Russia. Canning disavowed him, informed him that he had "cut the ground from under Mr Stratford Canning's feet," and added: "The Instructions which I have now to give your Excellency are comprised in a few short words—to be quiet." December 31st, 1825.

the Turks to make peace. His reasons for this decision were speedily justified by events. The Sultan, despairing of conquering Greece by his own armies, had called on the Pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, for aid. The Pasha had sent a strong force under his son, Ibrahim Pasha. That resolute commander had landed in the Morea and proceeded at once to display his efficiency and barbarity. He was subsequently forced by Canning to disavow a horrible project of depopulating the Morea and transplanting its inhabitants elsewhere. But his barbarities inflamed public opinion in England and, what was even more serious, in Russia. After deciding against any further collective action, Alexander journeyed down to the Crimea, convinced at last that he had been hoodwinked by Metternich, and, as was widely thought, determined to declare war on the Turk. Then the unexpected happened. Alexander, still a young man, died suddenly at Taganrog (December 1st, 1825). Canning, who had already proposed the "single intervention" of Great Britain to Turkey, now resolved to propose it to Russia also. The occasion was found in the fact that a British representative had to be sent to congratulate the new Tsar Nicholas on his accession, and the person selected was the Duke of Wellington.

Canning's Instructions to Wellington of February 10th, 1826, show very clearly his ideas. He stated that Alexander's determination not to move against Turkey without the consent of the Holy Alliance had made him the dupe of Metternich; but that the Tsar in his last days had been thoroughly undeceived and, "in a spirit of gloomy abstraction...had resolved on immediate war[1]." Russian Ministers like Nesselrode had, also, spoken with contempt of Metternich's "worn-out and delusive policy." Hence, the young monarch, Nicholas, was much more likely to pursue a purely Russian policy than one in concert with the Holy Alliance, or, in plain words, was not likely to be held back from making war on Turkey merely because Metternich reminded him that the Holy Alliance should always act in common, and sought, as always, to condemn Russia to inaction. The signs, therefore, tended to suggest a Russian declaration of war as an immediate possibility. To avert this, Canning had already proposed the single mediation of Great Britain, as between Greece and Turkey, to settle the Greek problem. This proposal should be pressed; but, if it could not be carried, then a joint Russo-British mediation should be attempted. In the case neither of joint nor of single mediation was

[1] Also in F.O., Wellington's *Desp. Corr. and Mem.* III. 85.

the Duke to admit that the failure of such a policy conferred on Russia "a right of war against Turkey." If the proposal of a general conference was made, Wellington was to oppose it by using the argument that Prussia wished to attend it, but that the Netherlands had an equal right with Prussia to be represented there, especially in any question of "maritime interest."

On the point of conferences Canning enlarged. "Nothing can exceed the soreness of other Powers, the Netherlands in particular, at the association of Prussia in an Alliance assuming the general direction of Europe, more especially since a question between Prussia and the Netherlands had been decided at Verona against the latter; the Netherlands not being summoned to state their case, and Prussia sitting as a judge in a cause in which she was a party." By multiplying other conditions, as, *e.g.* demanding that the conference should sit in London, the project of a general conference was to be scotched. Canning did not, in fact, believe that it would be seriously proposed. He recognised, however, that it might be desirable to take some vigorous step to prevent Russia from going to war with Turkey. An opportunity for this had already been offered, first, by our "single mediation"; it was now to be renewed by a threat, in certain circumstances, of British naval intervention between Greece and Turkey.

Appalling rumours had already been circulated as to Ibrahim's atrocities in the Morea. It had been reported, originally by Russia, and since then on reasonably good authority from the Near East, that Ibrahim purposed to massacre most of the males in the Morea, to carry off all that survived together with the women and children, and to re-people the peninsula with Egyptians or Arabs. In brief, a "new Barbary State" was to be created in Europe. Since neither British public opinion nor policy would permit the execution of so monstrous a design, strong measures had to be taken. Stratford Canning had been instructed (February 10th, 1826) to inform the Turks that

> our fixed determination is, that such a new State shall not grow up in Christian Europe. This determination is one which Great Britain can execute, by interposing, if necessary, for that purpose, her maritime power between the Morea and Egypt. We do not disguise from ourselves, nor intend that you should disguise from the Porte, that, by such interposition, we must incidentally, but no doubt materially, affect the operations of the war in Greece. That is not our object....But the apprehension that such would be the incidental consequence of a step to be taken in the pursuit of an avowed and legitimate object will not divert us from that pursuit.... The only thing by which we can be diverted from it is the disavowal

by the Turkish Government of any such design, or an immediate order to Ibrahim Pasha to desist from it[1].

The Duke was to inform the Russian Government of the proposed step and to disclaim any desire on the part of Great Britain, at the same time, to increase her prestige or to obtain territorial or commercial advantages by this or any other action. It was believed that "this step may probably save the Porte herself from destruction, and Europe from a general war." Finally, Canning hoped that the affairs of Turkey and Greece might be arranged by Great Britain, in close cooperation with Russia, and that, if any arrangement was finally agreed to by British mediation, it should be placed "under the guarantee of Russia, jointly with that of Austria, Prussia, and France," though Great Britain would not be a party to such a guarantee.

Underlying these Instructions is the conviction at which Canning had now finally arrived, despite the progress of Ibrahim's arms and the apparently desperate state of Greece. He now felt assured that Greece could never be recovered by Turkey; but he was prepared to consider some sort of arrangement by which she should become a State paying tribute to and acknowledging the suzerainty of the Porte, but with a government largely administered by Greeks, with full commercial freedom, and with arrangements for removing its Mussulman inhabitants. The analogy he adduced was that of the republic of Ragusa, which had been placed under Turkish suzerainty in 1699, but without losing its autonomy or changing its form of government in essentials. Canning seems to have been averse from placing Greece under the rule of "a European Prince," in view of the complications which might arise; and the evidence shows that he was prepared to see a republic established in Greece, as he had seen it so often formed in South America.

Wellington was, by this time, not very friendly in feeling towards Canning; but his ideas in the main agreed with those of the Foreign Secretary. On his arrival at Petrograd, however, he found that the situation was somewhat different from that which he had been led to expect. Canning's forecast that Nicholas would pursue a purely Russian policy proved in the end correct, but was for the moment premature. The Tsar had just suppressed a conspiracy against his life and was hostile towards the Greeks as being "rebels" against their legitimate

[1] Orders were sent to the British Naval Commander in the Levant to communicate with Ibrahim Pasha, who gave an evasive answer. The Porte did the same; but Canning instructed the British squadron to remain in the eastern Mediterranean for the repression of piracy, thus in effect preventing the project.

Sovereign. He even told Wellington that the Russian people cared nothing about those who shared their religious faith, whereas Alexander had always declared that his refusal to go to war with Turkey had made him unpopular with the majority of his subjects. Nicholas did not at the moment contemplate war on behalf of the Greeks; but he had decided to exact full satisfaction from the Turks as to the acknowledgment of various rights and the redressing of various grievances in which Russia was particularly concerned. "You menace and expect to attain your object," said he to the Duke (March 16th), "and why should not I?" The Tsar had, therefore, instructed Minciaky to present three demands to the Porte; first, the immediate settlement of certain difficulties in the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia; secondly, the release of certain Serbian delegates who had been improperly detained by the Porte for some years; and, thirdly, the despatch of plenipotentiaries by the Turks to some place on the frontiers of Russia to arrange for the carrying out of all clauses of the Treaty of Bucharest which had not yet been executed. It was demanded that these measures should be put into operation within six weeks. Wellington was much alarmed at this peremptory action, though Nesselrode took care to impress on him that the proceedings were to be conducted "in the most conciliatory manner" and that the third condition was not a *sine qua non*. Contrary to immediate expectation, such proved to be actually the case, and on October 6th, 1826, the Convention of Akkerman in effect afforded Russia satisfaction on all these points.

Meanwhile, the Greek question remained. Nicholas had begun by declaring that, in case of war, he did not desire to annex a single village, in the territory of European Turkey at all events. The Russian Ministers, so soon as Wellington began discussing the question, sought to weaken the force of this declaration and to omit it from any signed instrument. Wellington, however, stood firm and obtained a signed Protocol on April 4th, embodying the following conditions. The first two Articles provided that British mediation, as at present proposed between Greece and Turkey, should demand a status for Greece substantially on the lines already sketched by Canning. The third provided that Russia should assist the British mediation as and when required. Articles IV and V provided that, in case of the failure of such mediation, Russia and Great Britain should pursue a common policy with regard to Greece, on the basis of obtaining for her the status already defined in Article I, though both Powers reserved the right to define in future the territory to be known as Greece. By

Article VI, both Great Britain and Russia promised "not" to "seek in this arrangement any increase of territory, nor any exclusive influence, nor any advantage in commerce for their subjects, which shall not be equally attainable by other nations." Article VII provided that, in case both Governments became parties to the arrangements outlined, the Treaty effecting the reconciliation of Greece should be communicated to Austria, Prussia and France, who should join Russia in guaranteeing it, Great Britain not being a party to such guarantee.

It has been said that Canning was dissatisfied with this Protocol. He was certainly annoyed that it was made public in *The Times* of May 8th. The Powers, other than Russia, who had been invited to take part in the guarantee, seem to have in a measure resented not being present at the drawing up of the Protocol. Its justification, however, lay in the fact that the Greeks offered, for the first time, to come "to an accommodation upon...terms short of absolute and total independence," just before they became aware of the Protocol's suggestion as to their status. They demanded only, in addition, complete (instead of partial) exclusion of the Turks from their government, and the guarantee of Great Britain. Canning, finally, brought the matter to a head by arranging with Russia to define the situation at Constantinople in September. He made clear to Russia that, even if she went to war with Turkey, the British Government would not consider the Protocol abrogated, but only the joint mediatory Concert of England and Russia dissolved. This would, however, not put an end to Article VI, imposing a self-denying ordinance on the two parties[1]. At the same time, he reminded Russia that Austria had proposed in 1825 "to threaten to admit, some day, the independence of the Morea and the islands." From the Turkish point of view, the qualified independence proposed in the Protocol was clearly preferable, and therefore rendered the negotiation more hopeful. In taking this line, Canning was, perhaps, moving faster than his colleagues. As Bathurst complained to Wellington (September 5th, 1826), "it has long been a great object with the Foreign Office to take a part for the Greeks, as being a very popular cause among a large description of well-meaning people, as well as with all democrats[2]." He even suggested that Canning was priming Lieven, and Wellington did not rebut the suggestion. In any case, shortly after Lieven's return to England from Russia, he and Canning combined to press the question

[1] The Russians afterwards interpreted this article differently.
[2] Wellington's *Desp. Corr. and Mem.* III. 402–4.

of Greece on the Porte (September), and Canning went so far as to propose to threaten the Porte with a concerted and simultaneous withdrawal of Ambassadors, while Lieven practically suggested the recognition of Greek independence, to which Canning gave a qualified assent[1]. On November 20th, Canning finally suggested that Russia and Great Britain should not act alone in either of these matters, but should in the course of the winter communicate with the other Powers and secure their support. Canning had quite recently visited France, and already knew that he could count on her support. When the communication was finally made, France indicated assent and co-operation, and asked that the Protocol might be turned into a Treaty, but that all the parties to it (*i.e.* including Great Britain) should guarantee the settlement. Prussia indicated dissent and lack of interest. Metternich refused to agree, on the ground that he would be countenancing Greek insurgents. This Austrian refusal rendered nugatory the scheme for jointly withdrawing the Embassies from Constantinople. It also, probably, encouraged the Porte to reject Stratford Canning's final proposal of British mediation. Whatever the cause, the Protocol had failed, and stronger measures had become necessary.

The danger of Russia making war by herself was obviously increased by delay, and Canning seems to have been determined at all hazards to prevent Russia from acting alone. There is some evidence that she was less likely to make war than has been supposed; for Nicholas was conscious of the demoralised state of his army and of the emptiness of his exchequer. There were, moreover, certain important precedents justifying a formal intervention by Great Britain herself. Theoretically, the Barbary States were under Turkish rule; practically, Great Britain repressed their piracies, when necessary, without consulting the Porte. She had been prepared to act alone against Ibrahim Pasha, if he avowed or continued the "transplantation" scheme. It does not, therefore, seem unreasonable to contend that, though Great Britain had been so far scrupulously neutral, there were limits to the possibilities of her continued inaction. Hence, there was a real possibility of agreement between Russia and Great Britain, for British naval power could be used to support Russian pressure, in order to secure an armistice. Canning always said that he was not going to allow Russia to "swallow Turkey at one mouthful

[1] His view was that the proposal in the Protocol of limited independence for Greece must first be made to the Porte, and that, failing its acceptance there, complete independence should be suggested.

and Greece at another." If, however, he was to prevent this, he must use more forcible means than the Protocol; and on these he now decided. He was, moreover, resolved to bring France as well as Russia into the agreement.

The complications of negotiation with the Porte, of French obstruction[1], and the reconstruction of the Ministry in England delayed action, but the Treaty was finally signed at London on July 6th, 1827, by the British, French and Russian representatives. Its provisions included an express pledge of combined effort on the part of the three signatories to stop the effusion of blood by offering mediation between the Ottoman Porte and the Greeks. The basis of arrangement was to be that Greece should be under the Sultan "as a Lord Paramount," but should be a State paying tribute, choosing and appointing its own authorities, subject "to a defined right of nomination" by the Turkish Government. The boundaries were to be drawn later by negotiation. By Article V, the Contracting Powers agreed to seek no territorial extension, exclusive influence or commercial advantage; while under Article VI the settlement was to be guaranteed by such Powers as judged it "expedient or possible."

By a Secret Article, the three Powers bound themselves to enter at once into commercial relations with the Greeks.

> If, within one month[2], the Porte did not accept the Armistice, or if the Greeks refused to execute it, the said High Powers intend to exert all the means which circumstances may suggest to their prudence for the purpose of obtaining the immediate effects of the Armistice of which they desire the execution, by preventing, as far as possible, all collision between the contending Parties...without, however, taking any part in the hostilities between them.

Finally, the three Powers bound themselves to continue the work of pacification, in any case, on the agreed basis.

The main point of interest lay in the difference between this Treaty and Wellington's Protocol. The Duke objected to it because, as he later told Eszterházy, it removed the safeguards and precautions

[1] Due to the French desire to force the British Government to give a joint and binding guarantee of the settlement. Among other things France insisted on submitting the Treaty to Vienna. F O. France, 27/361. Dudley to Granville, June 1st, 1827.

[2] It is remarkable and significant, as indicating Canning's determination to preserve the Greeks from extinction, that this period was ultimately shortened from one month to a fortnight. "The affairs of the Levant are unhappily in a state in which the unnecessary delay of another fortnight might be severely felt." F.O. France, 27/361. Dudley to Granville, July 13th, 1827.

inserted in the Protocol to prevent separate action by Russia[1]. He admitted, however, at the same time, that the Treaty had had a very beneficial effect upon France, and that French cooperation had enabled England to restrain Russia within reasonable bounds. A good deal of mystery has hung about the Secret Article; but its meaning seems to have been that the three Signatory Powers were prepared to force either or both belligerents to an armistice by the use of maritime power and by preventing supplies or transports from reaching Ibrahim in the Morea, either from Turkey or from Egypt. The Admirals of the three Powers were instructed to use "extreme care," and to act as "conciliators." What this exactly meant, and to what lengths Canning was prepared to go, we cannot know with certainty. The Treaty was his, and the secret of his intentions is buried with him. One thing is certain, that, so long as Canning lived, the initiative and control rested with Great Britain. On August 8th, Canning died. The Greeks at once accepted the Armistice. Both Austria and Prussia refused to sign the Treaty; and their attitude was unmistakably most encouraging to the Turks, and goes far to explain what subsequently happened. Probably, the Turks were rendered more defiant by the fact that two distinguished British officers, General Church and Admiral Cochrane, now commanded the military and naval forces of Greece. The Turks received the Treaty on August 16th, and had therefore one month in which to execute the Armistice. It is significant that Codrington had already asked Stratford Canning how he was to enforce an armistice, pointing out, not unreasonably, that he could only enforce the Allies' will by blockade, and "if any attempt be made to force it, by force only can that attempt be resisted." Stratford Canning answered that the "prevention of supplies is ultimately to be enforced, if necessary, and, when all other means are exhausted, by cannonshot." This seems to be a reasonable interpretation by Stratford of George Canning's real intentions. But history abounds in later instances of British or Allied fleets imposing their will on the Turks by a display of force of the nature of a blockade. Unfortunately, Codrington missed the Egyptian squadron by two days, and reinforcements for the Morea

[1] *Wiener Staats-Archiv.* Eszterházy to Metternich, October 23rd, 1827; see also Wellington's letter to Capodistrias, October 21st, 1827, *Desp., Corr. and Mem.* IV. 137, where he speaks of the means to be used to enforce the Treaty, as "neither more nor less than measures of war," and thus as differing from the Protocol. Bathurst (see *ibid.* 140) seems to agree with this view; *v.* also Wellington's own statement (*ibid.* 144) and Lord Westmoreland's (*ibid.* 221).

entered the harbour of Navarino on September 7th. On the 21st, Codrington, joined in the nick of time by the French squadron, forced part of the Turkish fleet to return to port. On the 25th, Codrington induced Ibrahim to suspend hostilities pending fresh Instructions from Constantinople. Immediately afterwards, Ibrahim demanded permission to send part of his fleet to Patras, which was being assailed by the Greeks. Codrington promptly refused consent. Again, on the nights of October 3rd and 5th, he twice forced parts of the Turkish fleet to put back to harbour, and actually fired across their bows to drive home his argument. Thus, it is important to note, he had already four times succeeded in imposing terms on Ibrahim by the menace of force, but without actual bloodshed.

On October 13th, Codrington was reinforced by the French squadron, which had been temporarily absent, and the Russian, which had just newly arrived. About this time, Ibrahim seems to have thought it safe to begin again his work of slaughter and devastation. Women were violated, men massacred, fruit-trees cut down, the land laid waste, and the smoke of burning villages could be seen from the decks of the ships. These proceedings amounted to as contemptuously an open, as his previous action had been a concealed and illicit, defiance of his agreement with the Admirals. On October 18th an armed demonstration was decided on by the three Admirals; on the 20th they stood in to the bay of Navarino. A dispute among boats' crews brought on a general action, and, by the evening, only one out of sixty Turkish men-of-war "remained in a fit state ever to put to sea again[1]." Four hours had sufficed to decide for ever the independence of Greece.

The effects of Navarino were electrical. The Liberals rejoiced throughout Europe and America; few events have given rise to more enthusiasm. Capodistrias, recently appointed President of Greece, found that he at last had a country to rule. Even apart from Navarino, the terms of the Treaty of London precluded the return of Greece to complete dependence on the Turk. The victory itself made it impossible to suppose that the Greeks of the Morea could ever be permanently subdued. In England it seems to have taken everybody in the Government by surprise. George IV and the Duke of Clarence (Lord High Admiral) recovered from it the soonest, and bestowed the Grand Cordon of the Bath on Codrington. An enquiry into his conduct resulted in his favour, though it would have been

[1] Codrington, vol. II. p. 91.

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difficult to censure a decorated commander. Ibrahim's version of the affair proves definitely that he was trying to trick the British Admiral. Who can believe, for instance, his assertion that he desired merely to provision Patras and intended no expedition against the Greeks, or that he was honestly keeping the temporary truce at sea which he himself admits to have been concluded[1]? The real difficulty was, not that force became necessary, but that it became necessary on the spot where the whole Turkish fleet was concentrated. The Cabinet of Goderich, who had succeeded Canning as Prime-Minister, was divided on the subject. On the whole, it justified Codrington[2]. Before they could take any decisive action, Goderich resigned and a new Ministry was formed under the Duke of Wellington.

The Duke had never pretended to approve of the July Treaty, and naturally looked coldly on Navarino[3]. The King's Speech, therefore, "deeply lamented" this "untoward event"; while in the Lords on January 30th, 1828, Wellington referred to the Ottoman Porte "as the ancient ally of this country...an essential part of the balance of power of Europe," and said "that the change of possession which had taken place in the East of Europe rendered its existence, as an independent and powerful state, necessary to the wellbeing of this country." In February, Prince Lieven presented him with a Memorandum containing the distinct suggestion that forcible intervention could alone keep the peace and that Russia would act alone, unless Great Britain assisted her. This was confirmed by a despatch of Nesselrode to Lieven of February 26th, and left no doubt of the Russian intention to declare war immediately on Turkey. The Cabinet was divided; but Wellington, admitting that the Turks could never return to the Morea, proposed strictly to enforce neutrality, and refused "to become a party to the war." A third course between these two extremes was now urged by the French Government: the enforcement of the July Treaty by a Russian occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia and an Allied blockade of Constantinople. France subsequently added to it the suggestion that a Franco-British force should land in the Morea and expel Ibrahim. Wellington refused both the French and the Russian proposals. From this moment onwards, he

[1] Ibrahim's specious account is given in Wellington's *Desp. Corr. and Mem.* VII. 141.

[2] F.O. France, 27/361. Dudley had approved of Codrington and some of his officers receiving foreign decorations before the King had decorated him.

[3] He did not, however, disapprove of Codrington's action as necessarily inconsistent with his Instructions.

ceased to direct or control events. The French landed in the Morea, and Russia went to war and dictated peace to Turkey, in each case without attending to Great Britain's remonstrances.

Even in dealing with his own subordinates, Wellington was neither fortunate nor successful. His views on a Greek settlement were opposed in the Cabinet, and he ultimately recalled both Codrington and Stratford Canning. In July Codrington, while under sentence of recall, carried through a successful negotiation with Mehemet Ali at Alexandria. The Pasha arranged to recall Ibrahim and his troops from the Morea, except certain of them in garrisons, and to restore some 6000 Greeks who had been carried off to slavery in Egypt. On July 19th Wellington was forced to agree to a Protocol, by which he arranged to facilitate the French expedition to the Morea. Eighteen thousand French troops landed, and expelled the Turkish garrisons before the end of the year. Meanwhile, the three Ambassadors at Constantinople, Stratford Canning (British), Guilleminot (French) and Ribeaupierre (Russian)[1], came to three highly important decisions at Poros: (1) a large extension of boundaries beyond the Morea was to be accorded to Greece; (2) the Greek tribute was to be reduced to a relatively small sum (1,500,000 piastres per ann.); (3) the ruler of Greece was to be a hereditary Christian Prince. This agreement proved to be really final and conclusive. It was not the last time that the masterful and imperious Stratford was to dictate a policy to the Home Government against their wishes. His action led to his resignation; but, hard as they tried, neither Aberdeen, the new Foreign Secretary, nor Wellington himself proved able to reverse his policy. After a Conference in London on March 29th, 1829, a joint French and British representation was decided upon at Constantinople. The terms of the Conference of Poros were to serve as a basis of discussion, though not necessarily to be enforced as an ultimatum. This decision is known as the Protocol of March[2].

Sir Robert Gordon, Stratford's successor, reached Constantinople in June, and found the Porte resolved to refuse to accept the July Treaty of 1827, unless conditions were attached to it sufficient to nullify the effects of the Conference of Poros. On September 19th the French, Russian and British Plenipotentiaries met in London to

[1] Russia could be represented, as she had laid aside her belligerent rights in the Mediterranean and Aegean.

[2] There seems to have been a difference of opinion between Wellington and Aberdeen as to whether this programme was to be seriously adopted. At any rate Stratford thought so. See Lane-Poole's *Stratford Canning*, I. 490.

receive the Turkish answer. The British Plenipotentiary sought in vain to get rid of the Protocol of Poros, France and Russia insisting, and being in a position to enforce their demands. Eventually all agreed on the Protocol.

In point of fact, events, as has often been the case in the Balkans, took all power out of the hands of those not actively engaged in the struggle. Russia's progress had been chequered in 1828 and in the early part of 1829. But, in June, General Diebitsch captured Silistria; in July, he crossed the Balkans with a small force and advanced on Adrianople. His coming struck terror into all Turkish hearts, and resistance, in both a military and diplomatic sense, was at an end. Russia presented the Protocol of Poros as an ultimatum to the Turks. The Porte, at last awakened, hastened to accept in full the Treaty of London of July, 1827. Austria and Prussia, who had previously supported the Porte in its resistance, now at last counselled it to give way. Diebitsch, though with a sickly army, showed a bold front and dictated peace like a conqueror at Adrianople on September 14th. The sword had once more cut the knot.

The Treaty of Adrianople marked the culmination of Russian policy. Russia had actually achieved what Canning had always attempted to prevent her from accomplishing. She had acted alone; she had declared war on Turkey; she had emerged triumphantly from the War, and was therefore naturally inclined to demand her own terms. The Treaty is not, at first sight, very alarming. The river Pruth was, as in 1812, to form the boundary of the two empires, up to its confluence with the Danube. From that point onwards, the left bank of the Danube and all the islands, formed by the different branches of the river, were assigned to Russia. The right bank was to remain Turkish; but it was to be demilitarised by the destruction of fortifications and the removal of inhabitants "to the distance of two hours from the river." Russian warships were to enter the Danube, but not to proceed up it further than its junction with the Pruth (Art. III). In Asia, the port of Poti and some small extensions of territory were assigned to Russia, and Turkey recognised the territorial cessions in the Peace between Russia and Persia (February 22nd, 1828), (Art. IV). Freedom of trade in Turkey, and free passage of Russian Black Sea merchantships through the Bosphorus were granted, together with full freedom of trade and navigation in the Black Sea (Art. VIII). By Article X, Turkey adhered to the Treaty of London of July, 1827, and acceded to the Protocol of March 22nd, 1829, thereby granting a dependent status to Greece

and conceding to her the boundaries of Arta and Volo. By Article V, Moldavia and Wallachia were placed under the suzerainty of the Porte, but were to possess an "independent national government," and their "prosperity" was to be "guaranteed" by Russia. A separate Act, signed at the same time, prevented the Turkish Government from interfering in Moldavia and Wallachia, and from erecting or retaining fortifications "or establishments of Mussulmans on the left bank of the Danube[1]." Finally, by Article VI of the Treaty, the Turks agreed to fulfil the conditions of the Convention of Akkerman with respect to Serbia, to restore "the six districts detached from Serbia, so as to secure for ever the tranquillity and welfare of that faithful and devoted nation." By a subsequent arrangement, Serbia, like Moldavia and Wallachia, obtained the right to police herself and to maintain armed forces. It is obvious that Russia's intention was not to annex territory outright. Rather, she designed to render the invasion of Turkey from the Russian side easy in future, and to turn the principalities of Serbia, Greece, Moldavia and Wallachia into four satellites of the Russian sun.

Diebitsch, writing to the Russian War Minister on the day of the signature of the Treaty, claimed that he had obtained the maximum of the demands laid down as the basis of the Treaty, and that "all Europe will certainly recognise therein an increase of the great power of our beloved lord." Nesselrode rejoiced particularly that the Arta-Volo boundary had been given to Greece "by that famous Article 10, for which," he wrote to Diebitsch, "I kiss your hands and feet[2]." The Tsar himself appears to have been satisfied with the Treaty[3], and it was almost universally favoured by Russian public opinion. Curiously enough, the point which pleased the Russian Government most was the final defeat of the Franco-British policy on the one hand, and of the Austrian on the other. Nesselrode wrote that God had willed to confound the British and the French, and had made Greece owe her salvation to the Russian Tsar. The Tsar himself rejoiced over the discomfiture of his Allies. It was, however, not true, as Metternich and Wellington thought, that the Russians desired to put an end to the Ottoman empire by this Treaty. A Committee of Russian Ministers, summoned by the Tsar in the first week of September, had discussed the question of peace terms, and had unanimously arrived at the

[1] By a second Separate Act, providing principally for payment of indemnity, the Turks were to demolish the fortress of Giurgevo, which they still held.

[2] Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands*, II. 363.

[3] So far as Europe was concerned. He would, however, have been glad to obtain Kars and Erzerum.

conclusion that the fall of the Turkish Empire would create more problems than it solved. As a matter of fact, Russian Governmental circles knew that they had narrowly escaped a great disaster by the daring enterprise of their military commander. Diebitsch's Instructions, and the peace terms which he obtained, aimed at securing the desired result by other means. The Russian policy was one of "peaceful political and economic penetration." Moldavia and Wallachia were to be directly, Serbia and Greece indirectly, under Russian protection and influence. The Tsar was to be the guardian and protector of Christians inside Turkey, and Russian commerce was to complete the peaceful conquest of the Ottoman empire. When these influences had thoroughly asserted themselves, it would be time to think of a real dismemberment of Turkey. For the moment, the "sick man" was to be treated by auto-suggestion, not to be subjected to crude surgical operations.

Wellington has often been criticised for his conduct of affairs during this period. It was certainly unfortunate. He had tried to prevent Canning from signing the July Treaty of 1827, to prevent the French from entering the Morea in 1828, to prevent the Protocol of March, 1829, from becoming (as it did become) an ultimatum, to prevent Russia from annexing the port of Poti, to confine the Greeks to the Morea and the islands—and in every case without success. No man has condemned his policy more distinctly than he did himself. Even on August 25th, 1829, he wrote to Aberdeen: "We are certainly in a bad way....We have made the greatest sacrifices of opinions, principles and national pride and prejudice to our Allies. In return, they have not performed their promises." And the climax of all this was reached by the Adrianople Treaty. On October 4th, he wrote: "I am not quite certain that what will exist will not be worse than the immediate annihilation of the Turkish Power." His greatest mistake, however, was to attempt to make Greece as small and weak as possible—a mistake exaggerated by Aberdeen, who wished to divide Greece into two parts. The underlying idea was that Greece must in any event fall under Russian influence, and should therefore be made helpless. He continued this policy to the end and succeeded by the Protocol of February 3rd, 1830, in reducing the boundaries of Greece once more to Thermopylae on the one side and the mouth of the Aspropotamos on the other. Now, however, to counteract the Russians, he agreed to Greece being declared independent of the Porte and to her being ruled by a hereditary Sovereign. But these half-measures no longer satisfied

anybody. The French had turned Ibrahim out of the Morea; the Russians had freed Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia from Turkish tyranny and advocated a wide extension of boundaries to Greece. What had Great Britain done? Popular feeling was expressed in the bitter taunt of Lady Canning[1]. "Go to the North, and hear the terms of bitterness and contempt in which England is assailed by the Russian Government for our vacillation, by the Russian people for our illiberality....Turkey complains of being betrayed. Greece considers us her enemy." Certainly, whatever be the judgment passed, Great Britain's position was a humiliating one, if contrasted with that to which Canning had raised her.

The unpopularity of the Ministry was not primarily due to the failure in foreign policy; but was much increased by it. On November 15th, 1830, the Government fell, without any hand being stretched out to save it, and the new King William IV sent for Lord Grey, who handed the seals of the Foreign Office to Palmerston. This step at once brought fresh vigour into British foreign policy, which was now directed by a Foreign Minister who had declared himself the disciple of Canning, and by an anti-Turkish Premier. Wellington had rendered some services by insisting on the independence of Greece and on the candidature of Prince Leopold of Coburg for its hereditary Throne. Palmerston followed this up by the bold and wise policy of extending the boundaries of Greece to Arta and Volo, which he had already advocated and the Duke had steadily opposed. Prince Leopold, after accepting nomination as Sovereign Prince of Greece (February 28th), eventually resigned his claims (May 21st, 1830)[2]. The revolutionary movements of July, 1830, during which King Charles X of France lost his throne, had distracted the attention of the Great Powers from Greece, and the Turkish troops seized the opportunity to devastate the regions which they were evacuating, and to cut down half the olive-trees in Attica. These events, and the delay in the settlement of Greece, stirred up various movements of revolt against Capodistrias, whose rule was extremely arbitrary. The three Powers of Russia, France and Great Britain once more took up the question and finally worked out a new settlement by the Protocol of September 26th, 1831. This Protocol revoked that of February 3rd, 1830, by extending the Greek frontiers to Arta and Volo, and thus providing

[1] In her anonymous pamphlet (1830), pp. 46–7.

[2] Grey wished for the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. See his *Correspondence with Princess Lieven*, I. 31. November 12th, 1826. He advocated the Arta-Volo boundary. See G. M. Trevelyan's *Grey*, pp. 227–30.

Further reference to these transactions is made in a note to the Chapter on *Greece and the Ionian Islands* later in this volume.

the country with a good natural frontier and the accession of the warlike populations of Acarnania and Aetolia. It was also decided to arrange for a loan to Greece, and to choose a Sovereign. On October 9th, 1831, Capodistrias was assassinated, as the result of bitter political and local jealousies. Greece threatened to fall into anarchy and the three Powers hastily selected Prince Otho, the second son of King Lewis of Bavaria, as the future ruler of Greece (February 13th, 1832). A definite Convention was signed by the three Great Powers and Bavaria (May 7th), positively offering Otho the Crown of Greece, with the title of King. Greece was to form a Monarchical and Independent State, under the optional guarantee of the three Courts[1]. According to the terms of the Protocol of February 3rd, 1830, the Crown of Greece was to be hereditary, but was not to be united to that of Bavaria. A loan was to be guaranteed by the three Powers. They agreed to the evacuation of Greece by all Allied troops, and to send 3500 Bavarian troops to keep order there. As the King was only 17 years of age, a Regency of three Councillors was appointed and was to be despatched at once to Greece and supported by the Allied Squadrons. On August 8th, 1832, the Greek National Congress confirmed the choice of the Powers. On August 30th, the latter answered by a declaration, encouraging the Greeks to grant a new Constitution to their new Sovereign. The situation was still desperate, for all sorts of tribal feuds and guerilla combats distracted Greece. But the anarchy gradually began to subside; and, on January 28th, 1833, the watchmen on the hills of Navarino saw a British frigate approaching, from which, on the same day, the first King of the Hellenes disembarked in the harbour of Nauplia.

The events in Greece have carried us considerably beyond the death of Canning. But it is reasonable to suppose that the final settlement would have commanded his approval, and it is interesting that it mainly resulted from the action of his most illustrious disciple. Of the intermediate stages he would certainly have disapproved; and, had he lived, the Russo-Turkish War would either not have occurred or would have ended sooner. For it is a misreading both of the man and of his policy to suppose that, when a danger such as that in question threatened, he would not have taken strong measures to avert it. One final observation remains. Canning's policy in the Near East differed from Wellington's, and indeed also from Castlereagh's, in nothing more distinctly than in this: that the Turkish empire presented, in his

[1] *I.e.*, any Power could take part in the guarantee that wished to do so; Great Britain still refused.

view, a special and limited problem. He did not, like Castlereagh, favour Turkey, because she was "exempt from the revolutionary danger," or strive to depress Greece because she was a possible focus of Revolution. The Greeks were "a most rascally set"; but neither Turkey nor Russia were to be allowed to destroy or subject them. It was because Canning viewed the Greek problem as detached from the general system of Europe, that he could follow a policy of judicious opportunism, which was as incomprehensible, as it was distasteful, to his successor. This policy, as revived and interpreted by Lord Palmerston, at once brought order out of chaos and settled the problem of Greece on its own merits. Moreover, whatever might be the fate of the Balkan States, the future showed that Greece was not destined to remain dependent on Russia.

IX. SUMMARY

As an organiser of the Foreign Office, Canning's energy was noticed from the first. The establishment of modernised procedure and rules of business dates from his time. In 1870, Hammond, the Permanent Under Secretary, giving evidence before a Commission, described it as almost blasphemous to alter "Mr Canning's rule" as regards some small financial arrangements, because he was "a great man." He had a strong sense of discipline in dealing with our representatives abroad, which he put into practice irrespectively of whether his correspondent was a Minister or a clerk. Sir Edward Thornton was informed that his despatches showed "slovenly penmanship," which was to be corrected in future, and reproved for packing up tea in the despatches, which burst and defiled a letter of the King of Portugal to George IV. Canning did much also to insist on the proper keeping of the archives at Legations abroad. There are some other and curious details of his policy, as, *e.g.* a revival of the usage of appointing English chaplains at diplomatic centres, and the enforcement, on the advice of the Law Officers of the Crown, of the admission to the general meetings of merchants at Oporto of such British merchants as happened to be Catholics. In the larger sense, his example and Instructions marked a revolution in despatch-writing, and in the formulation of policy by subordinates. The incidents connected with Sir Charles Stuart's Mission to Portugal show that he was prepared to go to considerable lengths to defend a subordinate and to allow him a wise discretion[2]. On the other hand, in the case of Lord Strangford at Petrograd he

[1] F.O. Portugal, 63/282, March 8, April 17, May 27, 1824.
[2] F.O. Portugal, 63/282, April 14, 1824.

found it necessary to use disciplinary measures. When, on September 16th, 1823, Strangford presented the Porte with a Note which he said had been drawn up in London, Canning at once remonstrated "not because there is anything in it which your Government hesitates to sanction, but simply because such was not the fact." The measures which he took later with Lord Strangford at Petrograd, and which were known as "the padlock," were also sufficiently vigorous. The Instructions, as already mentioned[1], were "in a few short words—to be quiet." The general result of Canning's presence at the Foreign Office was certainly to infuse new vigour into every branch of it, and there is a decided improvement to be dated from his presence there in the precision and abundance of information supplied from representatives abroad. Moreover, his own interpretations of the doctrine of "international rivers," of the principles which should govern *de facto* and *de jure* recognition of new States, and of the limits of intervention, are, in themselves, classical examples of diplomatic papers. They are some of the finest State-papers ever written and are specially remarkable for their elegance of style and precision of expression.

In a further sense, Canning was confronted with difficulties as a Foreign Minister, such as no predecessor of his had encountered since 1760. There can be no question that the attitude of George IV and his relations with Foreign Powers constituted a serious danger. So long as Castlereagh lived, he had held George IV's entire confidence until the break with the Allies indicated on May 5th, 1820. It was only after Castlereagh's death that the King began to perceive that British policy was drawing away from that "Continental solidarity" in which he fitfully appears to have believed. His suspicions were increased and aggravated by conversations with foreign diplomats such as the Russian Count and Countess Lieven and the Austrian Prince Eszterházy, who lost no opportunity of bringing to his notice the views of Alexander and Metternich. Certain other relations existed with Prince Polignac; and there is some evidence that the Marchioness of Conyngham assisted the King in these intrigues with Foreign Powers[2]. These backstairs negotiations contained serious elements of danger, for the King might disclose important secrets, and was sure to convey false impressions, to Foreign Powers. It is at least certain that Metternich directed Eszterházy to take every means of counterworking Canning by direct negotiations with the King, and his reports of his conversations leave no

[1] *Ante*, p. 89, note 5.

[2] Lord Francis Conyngham was made Under-Secretary to Canning in 1823, but it has not been proved that he disclosed secrets to Foreign Powers.

doubt that the attempt was frequently made[1]. But, in 1824, a curiously different tone begins to creep into these reports. The King informs Eszterházy that a King in England is not a Continental ruler, and so forth. Finally, late in 1824, in the matter of the recognition of the Spanish Colonies, everything came to a head. Canning wrote afterwards of "a plot for the ides of December to change the policy of the Government by changing me....I would have resigned on the S.A. question and I would have declared openly that I was driven from office by the Holy Alliance; and further that the system which I found established of personal communications between the Sovereign and Foreign Ministers was one under which no English Minister could do his duty. If after this...the Lievens and Eszterházy did not find London too hot for them, I know nothing of the temper of the English nation!" The matter reached serious lengths. The King went so far as to send a Memorandum to the Cabinet (January 27th, 1825) in which he suggested that the policy of Castlereagh and Wellington was being departed from, and demanded an individual opinion from each member on the question whether "the great principles of 1814, 1815 and 1818, *are, or are not, to be abandoned.*" The Cabinet replied by refusing to state individual points of view and by adhering to their decision as to the recognition of Spanish America. Canning followed this up by a personal letter to the King, pointing out that the indiscretion of the Allies in publishing confidential Memoranda had necessitated some reserve in communicating secret decisions to them. The King's reply is stated to have been conciliatory; and he represented himself shortly afterwards to Eszterházy as having been overborne by his Ministers. On February 8th, 1825, the King told Eszterházy Canning had "done evil"; but he "could not get rid of him[2]." In March, 1825, Canning instructed Granville to hint to Metternich, then at Paris, that, in consequence of these intrigues, a visit from him would not be acceptable either at Whitehall or Windsor. On April 27th Sir William Knighton, the King's physician and confidential friend, called upon Canning and, in substance, promised that his royal master would amend his ways. This was the beginning of a new era. On August 21st, Eszterházy reported to Metternich that the King had told him Canning had "great talents" and was "necessary." On October 31st, Canning wrote: "The King, I hope (indeed I have reason to

[1] Several of these quotations are from the *Berichte aus England* of Eszterházy to Metternich and the latter's replies. These are in the *Wiener Staats-Archiv*, and have been supplied to me by the kindness of Professor C. K. Webster.

[2] See *Wiener Staats-Archiv*. Cf. Stapleton, *George Canning and his Times*, 415–34.

believe), begins to feel that I have *not*, as he was taught to apprehend, 'lost to him his status among the Powers of the Continent,' but only changed it from the tail of Europe to the head[1]." Canning had been successful, and henceforth the King was his loyal supporter; but the mischief unfortunately did not end with the conversion of its chief originator. The proceedings of Lord Westmoreland in Paris during 1824 and 1826 were not wholly reconcilable with the idea of Cabinet loyalty[2]. The Duke of Wellington had sometimes lent too ready an ear to the complaints of Metternich or Lieven and expressed his opinion too freely to them. Canning may, perhaps, have been too sensitive in the matter; but the position of the Duke of Wellington was gravely anomalous. He was more decorated and renowned than any British subject, and his private dissent from the attitude of Canning, both on Greek and Portuguese affairs, naturally led foreign diplomats to build hopes on such lines of policy not being persisted in. This intercourse was known to Canning, and from 1825 onwards the breach between the two men was widening. When the crisis came in March 1827, Canning and Wellington misunderstood one another and quarrelled. Wellington retired, not only from the Ministry, but from the command of the Army, and took the not very wise step of showing his correspondence with Canning to Prince Eszterházy[3]. Throughout this deplorable misunderstanding, the King acted wholeheartedly with Canning, wrote more than one reproving letter to Wellington, and told Eszterházy that all his personal friendship for the Duke was terminated for ever. Whatever may be the judgment passed on these incidents, there can be little doubt that Canning was right as to the necessity of terminating so misleading a series of communications as that which had subsisted between George IV and Foreign Powers. There can also be little question that Alexander, and none at all that Metternich, relied upon these methods for embarrassing British policy, and hoped thus ultimately to displace the British Foreign Minister. Canning was called upon to terminate a series of relations, which were not in fact in accordance with constitutional practice.

[1] Stapleton, *George Canning and his Times*, 446.

[2] *E.g.* E. J. Stapleton, *Correspondence of Canning*, I. 169, 173. Nor were those of Lord Strangford with diplomatic loyalty, *e.g.* in 1827 he showed Canning's famous "padlock" letter of December 1st, 1825, to Eszterházy (*i.e.* to Metternich. *Wiener Staats-Archiv*, December 1st, 1827).

[3] Canning, with considerably more sense of propriety, informed Eszterházy in private conversation that the whole incident testified to the strength of monarchical institutions in England. When Prime-Minister, Wellington complained bitterly of the King's correspondence abroad. See *Desp. Corr. and Mem.* VI. 313, 426.

The measure of his success is gauged by the fact that such difficulties never again arose and that, even in the fiercest struggles between Palmerston and the Crown in later days, the Crown never claimed to pursue such dangerous practices as those in which George IV had at one time indulged[1].

The difficulty of estimating many of Canning's achievements in foreign policy lies in the fact that they were successful. The dangers which he faced, the danger of the Holy Alliance which he destroyed, are now things of the past. He actually closed an epoch, and much of his policy, therefore, died with him. But, if he closed an epoch, he also began one, and it is in this light also that he must be judged.

The ideas of Pitt deeply influenced both Castlereagh and Canning; but they were interpreted by the two men in a different sense and received additions from each. Pitt seems to have been mainly influenced by regard for the upholding of established Treaties and the maintenance of acknowledged public law. Moreover, his policy, as disclosed in the 1805 Memorandum, did not base the resettlement of Europe on any nationalist principle, or indeed on any principle but that of the Balance of Power. Castlereagh adopted this policy, working out in accordance with it, not only the conception of territorial guarantees, but that of a European Peace permanently assured and maintained by a system of European Congresses. Towards the end of his life, he had seen clearly the danger of this policy, and, after May 5th, 1820, had resolutely sought to disentangle the policy of Great Britain from that of her Allies. But the links of union were numerous and hard to sever, and till the death of Castlereagh this separation was only partial. The admirers of Castlereagh will contend that he would have accomplished it, had he lived, by means more diplomatic than those Canning employed. The admirers of Canning will reply that it is only by these means that Great Britain could have been emancipated from the Holy Alliance.

Canning's ideas, in fact, exhibit a remarkable consistency, which can be traced back even to his first experience of public life. Even in 1822, he could say that Burke's ideas are "still the manual of my politics," and it should be remembered that the ideas of Burke were not always those of Pitt. Canning declared against the French Revolution about the same time as Burke and for a similar, though not identical, reason.

[1] It is a striking commentary on the King that, when *The Times* published Wellington's Protocol of April 4th, 1826, this indiscretion was ascribed in Russia to George IV. It was, in reality, revealed by Hugeland. See Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands* (1908), II. 139.

He believed that a State or nation had the right to change its constitution, to express its own principles and to develop its own nationality, almost unchecked. The only limit which he placed on its freedom was when it began to interfere with other countries, not only by doctrines but by "arms" and "overt acts." This qualification, which he impressed upon Granville in 1824, is important and furnishes the key to his doctrine of Non-intervention, and his attack upon the Holy Alliance. He believed that the French flame of liberty was a "spurious fire," and, as it affected the internal peace of other states and nations, it had to be destroyed. But he wished to substitute for it everywhere "the pure flame of national liberty," that is, the example of the Constitution of Great Britain. He thought that our purest cause for congratulation in the Napoleonic Wars was, not our assertion of supremacy on the sea or our victories upon the land, but the fact that a free, ordered, and Constitutional Government had found the requisite energy to contend with the frantic enthusiasm of revolution. We had the glory, "after being the saviours," of having "become the models of Europe. Let us hope for the interests of mankind that this model would be generally adopted—that all nations would endeavour to introduce that vital spirit, that germ of strength which had enabled so small a country to make such extraordinary exertions to save itself, and to deal out salvation to the world."

He agreed with the noble Lord (Castlereagh) as to the propriety of abstaining from the use of any force, to press the adoption of our moral conceptions and political principles upon any nation whatsoever. But he hoped and trusted that a consideration of the nature of our institutions, with the capabilities which they conferred, and the effects to which they led, would have a due effect upon all governments and people—that in reviewing the unparalleled exertions which such a limited population had made to repel unparalleled dangers—that in considering our signal triumph with elevated spirit and augmented strength, the great cause of all would be duly estimated. That such would be the result there was every reason to hope, from what had already happened; and this was a proud reflection. it was impossible, indeed, for any British subject not to be gratified by such a happy state of things. But the same feelings animated the parliament and people[1].

[1] Hans. *Deb.* XXIII. 447. Canning's speech on June 29th, 1814. It is interesting to note that, in 1814, he was very anxious to restore the Bourbons to Naples, but indifferent about restoring them to France. The distinction was real, for King Ferdinand had never ceased to reign in Sicily, whereas the Bourbons had been driven by their subjects from France. Thus, the Restoration of the Bourbons in Naples was a restoration of public law, while in France it was a matter for the nation itself to decide after Napoleon's fall.

In 1814, Castlereagh agreed with Canning that Constitutional principles should not be encouraged by force, though he gave only a very half-hearted adherence to the belief that they should be encouraged by moral influence. "I am sure," wrote he to Lord William Bentinck in 1814, "it is better to retard than to accelerate the action of this most hazardous principle (liberty) which is abroad[1]." The difference is one of emphasis, but the results were very important. Castlereagh disapproved of Alexander's encouraging the grant of a Constitution to France, and successfully threw cold water on such projects in Naples, Sicily and Spain. On one subject, Canning differed openly from Castlereagh at this time in Parliament: when Castlereagh used the British fleet to blockade Norway and force her to unite herself to Sweden, Canning said the news "had filled him with shame, regret and indignation." This seems to show the real warmth of Canning's feeling for "Non-intervention" as the basis of international policy. If Norway could have been persuaded or intimidated into union with Sweden he would not, perhaps, have objected; but the only justification of external coercion that he admitted was armed interference, such as France had always, and Norway had never, exercised against other States.

The situation had changed very much by 1822. "Ten years," wrote Canning, "have left a very different world to bustle in." But, even so early as 1818, he had shown objections to the system of Congresses. "The people of this country may be taught to look with great jealousy for their liberties, if our Court is engaged in meetings, engaged with great despotic Powers, deliberating upon what degree of Revolutionary spirit may endanger the public security, and therefore require the interference of the Alliance" (October 19th, 1818)[2]. Thus early, Canning had come to perceive that the system of Congresses could not be kept up without exciting a great popular outcry. During 1819–20, he continued to express the hope that the Congress system would cease, and in his speech when out of office, March 20th, 1821, he made the striking utterance, "I see the principles of liberty in operation, and shall be one of the last to attempt to restrain them." The date is of great significance. For, in 1820, popular movements had broken out in Piedmont, Naples, Portugal and Spain, and all had demanded the extremely democratic Spanish Constitution of 1812. Now, Canning is known to have, in private at least, considered that Constitution

[1] Castlereagh, *Despatches*, x. 18. Cf. also C. K. Webster, *British Diplomacy*.

[2] Bathurst to Castlereagh, October 20th, 1818. Castlereagh, *Despatches*, XII. 56–7; see also 75–6. He said however that it was "a popular argument."

a very improper and dangerous model[1]. But he seems, in 1821, to have reached the view that, if the Spanish model Constitution was dangerous, the Holy Alliance and the "Areopagitic spirit" were more dangerous still. Hence his utterance as to not "restraining the principles of liberty."

His action at Verona was clearly intended to break up the Congress system, and was in fact successful. This was the last Congress of the old type. It is significant enough that, when France invaded Spain, Canning remonstrated, but did not threaten war. But when there was a suggestion that France might restore order in Spanish America, Canning at once forced a disclaimer from her under threat of war, and told the United States that they were the leading Power on the American Continent. His reason for this was that French armed intervention in Latin America would have caused a European Congress on the affairs of the New World to meet and decide on its fate. To avoid this, Canning appealed to the United States, and then recognised the Spanish American Republics. The result was that he was able to refuse to attend the Congress on the affairs of the New World, and to turn the "Rump" of a Congress, which did actually meet, into the laughing-stock of Europe. It was significant enough, too, in its way, that Canning sent a British Representative to attend the Panama Congress in the New World, at the very moment when he refused to send one to the Paris Congress of European diplomats, which was occupied with the same subjects[2]. Canning's ultimate idea was to introduce the weight of the Spanish American republics and the United States into Europe, just as he meant to break down the influence of "the Monroe Doctrine" and to introduce Europe into America by the friendly alliance of Great Britain with the Latin Republics. His action in recognising the revolted republics as legitimate Governments was of the highest importance; for it accorded with his favourite principle that such recognitions depended on fact and not on theory. He preferred monarchies to republics, even in the New World, but between recognising an unstable monarchy and a stable republic he never hesitated. If anything, he delayed full recognition of the empire of Brazil and accelerated that of the republics of Colombia, Mexico and Buenos Ayres. This attitude was strongly opposed to that of European diplomats.

[1] He referred to the Constitutions of Spain and Naples as "however little worth maintaining in themselves"; Canning's contempt is explained by Lord Acton's summary. "The Spanish Constitution (of 1812) excluded Ministers from the Cortes. No Second Chamber. No re-election to the next Cortes. No offices to be given or promotion." *Acton MSS.* 4927.

[2] See above, p. 72.

Almost all of them assumed that republics were illegitimate forms of government, and Metternich even went so far as to declare that the United States could never be allowed to take part in a European Congress. Canning actually proposed that she should do so.

By 1825, the breach between Canning and the Holy Alliance was patent and definite. Holy Alliance principles had definitely been repelled from the other side of the Atlantic; Canning now set himself to diminishing their force and influence in Europe. The first step had been for Great Britain to refuse to attend another Congress in Europe, the next was to divide those different Powers who did attend them. The means were to his hand, and the rock on which he split the Holy Alliance was the Eastern Question. Alexander thought (and with some reason) that he had been tricked by Metternich, and it was Canning who openly contemned the Metternichian system, while at the same time offering friendly cooperation to the Tsar. At the end of his life, Alexander had decided to cut loose from Metternich, and his successor followed his lead. The result was the dissolution of the Holy Alliance in the menacing form it had assumed between the years 1818 and 1825. On September 5th, 1826, George Canning wrote exultantly to Stratford, "You have no reason to dread being shackled by the Holy Alliance. They no longer march *en corps*. I have resolved them into individuality and, having done so, I employ the *disjecta membra*, each in its respective place and for its respective use, without scruple or hesitation." The triumph of Canning was complete when France joined Great Britain, in order to cooperate with Russia, leaving the two despotic Powers of Germany to themselves. The *alliance solidaire* was thus broken into pieces.

The lengths to which Canning proceeded, and the arguments which he used, in diplomatic correspondence with the Holy Alliance are not always recognised. Wellington warned him against "quizzing them." But there was purpose in his taunts. Even so late as January 10th, 1825, the Emperor of Austria "offered" (in conversation with Stratford) "to help us over Ireland." "So general and purely philanthropic," scoffed Canning, "are his principles of occasional intervention with unruly subjects, whether of his friends or neighbours[1]." The knowledge that Canning was prepared to expose the principles of Legitimacy, whenever presented, was a serious deterrent from their being put forward in despatches. Thus, in 1822, when the representatives of three Powers had dwelt on the necessity of upholding Legi-

[1] Stapleton, *Correspondence*, II. 232.

timacy, he silenced them by asking them why they did not support the restoration of Gustavus (who was mad) to the Throne of Sweden. Metternich was equally checked in similar references in 1825, by Canning's pointing out to him that the Habsburg Emperors had always been elective until 1806, and had then received the title of Emperor of Austria, "which the Conqueror allowed him to wear." These Courts were similarly influenced by his demonstration of the absurdity of refusing to recognise revolted or republican Governments, for "that would be to make anarchy eternal." In the question of Portugal, he made most skilful use of the argument that the constitution of 1826 had been "*octroyée*" by the Emperor Dom Pedro of Brazil, and consequently ought not to be opposed by legitimist Powers. Again, when the question of Dom Miguel's claim to the Portuguese Throne and his relation to his brother, Dom Pedro, was under consideration, Canning pointed out that the settlement of this affair would offer "no difficulty to those Powers who conceive that there is a right in some European Tribunal to regulate the affairs of different countries, with reference to some scheme of general European convenience; but for us, who do not hold that doctrine, caution is necessary[1]." Merciless logic and ridicule were a weapon to be used to destroy the Holy Alliance and the Legitimist theory, and to prove it inconsistent with itself, and with the traditions of the public law of Europe. And that weapon was to be used both in private and in public.

One highly important part of Canning's policy consists in his appeal to popular opinion, not only in his own country, but in all countries. It was certainly an integral part of his system, and based on his earlier and very subtle conception of the relation of state to nationality. He certainly did not believe in the modern doctrine of self-determination, he certainly did believe that a State, once established by Treaty, should not be destroyed. But he had had a unique experience in his first Foreign Secretaryship; for, in 1807–8, he had beheld the armies of Napoleon flung back in Spain, not by organised armies, but by a universal national uprising. The impression made was ineffaceable. "I discharged the glorious duty of recognising, without delay, the rights of the Spanish people....It was indeed a stirring, a kindling time," said he, long afterwards. In the same way he made the utmost efforts to arouse national feeling in Portugal. In 1814 he spoke of Germany as "no longer a name, but a nation," and his plan for her future seems

[1] F.O. Portugal, 63/318. George Canning to Sir Wm. A'Court, February 10th, 1827.

to have been one which might conceivably have allowed her to become such. Poland, again, much occupied his thoughts. Canning had come to understand, as few others had, that nationality was the real enemy of Napoleon. "The enemy of all nations" could best be opposed by nations developing their individual capacity and energy to the widest extent, compatible with the maintenance of the balance of power. But, just as national independence could be used to resist Napoleon, so it could be used to resist the Holy Alliance.

As between forms of government, Canning was indifferent. He thought that they varied according to the development, the climate, the capacity of a people. Personally, he preferred Constitutional monarchy and sought to "hold the balance between the conflicting principles of despotism and democracy." He appealed to the popular element in all countries to work in the direction of this desirable "*via media*." This was why he never hesitated to appeal to them, for he thought that, while despotism or democracy had their agents and influences everywhere, the spirit of ordered freedom was not always so recognised. In order that British policy should be effective, it must be popular. Hence, he did what Castlereagh never did, and made speeches about foreign policy from the platform to popular audiences. The famous speech of October, 1823, at Plymouth, when he pointed to the mighty but silent power of England, embodied in the ships of war floating above the town, is an instance of appeal to pure national pride. Many of his utterances in the Commons, and many of his timely publications of State-papers, were of a more purely European character and intended to discredit the Holy Alliance and despotic principles. The remonstrance with France for her application of Legitimist principles to Spain, the object of keeping "within due bounds that predominating Areopagitical spirit," of opposing "the doctrine of a European police," were openly and almost defiantly avowed. Instead of a dominating Areopagus, "every nation" was to be "for itself and God for us all." He objected to all external interference with the internal institutions of States, whether on the part of democracy or of despotism. But the British attitude in such cases was determined by expediency. Austria was allowed to interfere in Naples in 1821, because of treaty obligations; France was allowed to invade Spain in 1823, because we did not deem it expedient to resist her; but, when she sought to extend her arms to America, Canning said: "I called the New World into existence to redress the Balance of the Old." The sending of troops to Portugal in 1826 was for a

different reason. It was due to a treaty obligation, to the fact that we were pledged to resist armed interference instigated by Spain. "We go to Portugal in the discharge of a sacred obligation...while Great Britain has an arm to raise, it must be raised against the efforts of any Power that should attempt forcibly to control the choice and fetter the independence of Portugal." Now, this kind of popular exposition and appeal was an entirely new one in the diplomatic sphere. It turned the weapons of European diplomats against themselves. For, while Metternich desired secrecy, in order to conceal the discords in the Concert of Europe, Canning desired publicity in order to reveal them. It is in this sense that his later actions and policy must be understood, and it is in this that his power consisted.

"*La force sur laquelle il s'appuie*," wrote Lieven to Nesselrode, "*est grande, puisqu'elle se compose de ce que la masse regarde comme l'intérêt général du pays, et de ce que l'élite des spéculateurs leur fait considérer comme intérêt particulier*[1]." This touches the point that Canning sought only the interests of Great Britain and not those of Europe or the world. Such, indeed, was the belief of Rush—the American Representative in London—and of Adams. But it is only true within limits. Canning was genuinely convinced that government by European Congress was a danger to the independence of all States, and to the extent that he made Great Britain free of it, he was fighting not only her battle, but that of all States. His invitation to the United States to join with him against Europe, and his careful cultivation of Latin-American States mark an epoch in diplomacy. They may well be contrasted with Metternich's view that the United States should never take part in a European Congress, because she was not a "legitimate State." If Canning did, in fact, prevent this spirit from prevailing, he rendered an essential service to Europe, as well as to America, and more particularly to the cause of small States, such as the Netherlands and Portugal, whose interests, as he never ceased to urge, ought not to be at the mercy of a Congress of Powers, which might apply despotic principles to the settlement of Europe. His own conception of his mission is probably best expressed by Lady Canning[2]:

It was Mr Canning's policy to obtain for Great Britain the confidence and good will of the people of other nations, not, however, by flattering their prejudices, or encouraging their discontent, but by showing a fixed determination to act with impartial justice towards them. While he was at the

[1] Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands*, I. 344.
[2] In the anonymous pamphlet cited above, pp. 52, 104.

helm, there was not one of the European Governments which dared to provoke the vengeance of England, because they well knew that war with England would be a measure unpopular to hazard. Thus Mr Canning was enabled to hold language, and to carry measures in defiance of the principles and prejudices of some, and contrary to the wishes of the governments of the great Continental Powers. By this means he obtained over these Governments an influence which he employed not only to promote the interests of England, but the general prosperity of the world.

Three convictions, certainly, lay at the root of all his ideas. First, that Treaty obligations should be maintained; next, that Great Britain could not withdraw from Continental politics, and, last, that the world was on the eve of a conflict between liberal and despotic principles.

Therefore, the leading object of his foreign policy was to preserve the peace of the world, holding high the balance and grasping, but not unsheathing, the sword. It was for this end that he sought to place this country in the position of an umpire; in order that, by restraining the passions of both parties, he might restrain their dreaded collision. He entirely succeeded in his endeavours, and, at the period of his death, the bright aspect of the political horizon indicated no approaching storm[1].

It is in some such words that Canning might himself have summarised his aims.

[1] In the pamphlet cited in previous note, p. 50. This view is specially interesting, as showing that Canning thought he had "localised" the Greek question and made "Holy Alliance" interference impossible.

CHAPTER III

BELGIUM, 1830–1839

FOREIGN POLICY, which had been a matter of such vital importance to the British people during more than twenty years of almost continuous war, excited less interest for some time after the Congress of Vienna rose in 1815. Wealth had increased; large fortunes were in the hands of certain classes; but to the majority of the nation the War had left a dismal legacy of suffering. The immense National Debt; the heavy taxes; the high cost of living; depression in every form of industry; agricultural distress; the crowds of discharged soldiers and seamen, and of artisans who had been employed in producing implements of war, and who were now unable to obtain work; the chronic discontent of Ireland; the loud demand for Parliamentary Reform, which had been so long delayed that there was danger of a terrible convulsion of society if it was not granted soon—all combined to cause widespread alarm. Thus it was that, outside the Foreign Office, where diplomacy had to deal with the grave problems discussed at Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laibach, and Verona, with the affairs of Spain and the South American Colonies, with the risings in Italy, and the revolt of Greece, domestic affairs occupied almost exclusively the attention of the country. Meanwhile, beyond the narrow seas events were taking place which might raise, at any moment, that dangerous question of the Netherlands which had been the fundamental cause of the long War with France.

In the Low Countries, a period of prosperity had followed the Reunion of the Northern and the Southern Netherlands. The Scheldt was free to the flags of all nations, and Antwerp was recovering something of the position it had occupied in the days of Charles V. At Brussels, the trade in carpets, silk, and lace was flourishing. The cotton mills of Ghent and the ironworks at Liége were busy. Orders from Germany, from the Levant and from South America were pouring in upon the linen-workers of Courtrai and the clothiers of Verviers, and from Holland and France upon the miners of the Walloon districts. On every side, new factories were being erected, and new companies formed to carry on various kinds of trade. There were some who doubted whether this vast extension of industrial

activity could last; but, though the Belgian Provinces did not altogether escape the commercial depression from which the whole of Europe suffered, the people had every reason to be satisfied with their lot. "It may be safely affirmed," we are told by Charles White, who lived for some years in Belgium and knew the country thoroughly, "on examining the average condition of the labouring classes, that no State in Europe presented a more flattering picture of comfort, ease, and general prosperity. It is true the working population were highly taxed; but they were paid in proportion, and were consequently contented[1]."

King William I worked hard to develop the resources of the country, and to promote the welfare of his subjects. But the Southern Netherlands were the "Catholic Netherlands"; and, from the very first day of his reign, he had to contend against the bitter hostility of the Bishops, who resented the Constitution of 1815, which tolerated all forms of worship and proclaimed the principle of complete religious liberty. Some of the clergy were prosecuted and severely punished for refusing to obey the law. These proceedings alienated large sections of the community; and as time went on other causes of discord arose. Though there were Ministers and a Council of State, the Ministers were not responsible for the executive acts of the Crown. This made Constitutional government, in the true sense of the words, impossible, and was one great cause of the troubles which were to break up the kingdom. The King wished to rule over a free, prosperous, and happy people; but he would allow no interference with his own measures. In order to improve the education of the clergy, he founded the *Collège Philosophique* at Louvain, where young priests were to be instructed in Liberal principles; and this scheme the Church opposed, as it had the *Séminaire Générale* of the Emperor Joseph II. He decided that Dutch must be the official language; but, though a majority of the people spoke only Flemish, which is akin to Dutch, and as a written language practically the same, he could not overcome the objections of the French-speaking part of the population. The States General met alternately at The Hague and at Brussels; but the chief Departments of Government had their headquarters in Holland, and most of the officials, and a great majority of the officers in the Army, were Dutch. This was thought to prove a desire for Dutch supremacy. Taxes which the Southern Netherlands disliked were imposed and resisted. The Press teemed with complaints; and heavy penalties were inflicted on journalists found guilty of

[1] White, *The Belgic Revolution of* 1830, I. 113.

seditious writings. At last, these and other grievances led, in July, 1828, to a union of the Catholic or Clerical party with the Liberals. After this Coalition had been formed, the agitation for a redress of grievances became more persistent. There was, however, no sign of a desire to dissolve the union between North and South. According to Lewis de Potter, the most turbulent of the Southern agitators, reforms, "painfully and slowly acquired," were all that the leaders of the Opposition wished. It seemed as if the kingdom of the Netherlands, that edifice to build which had been the great object of British foreign policy in the last year of the War, would stand firm. But in France movements were now on foot which threatened to confront the Foreign Office at London with an entirely new situation.

By the summer of 1829, two years had passed since the Treaty of London united France with Great Britain and Russia in the Alliance which was intended to settle the Greek troubles. Within twelve months after the death of Canning and the battle of Navarino, this Alliance had ceased to exist except in name. Differences between Great Britain and Russia on the Eastern question had followed the formation of the Wellington Administration in January, 1828; and next year, during the War between Russia and Turkey, plans for the annexation of Belgium and the Rhenish Provinces were discussed in France. This inroad on the settlement of 1815 was to be accomplished by an alliance between France and Russia; and they, it was hoped, would succeed in forming a combination of Powers against Great Britain, whose opposition to the acquisition of the Belgian Provinces by France was, of course, foreseen.

The French military party had never acquiesced in the loss of Belgium, or in the erection of the fortifications at Ypres and other places along the frontier. Philippeville and Mariembourg, taken from France, had been given to the King of the Netherlands. This, and the whole system of the Barrier Towns, constituted, it was said, a standing menace to the security of France. Early in January, 1829, Palmerston had a conversation at Paris with General Sebastiani, who declared that an extension of territory towards the Rhine was necessary. "So long," he said, "as the policy of England is opposed to these resumptions, so long will it be impossible for a cordial alliance to exist between England and France." During the following spring and summer, the annexation of Belgium was openly discussed in Paris; and, in September, the subject came before Charles X and the Council of State.

Prince Jules de Polignac, after acting as French Ambassador to the Court of St James's since 1823, had been recalled and appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new Cabinet, which was formed in August, 1829. Related though he was to English families, he had no love for their country. "There never," Wellington said, "was a more bitter enemy to England." And, soon after he became head of the French Foreign Office, he began to make plans hostile to British policy as to the critical problem of the Netherlands.

The traditional policy of England was founded on the conviction that her security required the exclusion of France from the Belgian Provinces; but Polignac thought there was now an opportunity for regaining them. The Emperor Nicholas, when his army was rapidly overcoming the resistance of Turkey, had proposed that Russia and France should come to an understanding as to what territorial changes were to follow the downfall of the Ottoman empire, which then seemed probable. Polignac, thereupon, prepared an elaborate project for a reconstruction of Europe. There were to be changes in almost every State, and even in Asia Minor and Egypt. But what he chiefly insisted on was that the settlement of the Netherlands made in 1815 must be altered. The Belgian Provinces between the Meuse, the estuary of the Scheldt, and the North Sea were to be separated from Holland and incorporated with France. North Brabant, Luxemburg, and Landau were also to be French possessions. The Dutch territory on the right bank of the Rhine was to be ceded to Prussia; and, on the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, the King of the Netherlands was to reign at Constantinople as the Sovereign of a New Greece. It was anticipated that Great Britain would resist these and the other territorial changes proposed: but an attempt was to be made to obtain her assent by an offer of the Dutch Colonies. If she refused this arrangement, as it was practically certain she would, she was to be confronted by a coalition of Continental Powers, which would leave her isolated, and with no alternative but to agree or face a general war.

In the Council of State, the Dauphin, prompted, it was believed, by Talleyrand, argued that no British Cabinet would ever consent to a French occupation of Antwerp, and proposed that, instead of Belgium, the Provinces on the left bank of the Rhine should be claimed. But, after a debate which occupied two sittings, Polignac's plan was adopted, and it was agreed that the whole project should be sent to the French Ambassador at Petrograd, with instructions to inform the Emperor that, if he thought it necessary for a Congress

of the Powers to meet in order to sanction the proposed arrangements, France would agree, but only on condition that there was an *entente préalable* relative to the annexation of Belgium. If, however, peace was concluded between Russia and Turkey before these Instructions reached him, the Ambassador was not to act upon them. Suddenly, on September 18th, before the despatches prepared for Petrograd were sent off, news reached Paris that the War in the Balkan Peninsula was at an end.

Though, after the Treaty of Adrianople, Polignac's extraordinary plan for a general redistribution of territory was laid aside, and the North African adventure became the principal concern of the French Government, the design of obtaining Belgium was not abandoned. Between September, 1829, and July, 1830, Belgian resistance to the King's measures became more obstinate, and the King grew more autocratic. Brussels swarmed with Frenchmen and political refugees from various countries. Some were journalists from Paris, who attacked the Dutch and fomented disaffection among the Belgians, with the object of creating a movement in favour of reunion to France. Emissaries were sent from Paris, where the military party loudly asserted that the Walloons, and many of the Flemings also, wished to be separated from Holland and united to France. Such was, in fact, the wish of a party among the Belgian people. But its adherents were not so numerous as the French supposed; and it was not till July, 1830, that signs of the coming Revolution began to appear.

Polignac was now acting as Minister of War, as well as of Foreign Affairs; and military camps had been formed at St Omer and Lunéville, in preparation for an armed demonstration on the Belgian frontier, when Charles X signed the Ordinances which led to the Revolution of July. With the National Guard disaffected, part of the regular army in Africa, and part on the Belgian frontier, the Government had no force in Paris strong enough to quell the mob; and, by the middle of August, Charles was an exile in England, and Louis-Philippe, Duke of Orleans, was on the Throne of France. This was the prelude to the Revolt of Belgium, of which the Comte de Circourt, who was employed at the French Foreign Office at that time, afterwards said Polignac was the author. Wellington was of the same opinion, "though," he said, "it did not break out till he [Polignac] and all that he belonged to had fallen victims to their own Revolution of the Three Days—a just retribution upon him at least."

The British Parliament was dissolved on July 24th, the day before

Charles X signed the Ordinances; and the General Election which followed the death of George IV had just begun, when it became known that Polignac and the reactionary clericals had fallen. A tidal wave of Liberalism was flowing over the country; and addresses of congratulation were sent to Paris, while the newspapers published articles praising the French people. Great Britain at once recognised Louis-Philippe. So did Austria, where Metternich, though alarmed, contented himself with expressing a hope that the new Government of France would suppress "that strange spirit of propagandism which the revolutionary faction may spread over Europe." Prussia followed the example of Great Britain and Austria; and the Court of Russia reluctantly accepted the *fait accompli*.

In Holland, there seems to have been no uneasiness about what might be the effect on Belgium of the July Revolution. But Brussels had been for some years a favourite meeting-place for political agitators; and, when these dangerous aliens heard the news from Paris, they gathered in the streets, urging the people to imitate the French, erect barricades, and rise against the Government. Most of the old Jacobins, Barrère among others, who had been living in the Netherlands since the Restoration of the Bourbons, had returned to France; but it was noticed that young Parisians who had fought in the "days of July" were arriving in Brussels, where they went about wearing tricolour cockades, singing the Marseillaise, and declaring that France was ready to help any country that was discontented with its rulers. Brussels was restless; and, during a performance of the *Muette de Portici* at the Théâtre de la Monnaie on the evening of August 25th, the storm burst. Inflamed by the story of the revolt of Naples, the audience left the theatre, shouting "Liberty, Liberty!" and were joined by such a mob as in any city is easily attracted by the prospect of disorder. Wholesale rioting and plundering followed; and, though next day order was to some extent restored, it was soon apparent that what had been at first a mere street uproar was rapidly becoming a revolution full of danger to the peace of Europe. A Deputation sent to The Hague laid the grievances of the Belgian Provinces before the King. The Belgian Deputies pressed for an administrative separation of Belgium from Holland. Maintain the dynasty, they urged, but give Belgium self-government with the Hereditary Prince of Orange as Viceroy. By this means alone, they declared, could civil war be avoided. The King promised to consider what they said, but insisted that his troops must occupy Brussels; and, on September 23rd, a Dutch

force marched in. After three days of street fighting, they retired. Almost the whole of Belgium rose. In a few weeks the King had lost all the important fortresses of the Southern Netherlands except Maastricht and Antwerp, and a majority of the people were obeying a Provisional Government, which, without waiting for the sanction of the Great Powers, had audaciously proclaimed that "the Belgian Provinces detached by force from Holland, shall form an independent State," and announced that a National Congress was to meet, in which representatives of the people would discuss the future of the country and frame a new Constitution.

For a time, it seemed possible that the Netherlands might yet be saved from disruption. A Commission appointed by the King prepared a plan of self-government for the Southern Provinces, a draft of which is still preserved among the archives at The Hague; and resolutions in favour of it were passed by the States General. But the retirement of the troops and the rapid spread of the revolt put an end to all hopes of giving effect to this measure; and, on October 5th, King William called on the Five Great Powers to intervene, in the belief that they would not allow the work of the Congress of Vienna to be undone. He trusted loyal Holland to defend his rights; but he told the States General that he also relied on the Powers to preserve the political system of Europe by upholding the Throne on which they had placed him.

In Great Britain, where the French Revolution of July had been praised, the Belgian Revolution was condemned. The British colony at Brussels had been dispersed in August. Some had gone to France; others had crossed the frontier into Holland; and every boat from Ostend brought over families who landed at Dover full of irritation against the insolent and disorderly conduct of the mob in Brussels. Their complaints, corroborated by letters from those who had remained behind, caused a strong prejudice against the Belgians, which increased when it was found that the rioting in Brussels had led to events that disturbed the settlement of the Netherlands secured by Great Britain fifteen years before. And, when rumours began to circulate that, if the Belgian Provinces became independent, the Throne might be offered to a Prince of the Orleans Family, there was a demand for strong measures to prevent such a revival of French ascendancy in the Low Countries.

All this encouraged King William to believe that Great Britain would send troops to help him. Holland, indeed, if given a free hand,

was strong enough to deal with the revolt. She had been taken by surprise; but it was inconceivable that the Dutch, who had won their independence from Spain, who, when Spain had fallen from her high place amongst the nations, had fought on equal terms with England for the empire of the seas, and who had repelled the armies of Lewis XIV, were now so weak that they were unequal to the task of recovering the Belgian Provinces. It was, however, all but certain that, if a Dutch army invaded Belgium, France would take the field against it. Then Holland, if left to fight singlehanded, would be defeated. The sympathies of Russia and the Germanic Confederation were wholly with the Dutch; and, though they might be unwilling to enter on a war with France, there was danger of a general conflagration if the question of the Netherlands, which had thus arisen in a new form to trouble the Peace of Europe, was not speedily laid to rest.

Wellington and Lord Aberdeen, who was now at the Foreign Office, saw the perils of the situation. "It is a devilish bad business, the most serious affair for Europe that could have arisen," Wellington said, when he heard that the Dutch forces had retired from Brussels. "We may do as we please," said Aberdeen, "but I feel confident that, sooner or later, we shall find in the Netherlands a cause of war. Fortunately, it will be a good one." The structure which British Foreign Policy had raised at the Congress of Vienna was in ruins; and the King of the Netherlands trusted that the British Government would insist that it must be restored. But Wellington was determined to avoid a rupture with France, and to preserve the Peace of Europe. He found that the Continental Powers were ready to mediate between King William and the Provisional Government at Brussels, with a view to settling the crisis without an appeal to arms; and Baron Falck, the Ambassador of the Netherlands at the Court of St James's, was told that a Conference would meet in London, and that the British policy was to prevent the troubles in the Low Countries leading to war. The same explanation was given to the Hereditary Prince of Orange, who came to England at the end of October, in the hope of persuading the Government to send a British army to help his father.

In France, the Revolt of the Southern Netherlands, deliberately planned by Polignac, and stirred up by foreign agitators, most of whom were French, had been welcomed, not from any genuine sympathy with Belgian grievances, but rather because it weakened the "Barrier State," thus opening the way to the Rhine, and might lead to the annexation of Belgium. But the official policy of France

had changed after the fall of Charles X and Polignac. Instead of plotting a coalition against Great Britain, Louis-Philippe wished to be on friendly terms with her. "The safety of Europe, even of the world, and the future happiness and independence of the human race, hang on the influence and independence of England," he had written after the rupture of the Peace of Amiens; and his feelings had not changed since then. The final verdict of Lafayette, who did so much to put him on the Throne of France, "He is a knave, and we are the victims of his knaveries," was not dreamed of in the autumn of 1830. To the French, he then seemed to be a democratic ruler, raised by a Revolution, who would reign under a democratic charter. But, from the first, he had to reckon with two powerful factions, the Bonapartists and the Republicans. Both called him "the Englishman"; and this was a term of reproach, for the amicable relations which helped so much to preserve the Peace of Europe during the Conference of London did not exist between the French and British peoples, but only between a very limited number of French and British statesmen. The influence of these factions, which always hoped for the union of France and Belgium, was felt from time to time, and might have led to serious consequences when, as happened on several occasions, France and Great Britain did not see eye to eye, if it had not been for the astute prudence of Talleyrand, who had come to London as Ambassador towards the end of September.

The Conference of the Five Powers met at the Foreign Office on November 4th. Great Britain was represented by Lord Aberdeen, France by Talleyrand, Russia by Baron Matuszevicz, Austria by Prince Eszterházy, and Prussia by Freiherr von Bülow. A Protocol was at once signed, which advised a suspension of hostilities. This was agreed to by both the belligerents; and a second Protocol, signed on November 17th, was followed by others relating to the terms of an Armistice, which Holland accepted at once, and Belgium on December 15th. It was stipulated that the respective troops should evacuate the territories they occupied on either side beyond the line which, before the Union, had separated the Northern and the Southern Netherlands. This was arranged by the Secretary of the British Embassy at The Hague (Cartwright), and the Secretary of the French Embassy at London (Bresson), who were sent to Brussels as Commissioners of the Conference.

Lord Aberdeen signed the second Protocol; but he was no longer in office. On November 15th, Ministers had been defeated in the

House of Commons, when a motion to refer the Civil List for the new reign to a select committee was carried against them. Wellington resigned, and the King sent for Lord Grey.

This change of Government brought with it something more than a probable extension of the franchise, to be followed by other domestic reforms. The general tendency in Foreign Policy of the party led by Wellington had been to support any established Government. But, in the new Administration, Palmerston was Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He had rejoiced at the Revolution which overthrew the Government of Charles X. "Is not this," he wrote to Sir James Graham, "the most triumphant demonstration of the advantages arising from free discussion, from the liberty of the Press, from the diffusion of knowledge, and from familiarising even the lowest classes with the daily examination of political questions[1]?" A Tory when he first took office, he had joined the school of Canning, had separated from Wellington at the crisis of 1828, and was, for the rest of his life, in general sympathy with Liberal movements on the Continent. But the change of Government did not change the traditional Foreign Policy of Great Britain on the essential head that, as Grenville had said many years before, "England will never see with indifference France make herself, either directly or indirectly, sovereign of the Low Countries and general arbitress of the rights and liberties of Europe." Before the resignation of Wellington, Silvain van de Weyer, the Belgian diplomat afterwards so well known and so popular in London, came from Brussels, and saw Aberdeen and Wellington. He told them that Belgium would repel any form of intervention, whether diplomatic or armed, and, rather than submit, would throw herself "into the arms of a powerful neighbour"; and, when Wellington said that the British Government would not interfere with the Belgians so long as they did not endanger the Peace of Europe, he spoke of reunion to France as a last plank of safety. "Instead of being a plank of safety," Wellington told him, "it would be a signal for a European war. England and all the other Powers will always oppose your reunion to France[2]." Palmerston would have said the same. His policy as Foreign Minister was to maintain a friendly understanding with France, but only so long as this was consistent with British interests.

It was obvious that the Belgian Revolution was, on many grounds,

[1] Parker, *Life and Letters of Sir James Graham*, I. 85.
[2] Juste, *Le Congrès National de Belgique*, I. 81.

a blow to Great Britain. But it was an accomplished fact. France had apparently discarded the aggressive schemes of Polignac. They might, however, be revived; for many Frenchmen thought that the Rhine was the natural frontier of their country, and clung, moreover, to the idea of annexing Belgium. To this Palmerston would not, any more than Wellington or Aberdeen, consent; and he had made up his mind that, in order to prevent Belgium from becoming a French province, some plan must be contrived for giving her a separate existence. In his hands, British Foreign Policy was henceforth directed to finding a settlement of the Netherlands which would establish Belgium as a self-governing country. The plan of an administrative separation from Holland, with the Hereditary Prince as Viceroy, which would have preserved the historic connexion between North and South, was not abandoned; but the Belgians were not to be forced into accepting anything short of an autonomy which would make them practically independent. On questions of Foreign Policy, the Liberalism of Grey, Russell, Durham, Holland and other Whigs was as robust as that of Palmerston; but, though they had taken no part in the arrangements made at the Congress of Vienna, they, like Palmerston, would have preferred to see the Kingdom of the Netherlands remain intact under the House of Orange. Nevertheless, they took up the Belgian question with no rooted prejudice against a change of the system established in 1815. Leaders in a movement which was to change the balance of political power in the British Islands, they had no bias against a Revolution on the other side of the Channel. Van de Weyer, who left England before the change of Government, was convinced that the case of the Belgian revolutionaries would obtain a fair hearing from the Opposition; and, when the change came, it was soon found that his judgment had been correct.

Meanwhile, on November 10th, when the Conference of London had just begun its work, the National Congress had met in the Palais de la Nation at Brussels. The Provisional Government resigned the functions which they had assumed at the crisis of the Revolution; but they were appointed to act as an executive holding office under the Congress, which now became the supreme authority in Belgium.

A proposal in favour of reunion to France was made; but the majority saw that, in view of the inevitable opposition of Great Britain, it would be unwise even to discuss that question, and decided that the Independence of Belgium should be at once proclaimed. But what was "Belgium"? It was understood that, besides the

Provinces of East and West Flanders, Brabant, Antwerp, Hainault, and Namur, it would include the Principality of Liége, which had been made part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands by the Congress of Vienna. But was Belgium to include, also, the district on the left bank of the Scheldt below Antwerp (known as Dutch Flanders), which had been taken from Holland when the Southern Netherlands were annexed by France in 1795? Were Luxemburg and Limburg to be included? These territories were all claimed by the Congress. There was a very serious difficulty about Luxemburg, which had been erected into a grand-duchy forming part of the Germanic Confederation in 1814, and given to the Prince of Orange in compensation for his Nassau estates, which were ceded to Prussia. What the Belgian leaders chiefly relied on to maintain their claim to the grand-duchy was that in the past, during nearly four hundred years, Luxemburg had usually shared the fortunes of the Southern Netherlands, and that the inhabitants had taken a prominent part in the Revolution, had accepted the Provisional Government, and sent deputies to the Congress. But the settlement of 1814 could not be ignored. Luxemburg belonged to King William personally, and was, at the present time, a State of the Germanic Confederation, and thus stood in a different position from the other Belgian Provinces, while the interests of the Confederation were directly involved in its fate. A Prussian garrison held the fortress of Luxemburg; and, in the event of war with France, the German armies could at once march through the grand-duchy upon Verdun, the key to Paris. The strategic value of Luxemburg, therefore, made it certain that the Confederation would not readily consent to see it become part of an independent Belgium, where French influence would be strong. The deputies at the Congress were convinced that Great Britain and France, if not all the Five Powers, were so anxious to preserve the general peace that Belgium might assert her independence without fear of seeing the plain of Flanders become once more the battlefield of Europe; and, on November 18th, the Declaration of Independence was issued, with a reservation, however, of the question of Luxemburg and its relations with the Germanic Confederation.

The next question was whether Belgium should be a monarchy or a republic; and, after three stormy sittings, it was decided that a Limited and Hereditary Monarchy was the form of government best suited to the traditions and social customs of the Belgian people.

On the following day, a resolution was moved, that the Orange

Family was for ever excluded from the Throne of Belgium. The Hereditary Prince, who was in London, had alienated many of his English friends; and the Belgian leaders believed that their cause would profit by the fall of the Wellington Administration. But it was known that public opinion in Great Britain was in favour of the Orange Family; and there were fears that Grey and Palmerston, looking to British interests, and following the settled lines of British Foreign Policy, might insist on limiting Belgian Independence to an administrative separation under the Hereditary Prince, in order to avoid the risk of Flanders, Antwerp, and the mouth of the Scheldt falling into the hands of France or any other of the Great Continental Powers. There were some hopes that France might support the National Congress, if Great Britain and the other three Powers objected to the vote of Exclusion. But it was soon found that there was to be no French intervention. The Provisional Government received a Message from the London Conference, announcing the unanimous opinion of the Plenipotentiaries that a vote of Perpetual Exclusion would endanger the Peace of Europe, and involve Belgium in difficulties with other States. The Congress was, therefore, advised to avoid the subject. Otherwise, if the vote of Exclusion was passed, Belgium might be occupied by an armed force, and divided amongst certain Powers.

The Provisional Government refused to yield; and it was at once apparent that the Message was causing great bitterness. Many deputies who had hitherto been hostile to the resolution were now eager to support it; the Orange party, intimidated by the mob, were afraid to open their lips; and by a large majority it was declared that the members of the Orange-Nassau Family were perpetually excluded from all power in Belgium.

There were good reasons for the warning given to the Congress. King William, as a Prince of the Germanic Confederation, was calling on the Diet to suppress the revolt of Luxemburg. The Austrian army had been increased. Preparations for war were on foot in Prussia, where it was believed that a reunion of Belgium to France would be attempted, even in the face of British opposition. The Emperor Nicholas was about to declare war on France; and there were rumours that he intended to send his Polish army against the Belgians. But suddenly, at the end of November, came the Revolt of Poland, in suppressing which he was fully occupied for the next twelve months. If there had been no Polish Revolution, the vote of Exclusion might

have caused Russia, Austria, and Prussia to withdraw from the Conference of London. As it was, the Five Powers continued to act in concert.

At the beginning of December, Lord Ponsonby was sent to Brussels as Commissioner for the Conference, taking the place of Cartwright, who had been accredited as British Minister to the Diet of Frankfort. The despatches which passed between Brussels and the Foreign Office in London show that, not only before the vote of exclusion but after it, there were hopes that the cause of the Orange Family was not entirely lost. But it soon became evident to Grey and Palmerston, and even to the Plenipotentiaries of the three Northern Powers, that Belgium would never accept the Hereditary Prince, and that the separation from Holland must be complete. Thus, on December 20th, a Protocol was signed declaring it manifest that the perfect fusion of the Northern and Southern Netherlands, which the Congress of Vienna had hoped to effect, had not been obtained, and that the Powers would proceed to arrange for the future independence of Belgium. A month later, on January 20th, 1831, these arrangements were embodied in another Protocol. Holland was to consist of the territories which had belonged to the Dutch republic in 1790. Belgium was to consist of the remainder of the territories which, between 1815 and 1830, had formed the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The grand-duchy of Luxemburg was to remain the possession of King William. The Powers at the same time declared their intention not to seek any isolated advantages for themselves, but to give Belgium and the neighbouring States "the best guarantees of repose and security."

But what were the best guarantees? For centuries, Belgium had been, in the hackneyed phrase, "the cockpit of Europe"; and it was to prevent its being this in the future that the Conference of London now declared the "perpetual neutrality." It appears to be uncertain which of the Plenipotentiaries first proposed that this should be done. According to Treitschke, following Hillebrand[1], it was Bülow, the representative of Prussia. That it was probably Matuszevicz, the Russian diplomat, is pointed out by Lannoy[2], who quotes a letter, of November 15th, 1830, to Nesselrode, in which Matuszevicz says that the best way to preserve Belgium from France and Holland would

[1] *Geschichte Frankreichs*, I. 178.

[2] *Les Origines Diplomatiques de l'Indépendence Belge*, p. 129. Cf. Martens, *Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie*, XI. 442.

be for the Five Powers to sign a Protocol or Treaty binding themselves not to enter Belgium except by common agreement, and also to guarantee Holland against attack from Belgium. Talleyrand, writing to Sebastiani on January 21st, 1831, uses language which seems to imply that it was he who proposed this[1]. Palmerston, however, says that he (Talleyrand) "fought like a dragon" to have Luxemburg made neutral, and threatened that he would not agree to Belgian neutrality unless this was done. The other four would not agree. Then Talleyrand said he would not consent to Belgian neutrality unless Philippeville and Mariembourg were ceded to France. But, "at last," Palmerston writes, "we brought him to terms by the same means by which juries become unanimous, by starvation. Between nine and ten at night he agreed to what we proposed, being, I have no doubt, secretly delighted to have the neutrality of Belgium established[2]." But, however the proposal may have originated, it was not adopted till after a debate which occupied two sittings. Belgium was to form a perpetually neutral State. The Five Powers "guarantee to it that perpetual neutrality, as well as the integrity and inviolability of its territory"; and "by a just reciprocity, Belgium shall be bound to observe the same neutrality towards all other States, and not to make any attempt against their internal or external tranquillity." Such was the first guarantee of Belgian neutrality, which Grey thought was "the best scheme for the future peace of Europe." In other words, Great Britain and the other four Powers, having solemnly bound themselves to seek no exclusive privileges in the new State, said to the Belgian people: "If we allow you to stand alone for the first time in history, your country must always be neutral; and, as you are weak, we promise to protect you in the peaceable enjoyment of the territory we assign to you without fear of invasion, on condition that you yourselves do not disturb the peace of other countries." Most of the Belgian leaders were against the system of perpetual neutrality. King Leopold, however, thought that it was in the real interests of the country; "but," he said, "our good Congress here did not wish it, and even opposed it; it was *imposé* upon them[3]."

A Protocol of January 27th provided that Belgium was to be responsible for nearly one-half of the public debt of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This was a considerable burden; but the Belgians

[1] *Correspondance Diplomatique: Ambassade à Londres*, I. 181.

[2] Palmerston to Granville, January 21st, 1831. Bulwer's *Life of Palmerston*, II. 29.

[3] The King of the Belgians to Queen Victoria, February 15th, 1856.

were to be allowed to trade with the Dutch Colonies on equal terms with the people of Holland.

These two Protocols, of January 20th and 27th, set forth the bases of separation which were to establish the Independence and future existence of Belgium. King William, though indignant at the recognition by the Powers of the Independence of Belgium, accepted the conditions they had laid down. But, on February 1st, Sebastiani sent a despatch to Bresson, saying that the French Government did not adhere to the Protocols, thus repudiating what Talleyrand had agreed to; on the ground that the Powers were mediators, who might offer suggestions, but had no right to impose decisions. Palmerston at once instructed Lord Granville, who was now British Ambassador at Paris, to inform the French Minister, that the British Government allowed the Conference to continue only because they were convinced "that satisfactory explanations would be forthcoming." These explanations were not made for some time; and, if it had not been for the good understanding between Palmerston and Talleyrand, who was surprised at the action of his Government, there might have been at this juncture a rupture between the Cabinets of London and Paris.

The effect of this episode was to weaken the authority of the Conference. While Sebastiani's despatch was on its way from Paris, the Congress had protested against any territorial limits, or any obligation whatever, being imposed on the country without its consent. The publication of the despatch at Brussels encouraged the deputies to set the Powers at defiance; and they insisted that Luxemburg, Maastricht with the whole of Limburg, and Dutch Flanders must belong to Belgium, while the proposed division of the public debt was rejected as unfair. The Conference forthwith announced that its decision was irrevocable, and that Belgian Independence would not be recognised till it was agreed to. Nothing, however, would persuade the Congress to yield; and, at the end of February, 1831, when the Powers had been negotiating for nearly four months, the position was that Holland had accepted the terms of separation, and Belgium had rejected them.

Meanwhile, the new kingdom which the Flemings and Walloons had combined to form had not yet found a king. Every Court in Europe took an interest in this question. In Belgium, many names had been discussed; but, at the beginning of 1831, the most popular candidates were the Duc de Nemours, second son of Louis-Philippe, and the Duke of Leuchtenberg, son of Prince Eugène de Beau-

harnais. In the Congress, there was a strong party in favour of electing Leuchtenberg. But, as grandson of the Empress Josephine, he was so closely connected with the Napoleonic faction which menaced the stability of the Orleans dynasty, that Louis-Philippe could not be expected to acquiesce in his election. Nor could Great Britain consent to the election of Nemours. On the Throne of Belgium, he would, though nominally an independent Sovereign, be really the viceroy of his father, and the Belgian Provinces, though not again formally united to France, would be little else than French Departments. The French Ministers could not forget that British Foreign Policy had always been directed to prevent this; and when, in the autumn of 1830, an offer was brought to Paris by Gendebien, leader of those Belgians who wished reunion to France, Lord Stuart de Rothesay, our Ambassador there, was privately informed of it by Count Molé, who told him that it would be declined. Towards the end of the year, the Belgian Government approached Louis-Philippe on the subject, when van de Weyer went to Paris with the suggestion that Great Britain might be induced to consent to the election of Nemours, if his marriage to a British princess was arranged. This proposal was rejected; but there were misgivings at the Foreign Office about the intentions of the French King, though the Comte de Flahaut, who was then in London, had given many assurances that he would do nothing hostile to British interests. "I am," Grey writes, on January 11th, 1831, to Granville, who had just succeeded Stuart de Rothesay at Paris, "a little discomposed by the hesitation in giving a plain, direct and absolute refusal of the Crown of the Netherlands to the Duc de Nemours." About this time—his letter is undated—he wrote to his friend Lord Holland that he saw nothing for it but holding strong language to France. "I wished and hoped," he said, "for better things, but, whether from insincerity or weakness, things are taking a course in which we cannot acquiesce[1]."

At the same time, the French Ministers were alarmed. They found that the election of Leuchtenberg was almost certain. The first step taken was to intimate that France would not recognise him. But this warning was unheeded. Flemings and Walloons alike resented any interference by the Powers; and, by way of asserting their independence, the partisans of Leuchtenberg and Nemours continued the struggle with headstrong obstinacy. The situation was embarrassing to Louis-Philippe. He had told the Belgians that he

[1] Howick MSS.

would not recognise Leuchtenberg, and had promised the British Government to prevent the accession of Nemours. The diplomacy of the Palais Royal was, however, equal to the occasion. Sebastiani's despatch, announcing the dissent of France from the decision of the other four Powers on the territorial limits of Belgium, and stating that the Conference was only a mediation, was timed so as to reach Brussels on the morning of February 3rd, the day fixed for the election, and was laid before the Congress in the afternoon, before the vote was taken. This, coupled with the fact that Bresson, acting on Instructions which he had brought from Paris, let it be understood that Louis-Philippe would allow his son to accept, turned the scale against Leuchtenberg, and Nemours was elected.

At the Foreign Office in London, Talleyrand was trusted. But no confidence was felt in the Cabinet of Paris. Palmerston instructed Granville to inform Sebastiani that, however anxious the British Ministers might be for peace, they would "never submit to an affront either in language or in act[1]." He said that the action of the French Government, "promising acceptance through Bresson at Brussels, and refusal through Talleyrand in London," was "a course of miserable intrigue"; and the British Government resolved, even at the risk of war, to call on France to refuse the Throne of Belgium. There is, indeed, some reason to believe that Louis-Philippe, in spite of his repeated assurances, began to waver after the election of his son; but, on February 17th, he gave an audience to a deputation from Brussels, and finally declined the offer of the Crown, giving as his reason the certainty that to accept it would plunge both France and Belgium into war.

For some time, the Government at Brussels had been showing signs of weakness. A Regent, Baron Surlet de Chokier, was chosen; and a Cabinet was formed, in which van de Weyer became Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Regent issued a proclamation to the people of Luxemburg, in which he boasted that Belgium, "the nation which has vanquished the Dutch armies," was able to resist the Conference of London. "We began our revolution," he said, "in spite of the Treaties of 1815; we will finish it in spite of the Protocols of London." The effect of this bombastic manifesto was to irritate every Cabinet in Europe. Van de Weyer wished to have a Minister at the Court of St James's; but Palmerston intimated that, while Belgium treated the Conference in so unbecoming a manner, no Minister would

[1] Palmerston to Granville, February 15th, 1831. F.O. France, 424.

be received. Three days after the issue of the Regent's proclamation, there was a change of Cabinet in France. The Laffitte Administration resigned, and Casimir Périer came into power. Sebastiani remained at the Foreign Office; and he was as firm as Palmerston. France, he said, would not support the Belgians, if they compromised the Peace of Europe. The Cabinet of The Hague called on the Conference to compel Belgium to accept the terms of separation to which Holland had agreed; and the Germanic Confederation prepared to enter Luxemburg. But Palmerston and Talleyrand in London, and Casimir Périer in Paris, worked together to prevent a breach of the peace; the advance of the German army was delayed; and the negotiations in London continued.

The state of Belgium was now deplorable. The Orange party engaged in plots; and several attempts were made to bring in the Hereditary Prince. Plans for a partition of the country were afloat. France, Prussia and Holland were each to receive a share; and it was believed in Belgium that Great Britain intended to establish a naval base at Antwerp. Nothing came of this; but the ominous reports which flew about alarmed the cooler members of the Congress, and made them fear that their Revolution, already discredited in the eyes of Europe, might end by breaking up the Southern Netherlands. Serious misunderstandings with Ponsonby led to the resignation of Bresson, who was succeeded, as joint Envoy from the London Conference, by General Belliard—the brave soldier to whom, in March, 1814, had fallen the painful duty of telling Napoleon that Paris had capitulated. He acted in complete harmony with Ponsonby; but the policy of the Regent was to cultivate an understanding with France alone, and to keep Great Britain at a distance.

Van de Weyer now perceived the mistakes which he and his colleagues had been making ever since the Conference of London met. There must, he felt, be a complete change of policy. He resigned. His resignation was followed by that of the other Ministers; and, on March 28th, another Cabinet was formed, in which Lebeau held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. Belgium was no longer to rely on France alone; but the Congress was still determined to reject the terms of separation. Men and supplies were voted, and it was decided that war would be declared against Holland if, within one month, Luxemburg, Limburg, and Dutch Flanders were not given up. The Congress rose on April 12th; and, five days later, Talleyrand announced to the Conference that his Government agreed to the Protocols of January.

It was now more necessary than ever that Belgium, torn by internal discord, and threatened by dangers from without, should find a king. Whoever was chosen must be one whom all the Five Powers would agree to recognise; and it was found that none of them would object to the election of Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, who had been living in England ever since the death, in November, 1817, of Princess Charlotte of Wales, to whom he had been married in the summer of 1816. He had often been spoken of as a possible king; but the strong Belgian feeling in favour of a French prince, and the reluctance of Great Britain and the Northern Powers to abandon the Prince of Orange, had prevented any definite movement on his behalf. He was in bad odour with Aberdeen and Wellington, whom he had offended by first accepting, and afterwards refusing, the Crown of Greece, which had been offered to him in 1829; and Palmerston was not, at first, very cordial. On April 13th, he wrote to Granville that England would still prefer a Union between Belgium and Holland, but that, if this was impossible, the election of Prince Leopold would be preferred to any other arrangement. But he made it clear that Belgium must accept the terms of separation before any king was elected.

Negotiations with Prince Leopold were now opened. On April 20th, delegates from Brussels arrived in London, where they saw him at Marlborough House, and told him that the terms of separation must be altered; for the Belgian Congress, when it met again, would not agree to surrender Luxemburg, Limburg, and the left bank of the Scheldt. The Prince explained that he could not give them a definite answer at once. He doubtless felt, Palmerston said, that what they were offering was, not so much a Crown as a standing quarrel with Europe. A few days later, he gave his decision. He would not accept the Throne, unless Belgium accepted the terms of separation. Some compromise, he thought, might be found as to Limburg; but Luxemburg must be given up. An interview of three hours with Palmerston followed without any result. This was on April 30th. A week passed; no progress was made; and again Palmerston summoned the delegates to the Foreign Office, but could not persuade them to meet the wishes of the Conference. Ponsonby was then instructed to inform Lebeau that, if the terms of separation were not accepted by June 1st, there would be a rupture between the Conference and the Belgian Government; that the Powers would approve of whatever steps the Germanic Confederation might take in Luxemburg; and that, if Belgium made

war on Holland, it would be regarded as an act of hostility against all the Powers, who would have to take strong measures.

Meanwhile, Lebeau had become anxious; and, on May 10th, the day on which the Conference drew up its ultimatum, he started for London to hasten the negotiations. He was followed, after three days, by Ponsonby, who, on reading his Instructions, felt that he must let Palmerston know how excited the Belgians were, and how desirable it was to calm them by offering more favourable terms. The plan he thought most feasible was to offer King William a money payment in exchange for Luxemburg. As the result of his visit to London, he was instructed by the Conference to inform the Belgian Government that the Powers, though they could not wait much longer, would try to obtain Luxemburg for Belgium by some "just compensation." On the evening of May 26th he was back in Brussels, and went at once to Lebeau, who had returned from England. On the following day, Lebeau read to the Congress, which was again sitting, a letter from Ponsonby, which stated that the Conference would endeavour to obtain Luxemburg for Belgium by treaty with Holland in return for an equitable indemnity. "Is Belgium," he asked, "powerful enough to force the five great military nations of Europe to subscribe to all her wishes?" His letter ended with a hint that, if Belgium continued to resist, she might lose part of her own territory. This gave offence; and Gendebien and his party demanded an immediate declaration of war against Holland. They boasted that they would drive the Dutch from the left bank of the Scheldt and hold Luxemburg against the Germanic Confederation. This vainglorious oratory was incredibly foolish; but the Belgian Ministers were wiser than many of their countrymen. They moved that the Congress should at once proceed to elect a king, on condition that the territorial question should be settled by negotiation; and, after seven days of acrimonious debating, they obtained a majority. Prince Leopold was elected on June 4th; and a delegation immediately started for London bearing a letter from the Regent offering him the Crown. Baron Northomb and Deveaux were appointed Commissioners to negotiate with the Conference. There was no time to lose; for Ponsonby was now recalled, because June 1st, the date fixed by the ultimatum of the Powers, had passed without an acceptance of the terms of separation.

The Prince received the two Commissioners on June 9th, and asked if they had anything to propose. They said that they no longer claimed the left bank of the Scheldt below Antwerp, as it had

belonged to Holland in 1790, and the population had taken no part in the Belgian Revolution. They proposed that Luxemburg should be made over to Belgium for a money payment, or that the question should be reserved in the meantime, and settled by a separate negotiation after the Prince was on the Throne. They demanded Maastricht and the whole of Limburg. While admitting that there were places in that Province which belonged to the Dutch Republic in 1790, they proposed to give Holland, in exchange for them, certain *enclaves*, outlying districts within the boundaries of Holland, which had never belonged to it, but had always formed part of the Southern Netherlands. Having heard what they had to say, the Prince sent them to the Foreign Office. "I have seen Northomb and Deveaux," Palmerston wrote to Grey, "they appear to be preparing to yield." But they must, he said, agree to the terms of separation in substance or in form, and might afterwards negotiate as they pleased about exchanges.

Prince Leopold knew that the Conference would never grant all the Belgian demands. But he had made up his mind to accept the Throne, if terms were arranged which would secure his recognition by the Five Powers; and at last, after many comings and goings between the Foreign Office and Marlborough House, Eighteen Articles were drawn up. These consisted of the original terms of separation, with changes introduced in favour of Belgium. The question of Luxemburg was left open, and was to form the subject of a separate negotiation between Holland, Belgium and the Germanic Confederation, the Five Powers promising to use their good offices to preserve the *status quo* in the grand-duchy during the negotiations. The right of Belgium to the whole of Limburg was not admitted; but, should it be proved that the Dutch Republic did not exercise exclusive jurisdiction at Maastricht in 1790, Holland and Belgium were to come to an arrangement by negotiation. The burden of public debt laid on Belgium by the original terms was reduced; and the liabilities of the two countries were allotted so as to lay on each the debts which it had contracted before the Union of 1814. An equitable division was to be made of debts incurred in common during the Union.

Palmerston and Grey, who had taken the lead in preparing the new conditions, were most anxious to settle the whole business, and thought that the Belgians ought to accept them. "Concessions," Grey wrote to Prince Leopold, "must not be all on one side; and if the Belgians insist upon everything being yielded to them, the conse-

quences must be most unfortunate, and they will themselves suffer most from them[1]."

The Eighteen Articles were finally adjusted at Marlborough House, on the evening of Friday, June 24th, by Palmerston, Prince Leopold, Northomb, and Deveaux. Next day there was a meeting of the Cabinet at the Foreign Office, after which Palmerston received the Plenipotentiaries of the four Continental Powers, who spent seven hours with him. The discussion was prolonged till midnight, when they all went to Marlborough House, and remained with the Prince till far on in the morning. In the afternoon of Sunday, June 26th, the Cabinet met again, and waited at the Foreign Office till the Plenipotentiaries of France, Russia, Austria and Prussia came and signed the Protocol which contained the Articles. In the evening the Belgian delegates waited on Prince Leopold, who told them that, if the Articles were accepted by the Congress, he would consider his difficulties removed, and go to Brussels without any delay. With this answer, the delegates left London at midnight.

The British Ministers had done their best. Palmerston, supported by Grey, had persuaded the Plenipotentiaries of the three autocratic Powers to revoke the decision which had been declared irrevocable, and, in order to save Europe from a general war, to make what the Princess Lieven called a sacrifice. "This Belgian question," she writes, "affects the honour of the Powers. Possibly, in the interests of peace this sacrifice is necessary; but what a sacrifice it is, and, after all, we have done well to submit to it." That union of strength and suppleness, the capacity for remaining inflexibly firm on matters of principle, while giving way on unessential points, which made Palmerston so great a master of foreign policy, was never more clearly seen than between November, 1830, when he went to the Foreign Office for the first time, and June, 1831, when the Protocol of the Eighteen Articles was signed. He had often said that his desire was to make Belgium "really independent." This, greatly owing to his courage and sagacity during those eight months, was now possible. But the fate of Belgium depended on what was done at Brussels.

When the Eighteen Articles were disclosed to the Congress, and circulated in the Provinces, the agitators of every party set to work. The partisans of reunion to France, Republicans, Orangists, and those who clamoured for a war with Holland, attacked the Conference of London for offering such terms, and threatened the Belgian Ministers

[1] Grey to Prince Leopold, June 24th, 1831. Howick MSS.

with vengeance if they ventured to accept them. On July 1st the debate began. For nine days, the Palais de la Nation rang with protests against giving up any territory, any town, any village. Even the certainty that, if they did not yield, Prince Leopold would decline the Crown, and that the Powers would not only refuse to recognise their Independence, but might even partition their country, seemed nothing to many of the deputies. But, on the fifth day, a speech by Lebeau was the turning point of the debate. He showed how favourable the Eighteen Articles were to Belgium, persuaded the Congress that Luxemburg, Limburg, and Maastricht could be obtained, and implored the deputies not to set an example of anarchy to the people, but to accept the new conditions, and welcome the King whom they themselves had chosen. It was one of those rare occasions on which a speaker convinces a hostile audience. The extreme men continued their opposition; but the end came on July 9th, when the closure was carried and the Eighteen Articles were agreed to by a large majority.

Lebeau, who had taken office only to carry through the election of a king whom the Powers would recognise, now resigned, and went to London with a deputation to Prince Leopold, who left for Belgium on the morning of July 16th. He sailed from Dover, and, passing from Calais through that narrow strip of Flanders where, in the autumn of 1914, the third King of the Belgians and his small army made their stand upon the Yser, travelled by Bruges and Ghent to Brussels, where he was "inaugurated" on July 21st. The National Congress was dissolved; orders were issued for the election of the Chambers; and the King, having named his first Cabinet, in which de Meulenaere was Foreign Minister, and appointed van de Weyer his Ambassador at London, set out to visit Antwerp and other places in his new dominion.

The acceptance of the Eighteen Articles by the Belgian Congress and the election of Prince Leopold had set Holland in a blaze. The King resolved to refuse the Articles; and, on July 12th, a Note protesting against them was drawn up and sent to the Conference. If, it declared, the Prince took possession of the Crown of Belgium without adhering to the original terms of separation, the King would regard him as an enemy. A fortnight later, on July 25th, the Conference invited the King to open negotiations for a Treaty with Belgium. The answer was a letter to the effect that the King of Holland was ready to negotiate, but had determined to support any

negotiation by means of his military resources, seeing that the sovereignty of Belgium had now been assumed by a prince who had sworn to a Constitution injurious to the territorial rights of Holland.

This letter was delivered at the Foreign Office at 12 o'clock on the night of August 3rd. It was not opened till the Conference met next day; and already King William had proved that his intimation as to military measures was no empty threat.

On August 2nd, King Leopold was at Liége, where he heard from Antwerp that General Chassé, the Dutch Commander in the citadel, had denounced the Armistice, and was about to open hostilities. He at once wrote a private letter to Grey. "Your Lordship," he said, "will save England and Europe from the most tremendous consequences, if you order immediately a fleet to the coast of the Netherlands, and if you declare to Holland that you will consider hostilities committed by it as committed against England, and make reprisals[1]." Before this letter reached London, the news from Antwerp had been received, and a fleet under Sir Edward Codrington had been ordered to the Downs, to be ready for any emergency. An official appeal for assistance, endorsed by Lebeau, who was then at Liége, was sent to London and Paris. An army under Marshal Gérard was concentrated on the Belgian frontier; but the Ministers at Brussels insisted that no foreign help was needed, and Marshal Gérard was requested to delay his march.

The Belgian army, without discipline or competent officers, was no match for the highly trained troops of Holland, commanded by the Hereditary Prince of Orange. But the street fighting in the early days of the Revolution had made the populace think they were invincible; and the journalists encouraged this delusion. "Let us march straight into Holland," one paper said, "let us sign at The Hague the Treaty which William has declined to sign in London." There was, however, to be no march into Holland and no signing of a treaty at The Hague. Before dawn of August 2nd, the Dutch army advanced; and in ten days the Belgians were completely routed and driven back upon Louvain. The march of the Dutch to Brussels was prevented only by the arrival of the French, for whom King Leopold had sent when he found that his own troops were useless.

Through the mediation of Sir Robert Adair, who had lately been appointed British Minister at Brussels, hostilities were suspended; and, in a few days, the Prince of Orange led his army back to Holland.

[1] King Leopold to Lord Grey, August 2nd, 1831. Howick MSS.

The Foreign Office in London had now to deal with a new difficulty caused by the reluctance of the French to withdraw their troops from Belgium. The ostensible reason for this was the danger of another Dutch invasion; but it was soon found that the French Cabinet were unwilling to recall the army till they could satisfy public opinion in France on the subject of the Barrier Fortresses. Palmerston's view was, that the number of fortresses should be reduced to what Belgium could maintain and defend; but that she must not be deprived of her means of defence to such an extent that "through her Holland and Prussia are to be thrown open to France"; and, on April 17th, when France at last adhered to the original terms of separation, the Plenipotentiaries of the other Four Powers had signed a Protocol stating that the Permanent Neutrality of Belgium, guaranteed by France, had made it unnecessary to maintain all the fortresses. This Protocol, though Talleyrand was privately informed of it, was not made public till July, when Louis-Philippe, in his speech opening the French Chambers, said: "The fortresses erected to threaten France are to be demolished." This announcement caused a great sensation in Paris; and it may fairly be suspected that, though the French troops were sent into Belgium to repel the Dutch, there was an *arrière-pensée* that they would be kept there till the question of the Fortresses was settled. Before Marshal Gérard crossed the frontier, Talleyrand told the Conference that the troops would return to France so soon as the Dutch left Belgium. He gave this assurance on Instructions from Paris. But, when the Dutch retired, Sebastiani, in spite of remonstrances by Talleyrand, turned round and announced that the French army would remain till the Treaty between Holland and Belgium, provided for in the Eighteen Articles, was concluded; and, at the same time, Adair discovered that King Leopold intended to negotiate separately with France as to the demolition of fortresses.

The despatches from the Foreign Office to the British Embassy at Paris show how determined Palmerston and Grey were that there must be no private negotiation between France and Belgium, and that the French army must leave. "It is a question of war or peace," Palmerston wrote to Granville on August 13th; and, on the same day, Grey wrote as strongly.

"The French," he said, "must not remain in Belgium on any pretext whatever. To insist on the demolition of fortresses before leaving would be inconsistent with policy and justice, as they have a sufficient assurance

that they will be dismantled. Public opinion in England is already excited, and any appearance of bad faith on the part of France would kindle a flame which would make war inevitable[1]."

These letters reached Granville on the evening of August 15th, and he immediately went to the Palais Royal and saw the King, with whom he had a long conversation, in the presence of Sebastiani. He said that very serious consequences might arise from the French troops remaining in Belgium "on any pretext." The King, Granville says, seemed "discomposed" by this pointed language; and Sebastiani fired up at what he called "dictating to France the movements of her troops." The British Ambassador replied that there was no dictation; Great Britain was only asking for what France had promised. The King's answer was, that the sense of the promise given by France was that the French troops would leave Belgium when Belgium was secure against another sudden inroad from Holland. Then Granville asked what the British Ministers were to say, if asked in Parliament whether the French army was remaining to enforce the demolition of the fortresses. To this question, Louis-Philippe gave an evasive reply. They did not, he said, enter with that intention; but France had always demanded the demolition of the fortresses, and would have gone to war rather than abandon that demand. Sebastiani eagerly assented to this statement.

Louis-Philippe would give no explicit declaration of his intentions. "One thing is certain," Palmerston wrote to Granville on receiving his account of this conversation, "the French must go out of Belgium, or we shall have a general war, and war in a few days." The danger was, indeed, great. Prussia was threatening a move in the Rhine Provinces. The Polish Revolution was all but crushed, and the Emperor Nicholas would soon be free to intervene in the Netherlands. Palmerston instructed Granville to make a formal demand privately to Sebastiani, but with the significant hint that the British Cabinet expected to hear "in a few days that the French Government has, of its own accord, given orders for the evacuation of Belgium[2]." He told Talleyrand that France would not be allowed to interfere in any way with the demolition of fortresses which had been repaired and paid for by Great Britain and her Allies. This resolute attitude, supported by the action of the Russian, Austrian and Prussian Ambassadors at Paris, who had united in remonstrating, together with Granville,

[1] Howick MSS.
[2] Palmerston to Granville, September 5th, 1831. F.O. France, 425.

against the presence of the French forces in Belgium, was successful. Early in September, the French Cabinet made up their minds that the troops must be withdrawn; and, at the same time, King Leopold, who had agreed to follow the lead of France as to which fortresses should be demolished, and had wished the French army to remain for his protection, consented to the evacuation.

When the Conference of London met after the Dutch invasion, the situation was that Holland had accepted the original terms of separation, and refused the Eighteen Articles; while Belgium accepted them after refusing the original terms. Neither side would yield; and the Peace of Europe was at stake. In face of this deadlock, the Plenipotentiaries, convinced that any attempt to settle the question by negotiations would fail, resolved to lay down conditions, and compel the two countries to accept them. It was soon apparent that the military failure of the Belgians had put them at a disadvantage. "That unfortunate campaign," Stockmar said, "has revived the old English principle that Holland must never be weakened."

As a concession to Belgium, the Eighteen Articles had left the question of Luxemburg to be settled by negotiation with Holland. This concession was now withdrawn. The Belgians had claimed the whole of Luxemburg. But the Conference now divided it. The eastern part, it was decided, was to be, as the whole had been since 1815, a State of the Germanic Confederation, with the King of Holland as Grand-duke. The western part was given to Belgium. Limburg was likewise divided. The part lying on the right bank of the Meuse, bounded by the Prussian frontier on the east, the frontier of Liége on the south, and Dutch Brabant and Gelderland to the north, was given to Holland in compensation for the part of Luxemburg assigned to Belgium. Limburg on the left bank of the Meuse was left to Belgium, except a small tract of country at Maastricht, which was recognised to be a Dutch town. This distribution of territory gave to Holland a larger share of Limburg than she had possessed in 1790.

After the Revolution of 1830, the Cabinet of The Hague had closed the Scheldt; but the Conference objected, and the river was opened in January, 1831. The Eighteen Articles had applied to the Scheldt the arrangements made by the Congress of Vienna relative to the free navigation of rivers. This provision was renewed in the new Articles; and the pilotage and buoying of the channel below Antwerp were to be placed under the joint supervision of Com-

missioners appointed by Holland and Belgium. The Dutch Government was empowered to levy a toll on vessels coming from the high seas to Antwerp.

Concerning the public debt of the Netherlands, there was a protracted struggle in the Conference. At one sitting, when the new terms of separation were nearly completed, Palmerston said he could not agree to charge Belgium with more than 8,000,000 florins of yearly interest. Next day, however, he consented to increase this sum to 8,400,000 florins, but only on condition that Arlon was included in the part of Luxemburg assigned to Belgium; and to this the other Plenipotentiaries agreed after a discussion which lasted from 8 o'clock on the evening of October 12th till 4 o'clock next morning, and left one diplomat so exhausted that he had to remain in bed all day.

The terms imposed on Belgium would have been much heavier, Falck reported to The Hague, if the British Foreign Office had not feared that King Leopold would throw himself into the arms of France, should Palmerston give his assent to all the claims put forward on behalf of Holland by Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The danger that the Cabinet of Paris might try to prevent a settlement on the lines proposed by the Conference was so great that the Plenipotentiaries agreed not to lay the details of their findings before Louis-Philippe and his Council, till they could present them *en bloc*, with Talleyrand's signature appended. They would then, in all probability, be approved. Otherwise, a number of modifications in favour of Belgium were sure to be demanded.

The findings of the Conference were set forth in Twenty-four Articles, which were handed to Falck and van de Weyer on the evening of October 15th. In Belgium, they were received with angry disappointment. The people of Luxemburg and Limburg protested. A violent agitation began all over the country; and King Leopold was so alarmed that he thought of abdicating. From this he was saved by the wise advice of Stockmar, van de Weyer, and Durham, whose vigorous remonstrances revived his failing spirit, and gave him courage to face what Stockmar called "the unreasoning, inconstant multitude."

The Twenty-four Articles were laid before the Belgian Chambers on October 20th. The Government moved that the King be authorised to accept them, and sign a treaty with the Five Powers, "under reservation of such claims as His Majesty may think necessary in the interests of the country," and with a Declaration that the terms of

separation were forced on Belgium. Some of the deputies were ready to reject the terms outright. But the defeat of August had put an end to the excessive confidence of the majority; and, on November 1st, the Ministers carried their motion. The Chambers having accepted the Articles on the understanding that no treaty would be signed till a claim for changes in favour of Belgium had been presented to the Conference, van de Weyer drew up two Notes on the subject, to which the Plenipotentiaries replied that the Articles must remain unaltered; and on November 15th, 1831, a Treaty was signed between Belgium and the Five Powers, by which the Twenty-four Articles became the terms of separation.

The ratifications were to be exchanged by January 15th, 1832; and, within three weeks, this formality took place between Great Britain, France, and Belgium. But the three Northern Powers waited to see whether Holland would agree, and, in the meantime, withheld their ratifications.

Though the Twenty-four Articles were more favourable to Holland than the Eighteen had been, King William was still unwilling to accept anything except the original terms to which he had agreed. He resented the partition of his grand-duchy, and could not bring himself to surrender the citadel of Antwerp and his control over the estuary of the Scheldt. He maintained that the rules which the Conference had framed to regulate the navigation of that river were inconsistent with his rights of sovereignty over waters flowing through his territory; but on this point Palmerston would not yield.

"I cannot describe," Matuszevicz wrote to van Maanen, the Dutch statesman, "how strongly the English Minister insisted, above all else, on Articles which would guarantee to the Belgians the liberty of navigating the Scheldt and its estuaries, and a communication by land with Germany. Concessions on these points were the only means of procuring his support of the vital interests of Holland as regards the debt and the frontiers. I am aware that the idea of renouncing the sovereignty of Belgium is repugnant to the King, in spite of all the ingratitude which the Belgians have shown him. Nothing could be more natural than this feeling; but should it not have its bounds[1]?"

But King William was not to be persuaded; and, on December 14th, Falck informed the Conference that the Twenty-four Articles were refused by Holland. On the same day a Convention with Belgium was signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and the

[1] Matuszevicz to van Maanen, October 16th, 1831. Dutch Archives at The Hague (*van Maanen Papers*).

Northern Powers, which provided that, "in consequence of the changes which the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium have made in the military situation of that country," the fortresses of Menin, Ath, Mons, Philippeville, and Mariembourg were to be dismantled. Ypres and the rest of the fortresses were to be kept in repair by Belgium.

Of the Barrier Towns, the French Government had been pressing for the disarmament of Charleroi and Tournai, instead of Philippeville and Mariembourg; and to this King Leopold had agreed during that separate negotiation with France on the subject of the fortresses to which the British Minister objected. On this question, Palmerston was guided by the opinion of Wellington, who had inspected all the fortresses in the summer of 1814, and had come to the conclusion that they were necessary for the defence of the Netherlands. Now, when it was decided that some of them were to be dismantled, he thought that Tournai and Charleroi should be kept up rather than Philippeville and Mariembourg. The French Ministers were indignant with King Leopold for signing the Convention, and with Palmerston for following the advice of Wellington; and, though Talleyrand implored them to remember that to keep on good terms with Great Britain was more important than to have the question of the Fortresses settled as they desired, he was instructed to inform the Foreign Office in London that France would withdraw from the Treaty of November 15th, if her wishes were not complied with. The French, moreover, maintained that, if Belgium was to be really independent, the Powers had no right to decide which of the fortresses were to be dismantled, and that France, as one of the guarantors of her independence, should be consulted. But Palmerston was not to be moved; and, in the end, the controversy was closed, and the *amour propre* of France was satisfied, by a vague Declaration, that the Convention did not affect the complete independence of Belgium, and that she stood in the same relation to all the Five Powers.

It was evident that, unless the Treaty of November 15th was speedily ratified by the "Northern" Powers, Europe might soon be divided into two openly hostile camps. The Emperor Nicholas, at whose instigation Austria and Prussia were withholding their ratifications, sent Count Orloff on a Mission to The Hague in January, 1832. A despatch from the British Embassy at Petrograd shows that Lord Heytesbury, our Ambassador there, was told by Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister (a German who could not speak Russian), that the purpose of this Mission was to find out whether King William

intended to accept the Twenty-four Articles, and to intimate that, if he declined, Russia would not help him. But the British Ambassador at Vienna, Sir Frederick Lamb, discovered, probably from Metternich, with whom he was on terms of personal friendship, that what Orloff had really been instructed to say was that Russia would not recognise King Leopold till he had been recognised by the King of Holland. On his way to The Hague, Orloff visited Berlin. The Prussian Minister Ancillon, however, declined to take the same course as Russia; and, soon afterwards, Lamb wrote from Vienna to Palmerston that Metternich agreed with Ancillon. It seems pretty clear that the Emperor Nicholas changed his Instructions to Orloff on hearing that he could not depend on the support of Austria and Prussia; for Orloff, on being informed at The Hague that King William was still determined not to accept the terms of separation, terminated his Mission by publishing a Declaration in which he said that he had done all he could to persuade the King to accept, but in vain; that the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium must be respected, and that, though Russia would not herself take part in action against Holland, she would not oppose the use of coercive measures, "the object of which may be to force the King to accept the Twenty-four Articles." He then went to London, in the hope of convincing Palmerston that the Emperor Nicholas was behaving fairly to the Conference.

Russian diplomats were in the habit of protesting that they always spoke the truth. "*Moi, je dis toujours la vérité; je parle des choses comme elles sont*," Orloff once remarked; and one of his colleagues described himself as a man who could be silent, but was incapable of opening his lips except to state what was an absolute fact. Mere words, however, were not enough to persuade Palmerston that the Conference was not being played with. He had, before Orloff came to London, threatened to stop the proceedings till all the Northern Powers ratified the Treaty; and the fear lest the Concert of Europe, already shaken, might thus be finally dissolved, brought Austria and Prussia into line with Great Britain and France. They ratified the Treaty on April 18th, with reservations as to the rights of the Germanic Confederation in Luxemburg; and on May 4th it was ratified by Russia also, with reservations regarding the navigation of the Scheldt and the division of the public debt of the Netherlands.

The Conference now called on Holland and Belgium to open negotiations for a Definitive Treaty. Both were unwilling. Belgium

declined to begin, till the citadel of Antwerp was surrendered. Holland declined to surrender it, till Belgium gave up Luxemburg and Limburg. Many proposals were made; but the Five Powers were completely baffled. Whatever Holland agreed to was refused by Belgium; whatever Belgium agreed to was refused by Holland. Palmerston believed that the Emperor Nicholas was responsible for this state of things; and Durham was sent on a Mission to Petrograd to find out how the land lay, since Heytesbury had retired owing to illness, and no new Ambassador had taken his place. Durham left England on July 2nd, 1832. Earlier in the summer, the Russian Court had expected a change of Government in England. The Reform Bill, they thought, would be thrown out; Grey would fall; Palmerston would be succeeded at the Foreign Office by Aberdeen; and British policy would become more favourable to Holland. But the Reform Bill had now passed, and the new constituencies were preparing for a general election which would, it was certain, strengthen the Government. Palmerston would therefore continue to direct British Foreign Policy. These considerations evidently had due weight; and Durham was able to report that the Emperor had said that, though he must himself stand aloof, he thought Great Britain would be justified in using force to execute the Treaty.

On August 9th, while Durham was in Russia, King Leopold was married to the Princess Louise of Orleans, eldest daughter of Louis-Philippe. The marriage was highly popular in Belgium. But, unfortunately, it produced among the Belgians a belief that France would henceforth support them in whatever course they might choose to take; and, though Belgium was bound to neutrality by the Twenty-four Articles, there were voices, both inside and outside the Chambers, that clamoured for a declaration of war against the Dutch. Further progress towards a settlement was impeded by the obstinacy of both countries. Neither would agree to any of the suggestions which were offered. Talleyrand was indignant. He accused King Leopold of showing very little gratitude to the Powers who had given him a Throne. He thought the French and British Governments were both acting weakly. There should be an end, he said, of making proposals, and begging for acceptance: orders should be given, and obedience enforced. "I believe," Grey wrote to Lord Holland on August 29th, "the best way would be to draw a cordon round Holland and Belgium, by sea and land, and leave them to fight it out." If the Dutch would agree to the free navigation of the Scheldt and a moderate fixed toll

without the right of searching ships, "we might then," he said, "tell Leopold that he must no longer expect any assistance from us in a pertinacious adherence to the strict letter of his Treaty of November[1]." The way in which two "Princelings"—so he contemptuously describes William and Leopold in a letter to Lord Holland—were allowed to keep all Europe in a state of uneasiness seemed to Grey disgraceful and ridiculous. "My dear Holland," he writes on September 3rd, "what is to be done with these damned Dutch and Belgians?"

On September 18th, however, there was a change of Government at Brussels. A month passed before a new Cabinet was formed; but the retiring Ministers carried on the business of their Departments, with the exception of de Meulenaere. His place at the Foreign Office was taken by General Goblet, lately come from London with fresh proposals drawn up by Palmerston, who had, as he said, "conceived that he might, as an individual member of the Conference, make with advantage one more attempt at an amicable adjustment." His plan was, that the Articles dealing with Luxemburg, Limburg, and the limits of the new kingdom, should be left as they were, while Holland and Belgium negotiated on the other matters in dispute. As to the Scheldt, he proposed that the question should now be discussed, not as one between Holland and Belgium alone, but so as to "reconcile the territorial rights of sovereignty claimed by Holland with the commercial rights which were conferred upon other nations by the Treaty of Vienna, and which those nations cannot permit to be abrogated or impaired." The Dutch maintained that the separation of Belgium from Holland had revived the right given them in the seventeenth century, by the Treaty of Münster, to prevent ships passing from the Scheldt into the high seas, or from the high seas into the Scheldt. The Belgians maintained that the Treaty of Vienna exempted ships using the river from the payment of any duty. Palmerston's policy was to initiate a negotiation, and then to settle the question by a compromise which would reconcile the conflicting interests of Holland and Belgium, and at the same time secure the freedom of the Scheldt for the flags of all the nations.

"The King of the Netherlands is in an evil mood, and the King of the Belgians is no better," the Duchesse de Dino observed at this crisis. But King Leopold had, at last, perceived that, if he persisted in opposing the Conference, he would alienate both Great Britain

[1] Howick MSS.

and France. He therefore authorised Goblet to accept "*le thème de Lord Palmerston*"; and van de Weyer informed the Conference that he had powers to negotiate on the basis of the British proposal.

The Conference asked van Zuylen van Nyevelt to state, yes or no, whether he, too, had powers to negotiate. His reply showed that King William would not give way; and, on October 1st, the Conference agreed that some decisive step must be taken. There was, however, a difference of opinion as to what should be done. The Plenipotentiaries of the Northern Powers would agree to nothing but economic pressure on Holland. Palmerston and Comte Joseph de Mareuil, French Chargé d'affaires in the temporary absence of Talleyrand, objected that this implied negotiations certain to delay the execution of a Treaty, "the non-fulfilment of which," they said, "exposes the Peace of Europe to constant and increasing peril." A proposal to refer the question to the Northern Governments, with an offer by the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors to abide by the decision of the Court of Berlin, neither Palmerston nor de Mareuil would accept; and at this point, as no agreement could be reached, the Northern Powers left Great Britain and France to act alone.

Public sentiment in England, especially among bankers, merchants, and shipowners, was hostile to military operations against Holland. At the Court, it was the same. The King objected strongly, and told Grey, in a long communication on the policy of the Cabinet, that, since he could not oppose the unanimous opinion of his Ministers, he must leave the responsibility with them. But Palmerston, with his finger on the pulse of every chancery in Europe, knew that there was danger of another general war, if matters were allowed to drift any longer. Casimir Périer had died in May. The Duc de Broglie, with Soult and Thiers among his colleagues, became Minister of Foreign Affairs soon after the disagreement in the Conference; and Granville reported from Paris that, whatever Great Britain might do, a French army would certainly enter Belgium in order to compel the surrender of Antwerp. One Prussian corps was at Aix-la-Chapelle, and another was posted in reserve on the Rhine. The doors of the Temple of Janus were creaking ominously, and might fly open at any moment. The danger of an explosion was increased by the temper of the Belgians; for it was quite possible that, if the two Western Powers did not act immediately, they might break loose and attack the Dutch. If so, Prussia would rush in to the help of Holland and, should she be victorious, would take from France Alsace and Lorraine,

with Strassburg, Metz, and Verdun, all of which she had tried to obtain during the Congress of Vienna. If Prussia was defeated, France would endeavour to annex the Rhine Provinces and the grand-duchy of Luxemburg. Austria and the other States of the Germanic Confederation would be drawn into the struggle. Russia would intervene, and might seize the opportunity to foment trouble in the Balkan peninsula. Great Britain, unless she deserted France, would find herself at war with more than one Continental Power; and soon not only Europe, but half the world, would be at war.

With such a prospect, hesitation would have been fatal. If Great Britain and France acted together, and did not permit a conflict between the Belgians and the Dutch, Prussia, it was known, would not oppose the coercion of Holland; and, on October 22nd, a Convention between Great Britain and France was signed. It provided that, if the Dutch did not surrender the citadel of Antwerp by the middle of November, a French army would attack it, and the ports of Holland would be blockaded. Belgium was required to evacuate all territories which had been given to Holland by the Twenty-four Articles. The Belgian Government agreed to evacuation taking place, so soon as the citadel should be in their hands; and this promise was tacitly accepted as a sufficient compliance with the terms of the Convention. But King William was inflexible; a French army under Marshal Gérard advanced through Belgium upon Antwerp; and the Dutch ports were blockaded by British and French squadrons. The siege, which began on November 30th, continued till December 22nd, when the Dutch garrison capitulated, and the Belgian army, which had not been allowed to take part in the operations, entered the citadel.

When the British and French Ministers heard of the capitulation, they offered to raise the blockade, if the Dutch would open the Scheldt and evacuate two outlying forts, Lillo and Liefskenshoek, which stood on the right and left banks of the river a short distance below Antwerp. Grey seems to have feared that the French might propose to remain till these forts were taken, which would have been a lengthy operation, as the dykes had been cut, and the forts were surrounded by water; but a despatch from Paris assured him that he need be under no apprehensions. "De Broglie," Granville wrote, "has always considered the reduction of the forts of Lillo and Liefskenshoek as quite out of the question[1]." Within a week, Marshal Gérard and his troops were on their way back to France.

[1] Granville to Grey, December 20th, 1831. Howick MSS.

The Dutch held the forts; and it was not till May 21st, 1833, five months after the surrender of the citadel, that King William relieved his subjects from the losses caused by the blockade. A Convention was then signed at London between Great Britain, France, and Holland, by which the King bound himself to leave the navigation of the Scheldt and Meuse free, and not to renew hostilities, "so long as the relations between Holland and Belgium shall not be settled by a Definitive Treaty." Communications were to be left open between Maastricht, Holland, and Germany. Great Britain and France then raised the blockade, Lillo and Liefskenshoek, though the Dutch continued to occupy them, being no longer of any value to Holland, since the river was now open. The retention of these forts by Holland was an advantage to Belgium, as, till they were given up, she could remain in possession of the parts of Luxemburg and Limburg which the Twenty-four Articles assigned to Holland.

The three Northern Powers agreed to assist in framing a Definitive Treaty; and the Conference, which met again in July, 1833, sat until the middle of November. Nineteen of the Twenty-four Articles were accepted by both Holland and Belgium. They could not, however, be brought to agree about the other five. This obstacle might have been surmounted. But the Cabinet of The Hague had not secured the concurrence of the Germanic Confederation on the question of Luxemburg, or of the members of the House of Nassau, who refused their assent to the partition of the grand-duchy. This refusal destroyed all hope of an early settlement, and convinced the Five Powers that it was useless to continue the negotiations. The Conference was therefore dissolved, on November 15th. Three days later a Convention was signed at Zonhaven, which laid down rules for the navigation of the Meuse, and for keeping open communications between Maastricht, Holland, and Germany.

Several changes now occurred among the statesmen who had been conducting the affairs of Great Britain, France, and Belgium during the Conference of London. Grey resigned in July, 1834, and was succeeded by Lord Melbourne, in whose Cabinet Palmerston was Foreign Minister till November, when Sir Robert Peel came into power, with Wellington at the Foreign Office. In Belgium, a new Government was formed by de Meulenaere, who held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs; and, in November of that year, 1834, Talleyrand left the French Embassy in London, and was succeeded by Sebastiani in January, 1835.

The Conventions of London and Zonhaven had fixed the terms on which the Armistice between Holland and Belgium was to continue till the conclusion of a Definitive Treaty. There was no rupture of this Armistice; but King Leopold and his Ministers were soon involved in very serious disputes with Holland, Austria, and Prussia. One of these related to the defence of Belgium. In December, 1834, there were rumours of an impending attack by Holland. In the Eighteen Articles, the Five Powers had guaranteed the "neutrality and inviolability" of Belgian territory. The Twenty-four Articles, however, only stipulated that Belgium was to be perpetually neutral. The Powers, indeed, guaranteed the execution of all these Articles; but they did not, in express terms, guarantee the territorial integrity. This being so, King Leopold's view was that he could no longer depend on the Powers for repelling an invasion; and, besides reorganising his army, he made plans for securing his northern frontiers by the construction of a line of fortresses from Diest to Hasselt. This project, violently opposed by Prussia, as inconsistent with the compulsory neutrality of Belgium, engaged the attention of the British Foreign Office in 1835. Wellington did not approve; and Adair, who was still British Minister at Brussels, was instructed to remonstrate against the recent increase of the Belgian army as "unwise and even dangerous," and also against the proposed fortresses, the effect of which Wellington thought would be "to make the Belgians believe that a state of hostility with Holland was to be their permanent state, instead of neutrality and the peaceable pursuits of commerce." Numerous despatches on this subject passed between London and Brussels; and on April 2nd, 1835, Wellington sent his final opinion to Adair.

"It is impossible," he wrote, "that this plan can be carried into execution without attracting the serious attention of all the Powers of Europe, as well as of the Government of Holland, against whom exclusively these works are directed. The impression which the measure will make at the present moment is to be regretted by every friend to the independence and prosperity of the Kingdom of Belgium, and to the peace of Europe[1]."

A few days after this, on April 18th, when Melbourne returned to power, Palmerston was once more installed at the Foreign Office; and a complete change of views followed. He heard from Adair that the Prussian Chargé d'affaires at Brussels had informed him confidentially of a despatch which he had received from Berlin, instructing

[1] Wellington to Adair, April 2nd, 1835. F.O. Belgium, 37.

him to remonstrate strongly with the Belgian Minister against the construction of the fortresses, and to point out that the true security of Belgium was her Neutrality, guaranteed as it was by Prussia and the other Powers, and that the erection of new military works on her northern frontier, when some of those on the frontier of France were to be demolished, would produce an alteration in the military situation which must seriously affect the security of the Prussian frontier in the event of war with France. Palmerston would not listen to these arguments. He called them "unreasonable and fallacious," in a despatch to Sir George Seymour, who had meanwhile replaced Adair at Brussels, and he told van de Weyer that he considered the interference of Prussia intolerable. Common prudence, he said, imposed on Belgium the duty of taking steps to make it difficult for either Holland, Prussia, or France to invade her; for though the Five Powers had guaranteed her neutrality by a Treaty, all history proved that it was wiser for an independent State to protect its territory by something stronger than a sheet of parchment. In defending Belgium, he used language so forcible that Baron von Werther, the Prussian Minister, sent a protest to Melbourne against the style of the documents which issued from the British Foreign Office. Melbourne, however, not only supported Palmerston, but took occasion to complain that if there was a Prussian agent in any country, he was always found to be working against British interests. The controversy, during which Austria supported Prussia, and the Court of Berlin threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Belgium, continued till January, 1838, when Prussia and Austria professed themselves satisfied on hearing that the Belgian plan of defence was to be postponed for a time.

Meanwhile, the Dutch, heavily taxed to keep their army on a war footing, had been complaining of the long delay in settling the Belgian question. King William, with the accustomed tenacity of his race, was still unwilling to accept the terms laid down by the Five Powers. But, at last, he saw that he must sacrifice his own feelings to the wishes of his subjects; and suddenly, on March 14th, 1838, Baron Dedel, who, in February, 1833, had succeeded van Zuylen van Nyevelt as Dutch Minister in London, informed Palmerston that the King accepted the Twenty-four Articles.

By this time, the Belgians had persuaded themselves that they were to be left undisturbed in Luxemburg and Limburg, where they had collected the taxes and exercised the usual functions of a

recognised Government since the Convention of May, 1833; and, when it became known that Holland had accepted the Twenty-four Articles, there was a violent explosion of wrath. The people of Luxemburg and Limburg sent up addresses against the partition. Fiery orations were delivered in the Chambers at Brussels, where King Leopold made a speech from the Throne, in which he said that the cause of Belgium would be defended "with courage and perseverance." These words, which were understood to mean that there might be an appeal to arms, were loudly cheered; and it seemed as if the Deputies actually wished for war, not only against Holland, but even against the whole power of the Germanic Confederation. They relied on Great Britain and France to support them. But the Cabinet of London, on November 26th, 1838, unanimously decided that the whole question must be settled at once, that Holland must not be asked to give up any territory, and that the British Ambassadors at Petrograd, Vienna, and Berlin should be instructed to intimate that on the territorial question Great Britain would not agree to any change in the Twenty-four Articles. Palmerston let the Belgian Ministers know that, if the negotiations for a Definitive Treaty broke down owing to their resistance, he would not oppose any steps which the Germanic Confederation or Holland might take. The British decision influenced that of France; and Louis-Philippe wrote to his son-in-law that, if he wished to preserve the Independence of Belgium, and keep the Crown on his head, he must accept the Twenty-four Articles. "Everything else," he said, "is an illusion."

On December 6th, a Protocol, signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and the Northern Powers, reduced the yearly interest payable by Belgium on the public debt of the Netherlands to 5,000,000 florins, but left the Twenty-four Articles otherwise unaltered. There was a delay on the part of France, Sebastiani reserving his adherence till January, 1839, when he too signed the Protocol. Belgium now stood face to face with a unanimous decision of the Five Powers; but the Cabinet of Brussels made a last effort to obtain possession of the disputed parts of Luxemburg and Limburg, by offering to purchase them from King William. None of the Powers, however, would listen to this proposal; and any hopes which King Leopold may have had that his father-in-law would help him proved vain. "We are resolved," Louis-Philippe wrote, on February 7th, "not to separate from the Conference, for the peace of the world depends on our holding together." Van de Weyer had already found

that Palmerston was not to be moved, and had left the Foreign Office on January 15th, after an interview which convinced him that the verdict of the Powers was final.

It was not till March that the Belgian Chambers gave way, and, after a debate which lasted for ten days, consented to accept the decision of the Powers. This was the end; and on April 19th, 1839, the famous Treaties, which gave the force of an international compact to the Twenty-four Articles, and established the Southern Netherlands as an independent State within the limits which the Conference had fixed, were signed at London.

Although, during the Conference of London, the most farsighted observer of Foreign Affairs could not, by any possibility, have foreseen that, in August, 1914, Great Britain would begin to reap a harvest of blood, the seeds of which were sown at Brussels in August, 1830, the anger excited by the Belgian Revolution arose largely from an instinctive apprehension of future danger. After the fall of Napoleon, the small corner of Europe which had been a mosaic of separate communities till they were united under the House of Burgundy, and had afterwards belonged in turn to Spain, Austria, and France, fell into the hands of the Allies as part of the wreckage of the Napoleonic empire. It was the veriest commonplace of history that this fragment of the Continent had for centuries been the prize for which endless Wars were fought, that the French were the chief aggressors in these Wars, and that it was essential to the security of the British Islands to prevent any Great Power, most of all France, from holding the coast of Flanders, with Antwerp and the mouth of the Scheldt. Therefore, partly with this British object in view, but chiefly in order to erect a solid barrier on the eastern boundaries of France, the Allies, led by Great Britain, reunited the Southern and Northern Netherlands, which had been separated since the close of the sixteenth century. The supreme desire of Castlereagh and the other statesmen of the Coalition was to find a lasting peace; and they believed that the creation of this strong buffer State would at least diminish the risk of a renewal of the secular struggle for supremacy in the Low Countries. But, in 1830, the people of the South, alienated from their fellow-subjects in the North by the unwise actions of King William, prompted by French emissaries, and led on by native priests and politicians, tore asunder the "kingdom of the Netherlands," and laid bare the rock on which the Peace of Europe had so often foundered.

During the perilous times which followed, the proceedings of Palmerston and Grey, in their conduct of Foreign Policy, formed an unbroken record of patience and wisdom. They showed infinite patience in dealing with the obstinacy of the Dutch and the irritating intransigence of the Belgians. They had the wisdom to admit, reluctantly it is true, that the plan of 1814, well conceived though it was as a means for preventing the outbreak of fresh wars in Western Europe, had failed, and that, if peace was to be maintained, there was no alternative but to try the hazardous experiment of leaving the Belgian Provinces isolated. It was hoped, indeed, that, with the guarantee of "Perpetual Neutrality" contained in the Treaty signed at London, they would cease to be a cause of wars, and a battlefield of nations; but, as Palmerston said, the Treaty was only parchment, and might one day be broken. Throughout the long negotiations which ended by giving this precarious independence to the Belgians, and imposing on them the obligation of Neutrality which they resented, the British Ministers worked in harmony with the Ministers of the Continental Powers, whenever that was possible; but they made it plain that Great Britain sought no permanent alliances, nor even a passing understanding with any Power, save for the purpose of preventing a rupture of the peace. "It is a narrow policy," Palmerston said, "to suppose that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of England. We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal, and those interests it is our duty to follow." This principle he carried into practice at the Foreign Office in the critical years from 1830 to 1834, but with an Ally on whom he could depend in Talleyrand, who supported the policy of an entente with Great Britain as firmly as he had supported it during the Congress of Vienna. He, also, acted, except when there was a direct conflict of interests, in concert with France, and thereby saved Europe from the calamity of a general war.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEAR EAST AND FRANCE, 1829–1847

I. THE EGYPTIAN CRISIS AND ITS SEQUENCE, 1833–1841

THERE was no definite Eastern Question in the minds of European statesmen before the year 1830, although it had been partially raised by Pitt, and also at the Treaty of Tilsit, and during the Greek War of Independence. Broadly defined, the Eastern Question was: what to do with Turkey? The Tsar Alexander and Napoleon, at the Treaty of Tilsit, had assumed that Turkey was moribund and was likely to be partitioned; and since their time most European statesmen had taken the same view. But it was not till after the Greek War of Independence, and the rupture between Mehemet Ali and the Porte, that European statesmen began definitely to face the problem of the decease, or probable decease, of Turkey.

Towards this question none of the Great Powers adopted quite the same attitude. Russia had for over a century been steadily encroaching on Turkish territory. The last Russian encroachment, at the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, had extended the Tsar's territory to the southern mouth of the Danube. Austria, on the other hand, although formerly an aggressor against Turkey, had, since Metternich had come into power, been in favour of maintaining the *status quo*.

France and Great Britain may be said, broadly speaking, to have followed the same policy, although they differed in their application of it, as well as in their reasons for adopting it. This policy cannot be better stated than in the words of Guizot:

> to maintain the Ottoman empire in order to maintain the European equilibrium; and, when by the force of circumstances, by the natural course of events, some dismemberment takes place, when some province detaches itself from that decadent empire, the right policy is to favour the transformation of that province into a new and independent sovereignty, which shall become a member of the family of States, and serve one day in the new European equilibrium—the equilibrium destined to take the place of the ancient elements when these are no longer in existence[1].

This policy meant as a rule maintaining the Ottoman empire, but acquiescing in particular provinces detaching themselves and becoming independent States. This process of detachment might go on until

[1] Speech in the *Chambre de Députés*, July 2nd, 1839. See Guizot, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps* (1861), IV. 330–1.

the whole Ottoman empire in Europe disappeared; but this contingency was considered to be so far off that the statesmen of Palmerston's period did not take it into account.

Palmerston, like the French statesman, believed that a general policy should be pursued of maintaining the Ottoman empire, while acquiescing, though reluctantly, in the detachment from it of particular provinces. On the whole, Palmerston's bias was more strongly towards maintenance than was the French view. For this he had two reasons: in the first place, he held that the Ottoman empire guarded the approaches towards India; and, secondly, he thought that the Turks might regenerate themselves and become a respectable Power. The first reason is clearly seen in the suspicion with which he regarded Mehemet Ali's advance through Syria: "Turkey," he wrote to Sir William Temple at Naples, "is as good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arabian Sovereign would be[1]." With regard to Turkey's ability to regenerate herself, he was equally insistent: "if the Sultan really has any stuff in him, he might in a few years make himself independent, by well organising his army and navy, his finances and his administration of justice." Of course, this is the sort of general, unexceptionable statement that has been made so often with regard to Turkey; but Palmerston made it quite seriously, for he added, as if calculating the means for helping the Sultan: "I wonder whether Metternich would allow that some alterations might be useful to Turkey, or whether he would extend even to that country his abhorrence of change." If only left to herself, Turkey might go on indefinitely: "no empire is likely to fall to pieces if left to itself, and if no kind neighbours forcibly tear it to pieces[2]."

The Eastern Question, thus considered, has two aspects. One aspect concerns the maintenance of the Ottoman empire: this problem was called the question of Constantinople. The second aspect concerns the detaching of a particular province or provinces: this, in the years between 1833 and 1841, was (because Mehemet Ali was the subject of chief interest) called the question of Alexandria.

The statesman who was to control the very difficult negotiations concerning these two aspects of the Eastern Question was Henry Temple, Viscount Palmerston. This remarkable man, born in 1784,

[1] April 19th (1833). See Ashley, *Life and Correspondence of Viscount Palmerston* (1879), I. 285. In the same letter, referring to an abortive Treaty, he says: "The terms imposed on the Pasha are good, inasmuch as he does not get Damascus or Aleppo, and so has not the avenues of Mesopotamia."

[2] To Henry Bulwer, September 22nd, 1838, in Ashley, *op. cit.* I. 355.

was elected to the House of Commons in 1806, and, even after he succeeded to his Irish peerage, he remained a member of it. In 1830, he became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Lord Grey's Cabinet, and he remained, with only short intervals, identified with the Foreign Office till the end of his life.

Palmerston was a well-educated man, conversant not only with the Latin and Greek tongues, but with French and Italian, and a hard worker, who thoroughly mastered all the current business of the Foreign Office. He was in the habit of writing, in his own neat hand, many of the despatches and letters which went out from the Foreign Office. The Instructions which he sent to Ambassadors and others were always clear and practical; but his policy was not always consistent. The truth is that, with all his great knowledge of Foreign Affairs, he was without the perfect clearheadedness of which the thorough study of political problems is a necessary condition. He saw with absolute precision what he wanted at the moment and how to get it; but he did not take very long views: nor did he always stop to correlate his current views with those he had previously put forward.

Moreover, his masterful will, combined with the "jauntiness" that made him so popular a figure in the street, led him to pay little attention to other men's—and, indeed, to other nations'—feelings. It is well known how he irritated Queen Victoria by not troubling to send her despatches in time for her to read them before they had to be sent off; and the venerable Talleyrand, the doyen of European diplomatists, during his London Mission of 1830–4, complained that Palmerston sometimes kept him waiting for two or three hours in the ante-rooms of the Foreign Office.

Palmerston's private correspondence is full of cricketing metaphors. He is always "making a capital hit," or going to do something "off his own bat," or seeing that someone "gets a good innings"; and there is, in some of it, in fact, a suggestion of irresponsibility. But in his official despatches he was careful of his words; and he was beyond all doubt in earnest when upholding what he conceived to be the honour and dignity of his country. He was, at the same time, quite straightforward; foreign Ambassadors, if in doubt about the intentions of the British Government, formed the habit of asking Palmerston point blank what he wanted, aware that if he told them anything definite at all, it would be true.

As the years went on his unrivalled knowledge of Foreign Affairs, and his personal popularity, made his influence at the Foreign Office

absolute; and even the opinions of his colleagues in the Cabinet failed, speaking generally, to make any impression on him, or affect his course of action.

The Greek War of Independence had convinced Europe that the Ottoman empire was decadent. The Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 had proclaimed the detachment of four "provinces"—Moldavia, Wallachia, Serbia and Greece. After the Greek settlement had been virtually completed, another province, which had already been practically detached, suddenly assumed the position of a domineering, conquering Power against its overlord. This province was Egypt, under its able Pasha (or Governor) Mehemet Ali.

This capable Albanian was a native of Kavalla on the Aegean, where for years he earned his living as a tobacco-merchant. He served in the Turkish Army during Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, quickly rose to be a colonel, Governor of Cairo, and finally Pasha of all Egypt. Barbarous and uneducated as he was, he yet had the ability to appreciate Western civilisation; and under him and the French experts whom he introduced, Egypt became a prosperous and a powerful State, vassal only in name to the Porte. Between 1824 and 1827, Mehemet's Egyptian army nearly reconquered the Peloponnese, and indeed, but for the intervention of the Powers, would have done so. After the Greek War was over, Mehemet, although he had been rewarded with Crete, thought that he had been insufficiently paid for his efforts by the Sultan, and formed the design of still further adding to his dominions by force—possibly, of becoming altogether independent.

Mehemet easily found a cause for war with the Porte, and in 1832 his son Ibrahim invaded Syria and advanced into Asia Minor. On December 21st, the Turkish army was defeated at Konieh. The way to Constantinople was opened to the invader.

The Sultan Mahmud II, feeling himself to be powerless against the advancing Egyptian, in his desperation turned to the Powers of Europe[1]. First, he appealed to Great Britain; but the Government at this time was too much occupied with the Belgian Question. Mahmud next applied to France, but public opinion in that country was sympathetic to Mehemet Ali. The Sultan, therefore, having failed

[1] Stratford Canning, who was on a special Mission at Constantinople from November, 1831, to August, 1832, had already given Mahmud to understand that Great Britain might support the Sultan, and had urged Palmerston to send a naval force to the Levant (F. O. Turkey, Aug. 9, 1832). For Stratford Canning's Memorandum to Palmerston on the Turkish Question of December 19th, 1832, see Appendix C.

in the West, unwillingly turned to the East of Europe, and accepted the offer of help which Russia was pressing upon him. Mahmud, who had formerly said that he would give Constantinople and the empire to anyone who would bring him Mehemet Ali's head, must have felt now that, in accepting Russian help, he was making a similar bargain. The Tsar's Government had everything ready. In February, 1833, a Russian squadron entered the Bosphorus; a Russian army encamped on the Asiatic shore; and, shortly afterwards, 5000 Russian troops were landed at Buyuk Dere, on the European side, close to Constantinople.

The French had been afraid of Muscovite intervention from the moment when Mehemet Ali started his War. The French Consul-general at Alexandria at the time was M. Mimault, a trained diplomatist of Napoleon I. France was keenly interested in Mehemet Ali, and looked upon him as, in some sense, a protégé, who was continuing the glories of Bonaparte's short but brilliant Egyptian régime. Mimault had tried to dissuade Mehemet from making war on the Porte; and, now that the war had brought on the intervention of Russia, the Duc de Broglie, French Foreign Minister, sent Admiral Baron Roussin on a Mission to Constantinople to induce the Russians to withdraw. The Mission failed; but Great Britain and Austria, who, unlike France, were not friends of Mehemet Ali, were more successful. They were able to persuade Mahmud to offer his vassal Syria and Adana—amazingly good terms, which Mehemet readily accepted (Convention of Kutaya, April–May, 1833). Thus the "Egyptian Affair" was ended, and the Russian expeditionary force, having no longer any *raison d'être*, departed from the Bosphorus.

In departing, however, the Russians left a sting behind them. While they had been at Constantinople, a grand official had arrived from Petrograd, with a splendid staff. This was no less a person than General Count Orloff, who belonged to the inner ring of the Tsar's Court. His presence caused some agitation in the chanceries of Europe, but they never discovered his doings till some months after he and the last Russian troops had quitted the Bosphorus. Actually on June 8th, two days before they left, Orloff concluded with Mahmud the Treaty known as that of Unkiar Skelessi. This was a Treaty of Alliance and Defence (to endure for eight years, but renewable) between the Tsar and the Sultan. The sting lay in a separate and secret Article:

In virtue of one of the clauses of Article I of the Patent Treaty of Defensive Alliance concluded between the Imperial Court of Russia and

the Sublime Porte, the two High Contracting Parties are bound to afford to each other mutually substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance for the safety of their respective dominions. Nevertheless, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, wishing to spare the Sublime Ottoman Porte the expense and inconvenience which might be occasioned to it by affording substantial aid, will not ask for that aid if circumstances should place the Sublime Porte under the obligation of furnishing it. The Sublime Ottoman Porte, in place of the aid which it is bound to furnish in case of need, according to the principle of reciprocity of the Patent Treaty, shall confine its action in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Strait of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any Foreign Vessels of War to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever.

In other words, if Russia went to war with any European Power, the Porte would close the Dardanelles, and so make Russia impregnable on the side of the Black Sea—the Russian Navy, at the same time, being free to issue from the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean, and to retire again, when it chose, into safety. Practically, too, the Treaty meant that the Russian Government would control the foreign policy of the Turks; for they would appeal to the terms of Unkiar Skelessi to ensure the repudiation of any Turkish Treaty incompatible with it. The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, in fact, converted Turkey into a sort of Russian Protectorate. Nicholas I had given up the policy of conquest or partition, in favour of that of penetration and control—a far subtler and far more feasible policy. The Treaty was to be for eight years, and might be renewed (Article V).

The arrangement thus made was a different solution of the Eastern Question from that outlined in the words of Guizot (cited above). No doubt, to convert Turkey into a Protectorate of one of the European Powers, was a solution with much to recommend it, except that no European Power could be trusted with such a "mandate," which would have given it the means of establishing dominion over a large part of the world, and over some of the world's most vital communications.

Lord Ponsonby, British Ambassador at Constantinople, early obtained a full copy of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi[1]. The Duc de Broglie, writing on October 28th, 1833, to the Marquis Maison, French Ambassador at Petrograd, correctly reproduced the substance of the Secret Article of Unkiar Skelessi, and added: "the Cabinet of St Petersburg has determined, in the face of Europe, to proclaim

[1] F. O. Turkey, July 12, 1833: Ponsonby to Palmerston.

openly, to erect into a principle of international law, its exclusive exceptional preponderance in the affairs of the Ottoman empire[1]."

This was more than France and England could allow. But the Tsar had managed to obtain some sort of sanction from the other two Powers, Austria and Prussia. This had happened at one of those "monarchical promenades," which took place from time to time in central Europe, "in some little town, whose half-barbarous name resounded for the first time in the ears of the news-mongers[2]." The place in question was Münchengrätz in Bohemia, where the Tsar Nicholas, with Nesselrode, the Emperor Francis II, with Metternich, and the Crown Prince of Prussia met together from September 10th to September 20th[3]. The Conference affirmed the right of any Sovereign to appeal for assistance to any other Sovereign: and added, "it shall not henceforth be permissible to any Power, not so appealed to, to intervene for the purpose of hindering such assistance." It is true that Nicholas, at the same time, assured Metternich, who did not like the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, that he would not invoke the Treaty without first accepting the mediation of Austria. Even with this qualification, Unkiar Skelessi remained a danger to Europe: "in reality, the situations and intentions remained the same[4]."

For months, war appeared imminent. Even before the conclusion of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, Palmerston, on May 7th, 1833, writing to Sir William Temple at Naples, had said that he thought France likely to declare war with Russia, and accordingly the British Government was sending Sir Pulteney Malcolm to the Mediterranean with a strong squadron. Great Britain was as much aggrieved with Turkey as with Russia; for the Porte's admission of Russian ships was contrary to the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1809. The King's Speech, in September, contained the words: "My attention will be carefully directed to any events that may affect the present state and future independence of that Empire"; and, as he said this, the King "looked round at Lieven to see how he took it[5]."

[1] Text in Guizot, *Mémoires*, IV. 384 (*Pièces historiques*).

[2] Haussonville, *Histoire de la politique extérieure du Gouvernement Français*, 1830–48, I. 41.

[3] Palmerston was much intrigued by the colloquy at Münchengrätz. To Temple he wrote: "What the three sovereigns are going to meet for in Bohemia, time alone will show. Nesselrode wrote to Lieven (to be shown to me) that it is only for an *épanchement de cœur*, and that politics have nothing to do with it. How can people take the trouble of writing such stuff? It is as if they wished to prevent one from believing *anything* they say." (September 3rd, 1833, in Ashley, I. 292.)

[4] Guizot, IV. 53.

[5] Palmerston to Temple, September 3rd, 1833. The Prince de Lieven was Ambassador at London from 1812 to 1834.

Palmerston, of course, had sent from the Foreign Office an official protest against Turkey's signature of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. "Ancillon[1] and Nesselrode," he writes to Temple (October 8th, 1833), "do not like our protest at Constantinople. We shall repeat it at Petersburg." More ships were sent to join Malcolm off the Dardanelles; but the Admiral was not yet authorised to enter the Straits, although Palmerston was seriously thinking of giving the order.

Public opinion in England was keenly aroused about Turkey and Russia, and the Government would have had plenty of support in resorting to a war policy. But Palmerston was proceeding very cautiously. As the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had not been officially communicated to him, he refused to say anything about it in Parliament. *The Morning Herald* had obtained a version of it from its Constantinople Correspondent, and had published this on August 21st, 1833; but still Palmerston refused to disclose what the Government knew about it, even after the official communication of the Treaty arrived at the Foreign Office in the beginning of the year 1834[2].

It may be that Palmerston's caution in dealing with Russia at this time was due to the fact that he was not certain of the attitude of France. She may have seen eye to eye with Great Britain in opposing Russia's designs on Turkey; but, at the same time, French and British policy tended to clash over the Carlist Question in Spain, and Talleyrand, at the London Embassy, was on far from easy terms with the Foreign Office. On April 15th, 1834, however, Palmerston concluded a Treaty with the Spanish and Portuguese Governments, which in effect would have made Great Britain their Protector; and so, to avoid this result, Talleyrand quickly demanded the admission of France to the Treaty—a request which Palmerston readily accorded. Thus, the Quadruple Alliance of April 22nd, 1834, was concluded. "*This treaty was a capital hit, and all my own doing*," wrote Palmerston to Temple, on May 12, 1834 (the italics are his own); and, in truth, this famous Alliance between France and Great Britain gave Palmerston whatever special confidence he may have needed, in order to handle the Turco-Russian Question firmly. On November 15th, 1834, however, the Melbourne Government fell, and Palmerston had to give place to the Duke of Wellington at the Foreign Office. He felt sure, however, that there would be no change of policy in Foreign Affairs: "Russia he [the Duke] hates more than I do, and Turkey he will be just as anxious to protect" (to Temple, November 25th, 1834);

[1] Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1831 to 1837.
[2] See also Palmerston to Ponsonby, February 15th, 1834 in Appendix C.

and he was pleased to learn that his original Instructions to the British Embassy at Constantinople were left in force by Wellington. Palmerston thought that Russia would easily be beaten if there was a war: "the fact is that Russia is a great humbug, and that if England were fairly to go to work with her we should throw her back half a century in one campaign" (to Temple, March 10th, 1835). In April, he was back in office again. No one really wanted war, and, since Russia showed no desire to assert her protective position at Constantinople, none broke out. For nearly four years, the Eastern Question was suspended.

In January, 1836, a change of Ministry occurred in France. The Duc de Broglie fell, and Thiers became First Minister. In the meantime, the British and French Governments had been agreeing fairly well together. Palmerston was aware that there was an anti-British section in French official circles; but he thought this would exercise no effect. "There will be no change of policy in France. Louis-Philippe is really minister and Thiers is all for the English alliance, and Madame Lieven and Talleyrand will be disappointed" (to Temple, March 5th, 1836). As a matter of fact, Thiers, who was something of a "firebrand" himself, disliked what the French called Palmerston's "conquering airs," and began to veer towards the Central Powers, more especially as there was a scheme on hand for marrying the Duc d'Orléans to an Austrian Archduchess. But Louis-Philippe took fright at Thiers' militant policy in Spain, and dismissed him in September.

The new French Prime-Minister was Comte Molé, with whom the Foreign Office never seemed able to get into contact. As Palmerston said to General Sebastiani, French Ambassador at London, Molé always talked to Lord Granville (our Ambassador at Paris), "*with the greatest openness and confidence about the weather*."

Meanwhile, Sultan Mahmud II and Mehemet Ali were obviously both preparing for a renewal of the struggle. Mahmud was "Westernising" his forces: Captain von Moltke (afterwards Field-Marshal), was his military adviser, and Captain Basil Walker, R.N., was instructing his navy. The British Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby, strongly disapproved of the terms which Mahmud had made with Russia at Unkiar Skelessi, and with Mehemet Ali at Konieh. "Ponsonby always has had a longing," wrote Palmerston, "to have the [British Mediterranean] squadron opposite Seraglio Point, and I believe, after all, there is no place in Europe where it could be more useful[1]."

[1] To Temple, March 10th, 1835.

In Egypt, the aspect of affairs was equally disturbed. In 1837, reports came from Colonel Campbell, British Consul at Alexandria, that Mehemet Ali was strengthening his forces in Syria. In May, 1838, Mehemet Ali told Campbell that he was resolved to be independent. Palmerston took the news seriously, because, as he wrote to Granville at Paris (June 8th, 1838), the Turks would be defeated, and then the Russians would fly to the aid of the Sultan, under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. But this was not the worst that might be expected: "it must not be forgotten," he wrote in the same letter, "that the one great danger to Europe is the possibility of a combination between France and Russia."

It will be seen, then, that Palmerston's policy had three specific objects: the first, to prevent any further disruption of the Turkish Empire by Mehemet Ali; the second, to obtain, in one way or another, the suppression of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi; and the third, to prevent a combination between France and Russia. These three aims he completely achieved in the two following years.

The method by which he meant to act was eminently peaceful and statesmanlike: it was, as he wrote to Ponsonby, "to merge the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi *in some more general compact of the same nature*[1]"; and, to this end, he proposed to Sebastiani that a Conference of the Five Powers should be held in London. But the scheme made little progress, and, meanwhile, the Turkish and Egyptian forces were on a war-footing, and facing each other across the Euphrates. "Nobody doubts of war," wrote Ponsonby in April, 1839[2].

Nevertheless, there was a fair prospect of peace being preserved. The Instructions of the Five Powers to their respective diplomatic representatives at Constantinople and at Cairo were that a peaceful policy should be recommended to both parties. A Conference would have been held, except that a Protocol of 1818 made it necessary to invite Turkey, as being a party to the dispute; and it was felt that this would have rendered the Conference fruitless. Instead, therefore, the Powers sent identical Notes to the disputants, proposing

[1] Letter of September 13th, 1838.

[2] Ponsonby was very influential at Constantinople, and had succeeded in concluding a Treaty between Great Britain and the Porte (Treaty of Balta Liman, August 16th, 1838), by which Great Britain was given the "most favoured nation" treatment in all commercial matters, and permission to trade throughout the Ottoman dominions. By this Treaty all commercial monopolies were declared abolished in the Turkish dominions, including Egypt (Art. II). This was a direct and severe hit at Mehemet Ali, who had monopolised the produce of Egypt. The Treaty is in the *Parliamentary Papers*, L. 292.

that Mehemet Ali should hold Egypt as a hereditary pashalik. At the same time, Palmerston arranged with Marshal Soult (Duc de Dalmatie), who had succeeded Molé as Foreign Minister in May, 1835, that, if the Russians entered the Bosphorus, the British and French squadrons should pass through the Dardanelles[1]. But Sultan Mahmud would not give up his warlike plan, and Mehemet Ali was quite ready to meet his army[2]. When the Aide-de-camp whom Soult had sent to Constantinople to press for peace called on Ponsonby to ask for cooperation, the latter said he had received no special Instructions. On June 9th, hostilities commenced. On June 24th, the Egyptian forces, commanded by the ever-victorious Ibrahim, routed Mahmud's forces, under the eyes of Moltke himself, at Nisib; on June 29th Mahmud died, and the Turkish Admiral with his ships sailed off to join Mehemet Ali at Alexandria. "In three weeks, Turkey had lost her Sultan, her army, and her fleet[3]."

The news of Mahmud's death and of the battle of Nisib convinced Palmerston that decisive action was necessary; and he assumed, as Great Britain and France were Allies, that the two would act together. But the French Government, which seems to have believed that the British Government was not impartial (though Palmerston supplied irrefutable proofs of the contrary[4]), persisted in its distrust.

On August 3rd, Palmerston drafted orders to Admiral Stopford to proceed with the Mediterranean squadron to Alexandria, to bring pressure to bear on Mehemet Ali. This despatch was transmitted to the French Government, and the messenger was ordered to await

[1] It was then that Palmerston wrote his famous remark to Granville at Paris: "Soult is a jewel." The Marshal had been Special Ambassador in the previous year at Queen Victoria's coronation, when he had met with an enthusiastic reception.

[2] See Campbell's reports from Egypt (Palmerston to Hobhouse, Feb. 19, 1839, F. O. Turkey, 384).

[3] Guizot, *Mémoires*, IV. 342.

[4] Guizot in his *Mémoires* mentions an interesting despatch sent to Soult by Baron Bourqueney, who, in the absence of General Sebastiani, was in charge of the London Embassy. Bourqueney called on Palmerston at the Foreign Office to complain of the attitude of Ponsonby at Constantinople. Palmerston assured Bourqueney that the Instructions sent to the Constantinople Embassy had all been in favour of peace. Bourqueney then suggested that perhaps Lord Ponsonby had not carried out the Instructions as he ought. At this Lord Palmerston touched a bell and ordered to be brought to him Ponsonby's correspondence for the last four months, and the correspondence of Colonel Campbell (Consul at Alexandria) for the last two years. The files were brought, and all gave evidence of peaceful influence (Guizot, IV. 333–5). The incident throws a light on Palmerston's method of work. He was master of all the business of the Foreign Office, and kept abreast of all the correspondence that came in. Guizot himself, who knew all the British statesmen, believed that Palmerston did not wish for war, and that the British Government was not acting in a Machiavellian way.

Soult's decision, before proceeding on his journey. Soult merely returned the despatch to the Foreign Office. He also rejected Palmerston's next proposal, that the British and French Consuls at Alexandria should jointly demand from Mehemet Ali the restitution of the Turkish fleet. The reason for this extraordinary refusal was, undoubtedly, that the French Government was especially favourable to the cause of Mehemet Ali[1].

In the meantime, there was every probability of the Pasha of Egypt gaining the terms he wanted from the new Sultan Abdul Mejid, who was, in fact, helpless against his powerful subject. In order, therefore, to prevent a hasty and unwise settlement, the Ambassadors of the Five Powers at Constantinople, who on this occasion acted unanimously, drafted a joint Note informing the Sublime Porte, in virtue of the Instructions received by them from their respective Governments, "that accord on the Eastern Question is assured among the Five Great Powers"; and engaging the Porte "to suspend all definite determination without their concurrence, and to await the result of their interest in It."

On July 27th, 1839, the Ambassadors of the Five Powers, headed by Admiral de Roussin, presented this Note to the Porte. Thus concerted action in the interest of the whole of Europe had been secured, and in this concert France was preeminent. And yet, while the French Embassy at Constantinople was acting in concert with the Powers, Soult at Paris was refusing to cooperate with Palmerston. The news of the Constantinople Joint Note of July 27th arrived in London much about the same time as the notification of Soult's refusal to join with Great Britain in bringing pressure to bear at Alexandria.

On hearing the twofold news Palmerston at once resolved to break off separate negotiations with France, and to summon, instead, a Conference of the Five Powers. The object of the proposed Conference was to induce the Five Powers to blockade Syria until Mehemet Ali should surrender the Turkish fleet.

Palmerston's anxiety to have the Turco-Egyptian affair settled by European intervention was due to his fear lest Russia would invoke her rights under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi—a Treaty which he was determined to get rid of altogether. The Tsar Nicholas showed all readiness to meet Palmerston's views. He knew that to invoke

[1] Palmerston wanted Mehemet Ali to give up Syria. The French Government wished him to keep it. See conversation of Bourqueney with Palmerston at the Foreign Office, June 17th, 1839. (Guizot.)

the Treaty would mean war with England; while not to invoke it, but instead, to join with England in driving Mehemet Ali out of Syria, meant the rupture of the Anglo-French Alliance—a prospect not at all unpleasing to Russia. To assist in bringing about friendly feelings the Tsar had in May sent the Tsarevitch (afterwards Alexander II) on a visit to London. Also, on June 17th (1839), Nesselrode had written to Pozzo di Borgo (who had been transferred from the Paris to the London Embassy) that he wished to avoid any crisis which would call into action the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Lord Clanricarde sent the same information from Petrograd.

To arrange matters with the British Government, Nesselrode sent Baron Brunnow on a special Mission to London. Brunnow was a suave, keen-sighted diplomatist, quick to see other people's points of view, wearing always himself the garb of moderation, and expert in wrapping up his ideas in phrases which actually committed him to nothing. He arrived on September 15th, 1839. He brought word that Russia agreed to the blockade policy, and that, if Ibrahim's army advanced further towards Constantinople, a Russian fleet would enter the Bosphorus, remaining however, all the time, at the disposal of the Allies. If this were agreed to, Russia would not renew the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. The Russian Government was prepared to act in concert with Great Britain and France, but would prefer to act without France.

Palmerston informed Sebastiani (who had returned to London) of all these proposals, except that of leaving out France. Soult, when he received them, told Henry Bulwer, Chargé d'affaires at Paris, that, if a Russian fleet should appear in the Bosphorus, a French fleet would appear there also. Hereupon, Palmerston, seeing that to agree to the Tsar's proposal for a Russian expedition to the Bosphorus, would entail war between Russia and France, proposed that Anglo-French ships should also have authority to enter the Dardanelles. To this, the Russian Government agreed (December, 1839).

Palmerston now saw his way clear to concerted action of either the Five or of the Four—he would have preferred the Five, but the Four would suit him well enough. At the end of September he had instructed Bulwer to inform Soult that the British Government would agree to act with Russia, Austria and Prussia, "*whether France joins or not; but that on every account we should deeply regret that France should not be a party to the proceedings*[1]."

[1] Palmerston to Bulwer, September 24th, 1839. The italics are Palmerston's.

There can be no reasonable doubt that Palmerston wished France to remain in the European Concert in its handling of the Eastern Question[1]. But there was something indecisive, and at the same time evasive, in the attitude of the Soult Ministry. "Nothing can be more miserable," wrote Henry Bulwer from Paris, "than the shifts and changes in the opinions and schemes of the French Government; and it is evident that they have wishes and objects at bottom which they are ashamed of confessing" (September 24th, 1839). Later in the year, graver intelligence came to Palmerston—nothing official, but a report which, he thought, amounted to something. He heard "secretly" that Louis-Philippe had said to some foreign Minister that France was protecting Mehemet Ali, because she would probably be at war with England in two years, and would want the cooperation of Mehemet Ali's fleet in the Mediterranean[2]. The story seems hardly to fit the prudent character of Louis-Philippe; but the idea contained in it may have lain at the back of the mind of some other French statesmen. Palmerston himself did not think Louis-Philippe was above it: "Louis-Philippe," he wrote to Granville, "is a man in whom no solid trust can be reposed[3]."

Sebastiani at London saw clearly enough that France would be left out in the cold, if she persisted in supporting Mehemet Ali's pretensions to Syria. But Soult felt that he must take the risk. He seems himself to have preferred Palmerston's policy, but he thought it impracticable, owing to the military strength of Mehemet Ali: one has to recognise, he said, *la nécessité des faits*. Moreover, French educated opinion and the Paris Press were strongly in favour of Mehemet Ali, and no French statesman could go against them. He, therefore, professed indifference to Sebastiani's warning: if the Four Powers cared to make a coalition among themselves, France would let them go their own way—such a coalition was against Nature, and would not long hold together[4].

Soult was probably reckoning on the probability that Great Britain and Russia would not agree together, on the question of not renewing the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. But, as has already been noticed, they did agree. Palmerston informed Sebastiani, and Sebastiani forwarded the news to Paris. The news must have staggered Soult. He must now give up insisting upon the retention of Syria by Mehemet Ali, or

[1] Guizot is quite clear about this: see *Mémoires*, IV. ch. xxvi *passim*.
[2] Palmerston to Granville, November 22nd, 1839.
[3] Ashley, *Life of Palmerston* (1879), I. 367.
[4] Guizot, IV. 366.

consent to see France shut out from the European Concert. But he made one more effort to preserve the Anglo-French Alliance. He recalled General Sebastiani, and appointed Guizot in his place to the London Embassy (February, 1840). A fortnight later, Soult's Ministry fell over the question of a grant to the Duc de Nemours, and Thiers once more became Prime-Minister (March 1st, 1840).

The record of Guizot's embassy, which is fully given in his *Mémoires*, is most interesting. Guizot, after Thiers, was the most distinguished living French man of letters and statesman. He had never before been in England, and he had never engaged in diplomacy. But he was an experienced politician, and he was already an authority on English history.

Guizot's Instructions, when he took up his work at the Embassy in Hertford House, were full of difficulty: he was to maintain the accord with Great Britain, to preserve for France her membership of the Concert of the Five Powers, and yet to insist upon keeping Syria for Mehemet Ali[1]. He was soon in touch with all the leading men in the British Government and in London society. Palmerston knew that the new French Premier, Thiers, could not be expected to gather up at once the threads of the tangled Eastern Affair, and, accordingly, proceeded in a leisurely fashion. To Guizot, as the Ambassador fully acknowledges, he was perfectly frank and friendly. The two statesmen fully discussed the affairs of Mehemet Ali at the Foreign Office. When Palmerston tried to prove that Mehemet Ali had been the aggressor against the Sultan, Guizot triumphantly showed, from a German map, that Ain-tab, where the first collision had taken place, was on Mehemet Ali's side of the Syrian frontier. Palmerston, therefore, abandoned this line of argument, but held to his ground that Mehemet Ali's power must be restricted. To this, however, Thiers would not agree.

Guizot, in spite of the friendliness of Palmerston, and of the leaders of the great Whig Houses, such as Lord Holland, Lord Lansdowne, and Lord Aberdeen, soon began to feel the coming isolation of France. The Prussian Ambassador, Baron von Bülow, was friendly and often conversed with Guizot about politics, literature and philosophy; but the Austrian Ambassador, Baron Neumann, trained in the strict Metternich school, was solemnly discreet. Baron Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador, kept out of Guizot's way altogether during six weeks.

In April, the Turkish Ambassador at Paris, Nouri Effendi, came

[1] Guizot, *Mémoires*, v. 27.

to London and presented a Note in which the Porte, not unreasonably, asked the Powers to redeem their Joint Note of July 27th of the previous year—when they had counselled the Ottoman Government to suspend negotiations with Mehemet Ali until the Powers made their decision. The Porte's Note also mentioned the offer of a hereditary pashalik of Egypt (without Syria) as the condition of peace with Mehemet Ali. Two days later (April 12th), at a reception given at Holland House, Guizot was privately informed that the British, Russian, Austrian and Prussian Governments were agreed on the reply which they would severally make to the Turkish Note. Next day, he received a communication from Lord Palmerston, enclosing a copy of his reply to the Note of Nouri Effendi, and adding: "Won't you reply somewhat in the same sense?" Nothing could be more courteous and frank than Palmerston's conduct at this juncture. The English reply said nothing about limiting Mehemet Ali to Egypt. But Thiers instructed Guizot to make no reply at all to the Turkish Note: "it would be superfluous," he wrote, "to prolong such a debate indefinitely."

For the next two months, the Eastern Question ceased to bulk largely in Guizot's diplomatic transactions. He was occupied in using his good offices in settling a commercial dispute between Great Britain and the kingdom of Naples. In May, he had to negotiate with the British Government for the transference of Napoleon's ashes from St Helena to France. When he laid the request before Lord Palmerston, a slight smile, quickly repressed, passed across the Foreign Secretary's lips; but two days later, the Cabinet's consent was conveyed to Hertford House.

Towards the end of May, a new Turkish Ambassador, Chekib Effendi, came to London. Thiers told Guizot not to talk with him: "he will repeat to you the follies of the Seraglio, without approving of them. For the question will not be settled with the Turkish Plenipotentiary." As a matter of fact, Thiers thought that the question was actually being settled, without the interference of the Four Powers, in a separate negotiation which was now going on at Constantinople, between the Porte and Mehemet Ali. These negotiations were being carried on through the mediation of Pontois, French Ambassador at Constantinople. From moment to moment Thiers expected to hear of their successful conclusion, whereupon he intended to confront Palmerston and Nesselrode with the *fait accompli*[1].

[1] *L'arrangement direct entre le Sultan et le pacha lui paraissait imminent.* Guizot, v. 229.

But the negotiations at Constantinople could not escape the vigilance of Lord Ponsonby, who gave timely warning of them to Palmerston[1]. This was just one of those occasions which Palmerston knew how to seize. As he had already reached an accord with the Russian, Prussian and Austrian Governments on their attitude to Mehemet Ali, he had no difficulty in obtaining a Treaty signed by the Representatives of these Powers at the Foreign Office in London (July 15th, 1840). The Turkish Ambassador also appended his signature. The Treaty provided for the settlement of the dispute between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, on condition of the hereditary pashalik of Egypt being assigned to Mehemet, with Acre and southern Syria for life. The offer of southern Syria (to which the Austrian and Prussian Ambassadors had induced Palmerston to agree, in the interest of peace) was to hold good for ten days; the offer of Egypt alone, for twenty days. If pressure were required to be put on Mehemet Ali, the Four Powers would blockade him; if he advanced upon Constantinople, they would, on the invitation of the Sultan, cooperate for the defence of his capital. Article IV maintained "the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire" to keep the Dardanelles closed to foreign ships of war when the Porte is at peace. Thus the Porte was placed under the protection of the Four Powers, and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was tacitly suppressed.

These results constituted a tremendous achievement for the policy of Palmerston. But two things remained necessary for its complete success: first, to assuage the chagrin of the French Government; and secondly to induce Mehemet Ali to evacuate northern Syria. Both these things took time; but Palmerston, by a happy combination of patience and vigour, accomplished them at last.

In the first instance, France had to be dealt with. On July 17th, two days after the signature of the Four Power Treaty, Palmerston invited Guizot to the Foreign Office, and there read him a careful Note stating that the Four Powers, in view of the refusal of France to join with them, had by themselves concluded the Treaty. This information, when conveyed to Paris, met with a perfect storm of anger. Thiers, in a Circular Note to the French diplomatic agents[2], admitted that France would not have signed the Treaty; but her Government felt acutely insulted by not being in form invited to sign, before the Treaty was completed. In truth, the whole French

[1] Cf. Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 23rd, 1840, in Appendix C.
[2] Note of August 6th, 1840: text in Haussonville, I. 167.

policy had miscarried. "No wonder," Palmerston wrote to Bulwer after communicating the news of the Treaty of July 15th, "Guizot has been looking as cross as the devil for the last few days."

For a few months war seemed imminent between France and the rest of Europe. During the last few years the French Chamber had been in a somewhat chauvinistic frame of mind, and had been indulging its fancy for the Napoleonic legend. Expeditions to Algiers had not satisfied its appetite for glory. The nation seems to have been actually eager for war, and the only hesitation in Thiers' mind was, apparently, whether the French attack should be mainly directed against England or against Prussia. The patriotism of Germany was aroused, and the *Wacht am Rhein* was composed.

Palmerston, on his side, was firm, if not bellicose. To Bulwer at Paris, he wrote on September 22nd (1840): "With that skill of language which I know you to be a master of, convey to him [Thiers] in the most friendly and inoffensive manner possible, that if France throws down the gauntlet we shall not refuse to pick it up."

At the same time, events were moving very rapidly in Syria. Mehemet Ali had refused the terms of the Powers; so Allied pressure was at once brought to bear on him. Lord Ponsonby had everything in train for a revolt in the Lebanon against Egyptian rule[1]. Something more than a blockade was already in force on the Syrian coast. On September 11th Admiral Sir Charles Napier bombarded Beyrout and captured it. Soon afterwards, he won a victory on land, in command of the Turks, at Nahr-el-Kelb; and, on September 26th, he stormed Saida. The position of Mehemet Ali had been made still worse by the Sultan having pronounced his deposition on September 14th.

This measure was a diplomatic mistake. It almost made war inevitable. For, even if France never meant to fight for Syria, she could scarcely refuse to take up arms when her protégé was contemptuously declared to be absolutely deposed. The action of the Sultan was probably taken on his own initiative. Palmerston softened the blow by telling Guizot that the deposition had only been pronounced *in terrorem*—as a means of bringing Mehemet Ali to terms.

In France many influences were working for peace. The prosperous and growing class of French manufacturers were against war, and Palmerston was counting on them. Louis-Philippe was always

[1] "If Ibrahim advances, it will be easy to raise all the Syrians against his government. I can answer for the inhabitants of the Lebanon." Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 23rd, 1840: Haussonville, I. 295.

prudent and peaceful, and as he said himself *parler de faire la guerre, et faire la guerre, sont deux choses bien différentes*. Malmesbury, a good observer, notes in his diary on September 11th: "I think that peace will be preserved, as Louis-Philippe is very much against all wars." Palmerston himself was willing to make the way to peace smooth. On October 8th, he instructed Granville to offer this declaration to the French Government: "*If France makes us a friendly communication tending to lead to an amicable discussion of the present state of affairs, we shall receive it, and deal with it in the spirit in which it is made.*"

While Palmerston was writing this Note to the British Ambassador at Paris, a French peace-offer was being indited at Paris for transmission to Guizot in London. The peace-party had triumphed, and Thiers himself had been talked round by Louis-Philippe and the more conservative statesmen. Thus the French Note of October 8th was drafted, and presented by Guizot to Lord Palmerston on the 9th.

Although in effect a peace-offer, it was not by any means a surrender on the part of France. It contained simply a categorical demand that Mehemet Ali should be left in possession of Egypt. This meant that, while France would not tolerate the deposition of Mehemet Ali, and would generously defend his cause even against all Four Powers, she would not insist upon the retention of Syria by him[1].

This offer of France, which, while involving an important concession, was yet in no way derogatory to the national dignity, fully met the wishes of the Four Powers, who had no desire to see Mehemet Ali completely deposed. Such, at any rate, was the view of Admiral Napier, who was blockading Syria. On November 3rd, he captured Acre, which had long been considered impregnable. This feat endangered the communications of Ibrahim Pasha, who was therefore compelled to retire from Syria. Admiral Napier then took the blockading fleet down to Alexandria, and on November 27th dictated to Boghas Bey, Mehemet Ali's Representative, "one of those brusque conventions so common with English agents[2]." By this Act, Mehemet Ali (on the advice of Walewski, at this time French Agent at Alexandria) undertook to evacuate Syria, on condition of retaining Egypt in heredity—terms equivalent to those contained in the French Note of October 8th.

The Four Powers decided to ratify Napier's Convention. Negotiations for a final settlement were, thereupon, taken up with France,

[1] Text in Guizot, v. 505 (*Pièces historiques*).
[2] Haussonville, i. 196.

in London. The Thiers Cabinet having fallen (on October 12th), and Guizot having returned to Paris as Foreign Minister under Soult, the conduct of the negotiations was left in the hands of Baron Bourqueney, a skilful and conciliatory diplomatist, who had been Chargé d'affaires at London in 1839.

On February 12th, 1841, the Sultan was induced to issue a firman withdrawing the act of deposition of Mehemet Ali, and recognising him as Hereditary Viceroy of Egypt, but without either Syria or Crete. The final settlement was brought about by a Conference at London, attended by the representatives of the Four Powers. This Conference, on July 10th, 1841, signed a Protocol which affirmed "the ancient rule" of the Ottoman empire (*i.e.* the closure of the Straits), and invited the accession of France, the appeal being made "on the invitation and according to the wish of His Highness the Sultan." The Protocol, which was signed by Eszterházy and Neumann for Austria, Bülow for Prussia, Palmerston for Great Britain, and Chekib for Turkey, was intended to mark the closure of the whole incident, and the invitation contained in it was taken in this sense by France. The Four Power Treaty of July, 1840, which the French Government had come to regard as another Treaty of Chaumont[1], was tacitly suppressed. On July 13th two Treaties were signed, the one definitely establishing peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, and confirming him in the hereditary pashalik of Egypt; the other, known as the "Convention of the Straits," reenacting "the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire," France subscribing with the other Powers to both these Treaties. The effect was that the Four Power Treaty of 1840 became the Five Power Treaty of 1841; that Mehemet Ali no longer menaced Constantinople from Syria; and that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, having expired by effluxion of time, was buried in peace.

Thus ended the long drawn-out crisis, which had begun with the battle of Konieh in 1832, and which had nearly produced one war between Great Britain and Russia, caused by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and another between Great Britain and France concerning the blockade of Syria. In the course of the crisis the Anglo-French Alliance of 1834 had been subjected to disruption, and only renewed (in a very half-hearted way) owing to the moderation of

[1] The Treaty of Chaumont, March 1st, 1814, bound Great Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria to continue the War against France until the objects of their Alliance against Napoleon were attained.

Louis-Philippe. The final solution of the crisis, in 1841, was universally regarded as a great triumph for Palmerston, who had known exactly what he wanted all through, and had completely achieved his objects. As a result, it has been said that the prestige of England had never stood higher since Waterloo[1]. At Constantinople, the British Government was all-powerful, Lord Ponsonby exercising an influence which nearly equalled that of Stratford Canning at a later date.

The success of Great Britain's Foreign Policy in these years was indisputably due to Palmerston's own courage and skill. He had never had very strong support from the Cabinet. In July, 1840, he had to complain to the Prime-Minister, Lord Melbourne, that members of the Cabinet actually expressed to foreign Envoys views of policy different from his own; and he placed his resignation in the hands of Melbourne, who, however, refused to accept it.

The Radicals in Parliament, such as Grote, Hume and Brougham[2], disliked the breach of the Anglo-French Alliance, and pointed out that Palmerston was losing the friendship of a Constitutional Government and associating England with the autocratic Powers of Northern and Central Europe. But, in answer to this, it may be asserted that to make Russia our friend, instead of our foe, at Constantinople, was no slight success; and this must stand to the credit of Palmerston. The annulment of Russia's Protectorate of Turkey (under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi) was a great triumph; and this was achieved without a war. The next time the Tsar Nicholas sought to renew the Protectorate (in 1853), it required a long and costly war to defeat his purpose.

It only remains to enquire whether Palmerston could have brought about the suppression of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, without at the same time opposing France on the Syrian Question. Was Syria worth the risk of an Anglo-French War? Palmerston evidently thought it was, because it led to Mesopotamia and the "avenues of India." It must be remembered that when Mehemet Ali held Syria, he also held in his possession Mecca and Medina, and aimed at conquering the whole of Arabia. It was as a counterpoise to the Egyptian partial conquest of Arabia that the Sultan Mahmud

[1] Spencer Walpole, *A History of England from the Conclusion of the Great War in* 1815, IV. 335.

[2] Mehemet Ali had a reputation, among the Radicals, as an enlightened despot; cf. the long letter of Jeremy Bentham to Mehemet Ali (April 28th, 1828) proposing to take Mehemet's grandson Abbas as a pupil, and advising Mehemet to declare Independence (Brit. Museum Add. MSS. 25663, pp. 139–48).

himself suggested, in 1837, that Great Britain should occupy Aden. Palmerston's victory in the settlement of the Syrian Question prevented the establishment of a Franco-Egyptian sphere from the Levant to the Persian Gulf; and thus removed what would have been a certain cause of war in the future.

II. TAHITI, 1836–1844

The affair of Tahiti forms an important episode in the chequered history of Anglo-French relations during the reign of Louis-Philippe. Tahiti is the chief of the Society Islands, so named by Captain Cook in honour of the Royal Society of London. Since 1797, the island had been a field for the work of the London Missionary Society; one of the earliest of these devoted workers was George Pritchard (a Congregational minister), who went to Tahiti with his wife in 1824, when he was twenty-eight years old.

The Society Islands at this time were ruled by Queen Pomare, herself a Christian and the daughter of a Christian. Pomare grew to regard Pritchard as her adviser in civil as well as in religious affairs. She liked and trusted Great Britain; and, in a letter written to King George IV, in 1826, she asked permission to use the British flag, and to be placed under British protection. Canning returned a kind answer, but was unable to grant the Queen's request, although he assured her that King George would "be happy to afford...all such protection as H.M. can grant to a friendly Power at so great a distance from his own Kingdoms[1]" (March 3rd, 1827). Pritchard's position in Tahiti was further strengthened by Lord Palmerston's appointment of him as Consul at Papeete.

The trouble with France began in November, 1836, when two French missionary priests were refused admittance to the islands by Queen Pomare. A similar event occurred in 1837[2]; and was followed on August 30th, 1838, by the arrival of the French frigate *Venus*, under the Commodore of the Pacific squadron, Du Petit Thouars. He was charged by his Government to demand an apology from the Queen, and an indemnity of two thousand Spanish dollars for the priests. The apology was given; and Pritchard, in his account, says

[1] *State Papers*, XXIII. 660.

[2] On the arrival of the first Roman Catholic missionaries, Queen Pomare wrote, through Pritchard, to Lord Palmerston asking whether she had the power to exclude foreigners, and whether the priests were, as they asserted, sanctioned by the British Government (November 18th, 19th, 1836). To the former question Palmerston replied in the affirmative, to the latter in the negative (July 19th, 1837). *State Papers*, XXV. 1412–13.

that he and some American friends paid the indemnity. The Commodore departed, after inducing the Queen to sign a Treaty of friendship with France[1]. After the French had gone, Queen Pomare, acting no doubt under Pritchard's advice, wrote to Queen Victoria, asking that the islands might be placed under British Protection[2]. Victoria was touched by the letter; but the request was refused, on the ground that Great Britain could not adequately fulfil any defensive obligations at so great a distance[3]. Probably the real reason was a desire not to offend France.

In February, 1841, Pritchard left Tahiti on leave of absence. While Queen Pomare was on a tour in her other islands, four Tahitian chiefs, at the suggestion of the French Consul, addressed a letter to Louis-Philippe, asking that the islands should be placed under French Protection. The next important event was the arrival of Admiral (as he now was) Du Petit Thouars in his ship the *Reine Blanche*. His enterprise was a quite unauthorised extension of the tenor of his Instructions, for Guizot had only charged him with declaring a Protectorate of the Marquesas Islands. The Admiral, however, under threat of bombardment, obtained from Queen Pomare (who by this time had returned to Tahiti) a letter asking for French Protection; and a proclamation of Protection was issued by the Admiral on September 9th, 1842. After establishing French officials in the island, Du Petit Thouars departed[4].

It was shortly after this, in February, 1843, that Pritchard came back to Tahiti[5]. He brought with him a present from Queen Victoria to Queen Pomare—a carriage and a handsome drawing-room suite. Pritchard was indignant when he found a French Protectorate in Tahiti; and when the news reached London, it also caused great

[1] *State Papers*, XXVII. 1137–9.

[2] "We are threatened in what we have dearest to our hearts, the Protestant faith and our nationality....Let your flag cover us." *Ibid.* 1140.

[3] *Ibid.* 1141–2.

[4] There is no doubt that Du Petit Thouars acted on his own initiative. See the confidential letter of Roussin to the Duc de Dalmatie, March 8th, 1843: "M. du Petit Thouars aurait tout à fait pris l'initiative de ce procédé." *Revue Retrospective*, p. 478. At first the report of Thouars' action was scarcely credited at Paris. The letter of Queen Pomare asking for Protection, and Du Petit Thouars' acceptance and guarantee in the name of the French Government (both letter and acceptance dated September 9th, 1842), are in *State Papers*, XXXI. 940–2. In fairness to the French, it must be borne in mind that a letter was signed by more than six British residents in Tahiti thanking the Admiral for accepting the Protection, and so putting an end to disorder (*ibid.* p. 958).

[5] Pritchard travelled via Sydney, N.S.W. From there he obtained a passage in H.M.S. *Vindictive* (*State Papers*, XXXI. 952).

perturbation there. The missionary societies and all the Evangelical interest were deeply agitated; public meetings of protest were held, and deputations were sent to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, and to the French Ambassador. The French public, on its part, also became excited and Guizot was made to understand that the Chamber would never allow the French flag to be hauled down in Tahiti, so soon after it had been raised[1]. Suddenly, fresh fuel was added to the flame, by the tidings that Admiral Du Petit Thouars, impelled thereto by the strongly anti-French attitude of Pritchard, had actually reappeared off Tahiti, and formally annexed it on November 6th, 1843[2]. Pritchard, by way of protest, hauled down his flag, and proclaimed that his Consulship was ended, as he had not been accredited to a French colony[3].

The presence of Pritchard in Tahiti, using all his great influence against the French there, caused serious inconvenience to the new régime, and at last on March 3rd, 1844, he was arrested by Captain D'Aubigny, the Commandant of Papeete. After ten days' confinement in a blockhouse he was put on board H.M.S. *Cormorant* and made to leave the island for good. His wife had to be left behind for about three months, and during that time, according to Pritchard's account, the French soldiers and sailors helped themselves to his live-stock and other property. He valued his losses at £4000.

The incident now assumed threatening dimensions, more especially after a speech made by the Premier, Sir Robert Peel, in Parliament (June 31st). He declared that a gross outrage, accompanied with gross indignity, had been committed upon the British Consul, and that, if the statements received were correct, it must be presumed that "the French Government will at once make that reparation which this country has a right to require[4]." This was just the sort

[1] Guizot had at first given assurances to Lord Cowley at Paris that the declaration of suzerainty over Tahiti was only provisional; and that equal protection would be afforded to Protestant and to Catholic missionaries. Cowley to Aberdeen, March 23rd, 24th, 1843: *State Papers*, XXXI. 945–6.

[2] Guizot, *Mémoires*, VII. 64.

[3] Pritchard himself makes no mention of his abdication in his book, *Queen Pomare and her Country* (published in 1879) on the subject. It is, however, distinctly stated by Guizot, who refers to a letter of Pritchard of November 7th, 1843, to Admiral Du Petit Thouars, formally declaring that he ceased to be Consul. (Guizot to Jarnac, August 8th, 1844, in *State Papers*, XXXII. 1068.) Lord Aberdeen at first insisted that Pritchard was Consul at the time of his arrest, but soon abandoned this claim. *Ibid.* p. 1070. (Cf. as to the Tahiti episode the London Missionary Society's Correspondence in Appendix C II.)

[4] *Hansard* (1844), LXXVI. 1575–6. The public indignation was increased when, in August, the French fleet, after the Sultan of Morocco had made an unsatisfactory reply to an ultimatum, bombarded Tangier.

of speech that Lord Aberdeen, justly apprehensive of Peel's irritableness, had all along been trying to prevent. Guizot too was in a difficulty: he had never meant to annex Tahiti, nor did he approve of the somewhat summary (though not wholly unwarranted) treatment which had been meted out to Pritchard by the French agents in Tahiti; but, in the highly overcharged air of the French Chamber, he could not make any, even the most distant, suggestion of retractation. Luckily, he and Aberdeen thoroughly understood each other; and so Guizot, while refusing to commit himself at all in answer to the interpellations in the Chamber, quietly arranged the Tahitian dispute, by a direct understanding with the British Foreign Office. On August 29th, he wrote expressing regret for the seizure of Pritchard; and on September 2nd, he agreed to pay an indemnity. The French Chamber was furious at the settlement, and protested against any idea of indemnity or submission to "English pride." French historians pride themselves on the fact that the indemnity was never paid—inasmuch as Louis-Philippe for the sake of peace (in his own country) agreed to pay it out of his own pocket[1].

The unfortunate Tahiti episode, which had actually brought Great Britain and France to the verge of war, was now ended. On September 5th, 1844, Peel stated in Parliament that the affair had been satisfactorily settled. For the maintenance of the *entente cordiale* credit must be given to Lord Cowley, Ambassador at Paris, and in a high degree to Count Jarnac, Chargé d'affaires at London.

Queen Pomare, who had been banished to the island of Raiatea by the French, was restored to Tahiti in 1847, but the French retained the "Protection," *i.e.* the external government, of the islands. Pritchard, in his work already referred to, states that the French continued to retain as much power as they ever had possessed. France formally annexed the islands in 1888[2].

III. THE SPANISH MARRIAGES, 1829–1846

For about sixty years after the close of the Napoleonic Wars, Spain was periodically convulsed by constitutional struggles, in which the British Government could not but take considerable interest. The defeat of Napoleon had brought with it the restoration of

[1] Guizot, VII. 107. Louis-Philippe to Guizot, September 2nd, 1844. He showed very good sense as to the whole affair. See Queen Victoria to Lord Aberdeen, October 17th, 1844, "*He wishes Tahiti au fond de la mer*" (*Letters of Queen Victoria*, II. 25).

[2] Queen Pomare died in 1877. Pritchard, who never returned to Tahiti, died at Hove in 1883, aged eighty-seven.

Ferdinand VII, a king who had learned even less in exile than his kinsmen the Bourbons of France. In the following years, he had to face revolution again, and was only saved in 1823 by the intervention of the French army under the Duc d'Angoulême.

In 1829 King Ferdinand, who was childless, lost his third wife, a princess of the House of Saxony; within seven months he was married again, this time to a Neapolitan princess, Maria Christina. This new marriage was a great blow to the hopes of the heir presumptive, Don Carlos, brother of King Ferdinand. Carlos was a man of absolutist views, while Ferdinand, although at times he had savagely persecuted the Liberals, had not done so on any consistent principle. Consequently, Carlos was the rising hope of the absolutists and clericals of Spain, and they looked with disfavour upon King Ferdinand's fourth marriage. In the same way, the new Queen, being thus opposed by the absolutists, associated herself with the Liberal elements in Spain. Thus the contest which was to break out later, and to be known as the Carlist War, became a struggle between the absolutists, supporting Don Carlos, and the constitutionalists, supporting Queen Christina, with Great Britain, naturally, favouring the constitutional side.

Trouble became imminent when on May 19th, 1830, Queen Christina gave birth to a daughter, who was named Isabel. Had the child been a son, no question would have arisen, and Don Carlos must have held his peace. But as it was a girl, he had some ground for claiming that she was disqualified from the Succession to the Throne, and that he himself was the lawful heir.

It was unfortunate for the peace of Spain that the law regulating the Succession to the Throne had been changed more than once. In the Middle Ages, the Succession of women was lawful in Spain; in modern times, the reigns of Queen Isabel, daughter of John II of Castile, and of Juanna (Isabel's daughter) formed precedents. There had, however, been no such precedent since the sixteenth century.

In the year 1713, the law of Succession was changed by the first Bourbon King of Spain, Philip V, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht which forbade the union of the Crowns of France and Spain. Philip's Act of Succession made females eligible for the Throne only if there were no direct or collateral male heir, and thus established the so-called Spanish Salic Law. In 1789, Charles IV annulled the Act of Philip, and restored the right of Succession to women. The annulment was registered with the Cortes

although not published to the world at large. Yet again, however, the "Salic Law" was restored, by Ferdinand VII himself, who was persuaded thereto by the Carlist interest during a severe illness that attacked him in September, 1832. Yet once more, however, did he change his mind; he restored the Pragmatic Law of 1789, by which women could inherit the Throne (December 31st, 1832). In the following year (June, 1833) the Cortes took an oath recognising Isabel, the daughter of King Ferdinand and Queen Christina, as heir to the Throne. On September 29th, Ferdinand VII died. Christina became Regent for her daughter, Queen Isabel. The Carlist party refused to recognise the new Queen, and raised their standard in Spanish Navarre and the Basque Provinces.

The cause of the Portuguese trouble was curiously similar to that of the Spanish. The French occupation in 1807 had driven the Portuguese Royal Family over the Atlantic to Rio de Janeiro, not to return till 1821. Yet while King John VI came back to Lisbon, his eldest son and heir, Dom Pedro, stayed behind as Regent at Rio; and in 1822 a national movement in Brazil induced him to become Emperor of that country. In 1826 King John VI died, and Pedro became King of Portugal as well as Emperor of Brazil; but, recognising that he could not be Sovereign in two countries which were now independent[1] of each other, he abdicated the Portuguese Throne, in favour of his daughter, Donna Maria da Gloria. Thus, Donna Maria, aged seven, became Queen, with Pedro's brother, her uncle Dom Miguel, as Regent (May 2nd, 1826). Before Dom Miguel, who was residing in Vienna, reached Lisbon, civil commotions broke out in the country, which were suppressed with the aid of 5000 British troops despatched by Canning (1827). When Dom Miguel arrived in Portugal, he found himself greeted as a popular King. In April, 1828, the British troops were recalled by the Wellington Ministry. With the way thus cleared, the Cortes offered the Crown to Dom Miguel, who readily accepted it (July 7th, 1828). Queen Maria had to be shipped to England, where she was well received; but the Duke of Wellington, who was still Prime-Minister, refused to intervene in a military way[2]. In the

[1] By a Treaty signed at Rio on August 29th, 1825, negotiated through Canning as Foreign Secretary, and Sir Charles Stewart as British Plenipotentiary, Brazil and Portugal were declared to be separated (*State Papers*, XII. 675).

[2] Even Canning, though he despatched troops to maintain order in 1827, had always maintained that the Succession to the Portuguese Throne was a matter for the Portuguese themselves to decide. "A guarantee of an internal arrangement, which is matter wholly of municipal regulation, was surely never contemplated in any of the ancient treaties between Portugal and Great Britain." To Palmella, February 3rd, 1826, in *Some Correspondence of George Canning*, by E. J. Stapleton, II. 2.

following year (August, 1829) Maria betook herself to her father in Brazil. Her cause seemed lost, for all Portugal accepted the rule of Miguel, and only in the island of Terceira in the Azores a loyal garrison held out for the Queen. In 1832, the Queen's father, Dom Pedro, managed to land with a mercenary force in Portugal and to seize Oporto, but his "Liberator" army made no headway, and remained blockaded in Portugal till June, 1833.

Thus, both in Spain and Portugal civil war was raging in 1833. In both countries a child-Queen (whom circumstances forced to adopt the constitutional side) was opposed by an absolutist Pretender; and in both countries the cause of the Constitutional parties had the sympathy (though not the active support) of the Whig Government, in which Lord Palmerston was now Foreign Secretary.

The Portuguese trouble was the first to be settled. The French Government left the way fairly clear[1] for the British to exert all its moral force. In spite of the Foreign Enlistment Act, British volunteers lent valuable aid to Dom Pedro's Liberator army. Captain Charles Napier[2], as Vice-Admiral of the loyalist Portuguese fleet, won a brilliant victory over the Miguelites on July 5th, 1833, off Cape St Vincent; and Dom Pedro's army was able to occupy Lisbon. The finishing touch was given to the victories of Queen Maria's cause by an alliance which Palmerston offered to the Governments both of Queen Maria of Portugal and Queen Isabel of Spain. The offer was naturally accepted with cordiality, and a Triple Alliance was concluded. The French Ambassador in London, Talleyrand, totally ignorant of the transaction while it was in progress, was greatly mortified when he heard of its conclusion. He at once demanded the inclusion of France in the Alliance, to which Palmerston agreed, and which thus became the Quadruple Alliance of April 22nd, 1834[3].

By this Treaty the Regents of Spain and Portugal agreed to join

[1] When Canning was Foreign Secretary, Hyde de Neuville, French Ambassador at Lisbon, had stood in the way of British influence. Villèle however had withdrawn him (*Some Correspondence of George Canning*, I. 256); and after the Revolution of 1830, Louis-Philippe's Government had thrown no obstacle in the path of Queen Maria da Gloria.

[2] Napier simply disregarded the Foreign Enlistment Act. See Sir Edward Codrington in *Hansard*, XX. 388, "He gloried in the breach of this law by Captains Napier and Sartorius." The Foreign Enlistment Act was subsequently suspended by Order in Council to permit of enlistments in the Spanish forces. *Hansard*, XXVIII. 1133 (Third Series).

[3] Before the death of Ferdinand VII, Palmerston had been negotiating to induce the Spanish Government to intervene in Portugal. But Stratford Canning, who went to Madrid on special Mission in January, 1833, was unable to make his views prevail.

forces in order to compel the withdrawal of Don Carlos and Dom Miguel. By Article II, Spanish troops were to be despatched to Portuguese territory, at the charge of Spain. Great Britain engaged herself to employ a naval force to cooperate with the Spanish and Portuguese land-forces (Article III). Article IV assigned to France a very minor rôle: "if the cooperation of France should be deemed to be necessary by the High Contracting Parties, for the complete attainment of the objects of this Treaty, His Majesty the King of the French engages to do, in this respect, whatever might be settled by common consent between himself and his three August Allies."

The truth is that the Quadruple Alliance was not a sign of Anglo-French friendship, but of Anglo-French mutual suspicion. Palmerston had a shrewd notion that Louis-Philippe's Government intended to intervene single-handed; and he negotiated the Quadruple Treaty to prevent this. By a supplementary Treaty of August 18th (1834) he still further forestalled any French (even unofficial) countenancing of Don Carlos: the King of France engaged "to take necessary measures in adjoining parts of his dominions to prevent succours reaching the Insurgents" (Article II)[1]; and Great Britain agreed to provide Queen Christina with arms and warlike stores, and if necessary to assist her with a naval force (Article III).

The victory of Admiral Napier, the successes of Dom Pedro's Liberator army, and finally the Quadruple Alliance, proved more than Dom Miguel could resist. By the Convention of Evora (May 24th, 1834), he bound himself to leave the Peninsula for ever. In accordance with Article V of the Quadruple Alliance an amnesty was promised for all political offences on the part of his followers, and the Pretender (in accordance with the same Article) was guaranteed a pension "suitable to his birth and rank"; but he refused to accept it, and retired from the Peninsula, not without some magnanimity at the last. On April 9th, 1836, Queen Maria married Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, nephew to Leopold, King of the Belgians.

The Spanish trouble was not so easily settled, in spite of the Quadruple Alliance, since the Carlists were much better led than the Miguelists had been, and the conditions of Spanish geography (the

[1] The reason why the French Government was content to accept so subordinate a rôle in the Quadruple Alliance was probably that Louis-Philippe did not want to intervene at all in favour of Queen Isabel. He privately preferred the cause of Don Carlos (see documents quoted in Hall, *England and the Orleans Monarchy*, p. 182). The provision of stores and munitions by non-interventionist England was, as it always is, very expensive. It cost £616,000 (*Hansard*, LII. 553).

large extent and the almost impenetrable nature of the country) would have rendered any naval demonstration on the part of Great Britain negligible. The atrocious civil strife went on, possibly a little softened by the Convention of Logrono, which the British Special Envoy Lord Eliot was able to negotiate between the Regent's Government and the Carlists (April 27th, 1835)[1]. The British Government so far departed from its practice of non-intervention, as to suspend the Foreign Enlistment Act, and to allow Christina's Government to levy a British Legion[2], which served with distinction for two years, under Colonel de Lacy Evans.

After the death of Zumalacarregui in June, 1835, the Carlists had only one good general, Ramon Cabrera; and he could not indefinitely stand out against the skill of General Espartero, backed as it was by the financial help of Great Britain. G. W. F. Villiers (afterwards Earl of Clarendon), the British Ambassador at Madrid, was a strengthening influence there. Gradually, the resistance of the Carlists was worn down. The end came partly through the victories of General Espartero, who was Queen Isabel's best soldier, and partly through the defection from Don Carlos of his highest commander, General Maroto. The negotiations between Espartero and Maroto were carried on through the mediation of Mr Villiers, who used for this purpose Admiral Lord John Hay, commanding the British squadron in Spanish waters, Colonel Wylde, the British officer attached to Don Carlos' staff, and Lieutenant Turner, attached to the Isabel forces. The negotiations issued in the Convention of Vergara or Bergara (August 29th, 1839), according to which Maroto's army laid down its arms and was allowed to enter Queen Isabel's service. Don Carlos escaped into French territory, and the Civil War was at an end.

[1] The Convention provided for periodic exchanges of prisoners, and for the respecting of sick and wounded. Lord Eliot had been sent by the Duke of Wellington (as Foreign Secretary in Peel's Administration of 1835) on a special Mission, partly to arrange for more humane treatment of prisoners, but also with secret Instructions to point out to Don Carlos that his cause was hopeless, and to induce him to abandon the struggle. This part of Lord Eliot's mission failed; Don Carlos proved obdurate, and moreover Louis-Philippe refused to associate himself with the British representative.

[2] Don Carlos refused to allow the Convention of Logrono to apply to foreigners; he issued a Decree at Durango, announcing that foreigners captured while bearing arms would be shot (June 20th, 1835, in *State Papers*, XXIV. 398). This barbarous Decree was carried into effect. Forty-seven Legionaries fell into the hands of the Carlists, and all were put to death. On its side the Legion captured 1100 prisoners, and spared their lives (Speech of Evans, March 13th, 1838, in *Hansard*, XLI. 842). Louis-Philippe refused to associate himself with the British protest against the Decree of Durango.

The Convention of Vergara, which so quickly put a stop to the apparently interminable hostilities, was hotly denounced as black treason by the Marquis of Londonderry in the House of Lords (February 25th, 1840), and other lords who spoke showed no love of it. But the Earl of Clarendon (who as Mr Villiers had negotiated it) in a cold and impartial speech clearly vindicated his actions, which, it was admitted, had been performed without the use of bribes, and to the advantage of the whole Spanish people. The motive behind his successful negotiation was "the immovable resolve of the people to terminate the War, and to settle their own affairs[1]."

So far, the affairs of Spain, in spite of the famous Quadruple Alliance of 1834, had only weakened the connexion between France and England. England had made some sacrifices in order to preserve the entente. For instance, in 1835, Palmerston had refused, in deference to French protest, to complete a Treaty which Villiers had negotiated with the Spanish Government for "most favoured nation" treatment to British trade in Spain. He had been anxious to associate France in the pacification of Spain; but, although there was a French Legion there, it was withdrawn in 1836 and sent to Algiers. This provoked Lord Melbourne to the "no mention" incident, when all reference to France was omitted from the King's Speech of January 31st, 1837. This omission was greatly resented in France. The Carlist War had thus really done nothing to keep France and Great Britain together. The next question—that of the Spanish Marriages—was to estrange them completely.

Although Queen Isabel was only ten years old, the question of her marriage had already, by the year 1840, been mooted in Government circles. It was not only the Spanish Government which took a keen interest in the matter; for, in March, 1842, Louis-Philippe sent Pageot to London, to ascertain the views of Great Britain. Lord Aberdeen said that the matter was regarded by Great Britain as one "entirely and exclusively Spanish[2]."

As the crisis in the East had been allayed, the political horizon appeared untroubled. Lord Melbourne's Cabinet (including, of course, Palmerston) had gone out of office in August, 1841, and had been succeeded by a Government of which Sir Robert Peel was Prime-Minister, and Lord Aberdeen Foreign Secretary. For

[1] *Hansard*, LII. 563.

[2] Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and Infanta of Spain (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1847, LXIX. 274).

Aberdeen Guizot, who was now French Minister for Foreign Affairs, had sincere admiration and respect, and the relations of France and England were accordingly conducted for a time with an almost complete lack of friction.

The interest of Great Britain and France in the Crown of Spain dates particularly from the Spanish Succession War of 1700–13. As the result of that struggle, King Philip V of Spain, a grandson of Lewis XIV of France, renounced for himself and for his heirs for ever, all rights of Succession to the Crown of France; while the Duke of Berry and the Duke of Orleans also renounced for themselves and their heirs all rights of Succession to the Crown of Spain[1]. Now, however, the Spanish Crown was worn by a Queen who was certain to marry. The French were naturally proud of the fact that the House of Bourbon had been reigning in Spain for nearly a hundred and fifty years; and they did not wish this Succession to be changed by the young Queen marrying into another House and establishing a new line on the Throne of Spain. They desired, accordingly, that Queen Isabel should marry some French prince; such a prince might be chosen from the House of Orleans, which was reigning in France; or from one of the branches of the House of Bourbon reigning in Naples or in Parma. In Great Britain, however, opinion was somewhat sensitive regarding a possible marriage of a French prince and the Queen of Spain, as this might, in spite of the bar imposed by the Treaty of Utrecht, lead to the union, at some future date, of the two kingdoms of France and Spain.

Probably, the affair would have been amicably settled, if Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen had remained in office throughout the whole episode. On September 2nd, 1843, there took place the now famous meeting at Eu—the first time an English Sovereign had set foot in France since the reign of Henry VIII. "Our reception," wrote Queen Victoria in a private letter to the King of the Belgians, "by the dear King and Queen has been most kind, and by the people really gratifying[2]." The visit was returned by Louis-Philippe in 1844; and once more, on September 8, 1845, Queen Victoria went to Château d'Eu. She was accompanied by Lord Aberdeen; and Louis-Philippe on his

[1] The renunciations were recognised by Lewis XIV in Letters Patent which were inserted in the Treaty of Utrecht of April 11th, 1713, between France and England.

[2] *The Letters of Queen Victoria.* The letter of September 4th, 1843, was written from Château d'Eu. Lord Aberdeen and Guizot were present with their respective Sovereigns. The Spanish Marriage Question was discussed, but no decision was made.

side, had Guizot. The Spanish Marriage Question was discussed between the two Ministers. It had been well known for some years that Queen Victoria and her husband favoured a scheme to marry Queen Isabel to a prince of the House of Coburg[1]. But in the Eu discussions the candidates were reduced to two cousins of Isabel, namely Francisco, Duke of Cadiz, and Enrico, Duke of Seville. Don Francisco was the elder and Don Enrico was the younger son of the Duke of Cadiz, brother of the late King Ferdinand VII. It was not only the marriage of Queen Isabel that had to be considered: she had a sister, the Infanta Louisa, for whose hand Louis-Philippe had destined one of his numerous sons, the Duc de Montpensier. But the British Government could not assent to this straight away; because, if Queen Isabel's marriage were to produce no children, the issue of the Duc de Montpensier and the Infanta Louisa would inherit the Spanish Crown. This would be contrary to the Treaty of Utrecht, which not merely forbade the union of France and Spain, but debarred the heirs of the Duke of Orleans from Succession to the Spanish Throne. Hence, the British and French Ministers at Eu agreed that the marriage of the Infanta and Montpensier should not take place, till Queen Isabel should have married and had children[2]. Of the two Spanish Princes proposed for the Queen's hand, the British Government preferred the Duke of Seville, who was a Liberal in politics; and both the King and Guizot stated that they had no objection to him. With respect to the Infanta, they both declared in the most positive and explicit manner that, *until the Queen was married and had children*, they should consider the Infanta in precisely the same light as her sister, and that any marriage with a French prince would be entirely out of the question[3].

[1] At this time and for about another year, the French Government appeared to prefer Count Trapani, brother of the King of Naples and of Queen Christina, who was Isabel's own mother. But the Spanish Court itself suggested the Prince of Coburg—at least Lord Cowley, Ambassador at Paris, thought so. Cowley to Palmerston, July 13th, 1846.

[2] Guizot was prepared for this condition. Indeed according to Henry Bulwer, he had himself suggested it, when Bulwer, travelling from Madrid to London "in the summer of 1845" met him in Paris. "He did not say that the two Princesses must marry two Bourbons, but that King Louis-Philippe and Queen Christina were desirous to settle this marriage for private personal reasons into which the Infanta's fortune entered: adding that it would not take place for some time, nor till the Queen had children." Bulwer's *Palmerston*, III. 215.

[3] Aberdeen to Peel from Château d'Eu, September 8th, 1845, in *Letters of Queen Victoria*, chap. xiv. In the same letter, Aberdeen also says: "I distinctly understood, that it was not only a marriage and a child, but children, that were necessary to secure the succession." Guizot's letter to Bresson, the Ambassador at Madrid proves this (September 19th, 1845, in Guizot's *Mémoires*, VIII. 225).

There is no doubt at all about this promise. On the other hand, Louis-Philippe at this Eu interview also asked Lord Aberdeen to state that the British Government would not support a Coburg candidate; and Lord Aberdeen did so: "as to the candidature of Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, you can be tranquil on this point: I answer that it will not be either avowed or supported by England[1]." Guizot, in his detailed defence in the *Mémoires*, does not actually state that this was a condition on which the French promise depended, and in his private letter to Lord Aberdeen, when the Spanish Marriages had been concluded, he takes his stand upon a reserve notified to Aberdeen, not at Eu in September, 1845, but at a later date, namely, on March 6th, 1846[2]. This was a Memorandum (dated February 27th) read (on March 6th) by M. de St Aulaire, French Ambassador at London, to Lord Aberdeen, stating, among other things, that the French Government would be free "from all engagement...if the marriage, either of the Queen or of the Infanta, with the Prince Leopold of Coburg or with any prince other than a descendant of Philip V, became probable or imminent[3]."

Lord Aberdeen appears to have listened to this statement with his habitual patience and courtesy, but without admitting that it was a correct interpretation of the Eu terms, which were meant to govern the attitude of the British Government and Louis-Philippe on the Spanish Marriage Question. It will probably be admitted on all sides that Guizot's Memorandum of February 27th went rather further in stating a condition than did Louis-Philippe's words at Eu. In his *Mémoires*, Guizot says that the British Government was "*bien instruit*" about this new condition; but he nowhere even pretends that they assented to it.

Unfortunately for the Anglo-French entente, Lord Aberdeen did not continue to be Foreign Secretary. On June 9th, 1846, Sir Robert Peel carried through Parliament his Bill for the repeal of the Corn Laws, and thus, in Disraeli's famous phrase, "he broke up the party." Consequently, his Government fell, on June 27th, and Lord John Russell formed a new Cabinet, with Palmerston as Foreign Secretary. Louis-Philippe and Guizot, and the French in general, did not much

[1] This conversation is given in a letter of Louis-Philippe to the Queen of the Belgians, written on September 14, 1846, in order to exculpate his conduct: it is printed in the *Revue Rétrospective ou Archives secrètes*, p. 18.

[2] "*Évidemment j'ai pu tout craindre. J'ai dû agir efficacement pour échapper au danger prévu dans le Memorandum du 27 février, et en usant la liberté qui nous y était réservée.*" This letter has been printed by M. Denys Cochin from the Archives of the Marquis de Lasteyrie at La Grange (*Louis-Philippe d'après des documents inédites*, par D. Cochin, Paris, 1918, p. 242).

[3] Guizot, *Mémoires*, VIII. 254.

like, or greatly trust, Lord Palmerston, especially since he had so successfully outmanœuvred them in the Eastern crisis of 1840.

When Palmerston came into office in July, 1846, the British Ambassador at Madrid was Sir Henry Bulwer (afterwards Lord Dalling). The French Ambassador was the Comte de Bresson, a very experienced and even brilliant diplomatist. While Lord Aberdeen was still Foreign Secretary, Bulwer had let his zeal outrun his discretion, in not dissuading the Regent Christina from sending to Coburg and offering her daughter's hand for the young Prince Leopold of Coburg-Cohary. For this Lord Aberdeen had sharply reprimanded Bulwer, and to show his good faith, had informed Guizot[1]. So the French Government felt that Bulwer was a man dangerous to their interests, and one who might any moment steal a march on them. This feeling made Bresson all the more eager to get the better of his diplomatic vis-à-vis. The close attention with which de Bresson followed the development of the Spanish Marriage Question is proved by the remarkably early intelligence that the Queen was now marriageable, sent by him to the Paris Ministry on April 3rd, 1846—"*la reine est nubile depuis deux heures*[2]." The pressure upon Queen Christina to decide about her daughter the Queen's marriage became more insistent. Bresson had close relations with the Spanish Government, and Queen Christina herself talked very frankly indeed about the Marriage Question. She was quite ready to consider the Duke of Cadiz as a husband for her daughter, if not ineligible for an all-important personal reason[3]. The French Ambassador rebutted this rumour by various arguments. De Bresson also told Queen Christina at the same interview,

> that the King [Louis-Philippe], taking into account the difficulties of the Queen, and desirous of furnishing fresh testimony of his solicitude and his friendship, was disposed to consent that in any Bourbon combination, the Duc de Montpensier should take a place by the side of the husband of the Queen—that is to say, that the two marriages, if the one could facilitate the other, should be celebrated, or at least declared, simultaneously[4].

"You are freed," added de Bresson in his report to Guizot, "a thousand times, by the proceedings of the English agents"—meaning that the

[1] "When Queen Christina informed me that she had determined on addressing herself to the head of the Coburg family...I did not think myself called on to express an opinion on the course she had adopted....Lord Aberdeen then at once informed the French Government of Queen Christina's proposal, and reprimanded me severely for not having made it known to Count Bresson." Bulwer's *Palmerston*, III. 223, 226.

[2] F.O. France, April 8th, 1846. Cowley to Aberdeen. How did Cowley obtain a copy of the telegram?

[3] Bresson to Guizot, July 12th, 1846, in *Revue Rétrospective ou Archives secrètes du dernier gouvernement* (Paris, 1848), p. 181.

[4] *Ibid.*

Eu Convention need not be now considered to stand in the way of the double simultaneous marriage.

Nevertheless, this declaration by Comte de Bresson was absolutely contrary to the Eu Convention, and Louis-Philippe knew it to be so. On receiving de Bresson's report, he at once wrote to Guizot:

> My astonishment is all the greater, that Bresson should thus compromise himself over *the simultaneity of the two marriages*, which he knew to be diametrically contrary to my will.... It results from all this, that a formal disavowal is indispensable. How to make it, is the only question to examine; but I have never deceived anyone, and I will not begin today to allow anyone who acts under my name, to deceive[1].

On July 24th, Louis-Philippe wrote again to Guizot insisting that a verbal disavowal by de Bresson was not enough, but that *the disavowal must be sent to Queen Christina in writing*. Evidently, the King was sincere in his determination scrupulously to adhere to the Eu Convention. Guizot, however, did not at once send the order to de Bresson; for on that same day—July 24th—he was able to write back to the King informing him of the terms of Palmerston's now famous despatch of July 19th which was sent to Bulwer at Madrid, to guide him in his conduct towards the Spanish Government. This despatch Palmerston, also, communicated to Jarnac, Chargé d'affaires at London, for the information of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It contained two messages: the one respecting the Marriage Question, the other dwelling on the political condition of Spain. As to the Marriage Question, Palmerston reduced the candidates to three, in the following order—"Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg and the two sons of Francisco de Paula." As regards the political condition of Spain, he wrote (among other things) "it is greatly to be hoped that the present Ministers in Spain, or those who may succeed them, will lose no time in returning to the ways of the constitution and to obedience to the law[2]." By the earlier remark he frightened Louis-Philippe into believing that French interests were going to be set aside, and that Great Britain was arranging a Coburg Marriage with the Queen of Spain; by the later, he offended the Spanish Government.

When Louis-Philippe heard that the Coburg candidature was mentioned and put first in Palmerston's despatch, he at once changed his mind about the disavowal. "My actual impression," he wrote on

[1] *Revue Rétrospective*, p. 182, July 20th, 1846.

[2] *Parliamentary Papers* (1847), LXIX. 280–1. Palmerston's reasons for communicating the despatch to Jarnac are exceedingly difficult to divine. He must have thought that de Bresson at Madrid would in any case manage to get a copy of it—unofficially, if not officially. As to this dispatch (of July 19th, 1846) and the subsequent correspondence with Bulwer, see Appendix C.

July 25th to Guizot, "is that it is necessary to give back blow for blow, and to take him immediately *corps à corps*, in demasking the slip he has made to destroy our *entente cordiale*[1]." In conclusion, however, the King still advised Guizot "*de ne pas accoler... Cadix et Montpensier*," as "this accolade savours too much of simultaneity." Guizot replied that the King was right not to *engage himself* in simultaneity, but at the same time to reflect that this parade of "Cadix et Montpensier" was the only way to rebut the English support of Coburg. Thus no official denial of "simultaneity" went to Madrid.

Palmerston, in his conversations with Jarnac made no secret of the fact that Great Britain would prefer Don Enrico to the Duke of Cadiz as husband of the Queen of Spain; also, he plainly told Bulwer that "if the marriage of the Prince of Coburg to the Queen could be effected with the full consent and concurrence of the Spaniards, and would not bring them into a bad understanding with France, we, the English Government, should see it with pleasure[2]." Much the same intimation was given to Jarnac. Louis-Philippe and Guizot, therefore, fearing that the Spanish Throne would pass from the House of Bourbon altogether, allowed de Bresson to press on the "Cadix et Montpensier" marriages. On August 22nd, Bulwer reported from Madrid that the French Government had been able to make use of its knowledge of Palmerston's despatch of July 19th to represent it as a declaration of hostility against the Spanish Government[3]; and, finally, his despatch of August 29th was able to announce that the Duke of Cadiz was to marry the Queen, and that de Bresson had formally asked for the hand of the Infanta for Montpensier, stating that he had full powers to enter upon and to conclude the affair; the two marriages were to be simultaneous[4].

After this, events moved quickly, and on September 4th the *Journal des Débats* announced that the marriages of the Queen of Spain and the Infanta would take place at the end of October[5]. To Lord Normanby at Paris Guizot had asserted that, though at Eu in 1845 he had agreed that Montpensier should not marry the Infanta till the Queen was married and had children, yet he was free from

[1] *Revue Rétrospective*, p. 185.
[2] *Parliamentary Papers* (1847), LXIX. 283 (August 3rd, 1846).
[3] *Ibid.* p. 286.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 288. The despatch was not received in London till September 7th. When Lord Normanby on September 1st asked Guizot if the two marriages were to take place at the same time, Guizot replied: "Not at the same time; not to take place at the same time" (Normanby to Palmerston, September 1st, 1846; *ibid.* p. 289). He afterwards explained this to Normanby to mean that though the marriages might be on the same day, the Queen would be married first.
[5] The marriages were celebrated at Madrid on October 10th.

that engagement through the Declaration subsequently made to Lord Aberdeen—viz. that if any danger of a Coburg marriage arose, the French Government would consider itself absolved from the engagement[1]. But, as Lord Aberdeen never assented to that reservation, it comes to nothing. The most that can be said to justify Guizot is that he had asserted, at Eu, that the Queen must marry a Bourbon; that the British Government had not opposed this view, and that Palmerston's injudicious mention of the Prince of Coburg in the despatch of July 19th (combined with his obvious favouring of the Coburg candidature) made the French Minister for Foreign Affairs think that the British Foreign Secretary was stealing a march on him. So he resolved to take a leading part in the race, and be well ahead. The most questionable part of Guizot's action is where he arranged for the marriages to be simultaneous; for, if the Queen's marriage should prove sterile, then Louis-Philippe's son would be already married to the Infanta, and his line would inherit the Spanish Throne. This is why Palmerston in his despatch of September 22nd to Normanby calls the double marriage "a most objectionable political arrangement[2]." His concluding words were wise:

> The British Government will rejoice to see France happy, prosperous, and powerful. But France possesses within her own ample territory and in her own immense resources, the means of maintaining that high position which Providence has destined her to occupy among the nations of the world; and all attempts on her part to establish by indirect methods an illegitimate influence over other States, which, though not so powerful as herself, are equally entitled to perfect national independence, must from the very nature of things end at last in disappointment and failure.

Though a failure for France, the marriages were not such for Spain. The Queen and her husband had issue, and their line reigns in Madrid today, and the Duc de Montpensier's heirs are not nearer to the throne. Guizot's success cost France her best friend: so that the Entente no longer existed; and the only result of this was to encourage Russia and Austria to act as, perhaps, they would not have acted, had Great Britain and France been united in a common policy. Thus the Republic of Cracow was annexed, and the Treaty of Vienna broken, on November 6th, 1846. Louis-Philippe's prestige at home, also, suffered, and, when the Revolution in Paris broke out in February, 1848, he had no friends. Yet both he and Guizot were glad to find a refuge as exiles in the country which in the days of their power they had resolved to distrust.

[1] *Parliamentary Papers* (1847), LXIX. 289. Normanby to Palmerston, September 1st, 1846.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 297.

CHAPTER V

INDIA AND THE FAR EAST, 1833–1849

I. INDIAN AFFAIRS AND ANGLO-INDIAN RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA, PERSIA AND AFGHANISTAN, 1835–1849

THE rivalry between Great Britain and Russia during the second quarter of the nineteenth century was inevitably extended from the Near to the Far East. Russia was currently believed to be planning an attack on British India. The charge was officially repudiated by the Russian Government. But the conduct of Russian agents in Central Asia was not in accordance with the declarations made at Petrograd. As a result, "Russophobia" became a leading element in British public opinion. Experts in the Far Eastern problem raised the cry of "India in danger." In 1836 a dissertation on the Russian designs, entitled "Progress and present position of Russia in the East," attracted the favourable notice of the Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston. It was written by Dr John McNeill, who, originally a medical officer of the British Mission to Persia, had, on account of his political insight, been entrusted with diplomatic duties in that country. That eccentric genius, David Urquhart, in a succession of pamphlets, popular addresses, and, above all, through the medium of his organ, *The Portfolio*, systematically denounced Russia as the incarnation of Satanism in politics; and, in the frenzy of his anti-Muscovite zeal, ended by accusing Palmerston himself of being a secret accomplice of the Tsar[1].

There was some excuse for the alarm felt in England about Russian machinations. The North-Western Boundary of the British dominions in India had not, by the year 1835, reached the barrier of mountains which, starting as a southern offshoot of the Himalayas, runs west of the river Indus to the sea-coast. The boundary was confined, in the upper part, by the line of the river Sutlej; in the lower part, by the desert which fringes the western border of Rajputana. Between the British sphere of influence and the mountain chain lay two independent areas: the Punjab, under Ranjit Singh, and the territory of Sind, in the possession of the Talpur Amirs. The Maharajah of Lahore, though long since allied with the British, was quite capable of sacrificing

[1] See Bibliography.

loyalty to self-interest; the Amirs of Sind, at once turbulent and disunited, might at any moment become the victims of an ambitious intruder. The British defence to the north-west was thus by no means secure. The borderland offered scope for foreign intrigue; the boundary-line presented no natural obstacles to military penetration.

Afghanistan, which lay immediately across the north-western mountains, was the critical point of Central Asian politics. At that date the country now known as Afghanistan did not form a united State. Dost Mohammad, a member of the Barakzai clan of the Daurani Afghans, had in 1835 assumed the title of Amir-ul-Muminin, Commander of the Faithful. But his supremacy extended only over Kabul, Ghazni and Jalalabad, *i.e.* over the north-eastern part of modern Afghanistan. Kandahar, with its dependencies, *i.e.* the south, was in the possession of three brothers of Dost Mohammad, usually styled the Kandahar Princes, of whom Kohandil Khan was the most prominent. Kandahar acted in complete independence of Kabul. In the extreme west, the vital position of Herat was held by Kamran *Mirza*, of the Saduzai clan of the Dauranis, the historic enemies of the Barakzais. To Dost Mohammad's throne, the most important of all, there was a Pretender, Shah Shujá, then resident in British India. A grandson of the famous Ahmad Shah Daurani, and, for a time, the reigning sovereign of Kabul, Shah Shujá had been driven thence as far back as 1809. After many vicissitudes, he had appealed to the charity of the Government of India, which had given him a pension and also a refuge at the British outpost of Ludiana, to the east of the Sutlej. In the winter of 1833–4, Shah Shujá, with the approval of the British, had made an expedition into Afghanistan, in hope of regaining his lost authority. The adventure had ended in his defeat at the hands of Dost Mohammad. The Saduzai Pretender had returned to Ludiana, to await the next opportunity offered by fortune. But the Sikh Maharajah had taken the opportunity of the conflict between the Afghan rivals to seize upon the Afghan frontier fortress of Peshawur, which he successfully held against Dost Mohammad's attempts to take from him. Dost Mohammad thus had valid grounds for distrust with regard to the British in India; their patronage of a Pretender to his Throne, and their alliance with a hostile neighbour.

There were two routes by which Russia might strike at British India. The first, the direct route, ran southward from the Russian headquarters at Orenburg on the upper waters of the Ural river. On the map, it was easy to trace a passage between the Caspian and Aral

seas to the valley of the Oxus, occupied by the Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara. Of these, Bokhara was coterminous with Afghanistan. In reality, this route, a wilderness of sand deserts and rocky plateaux, was then impracticable for the ordered march of an army. Nevertheless, the Government of India was in constant fear of a Russian advance from this direction, and it carefully watched the attitude of the Khanates on the Oxus.

The second, the indirect route which Russia could follow, was by way of Persia. That country was a sovereign State. But a long course of successful aggression on the part of Russia, together with a long course of diplomatic ineptitude on the part of Great Britain, had given to the former the predominance in Persian counsels. By inciting Persia to push eastwards into Afghanistan, Russia was, at the same time, extending her grasp over a vantage ground from which to make an attack on British India. Fath Ali Shah of Persia had died in 1834. His grandson, the heir designate, Mohammad *Mirza*, had been placed on the throne by the combined efforts of the British and Russian Envoys at Teheran. But Russia remained in the ascendant. Fath Ali, in spite of the disappointing results of the British Alliance, had always shown a preference for Great Britain. Shah Mohammad was an enthusiastic partisan of Russia. He was eager for martial glory. In spite of British warnings, he lent a ready ear to his Russian patron, who urged him to undertake the conquest of Herat, to be followed by a triumphant march through Afghanistan, and, if possible, beyond it.

The Whig Ministry of Lord Melbourne came into office after the fall of Sir Robert Peel in April, 1835. Lord Palmerston was Foreign Secretary, and Sir John Cam Hobhouse (afterwards Lord Broughton), presided over the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, popularly known as the "Board of Control." Palmerston was at that time an ardent Russophobe; and he exhibited special solicitude for the defence of India. The Peel Ministry, just before its fall, had obtained the appointment as Indian Governor-General of Lord Heytesbury. He had been sworn in as Governor-General, but had not started for India by the date of Lord Melbourne's advent to power. Heytesbury had been Ambassador at Petrograd and he was an avowed admirer of the Tsar Nicholas. To Palmerston such a record was matter for suspicion. In spite, therefore, of the protests of the Court of Directors, the new Ministry cancelled Lord Heytesbury's appointment and insisted on the selection of Lord Auckland, a sound Whig henchman, in his place.

Palmerston's anti-Russian zeal was further shown in his settlement of the British Mission to Persia. In 1836, he nominated Dr McNeill to the dignity of Minister Plenipotentiary at Teheran, in succession to Henry Ellis, who now relinquished his post. The Instructions given by Palmerston to McNeill specially directed him to prevent Russia from establishing anything in the nature of a protectorate over Persia, and also to thwart the ambitious schemes which the Persian Government, at Russia's instigation, was hoping to carry out in Afghanistan[1]. With trustworthy agents at both Calcutta and Teheran, the British Foreign Secretary was able to enter upon the Central-Asian duel with Russia in a spirit of confidence and ardour.

Lord William Bentinck, Auckland's predecessor as Governor-General, had paid earnest attention to the North-West Frontier problem, and he had carefully examined the possibilities of a Russo-Persian attack in that quarter. He had cherished the alliance between the Government of India and the Sikh Power of the Punjab, had taken care to protect British interests in the Sind valley, and had extended his sympathy to the attempt on Afghanistan made by Shah Shujá in 1833–4. Had Shah Shujá been successful, the British would have been able to comfort themselves by the thought that Afghanistan was both friendly and dependent. The failure of the scheme had brought serious dangers in its train. Dost Mohammad's prestige was enhanced and his position consolidated. Full of resentment against the British, he had sent a protest to Bentinck, complaining of the conduct of their ally, Ranjit Singh, in seizing on Peshawur. When this was disregarded, he made overtures to the Court of Persia to invite its cooperation in securing redress. Not content with this, Dost Mohammad took the serious step of despatching an agent to Petrograd. In return, the Russian Government appointed a Special Envoy, Captain Witkiewicz, who received orders to make his way to Kabul[2].

Lord Auckland left England in November, 1835, and entered on his duties as Governor-General at Calcutta in March, 1836. He was the son of an eminent diplomatist, and he had had experience of high political office. Conscientious and well-meaning, reserved in

[1] *Memoir of Sir John McNeill*, by F. M., p. 190.

[2] Correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan, no. 27, p. 14, Ellis to Palmerston, August 22nd, 1836, for Dost Mohammad's overtures to Persia; no. 110, p. 181, from Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, $\frac{\text{October 20th}}{\text{November 1st}}$, 1838, for the Russian Mission to Kabul.

manner but, as is amply shown by his sister's journal[1], of amiable disposition, inclined to be distrustful of his own judgment, Lord Auckland was eminently fitted to be the agent in India of the Whig Government, and, in particular, of its ruling personality, Lord Palmerston. In the spring of 1836, Dost Mohammad wrote to congratulate Lord Auckland on his accession to the Governor-Generalship. Auckland replied in courteous, but somewhat frigid, terms. He took advantage of the opportunity to say that, at a later date, he might "depute some gentleman" to the Amir's Court to discuss commercial questions[2]. For the time being, Lord Auckland's attention was occupied by the need of restraining Ranjit Singh's designs towards the acquisition of a footing in Sind. It was the British policy to keep the Sikhs out of the lower Indus valley. Auckland persuaded the Maharajah to abate his pretensions. The accord between the British and the Sikhs remained unruffled; but the Government of India was now more than ever obliged to avoid any friction with the great Punjab Power.

The definite impulse towards a forward North-West policy on Lord Auckland's part was given by the home authorities. A despatch from London, dated June 25th, 1836, written in terms of the utmost gravity, warned the Governor-General of the dangerous character of Russian action in Persia. It mentioned that Dost Mohammad, from Kabul, and his brother, Kohandil Khan, from Kandahar, were in active correspondence with the Persian Court. It referred to a rumour that the Khan of Khiva had entered into an engagement with Russia, and, therefore, urged the Government of India "to raise a timely barrier against the encroachments of Russian influence." The despatch, rather curiously, suggested that an agent might be sent to Kabul, the capital of Dost Mohammad, to watch the progress of events—the very course which Auckland already had in his mind[3]. In September, 1836, Auckland issued Instructions to Captain Alexander Burnes to pay a visit to Kabul, nominally on a commercial mission. He was ordered to proceed thither by way of Sind and Peshawur. The journey by this route took a long time, and he did not reach Kabul till September 20th, 1837. By that date, the Russian agent, Captain Witkiewicz, had appeared in the neighbourhood. He

[1] The Hon. Emily Eden, *Up the Country. Letters written to her sister from the Upper Provinces of India.*

[2] Correspondence relating to Afghanistan, *Indian Papers*, 1839, Schedule v, nos. 1 and 2.

[3] Quoted by Sir Auckland Colvin, *Life of John Russell Colvin*, pp. 86–8.

brought with him two congratulatory letters: one from Count Simonich, the Russian Envoy at Teheran, the other unsigned, but purporting to be from the Tsar Nicholas[1].

Persia was the real centre of gravity of the Anglo-Russian dispute, and it was as a counterstroke to Russian action in Persia that Auckland had sent Burnes to Kabul. A digression, is, therefore, necessary on Persian affairs. The antagonists in this quarter were the British Envoy, John McNeill, well known, as mentioned above, for his anti-Russian publications, and Count Simonich, the Tsar's Representative, a past master in all the arts traditionally ascribed to the Muscovite intriguer.

In spite of the strongest protests from Lord Palmerston, addressed to the Government at Petrograd, and in spite of all Russian official statements to the contrary, Count Simonich at Teheran continued to encourage the Persian Sovereign in his ambitious designs on Herat. On July 23rd, 1837, Shah Mohammad left Teheran at the head of his army for the siege of that city. McNeill's objections were treated with contempt. In October, a courier attached to the British mission, carrying letters from Herat to McNeill at Teheran, was assaulted by Persian soldiers, robbed of his property and papers, and placed under arrest. A demand of redress for this breach of diplomatic privilege was refused. By November 27th, the Shah, after a successful preliminary advance, reached Herat and opened siege operations. The crisis was serious. If Herat fell to the Persian army it would become the seat of a Russian Consul, and a centre of Russian influence. Strategically, Herat was at that time of unquestionable value. Standing in a fertile oasis, rich in the materials for military supply, it was the starting point of routes to Kabul on the one hand and to Kandahar on the other, from both of which there run natural lines of invasion into India. Palmerston's efforts at Petrograd had produced many promises, but no performance. In a letter to McNeill, dated June 10th, 1837, he had written: "We drove Russia to the wall about Count Simonich; the Emperor had no choice but to recall him and to acknowledge that Nesselrode had been telling a series of untruths." But a year passed by, and Simonich continued not only to remain in Persia, but to direct the operations of the Persian army against Herat[2]. In March, 1838, McNeill wrote to Auckland, demanding the despatch of a British expeditionary force to the Persian Gulf, as the sole means

[1] Sir J. W. Kaye, *History of the War in Afghanistan*, I. 197–8.

[2] McNeill, p. 210. The date of the letter is misprinted as 1827. See also pp. 238–46 for McNeill's subsequent interview with Nesselrode in February, 1839, when he taxed the Russian Chancellor for his duplicity in this matter.

of compelling the Shah to listen to the British representations[1]. Not content with this, McNeill, in April, proceeded to the Persian camp outside Herat, entered the fortress under a safe-conduct, and succeeded in arranging the draft of a treaty between Kamran *Mirza*, the Saduzai holder of Herat, and Shah Mohammad. But Simonich persuaded the Shah to refuse his ratification, and the siege continued. News soon afterwards reached McNeill to the effect that Burnes had failed in his mission to Dost Mohammad at Kabul. British influence appeared to be everywhere on the decline. On June 7th, therefore, McNeill took the serious step of declaring his relations with the Government of Persia suspended. He left the Persian camp before Herat and set out for Tabriz, which was within easy access of the Turkish frontier. Writing to Palmerston on August 3rd, McNeill painted the situation in the most gloomy colours. The united influence of Persia and Russia was on the eve of complete predominance in Afghanistan. No means, therefore, must be neglected to guarantee the defence of British India[2].

Burnes's mission to Kabul had been foredoomed to failure from the very beginning. He had been the first of the rival Envoys to obtain admission to the Amir's capital. He had established the most cordial relations with the Amir. But there his success had stopped. Between him and Lord Auckland there was a hopeless incompatibility of purpose. To Auckland, the British alliance with Ranjit Singh, whose extensive dominions and superb army lay at the most vulnerable point of our Indian frontier, was, diplomatically speaking, the ark of the covenant. As Auckland had summed up the whole matter in a previous letter to McNeill: "In the consideration of all these questions you will bear in mind that the Sikhs are always our first friends and steadfast allies[3]." Burnes pressed on the Government of India the need of persuading Ranjit Singh to give up Peshawur, while Auckland knew that this was impossible, and that any attempt to use pressure would endanger the Anglo-Sikh alliance. Burnes wanted the British to strengthen Dost Mohammad's local authority, while Ranjit Singh's interests were best served by Dost Mohammad's weakness. Thus Auckland had to follow suit. On January 20th, 1838, he wrote to Kabul, stating categorically that Dost Mohammad must give up all hope of obtaining Peshawur; that, in keeping the peace between

[1] McNeill, p. 205.
[2] Correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan, no. 94, p. 139.
[3] McNeill, p. 201.

Lahore and Kabul, the Government of India was really rendering him a service of the highest value; and that, as a consequence, Dost Mohammad must conclude no alliances with foreign Powers on pain of British displeasure[1]. On April 27th Auckland wrote, instructing Burnes to leave Kabul. Burnes had already done so on April 26th. A final letter was sent after him by Dost Mohammad, who complained bitterly of the unsatisfactory and unreasonable treatment which he had received from the Government of India[2].

The Tsar's Envoy, Captain Witkiewicz, was left in possession of the field. Not unnaturally, he made an exulting use of his success. In his conversations with the Amir he dilated on the superiority of Russian to British friendship. With Russia on his side, Dost Mohammad need have no fear of Persian encroachments. Not content with this, Witkiewicz had the presumption to write to Lahore, asking permission to pay a visit to the Sikh Maharajah. Auckland had no difficulty in persuading Ranjit Singh to decline this proposal[3]. But the incident was symptomatic of Russian arrogance. The siege of Herat was in full progress. Russia had triumphed at Kabul. Now, if ever, decisive action was needed.

Lord Auckland's mind was made up. On May 12th, 1838, he drew up a Minute to the effect that the only solution of the present problem lay in a restoration of Shah Shujá, the Saduzai claimant, to the throne of Kabul. On May 22nd, he wrote home explaining and justifying the project. He maintained that Dost Mohammad, inspired by a sense of the increase of Russian and Persian power, had addressed unwarrantable pretensions to the Government of India; that he had deliberately rejected its offers of friendship; and that, in consequence, the English Envoy had to be recalled from Kabul[4]. To such conduct there could be no answer save a declaration of hostility. It is a curious fact, as showing the identity of view between the Government of India and the Cabinet in London that, on October 24th, just before they received Auckland's letter of May 22nd, the home authorities wrote to India advocating an attempt to restore Shah Shujá. On November 9th, *i.e.* after the letter of May 22nd had come to hand, they wrote again to say that they had already re-

[1] Correspondence relating to Afghanistan, *Indian Papers*, 1839, Schedule v, no. 18, p. 25.

[2] For a discussion of the revision of Burnes's despatches from Kabul by the Government, see Gertrude Robinson's *Life of David Urquhart*, pp. 142–6.

[3] Sir J. W. Kaye, *History of the War in Afghanistan*, I. 208–10.

[4] Correspondence relating to Afghanistan, *Indian Papers*, 1839, Schedule IV, nos. 1, 2, 3 (enclosing minute of May 12th).

commended in anticipation the course which Auckland had decided to adopt[1].

In the meantime, Lord Auckland had hurried through the arrangements for the projected restoration of Shah Shujá. On June 26th, 1838, the draft of a tripartite Treaty between the Government of India, Ranjit Singh, and Shah Shujá was accepted by the Maharajah of Lahore. It was signed by Shah Shujá at Ludiana on July 16th, and by the Governor-General at Simla on July 23rd. On October 1st, Auckland issued a public manifesto in denunciation of Dost Mohammad. The original plan had contemplated merely the provision of funds, munitions and expert guidance for Shah Shujá's enterprise. But it was now seen that this would not be sufficient. A well organised British army was therefore to advance into Afghanistan, in order to ensure the success of the Saduzai Pretender.

Hardly had the manifesto of October 1st appeared, when news arrived from Persia which put the Government of India in a dilemma. In the spring of 1838, Lord Auckland, in answer to McNeill's petitions, had sent out a small expeditionary force to the Persian Gulf. It had occupied the island of Kharak, thirty miles north-west of Bushire. At the same time, McNeill received despatches from Palmerston authorising him to inform the Shah that the Persian attack on Herat was regarded by Great Britain as a hostile act. McNeill sent Colonel Stoddart, with a message to this effect, to the Persian camp before Herat. The Shah grew alarmed. The numbers of the British expeditionary force were magnified by rumour. The ominous tone assumed by McNeill made a deep impression. The great Persian assault on Herat, that of June 24th, 1838, had ended in complete failure. The Herat enterprise was evidently much more hazardous than had been anticipated. After some expostulation, therefore, the Shah consented to accept the British demands. The Persian military efforts slackened. On September 9th the siege of Herat was declared to be raised, and the Persian army set out on its return westwards. Finally, Count Simonich, the Russian Envoy, whose action had been the subject of so many British protests, was at last superseded by Colonel Duhamel[2].

[1] H. G. Keene, *History of India*, II. Appendix I, pp. 361–3, abstract of the original despatches dealing with this stage of the Afghan question.

[2] McNeill, p. 210. Palmerston was still doubtful of Russia's good faith. Letter of July 2nd, 1837: "Duhamel, who is to succeed Simonich, is perhaps a more formidable man, because he is not quite so much of an intriguer. Simonich overshot his mark; Duhamel will take a better aim."

Expectation of the speedy fall of Herat had been the main excuse for Auckland's determination to restore Shah Shujá to Kabul. With the Persian retirement from Herat, the wave of Russo-Persian aggrandisement was stayed. Did, or did not this circumstance logically entail an abandonment of the project for Shah Shujá's restoration? Lord Auckland decided that it did not. On November 1st, he published a General Order stating that, in spite of the rescue of Herat, the intended expedition would nevertheless take place, in order to establish "a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression upon our North-West Frontier." Lord Auckland's action has been much debated. But he had no option in the matter. He had gone too far to recede. It may also be argued that the isolation in which Dost Mohammad was now left by the Russo-Persian withdrawal was, on military grounds, a special reason for pressing on against him. By the end of 1838 the movement of the British army towards Afghanistan was in full progress. On August 7th, 1839, Shah Shujá was escorted in triumph through the streets of Kabul. The Barakzai resistance collapsed, and, in November, 1840, Dost Mohammad surrendered and was brought as a State prisoner into India.

The British success was naturally resented in Russia, and the Tsar attempted what might be regarded as a counterstroke. In November, 1839, a Russian army under General Perovski, the Governor of Orenburg, started from that city on a punitive expedition against the Khan of Khiva. The Khan had been long addicted to the seizure and enslavement of Russian subjects and to the plunder of Russian caravans. He had disdained all demands for redress. But General Perovski now announced that one of the aims of the Russian expedition was "to confirm in this part of Asia the influence which rightly belongs to Russia, and which alone can serve as a guarantee for the maintenance of peace." In the course of several conversations with Baron Brunnow, then on a Special Mission to London from the Court of Petrograd, Lord Palmerston fixed upon this phrase as indicative of sinister designs. He declared that Russia, foiled in her designs on Persia, was now seeking to secure the alternative route to India by the Central Asian Khanates. When Brunnow called his attention to the recent British action in Afghanistan, Palmerston maintained that the cases were not parallel. Afghanistan was the immediate neighbour of India, and the British had merely given assistance to the rightful Afghan Sovereign, Shah Shujá. Khiva, on the other hand, was separated from Russia by an immense distance,

and there was no dynastic Pretender for her to support. If Russia became predominant on the lower Oxus, the British, in self-defence, must occupy the upper valley of that river. The Russian enterprise would thus entail the despatch of British troops across the Hindu Kush into the territory of Balkh. Brunnow expressed grave concern, and remarked that the British attitude meant war. Sir John Hobhouse, who, as President of the Board of Control, was associated with Palmerston in this matter, retorted defiantly, that he thought this very likely but that he had no fear of the result[1]. However, owing to the difficulties of the route, Perovski's troops had to come to a halt at the edge of the plateau of Ust-Urt, some 250 miles from their objective. The crisis passed off, and the British authorities in India subsequently persuaded the Khan of Khiva to make amends to Russia. In return, Russia, for the time being at any rate, agreed to refrain from further military projects in this direction.

In the meantime, the British enterprise in Afghanistan was running its dramatic course. This is not the place to narrate the story: the attempt to consolidate the early successes, the Barakzai reaction, the fall of Shah Shujá, the British military retrieval, and the eventual restoration of Dost Mohammad to the throne of Kabul[2]. One matter, of direct diplomatic interest, however, needs a reference. The first news of the British reverses in Afghanistan emboldened the Persian Shah to renew his ambitious plans with regard to Herat. But the British Envoy, John McNeill, imposed an emphatic negative. He threatened a resort to force if his representations were disregarded. On this occasion he found genuine support in the Russian Envoy, Count Medem, who had recently succeeded Duhamel[3]. The Shah, therefore, yielded. In May, 1842, the Persian Government composed all its difficulties with Great Britain and put on record the statement that nothing but benefit could result to Persia from British friendship, and nothing but evil from its loss[4].

In September, 1841, Lord Melbourne's Ministry gave place to that of Sir Robert Peel. Lord Aberdeen succeeded Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office, and Lord Ellenborough at first took the place of Hobhouse at the Board of Control. But Ellenborough was anxious to go out to India. In October, 1841, he obtained the appointment

[1] P.R.O.; F.O. 65, Russia, 258. Papers numbered 13, 14, and 50, where a lengthy report is given of these diplomatic conversations.
[2] See *The Cambridge Modern History*, XI. xxvi 732–6.
[3] P.R.O.; F.O. 60, Persia, 85. Papers numbered 14, 16, and 18.
[4] McNeill, pp. 263 *et seq.*

of Governor-General, and in February, 1842, he arrived at Calcutta and assumed office in Lord Auckland's place. Meanwhile, the Presidency of the Board of Control was handed over to Lord Fitzgerald (better known as Vesey-Fitzgerald), who on his death in May, 1843, was succeeded by the first Earl of Ripon.

The connexion between India and the Foreign Policy of Great Britain during the years 1842–9 is marked by two principles: by a resolve, on the part of the Government of India, to secure, as opportunity offered, the strategical extension of the North-West Frontier; and, secondly, on the part of the home authorities, by a bias in favour of moderation, which did not, however, lead them to cancel the advances made by their servants in India, even when the morality or wisdom of the acts in question might be regarded as open to doubt[1].

Lord Ellenborough was sent out to India in the character of a peacemaker. But his patrons, the Tory Government, were grievously disappointed. Ellenborough was a Russophobe, and he had a contempt—shared by many other persons—for the pacific policy of the Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen. The situation in India was full of difficulties. The Afghan War had to be ended. The future relations between British India and Afghanistan had to be defined. Still more serious was the problem of the Punjab. Ranjit Singh, the omnipotent Maharajah of Lahore, had died on June 27th, 1839. With his disappearance from the scene, Indian North-West politics entered on a transformation. The Punjab lapsed into disorder. The Sikh Army assumed a power like that of the Praetorians in ancient Rome. The Sikh Government at Lahore, rent by faction and interrupted by recurring assassinations, struggled to maintain itself amidst the rivalries of warring chiefs and the threats of truculent legionaries. In September, 1843, the infant Dhulip Singh, a reputed son of Ranjit Singh, was installed as Maharajah under a regency. But everything in the nature of a definite policy had disappeared. The old system, under which British security to the North-West was based on an accord between the British and Sikhs, had vanished for ever. To careful observers, it appeared probable that the Punjab, far from remaining the sure and steady friend of the Government of India, was likely at no very distant date to rush into war against it.

Ellenborough entered on his task in a spirit which exhibited an amazing combination of ruthlessness, sagacity, and megalomania. He finished off the Afghan War successfully. At the end of 1842, he

[1] Cf. *The Cambridge Modern History*, XI. xxvi. 734–42.

allowed Dost Mohammad to return unconditionally to Kabul. Such a step implied not only political wisdom, but moral courage. But the Governor-General shocked his friends and amused his enemies by the grandiloquent proclamations and ceremonial displays with which he thought fit to celebrate his military triumph.

Then came the annexation of Sind. The story of that much discussed event might be taken for a lost chapter from *The Prince* of Machiavelli. No amount of sophistry can disprove the charge that Ellenborough was determined from the very beginning to carry through the project by fair means or foul, that the treaty engagements with the Talpur Amirs were cynically violated, and that the ensuing War was forced upon them. Opinion at home was prompt in denunciation. Mountstuart Elphinstone, the Nestor of Anglo-Indian politics at that time, gave the best of the many verdicts passed on the subject. "Coming after Afghanistan, it (*i.e.* the annexation of Sind) put one in mind of a bully who had been kicked in the streets and went home to beat his wife in revenge." The act was solemnly condemned by the Court of Directors, and disapproved by the Cabinet. Nevertheless, there was no modification, much less any reversal, of the Governor-General's action[1].

Ellenborough's interference in Gwalior was both just and salutary. A disputed regency and an overgrown local army had created a situation of danger which the Paramount Power very properly refused to tolerate. He compelled allegiance to the Regent favoured by the Government of India, and he reduced the army to proportions compatible with public order. But it was hardly necessary for a civilian Governor-General to accompany the march of the British troops to Gwalior and to intrude himself at the fighting which was required for the enforcement of his commands.

In 1844, the Court of Directors, alarmed at Ellenborough's Napoleonic proclivities, issued an order for his recall. No opposition was offered by the Cabinet. Ellenborough quitted India on August 1st, 1844, leaving behind him a reputation for vainglorious arrogance. Yet the practical value of his services had been incontestable. The restoration to Kabul of Dost Mohammad was the only possible solution at that time for the Afghan problem. Any other course would have meant the revival of interminable difficulties. The annexation of Sind

[1] E. T. Colebrooke, *Life of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone*, II. 374, for Elphinstone's remark; and W. E. Gladstone, *Contemporary Review*, November, 1876, p. 875, for the opinion of the Cabinet.

closed up one of the weak points of our North-West Frontier; it placed the British in possession of the only remaining strip of Indian sea-coast which, until then, had been outside their jurisdiction; and it gave them the navigation of the Lower Indus for a course of 350 miles, with all the commercial prospects and political advantages thereby entailed. In his settlement at Gwalior, Ellenborough showed strategical insight. He had carefully watched the growing disorder in the Punjab. His *coup d'état* at Gwalior secured both the rear and the communications of the British army in the event of a Sikh War.

Sir Henry Hardinge (from 1846 Lord Hardinge) succeeded Lord Ellenborough as Governor-General. He was Ellenborough's brother-in-law, and a soldier by profession. But his service in the field dated back to the Peninsular War and the campaign of Waterloo. He was now in his sixtieth year, and advancing age, combined with long experience of domestic politics, might be expected to have subdued his martial ardour. The first eighteen months of his rule were peaceful. But in December, 1845, the long-expected crisis occurred with the Punjab. The Sikh Army had crossed the Sutlej and was hurrying forward to try conclusions with the British. The Government of India on this occasion was guiltless of provocation. It was the Sikh Regency which, for purposes of its own, incited its soldiery to issue the challenge.

The War, which began in December, 1845, was decided in favour of the British by the victory of Sobraon on February 10th, 1846. Hardinge always acted in strict accordance with the wishes of the home Government. He knew that it objected to the pursuit of ambitious ends and that it deprecated the extension of British territory in India. Hence the very limited character of the settlement which he now made. On the outbreak of hostilities, he had proclaimed the establishment of British suzerainty over the Sikh principalities on the eastern, *i.e.* the British, side of the Sutlej. Now that peace was established, he annexed the Jalandhar Doab, lying west of the Sutlej up to the Bias; he imposed an indemnity; he recognised Gulab Singh as ruler of Kashmir on terms which made that prince a British dependant. But he left the remainder of the old Punjab in possession of the Maharajah Dhulip Singh, or rather of the Regency which governed in his name, under the supervision of a British Resident. Hardinge's settlement won unanimous praise.

"He [*i.e.* Hardinge] still keeps, between British India and the mountain hordes of Central Asia, a power strong enough to restrain the latter

should they aim at permanent conquests in the plain, yet has so far weakened it by the severance of the new principality [*i.e.* Kashmir] assigned to Gulab Singh, that we trust all risk of a rupture with us, for many a day to come at least, is averted[1]."

Sir Robert Peel, in a private communication to Hardinge, dated April, 1846, declared of the latter that his success in the War had been equalled by his moderation in the hour of victory[2]. A peerage and a pension rewarded the popular Governor-General. Moreover, when, in June, 1846, Sir Robert Peel resigned, his successor, Lord John Russell, asked Hardinge to continue in office, on the ground that he was of all persons the best fitted to consolidate the peace[3].

The Whig Ministry brought back Palmerston to the Foreign Office and Hobhouse to the Board of Control. The Whigs as well as the Tories had, by this time, grown nervous about Eastern adventure. Hardinge's settlement was regarded as having permanently solved the Sikh question. In January, 1848, Hardinge was relieved by the Earl of Dalhousie. Peace was supposed to be secure. But on April 18th, occurred the outbreak of Mulraj at Multan, and the murder of the British Agents, Mr Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson. The Punjab was speedily in a blaze, and the Sikh Army was again in the field, eager to avenge its recent defeats. The ensuing conflict proved to be far more serious than its predecessor. So doubtful was the issue, and so heavy the British losses at the battle of Chilianwala, fought on January 13th, 1849, that the news of it caused dismay throughout India and led to a panic in England. The home Government hurriedly superseded the Indian Commander-in-chief, Lord Gough, by Sir Charles Napier; but, before Napier reached India, Gough had redeemed his fame and saved the situation by his victory at Gujarat. The last resistance of the Sikhs was crushed, the Punjab occupied, and the War at an end. It was now for Lord Dalhousie to face the question of a new settlement.

Dalhousie, on one occasion, aptly summed up his own character as "a curious compound of despot and radical[4]." As despot he acted on his own initiative; as radical he treated every case on its intrinsic merits. On the outbreak of war, he had examined carefully the different courses that might be adopted with respect to the Punjab. He concluded that there was no remedy save annexation. Such a

[1] *The Quarterly Review*, LXXVIII. 215.
[2] Charles, Viscount Hardinge, *Life of Lord Hardinge*, p. 143.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 146.
[4] J. G. A. Baird, *Private Letters of the Marquis of Dalhousie*, p. 372.

contrast to the "moderation" of Lord Hardinge was by no means welcomed at home. Dalhousie stated his views in a letter to Hobhouse dated August 15th, 1848, to which Hobhouse replied on October 23rd. The President's letter was confused and unsatisfactory. Governmental opinion, he remarked, would prefer some measure short of absolute annexation. If, however, Dalhousie decided to take this step without waiting for the sanction of the home authorities, the most favourable construction would be put upon his action. The Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, writing on November 24th, 1848, adopted a similar tone. They did not forbid annexation. But they would like to hear what Dalhousie had to say in support of the project before he put it into execution[1]. But, by the time the War ended, further delay was impossible. No Sikh Government could maintain even the rudiments of order. The moment that the terror of the British arms was withdrawn, the Punjab would again become a scene of anarchy, and war with the British would recommence. On March 29th, 1849, therefore, Lord Dalhousie, well aware of the responsibility he was incurring, issued the momentous proclamation declaring the Maharajah Dhulip Singh deposed from his sovereignty and the dominion of the Punjab annexed to the British Indian Empire. The hand of the home authorities was thus forced by the action of their Indian proconsul.

The results of British Foreign Policy in India during the years under consideration may at this point be summed up. Gains had been achieved both strategically and politically. The advance of the British North-West boundary to the natural frontier of mountain simplified the task of military defence. The treatment of the Afghan problem entered upon a new phase. Dost Mohammad had given assistance to the Sikhs during the Second Punjab War. After the annexation of that province, he saw the necessity of maintaining good relations with the British Power, which was now within easy striking distance of his dominions. In 1855 a Treaty of friendship was signed between him and the Government of India. The defect of the situation in 1837—the interposition, between the British and the Afghan spheres of influence, of an independent Sovereign whose susceptibilities demanded so much consideration and whose ambition had been the cause of so much anxiety—was ended.

[1] Sir William Lee-Warner, *Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie*, I. 235–40.

II. CHINA, 1833–1842

In treating a long period of British Indian policy as a connected whole we have in one particular anticipated the order of events. It still remains to discuss the question of British relations with China—a question which reached its crisis during Lord Auckland's Governor-Generalship[1].

Difficulties between England and China became inevitable after the passing of the Government of India Act of 1833. By that measure the monopoly of trade with China, previously confined to the English East India Company, was abolished; the trade was declared open to all British subjects; and its management was transferred from the East India Company's Supercargoes to a Chief Superintendent and staff nominated by the Crown.

Our trade with China had always been subjected to peculiar conditions. It had long remained restricted to a factory at Canton, the single Chinese port to which the British merchants, ordinarily resident at Macao, were allowed to resort during the winter season. All business had to be transacted through a guild of Chinese merchants known as the "Hong." Direct communication with the Chinese officials was forbidden. No British Representative resided at Pekin, nor was China diplomatically represented at the British Court. This was in accordance with the rule of exclusiveness rigorously observed by China with respect to all foreign States. When British Crown Agents took the place of the East India Company's Supercargoes China did not consider that any change of treatment was needed. If Englishmen came to China to trade, they must do so on the old conditions of subordination.

The British Government, in pardonable ignorance of Chinese prejudices, aimed at the establishment of normal diplomatic relations. As a result, there was, from the outset, a complete incompatibility of point of view between the two Governments. The issue was further complicated by the Opium question. Was it solely on moral grounds that China strove to forbid the importation of opium? Was Great Britain forcing China to accept it? Is opium a deleterious and deadly poison, or is it merely a harmless adjunct to physical recreation? On these heads there was waged an interminable war of accusations, replies, and rejoinders[2].

A Royal Commission, dated December 10th, 1833, appointed

[1] See *The Cambridge Modern History*, XI. xxviii. 802–10.

[2] For the literature on this subject see the Bibliography to the present volume.

Lord Napier to be Chief Superintendent for affairs in China, Mr Plowden to be Second, and Mr Davis to be Third. Lord Napier arrived at Macao on July 15th, 1834. His original Instructions, issued under the royal sign manual[1], laid stress on the need of precaution. This warning was repeated in a separate letter, dated January 25th, 1834, from Lord Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary under Lord Grey[2]. Lord Napier, assuming that he possessed a diplomatic status, proceeded to Canton without asking permission, and addressed a letter, written on terms of equality, to the Viceroy of the province. His action was promptly denounced by the Chinese officials as a gross insult. He was requested to communicate, as had been the custom of the East India Company's Supercargoes, through the Hong merchants, and in terms appropriate to an inferior. Napier refused to accept such a humiliation. Hence the first dispute with the Chinese. Unsupported by the home Government, Napier was unable to establish his pretensions or even to resent the Chinese proclamations, which publicly stigmatised him as a "lawless foreign slave" and a "dog barbarian." Overcome by these indignities and worn out by physical illness he died, at Macao, on October 11th, 1834.

Letters of complaint from Napier, written between August 2nd and August 21st, 1834, had been laid before the Duke of Wellington, Foreign Secretary in the short-lived Peel Ministry from December, 1834, to April, 1835. On February 2nd, 1835, the Duke, misunderstanding Napier's difficulties, answered in brief and uncomplimentary terms, accusing him of undue violence and reminding him of the necessity of conciliation. Napier died before the letter reached him. Wellington subsequently busied himself in drawing up a Memorandum on Chinese affairs. He suggested certain changes in the composition of the British Commission of superintendence. More important were his remarks on the question of diplomatic status. For the present, the British Representative must defer to Chinese prejudices. Later on, an effort might be made to obtain improved conditions. "That which we now require is not to lose the enjoyment of what we have got." None the less, Wellington advised that "there should always be, within the Consul-General's reach, a stout frigate and a smaller vessel of war[3]."

On the death of Lord Napier his place as Chief Superintendent

[1] *Correspondence relating to China*, no. 1, incl. 2, p. 2.
[2] *Ibid.* no. 2, p. 4.
[3] *Ibid.* no. 23, p. 51. The use of the term "Consul-General" is peculiar and apparently unauthorised.

was assumed, *ad interim*, by Mr Davis. He left China on January 19th, 1835, being succeeded by Sir George Robinson, who, as will be seen, held the office till December 14th, 1836. Sir George Robinson, possibly in deference to Wellington's recommendations, followed what is known as the "quiescent" policy. That is to say, he behaved with due submission to the Chinese authorities. The practical results were certainly satisfactory. No difficulties occurred. The trade remained both regular and lucrative[1].

Meanwhile, in April, 1835, the Whigs under Lord Melbourne returned to power. Palmerston was again Foreign Secretary, and the duty of issuing Instructions on Chinese affairs passed into his hands. In a despatch dated June 7th, 1836, he informed Sir George Robinson that he was superseded by Captain Elliot. The transference of office took place on December 14th, 1836[2]. Palmerston's sudden promotion of Captain Elliot was severely criticised. A contemporary pamphleteer remarks: "The desire to serve the clansman of a noble lord" (*i.e.* Lord Minto, head of the Scotch house of Elliot), "was the probable and only motive for turning out Sir George Robinson[3]." Captain Elliot had, however, in a private communication to Lord Palmerston recently expressed dislike of the "quiescent" policy. It may not unreasonably be assumed, therefore, that Palmerston regarded Elliot to be better suited than Sir George Robinson to the exigencies of the situation[4].

Certain it is that, from the date of Elliot's appointment as Chief Superintendent, Palmerston began to demand the adoption of a more spirited attitude in British relations with the Chinese. He kept pressing Elliot to secure the abolition of the two most humiliating conditions still imposed on the British Representative in China—the practice of communicating with the Chinese officials through the Hong merchants and the adoption, on the part of the British Representative, of phraseology suggesting a petitioner[5].

In the course of 1838, the Opium problem began to grow serious.

[1] *Correspondence relating to China*, no. 55, p. 113, and no. 57, p. 114.

[2] A further despatch, dated November 8th, 1836, abolished the post of Third Superintendent, and restricted the English Commission to a Chief and a Deputy Superintendent. This change was recommended in Wellington's Memorandum mentioned above. See no. 56, p. 113, and no. 73, p. 130.

[3] Anonymous pamphlet, referred to in Bibliography.

[4] See H. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, I. 155, for a discussion of this point.

[5] *Correspondence relating to China*, no. 66, p. 123, and no. 88, p. 149. Both are despatches characteristic of Palmerston.

The importation of opium into China by the British was craftily utilised by the Chinese Government as a weapon against Elliot's pretensions. But the real point at issue was the question of diplomatic status. After long hesitation Palmerston came to the conclusion that a demonstration of force was required. In July, 1838, a small British squadron under Admiral Maitland reached the Chinese coast. The belief that his appearance would impress the Chinese was proved mistaken. On the contrary, they took the opportunity to adopt strong measures on the opium question. In January, 1839, Lin, the most trusted Councillor of the Chinese Emperor, was appointed High Commissioner to settle the difficulties with the English. On March 10th, 1839, he made his State entry into Canton. Against his high-handed methods and still more ominous threats Captain Elliot was helpless. On March 27th, 1839[1], there appeared the humiliating proclamation in which the British Representative, in terms little less than degrading, acknowledged the fact of his forcible restraint by the Chinese authorities, and ordered the surrender into the hands of the Chinese Commissioner of all the British owned opium in China and Chinese waters. Chinese self-esteem was more than satisfied. But, as might have been expected, the triumph of the Chinese impelled them to inflict a series of outrages on the British subjects within their jurisdiction. On November 3rd, 1839, a conflict occurred off Chuen-pi, at the entrance of the Bocca Tigris, when two British frigates decisively defeated a fleet of twenty-nine armed Chinese junks. The long dispute between Great Britain and China had reached its inevitable conclusion in war.

In a statement drawn up at the Foreign Office on February 20th, 1840, and intended for transmission to the Court of Pekin, Palmerston justified the British appeal to arms. He pointed out that Commissioner Lin's sudden decision to confiscate the opium was totally inconsistent with the attitude maintained for a course of many years by the Chinese Government towards the opium traffic. The violence exercised against the British Chief-Superintendent in order to enforce the surrender of the opium was, he declared, a gross outrage on international law; and the conduct of the Chinese Government, not only on this but on numerous other occasions, had been so scandalous that the Government of Great Britain had decided to insist not only upon reparation for the past but upon security for the future. Hos-

[1] *Correspondence relating to China*, no. 146, incl. 20, p. 374.

tilities would, therefore, continue until the British demands had been accepted in the shape of a formal treaty[1].

It took some time for the continuous successes of the British to produce the required effect on the Chinese. On January 20th, 1841, Captain Elliot signed a preliminary convention, which flagrantly disregarded Palmerston's Instructions. Palmerston sent him a most severe reprimand and dismissed him from his office[2]. In September, Lord Melbourne's Ministry made way for that of Sir Robert Peel, and the termination of the Chinese, as of the Afghan conflict, passed from Lord Palmerston's hands into those of Lord Aberdeen. But the Treaty of Nankin, signed on August 22nd, 1842, embodied the substance of Palmerston's original demands, and must, therefore, be counted to his credit. It provided Great Britain with a valuable territorial basis in the acquisition of Hong Kong, and a source of increased commercial prosperity in the opening of five additional Chinese ports. The most important fact, however, concerning the Treaty is that it broke down the attempt of China to maintain her diplomatic exclusiveness, and introduced her, though against her will, into international society.

In China, as in India, the general effect of British Foreign Policy during the years under consideration was to extend and consolidate, both politically and strategically, the power and prestige of Great Britain in the Far East.

[1] H. B. Morse, 1. 621, Appendix A.
[2] See Sir Henry Taylor, *Autobiography*, 2 vols., London, 1885, vol. 1, Appendix.

CHAPTER VI

UNITED STATES AND COLONIAL DEVELOPMENTS 1815–1846

I. THE-SLAVE-TRADE AND FRONTIER DIFFICULTIES, 1815–1841

THE terms of the Treaty of Ghent, which brought to a close the state of war that had prevailed between the United States and the British empire since 1812, were made public upon its presentation to the Senate for ratification on February 17th, 1815. It was found to be a colourless document, which ignored all the more important demands that had been made on either side and every one of the maritime difficulties that had brought about the War. Besides agreement on a mutual cessation of hostilities, the Treaty contained only certain minor provisions of little interest. The two Powers mutually bound themselves to put an end to all warlike operations against the various tribes and nations of Indians on their borders and to restore them to all those possessions, rights and privileges to which they had been entitled in 1811. The territorial *status quo ante bellum* was almost entirely restored; but certain questions as to the carrying out of various provisions of the Treaty of 1783 were referred to Boundary Commissions, and finally it was agreed that the traffic in slaves being irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, both Contracting Parties should use their best endeavours to accomplish its entire abolition, although no methods were indicated whereby this end could be attained.

The contrasting views that were formed in the two countries concerning the Treaty may be studied in the respective debates upon its ratification, and furnish the keynote of Anglo-American relations for many years. Albert Gallatin, who had had the greatest share on the American side in the conclusion of the Treaty, took a just view of what had been secured when he wrote to Monroe, the Secretary of State, that the Treaty was as favourable to America as could be expected under existing circumstances. But the President, with a view to serving the purposes of his party, was unwilling to accept so modest an estimate, and he struck a louder and more jubilant note in his Message to the Senate recommending ratification. He congratulated the nation upon an event highly honourable to it and

terminating with peculiar felicity a campaign signalised by the most brilliant successes. The American Government had demonstrated the efficiency of its powers of defence, and the nation could review its conduct without regret and without reproach, in the light of a success which was the natural result of the legislative counsels, the patriotism of the people and the public spirit of the militia, the military and naval forces of the country. A not less exalted tone characterised the whole of the Senate debate, and the many abject military failures of the War and the dissension between the States to which it had given rise were entirely forgotten. A legend as to America's triumph was thus started to supplement the heroic traditions of the Revolutionary War; and, ineradicably planted in the public mind, this legend had permanent influence on the American outlook on foreign events, and implied in every glorification of the greatness of the United States and every incitement to patriotism a belittlement of British efforts and aversion to Great Britain as the only enemy.

On the other side of the Atlantic, Englishmen had no desire to claim any sweeping triumph, though they felt that in the repulse of all American attacks upon Canada the honour of the empire had been amply vindicated. Great Britain had not at all given way in respect of the Maritime Rights that had been the main cause of the War, and she had, apparently, secured something in respect of her demands for the Indian tribes. The general impression was that a close had been put, in a satisfactory enough fashion, to a disagreeable episode too much resembling civil war to commend itself to Englishmen. In the expressions of generous admiration of America's growth in power that proceeded from some of her well-wishers most parties tacitly acquiesced, and no jealousy or fear of that growth manifested itself anywhere. The feeling had not yet died away, that in seceding from the British empire the Americans were renegades, but still entitled to an exceptional consideration which Great Britain would not concede to other trespassers on her rights. The troubles that have affected Anglo-American relations during the last hundred years have mainly been concerned with questions left undecided by the Treaty of Ghent, and the story of those relations in the diplomatic sphere has to deal with the gradual solution of the difficulties in question by the combined effects of time and of a mutual reluctance to drive matters to extremes.

The undecided matters fall into two categories, the first of which is concerned with questions of world policy—British Maritime

Claims, the principles governing Blockade and the Rights of Neutrals in time of war, and the methods to be adopted for the complete suppression of the Slave Trade. Two of these questions could afford to wait, and they passed rapidly into partial oblivion, because the world was entering upon a period of maritime peace unbroken for forty years. When they again became of firstrate importance, owing to the renewed manifestation of British sea-power at the time of the Crimean War, they had lost most of their danger in consequence of the change in maritime conditions, and agreement could be reached with comparatively little difficulty. The only way in which the old disputes concerning the Right of Search were kept alive was in connexion with the British crusade for the suppression of the Slave Trade. Repeated efforts were made on this head to secure the effective adhesion of the United States to the efforts of the other Powers; but these were always baulked by America's sensitive remembrance of her wrongs as a neutral during the Napoleonic Wars. Agreement was only reached very late, and then merely as an incidental result of civil war within the United States. The second class of questions left unsolved by the Treaty of Ghent related to difficulties concerning the frontiers of British North America and disputes of a similar character concerning fishery rights. These questions have been tackled and solved piecemeal, one by one, as they became of immediate practical interest to a considerable number of American citizens. Upon occasion, there has been a good deal of clamour on either side of the border from those whose financial interests were concerned; but, save on rare occasions, there has been no marked excitement of public opinion, and the disputes have been irritating rather than serious.

When peace was secured, the needs of both countries dictated as early as possible a renewal of regulated commercial intercourse. But, in any commercial negotiations which America might set on foot in her great need for manufactured goods, Great Britain held the stronger position for bargaining. In the temporary Convention[1] that was negotiated by Gallatin and his fellow-Commissioners before their return to the United States, this fact was clearly marked. By this Agreement, which was to last for four years with the option of renewal, freedom of commercial intercourse was restored; but the American

[1] *U.S. Treaties and Conventions*, pp. 410–13, and *Commercial Treaties*, II. 387. The necessary Acts of Parliament to carry the Convention into effect were passed as 53 Geo. III, c. 15 and 57 Geo. III, c. 58.

demands for free trade with the British West Indies and the North American Colonies were refused, and American ships continued to be debarred from the markets that lay so near. The British Colonists were not dissatisfied with the new Agreement; for, though they could not trade freely with their neighbours to the South, yet the lucrative West Indian trade remained wholly in their hands. By the General Convention of 1818 the agreement was extended for ten years, and later for an indefinite term. The commercial relations between the two Powers were thus mapped out, until the revolution in Britain's fiscal policy brought entirely changed conditions.

The most dangerous question affecting the relation of the two Contracting Parties left unsettled by the Treaty of Ghent was that concerned with their respective armaments on the waters of the Great Lakes. The British demands either for strategic security or for disarmament had been flatly refused by the Americans, and both parties therefore continued during the peace the efforts to build and arm ships of war upon a considerable scale on which they had entered during the War. The opposite shores of Lakes Erie and Ontario were scenes of great activity; but such proceedings necessarily imposed a large expenditure that was an unwelcome drain upon the taxpayers both of the United States and Great Britain. When the matter was once more brought to negotiation, a proposition for the limitation of armaments came from John Quincy Adams, now American Minister in London, who had refused a similar British proposal put forward at Ghent. Since complete disarmament would appear to leave the Canadian Colonists defenceless against a sudden American attack, the British Cabinet was somewhat loth to consider the proposal, and a good deal of discussion took place in England as to its advisability. Ultimately, however, Castlereagh expressed his readiness to enter upon negotiations; and, at the end of April, 1817, Notes were exchanged in Washington between Richard Rush, the Secretary of State, and the Hon. Charles Bagot, the British Minister, embodying what is known as the Rush-Bagot Agreement. It was very short and provided only for mutual disarmament upon the Lakes, each Power binding itself to maintain not more than one lightly armed vessel on Lake Ontario, two on the Upper Lakes, and one on Lake Champlain, for police purposes, and it being agreed that there should be no interference of the vessels of one Power with those of the other. This agreement was approved by the Senate and proclaimed by President Monroe on April 28th, 1818. Though it attracted comparatively

little attention at the time, it had most important effects; for in the temptation to naval rivalry on the opposite shores of the Lakes lay the germ of infinite mischief. Its removal set a precedent for the management of the frontier between the United States and British North America which has saved both Powers from great expense in fortifications and military guards and has deprived the frontier disputes of much of the acute danger they might otherwise have caused[1].

The conclusion of the Rush-Bagot Agreement marked the progressive subsidence of hostile feelings caused by the War, and in 1818 the opportunity was taken of the renewal of the temporary Commercial Convention of 1815 to open general negotiations with a view to clearing up the outstanding difficulties between the Powers. These negotiations were specially hastened by the need of finding some means of settling the irritating Fishery questions that were causing so much trouble on the Atlantic coast. The discussions were carried on in London between F. J. Robinson, President of the Board of Trade, and Henry Goulburn for Great Britain, and Albert Gallatin and Richard Rush for the United States. The resulting Convention, signed on October 20th, 1818[2], and ratified by the Senate on January 30th, 1819, contains provisions which have been of lasting importance both in relation to the Fisheries and to the progressive delimitation of the long Anglo-American Boundary. The unpleasant question of the restitution of American slaves who had fled into British protection during the War was solved by reference to the arbitration of the Tsar of Russia. The Arbitrators appointed by him ultimately gave judgment that, though restitution was impossible, the British Government must indemnify the owners for the value of the slaves who had secured their freedom by escape to British ships or territory. The interpretation of this award gave rise to some difficulty, and two further Conventions, dated respectively July 12th, 1822, and November 13th, 1826, had to be negotiated before the amount of the indemnity to be paid could be fixed.

In regard to boundary questions, the Convention of 1818 marked some progress. The Commissions set up by the Treaty of Ghent for the allocation of the islands in the Bay of Fundy and the delimitation of the frontier in the St Lawrence and the great Lakes

[1] For details concerning relations along the lake frontier see J. M. Callahan's *The Neutrality of the American Lakes and Anglo-American Relations*.

[2] For text see *U.S. Treaties and Conventions*, pp. 415–18.

had either completed their work or were upon the point of doing so; but the difficulties as to the Maine Boundary showed no signs of solution. The boundary, from the Lake of the Woods westward to the Rocky Mountains, was fixed by agreement to be the Forty-ninth Parallel, under the mistaken impression that this had been decided upon as the northern boundary of Louisiana under the Treaty of Utrecht. Neither Power was as yet ready to discuss an exact definition of a frontier in the Oregon country beyond the Rocky Mountains, and it was therefore agreed that Great Britain and the United States might for ten years jointly use the whole of the Oregon country, and that it was to be free and open to the vessels, citizens and subjects of both Powers, without prejudice to the claims of either.

The most urgent matter dealt with by the Convention of 1818 concerned the Fisheries along the Atlantic coast and was arranged by Article I, which has been of permanent importance and has governed all subsequent negotiations. Great Britain relinquished her ancient claims to control the fisheries of the open sea on the Newfoundland Banks, and tacitly admitted the right of American fishermen to complete freedom. On the other hand, the Americans abandoned their contention that they had a right to use the unsettled parts of the coasts of British North America generally for drying and packing their fish, and consented to a considerable restriction of the liberties that had been granted by Great Britain, as a matter of grace, under the Treaty of Versailles of 1783. They struggled hard to secure the acceptance of their old contention that fishery privileges are inalienable by war, but without success. Throughout the negotiations, the United States Representatives appear to have devoted their chief attention to abstract principles as to the nature of treaties and the Freedom of the Sea, while Great Britain was mainly concerned with the practical management of a difficult situation that was giving rise to incessant irritation among the fishermen on the spot, and her negotiators seemed to care little for abstract theory. The conclusion arrived at pleased neither of the fishing industries; but circumstances, compelled them to accept it, and down to about 1856 there was very little further trouble.

The adjustment of the causes of difference between the two Powers in the North made slow but favourable progress and left little lasting bitterness; but on the troubled inland frontier of the Southern States a series of unpleasant incidents kept alive the bitter memories of earlier Indian Wars, and, though little was heard by the British public

at home of these matters, the pioneers who were pushing out into the western wilderness put down many of their difficulties with the Indian tribes to British intrigues and kept alive the hatreds of the Revolution. When Andrew Jackson, with dictatorial action and complete disregard of Spain's territorial rights in Florida, put down the resistance of the Creeks and Seminoles, his advocates were able to convince the general public that the victor of New Orleans had once more saved his country from unwarrantable British aggression, and fresh matter was added to the legend of the repulse of despotism by the heroic sons of liberty. In February, 1819, after a very energetic indictment of the incompetence of Spanish Colonial control from John Quincy Adams, Spain was prevailed upon to accept a Treaty ceding to the United States the whole of her rights in the Floridas, and thus rounding off the territory of the United States in the south-east to its natural limits. By the Third Article of the Treaty[1] the western boundary between Louisiana and Spanish territory was for the first time clearly defined; and this provision was of interest to Great Britain, for it involved the abandonment of all the old Spanish claims to the Oregon country. The Forty-second Parallel was fixed as the northernmost boundary of Spanish territory on the Pacific coast, and Great Britain and America were therefore left as the sole Powers contesting the right of possession between that latitude and the southern boundary of Russian America.

The annexation of Florida had far reaching effects upon the political situation in the New World; for, on the one hand, it brought within the political orbit of the United States the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, the last of her Colonial possessions in which Spain retained any real power, and, on the other, it moved the Russian Government to efforts for the extension of her dominions on the shores of the Pacific. In both of these directions the interests of Great Britain were closely concerned. Cuba is the richest of the West Indian sugar islands and the great fortress port of Havana occupies a commanding position as guarding the exit from the Caribbean through the Florida channel. No nation with possessions in the West Indies could regard with equanimity a change of allegiance that might place the island in the possession of an aggressive or hostile Power. While her mainland Colonies had during their long struggle for independence driven out practically every vestige of Spanish

[1] *U.S. Treaties and Conventions*, p. 1017. Treaty signed February 22nd, 1819; ratified and proclaimed in United States, February 22nd, 1821.

power, the islands were still under the control of the royal government. But there were parties that aspired to throw off the Spanish yoke, and in 1822, at the prompting of certain Americans, some of these parties made overtures to the United States for the express purpose of securing annexation. President Monroe listened to their representations without committing himself, and he gave no encouragement to the designs of the revolted Spanish American republics in favour of a joint naval expedition for the liberation of Cuba. Canning, who had recently become Foreign Secretary, heard of the Cuban overtures at Washington with distaste; for he felt that the further extension of the dominion of the United States on the shores of the Caribbean might mean a serious alteration of the distribution of naval power in those waters and imply a considerable menace to the British possessions in the West Indies. Great Britain's naval strength in West Indian waters was therefore unobtrusively reinforced, not so much in view of American intervention as to be prepared against French designs. There was reason to believe that such designs were not unlikely, in view of the desire of France to restore her power in Haiti, and of the armed intervention in the domestic affairs of Spain for which she was known to be preparing. But these naval precautions at once aroused alarm in the United States, and gave rise to a suspicion that Great Britain herself was preparing to annex Cuba, although the Ministry had no such design; for it was entirely in the interests of Great Britain to preserve the *status quo* in the Caribbean so long as possible.

The influence of this suspicion upon the mind of John Quincy Adams, President Monroe's Secretary of State, was such as to cause him to formulate clearly for the first time a fundamental idea of American policy that had slowly been growing in the minds of her statesmen for thirty years. Alexander Hamilton had forecast it in *The Federalist* in the earliest years of the republic, when he had pointed to an ascendancy in all American affairs as the natural destiny of the United States, and desired that the two Americas should form a political system independent of that of Europe and free from European interference. Jefferson had been imbued with the same idea so early as 1793, and again when he strenuously and successfully objected to the transfer of Louisiana from Spain to France. Now, in a letter to the American Minister in Spain of April 28th, 1823, Adams laid it down unmistakably that, if the status of Cuba, and by implication that of any other European Colony, were to be changed,

it could only be in the direction of annexation to the United States.

"There are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation," he wrote, "and, if an apple severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but to fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its unnatural connexion with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from her bosom. The transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpropitious to the interests of this Union."

It was not merely the negative objection to the establishment of British or French control over Cuba or San Domingo that was moving Adams's mind, but the thought of an aggressive and constructive policy that aimed at dominance in the Caribbean and the leadership of the New World.

[Cuba's] commanding position with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indian seas, its situation midway between our southern coast and the Island of San Domingo...the nature of its productions and its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial, give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no other foreign territory can be compared, and little inferior to that which binds the different members of this Union together....Looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself[1].

Adams's letter was no mere general expression of opinion, but was drawn up to furnish explicit Instructions to the diplomatic representative of the United States as to his course of action in view of the impending armed intervention of France in the internal affairs of Spain. The European situation which was bringing this about, and the attitude of Canning and the British Ministry towards the projected interference of the Powers in the affairs of the revolted Colonies of Latin America are, however, treated fully elsewhere in this work[2] and need not here be insisted upon. Before the working out of Adams's ideas of American policy is further traced, it is necessary to show how another menace to what was regarded as the natural expansion of the United States was causing concern to each of the Anglo-Saxon Powers as assailing their interests in the Pacific and the Oregon country, which in the Convention of 1818 they had set aside for future delimitation.

[1] Adams to Nelson, April 23rd, 1823. Lawrence's edition of Wheaton's *International Law*, pp. 673–4.

[2] See especially *ante*, Chap. II, pp. 73 *sqq.*

While Great Britain and the United States came to the Pacific slope westwards and by sea from the south, Russian enterprise had crossed the breadth of northern Asia to establish her control upon the shores of Alaska and thence to carry down her trade with the Indian tribes. The pretensions of the Tsars had varied in their southern extension at different periods; but, in 1806, Russia had laid claim to the whole coast down to the latitude of San Francisco, and had for a time established a garrison in California at Bodega Bay, a little to the north of that place. American traders were accused by the Russians of causing difficulties to their rule by clandestinely supplying arms and munitions to the Indian tribes, and considerable difficulties in consequence engaged the attention of the two Governments, which found it impossible to come to any agreement because of the indefinite nature of the Russian claims. By the Florida Treaty of 1819, Spain transferred to the United States the whole of her claims in Oregon and on the Pacific coast to the north of the Forty-second Parallel; and the Tsar, learning this, on September 4th, 1821, issued a Decree granting to the Russian-American Company which exploited the Alaska trade, exclusive rights on the American coast and in the Behring Sea and the North Pacific, so far south as the Fifty-first Parallel. This claim not only ran absolutely counter to America's traditional contention that the open sea is free to all, but it also carried Russia's territorial pretensions far to the south of any region she had made her own by long effective occupation. Adams, without delay, protested against the Decree and proposed to Great Britain, the fellow-claimant to the Oregon territory, a joint remonstrance at Petrograd. To the Russian Minister in Washington, Baron Tuyll, on July 17th, 1823, he emphatically declared that the United States would contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment in America, and would assume distinctly the principle that the American Continents were no longer subjects for any new European Colonial establishments. Under his Instructions, the American Minister at Petrograd, to whom the further negotiations were entrusted, also took a high tone against Russian pretensions, but expressed the willingness of the United States to acknowledge Russia's effective occupation as far south as the Fifty-fifth Parallel.

In his desire to withstand Russia's claims, Adams hoped to have the support of Great Britain; but, though Canning was equally opposed to admitting them, the American resistance to them was based on grounds unacceptable to him, since they seemed to imply

a serious menace to the development of British North America, and to be entangled with discussions concerning Maritime Rights into which Great Britain was not prepared to enter. British Ministers had found the United States most uncompromising in the long negotiations for the suppression of the Slave Trade, and Canning learned privately from his agent at Petrograd that America, while contesting Russia's claims in the Pacific, was at the same time endeavouring to secure her formal adherence to a convention against privateering which exempted private goods and vessels from capture at sea—matters in which Great Britain's maritime interests were vitally concerned. In view of these circumstances, and of the complexities of the European situation, the Foreign Secretary preferred to maintain British rights on the Pacific by independent representations to Russia, and not to enter into any joint action with the United States.

The full enunciation of the American policy along both its lines came in President Monroe's famous Message to Congress of December 2nd, 1823. In this Message, largely under the inspiration of Adams, his Secretary of State, Monroe dealt, in quite different parts of a long and somewhat wordy composition, with separate concrete matters of immediate political importance. In doing so, he succeeded in enunciating a doctrine that had been implicit in American foreign policy from the beginning of the republic. The Russian claims were dealt with in the earlier part of the Message, though not apparently according to any particular design. In almost routine fashion, Adams's momentous statement to the Russian Minister in July, 1823, was placed on record as of general application.

> The occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American Continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European Powers.

Russia did not think it worth while to proceed further with her claims, and, with a slight compromise that allowed her to carry her southern boundary down from 55° to 54° 40′ she accepted the American contentions. On April 17th, 1824, the Treaty was signed whereby she relinquished her claims to the Oregon coast and to the closure of the North Pacific. Traffic with the Indians in intoxicating liquors and arms was forbidden, and each Power formally disclaimed the right of search over ships of the other[1]. A few months later,

[1] *U.S. Treaties and Conventions*, pp. 931–3.

a closely similar Treaty with Russia was negotiated by Great Britain[1], of which, after the purchase of Alaska by the United States in 1867, the interpretation provided much matter for controversy and negotiation. The immediate importance of these Treaties in connexion with the Florida Treaty of 1819 was that the Oregon question was now clearly left to the principal claimants; Spain was shut off to the south below the Forty-second Parallel, and Russia to the north above 54° 40′. Only Great Britain and the United States therefore remained to argue out the possession of the coveted territory between them.

It was in the latter part of President Monroe's Message that he made the pronouncement to which he and Adams seem to have attached the highest importance, as involving a constructive policy for the New World under the leadership of the United States. The President's rather ambiguous and lengthy phrases were interpreted in different senses by those who read them at the time—as they have been ever since. Observers in Great Britain were delighted with the intention manifestly displayed of carrying out the policy outlined by Canning in his suggestions to Rush on August 20th, 1823, and warning off the despotic Powers of the Old World from interference with the affairs of the democratic peoples of the New. But to the United States the Message made a different appeal. There was a general glow of exaltation, a universal feeling of gratified love of liberty, a conscious and proud perception of the consideration which the United States now enjoyed and of the respect and honour which belonged to them[2]. The United States seemed to stand forth and claim the place of leader among the American peoples, and to the ordinary citizen the ban upon adventures in the New World appeared to be directed at least as much against Great Britain and her supposed designs upon Cuba as against the Continental Powers of whom much less was known. But, though a diplomatist so experienced as Adams fully understood the radical differences that separated Great Britain from the despotic Continental monarchies, yet he lent himself to the inclusion in the Message of phrases that appeared to stigmatise the whole of the Powers of the Old World as hostile to democracy. He might thus forward the accomplishment of a policy in which he was keenly interested, the setting over against the Old World league of monarchs with their system of Congresses a New World league of

[1] Convention between Great Britain and Russia, signed at Petrograd, February 28th, 1825. *State Papers*, XII. 38–43.

[2] Daniel Webster, quoted in Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations*, I. 347.

free peoples which might, also in congress, decide upon matters of common concern under the leadership of the United States. The sentences in which this idea is implied are among the best known in the Message:

> The system of the allied Powers is essentially different...from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments....It is impossible that the allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of either Continent without endangering our peace and happiness, nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves would adopt it of their own accord.

The idea of a Pan-American Congress, at which the newly founded republics of the New World might concert measures for the repulse of the attacks of Old World despotism was first officially broached in 1822 by Simon Bolivar, the Liberator, President of the republic of Colombia. After some hesitation, most of the Latin-American republics accepted and it was agreed to extend an invitation to the United States. Adams, who had now succeeded Monroe as President, eagerly accepted the invitation to the Panama meeting in which he saw the opportunity for rounding off his Pan-American policy and assuming the leadership of Latin-America which, he felt, might otherwise fall to Great Britain. In his Message of December 26th, 1825, he explained to Congress the purpose of the meeting at Panama and the reasons why he had accepted the invitation to take part in it. In doing all this he was keeping a wary eye on the action of Great Britain in the Caribbean. In August, 1825, Canning had proposed to the American Minister in London that the United States should join with Great Britain and France in an undertaking that none of the three would annex Cuba nor acquiesce in its annexation by either of the others. France at first indicated her readiness to accept the proposal, but then withdrew the acceptance and refused to enter into any agreement; while Adams entirely declined the invitation and in September, 1825, instructed the American Minister in Paris to inform the French Government that in no circumstances would the United States permit French occupation of Cuba or Porto Rico, whatever the attitude of Spain[1].

This was a direct application of the principles embodied in Presi-

[1] The United States Government was, also, anxious at this period as to French projects for the reconquest of San Domingo. These were finally abandoned, and matters cleared up, in 1824, when France for the first time formally recognised the independence of the republic of Hayti. (See correspondence in *State Papers*, XII. 693–742.)

dent Monroe's Message and marked a further stage in the evolution of Adams's policy. He demanded the abandonment of naval expeditions which were being fitted out by Colombia and Mexico for the conquest of Cuba and Porto Rico on the ground that the possession of those islands must be left for the decision of the Panama meeting. Such action on the part of the United States gave rise to great anxiety in the British Government as to the nature of Adams's designs in the West Indies, where the interests of Great Britain were of so vital an importance. That America was purposing to extend her political dominion in the Caribbean might be a matter of suspicion only, but such suspicions were strengthened by her persistent efforts to extend her commerce in those waters and by the difficulties which were being experienced in the lengthy negotiations in progress concerning access to British West Indian ports. These difficulties were concerned with the removal of restrictions on American trade imposed by the Commercial Convention of 1815, and they undoubtedly reacted on political relations. After much inconsistent tinkering with the regulations and fruitless negotiations with the United States, in order to secure corresponding alterations in their commercial laws, an Act of Parliament was passed in July, 1825[1] which opened the colonial trade to all countries that would afford reciprocal privileges to British shipping. The Act[1] was exceedingly complicated, and it was difficult to ascertain at once its precise bearing on the points at issue. The matter was further entangled by the passing of certain Colonial Acts which imposed discriminating duties. The United States refused to accept the conditions prescribed, and both in official correspondence and in debates in Congress positions were taken up that seemed to claim for the United States a right to prescribe to Great Britain her course of action in her West Indian Colonies. An Order in Council of July 26th, 1826, therefore, prohibited all trade and intercourse between the British West Indies and the United States in American vessels. President Adams countered by refusing to allow British vessels from the West Indies to enter American ports. The result of these various prohibitions was disastrous to the sugar Colonies, who found one of their best markets in the United States.

The aggressiveness of the United States in these commercial disputes, combined with the refusal of any joint pledge concerning the annexation of Cuba and with the President's enthusiastic Messages

[1] 6 Geo. IV, c. 114. For difficulties see Gallatin to Secretary Canning, December 28th, 1826. *State Papers*, XIV. 486–93.

concerning the Pan-American meeting, made Canning and his Government very anxious as to the future of British interests in the Western Hemisphere. In a private letter to the British Minister at Washington, he stated the case pointedly.

> The avowed pretension of the United States to put themselves at the head of the confederacy of all the Americas, and to sway that confederacy against Europe (Great Britain included) is *not* a pretension identified with our interests, or one that we can countenance as tolerable. It is, however, a pretension which there is no use in contesting in the abstract; but we must not say anything that seems to admit the principle[1].

To shrewd observers behind the scenes the situation seemed to be fraught with considerable danger; but comparatively little concerning it was known to the public at large on either side of the Atlantic. The danger mainly arose from Adams's somewhat grandiose ideas and his attempt to carry them out in the region of practical politics; they were thwarted not by any action on the part of Canning, who dealt with the situation with great caution, but by the natural evolution of events in America. In these events, two causes played the potent parts—the jealousy felt by the Latin-American republics towards their aggressive northern neighbour, and the antagonism of the slave-holding interests of the southern States to Adams and the ideas of the emancipation of the negro which from the published words of Bolivar they read into the invitation to the Pan-American Congress. Slavery was rapidly coming to be the crucial question that entered into every political struggle in the United States, and it was because of their distrust of Adams's attitude towards the "peculiar institution" that the dominant southern interest in Congress were determined to thwart his Pan-American plans. The result was the failure of the "Congress of Panama." It accomplished nothing, and adjourned leaving great disappointment in the minds of the delegates who spread throughout Latin-America deep suspicion and distrust of the faith of the great Power in the north. The republics were driven to rely more closely on British advice and help in their struggles against the initial difficulties of their newly-won freedom. The course of events for many years did nothing to remove their distrust of the United States, and it was not until nearly the end of the nineteenth century that Pan-American ideas could again become matters of practical politics.

The failure of Bolivar's benevolent ideals and of Adams's practical

[1] Canning to Vaughan, February 8th, 1826. *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.* (1912), p. 234.

designs for a confederacy of the western world under the leadership of the United States was thus intimately connected with the question of Slavery. Not only had this "institution" become since 1820 a vital factor in American politics, but the suppression of the Slave-trade filled an exceedingly important place in international negotiations throughout the earlier half of the nineteenth century and was closely bound up with the controversies concerning Maritime Claims and the Right of Search. The relations between Great Britain and America were throughout made more difficult by their different attitude on this subject, although British policy in connexion with it was not concerned with the United States alone; it touched every maritime nation, and its furtherance demanded for many years a large share of the attention of every succeeding Foreign Secretary. Wilberforce's Bill for the Abolition of the Slave-trade that passed the Commons in 1804, but was thrown out by the Lords, finally became law under the Fox-Grenville Ministry in 1807. It enacted that no vessels should clear out on a slaving voyage from any port within the British dominions after May 1st, 1807, and that no slave should be landed in the British Colonies after March 1st, 1808. Denmark had abolished the trade in 1792, the prohibition to take effect in 1804, and the United States in 1807 enacted laws that prohibited the importation of slaves into the Union after January 1st, 1808. An attempt was made by Fox in 1806, during his abortive negotiations for peace with France to induce her to join with Great Britain in the abolition of the Trade, but without effect. The worst evils occurred under the flags of Spain and Portugal, and an Order in Council was issued in 1809 in disregard of the ancient Treaty[1] which secured to Portugal freedom from the exercise of the right of search by English cruisers. Portuguese ships that were found carrying slaves to places not subject to the Crown of Portugal were to be brought into British ports for adjudication. In the British Treaties with Portugal of 1810[2] the Portuguese agreed to abandon their old privilege by which England waived the principle of "free ships, free goods" in their favour, and to prohibit Portuguese subjects from carrying on the Slave-trade in any part of Africa not belonging to them. These provisions of the Treaty were of very little avail, for it was in the Portuguese possessions south of the equator that the slave-traders chiefly secured their cargoes, while it was as yet impossible to prevent even British-owned

[1] Treaty of 1654 between Great Britain and Portugal.
[2] Treaty of Alliance of February 19th, 1810, Article X.

vessels from sailing in the nefarious traffic under neutral flags. Sweden agreed with Great Britain to prohibit the Trade to her subjects in 1814; but Castlereagh found it impossible to secure any serious satisfaction from France on the subject, and had to put up with the very imperfect first additional Article in the Treaty of Paris of May 30th, 1814. The reluctance of the other Powers to abolish the trade in the case of their subjects was in part attributable to their failure to believe in the sincerity of Great Britain's philanthropic motives and their mistrust of her Colonial monopoly. But bound up with this was the vexed question of Maritime Rights, which had agitated Europe for half a century. To enforce satisfactorily the prohibition of the Slave-trade it was necessary to maintain a maritime police and to grant to them the right of searching suspected vessels regardless of the flag flown. Owing to Britain's maritime pre-eminence, she would undoubtedly provide the greater part of the vessels engaged in suppressing the traffic; and the grant of the Right of Search, therefore, meant the bestowal upon British naval officers in time of peace the powers that every maritime nation had contested when they were claimed as belligerent rights.

By the Treaty of Kiel, concluded on January 15th, 1814, Denmark agreed to prohibit the Trade entirely to her subjects as she had already prohibited the importation of slaves into her Colonies. The Dutch Government prohibited the Trade to its subjects in June, 1815, and by the Convention of August 13th, 1815, agreed to the entire prohibition of the traffic including the importation of slaves into Java and the other colonies restored to the new kingdom of the Netherlands by Great Britain. Very little could be done with Spain, and in the Treaty of Madrid of July 5th, 1814, she could be brought to agree to nothing beyond the prohibition to her subjects of the Slave-trade with foreign colonies. By the grant of money subsidies to Portugal Lord Castlereagh secured from her in January, 1815, the prohibition to her subjects of the Slave-trade north of the equator. The Powers assembled in the Congress of Vienna were willing to denounce the Trade "as inconsistent with the principles of humanity and universal morality[1]," but they were entirely unwilling to agree to the enforcement of sanctions against it. Castlereagh proposed that, in the event of the Trade still being continued by any State beyond a term of real necessity, the importation of its

[1] Congress of Vienna, Declaration of February 15th, 1815, confirmed by the additional Article annexed to the Treaty of Paris, November 20th, 1815.

colonial produce into their dominions should be forbidden in unison by all the Powers represented in the Congress; but no such economic sanction could be secured.

Napoleon, in March, 1815, immediately after his return from Elba reversed his earlier refusals and decreed the immediate abolition of the Slave-trade throughout France and her possessions, and Lewis XVIII was constrained to ratify this Decree after his second Restoration. But this meant comparatively little, for the means of enforcing the prohibition on the part of France were very deficient. In August, 1814, the Duke of Wellington proposed to Talleyrand the reciprocal grant of permission to the ships of war of each nation to visit the merchant-vessels of the other north of the equator in search of slaves and to carry into port any vessels on which any such were found, there to be condemned by the Courts for the Trial of Marine Causes[1]. Talleyrand entirely refused to consider the idea, and maintained that the functions of maritime police could only be exerted by a Power over its own vessels and notorious pirates. By the aid of a subsidy of 400,000 *l.*, however, in the Treaty of Madrid of September 22nd, 1817, Great Britain secured from Spain the desired concession of the Right of Search and the abolition of the Slave-trade to her Colonies after the year 1820. Acting on the precedent thus set, Lord Castlereagh invited the Maritime Powers to a Conference in London in February, 1818, and there laid before them evidence that the illicit traffic in slaves had assumed greater dimensions since the declaration of the Congress of Vienna than ever before, owing to the cessation of Great Britain's belligerent right of search. It was admitted that such a right does not exist in time of peace independently of special compact, and Castlereagh therefore proposed that the Powers should enter into an engagement to concede mutually to their ships of war the right of search for contraband slaves. The proposition was declined by France, on the ground that the reciprocity was illusory, and the United States, who had not been represented at the Conference but had been approached with similar proposals through their Minister in London, likewise refused them[2], partly on the ground of the inapplicability to their Constitutional circumstances of the proposals for mixed Courts but also on that of the impossibility of receiving the cargoes of liberated African negroes into the States and employing them as free servants.

[1] Quoted by Berryer in the *Chambre des Députés*, January 24th, 1842.

[2] Adams to Rush, November 2nd, 1818. *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV. 399.

To the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle Lord Castlereagh repeated his proposals, and added the additional suggestion that the Slave-trade should be proscribed as piracy under the law of nations. Again, France led the way in peremptory rejection, and she was joined by each of the other Great Powers, Austria, Prussia and Russia. The latter proposed the formation of a neutral maritime police on the coast of Africa, under the direction of a supreme international council, with Courts for adjudicating upon the ships and cargoes seized. This proposal proved generally unacceptable and was rejected by Great Britain; so that nothing resulted from the Congress but a fresh general condemnation of the Trade.

Though the United States would not adopt Great Britain's suggestions, some real steps were taken to further the humanitarian cause; naval forces were maintained in commission for the policing of American waters against slavers, and in 1820 by Act of Congress any American citizen engaged in the Trade was subjected to the penalties of piracy. To the Congress of Verona, in 1822, Canning again made proposals for the banning of colonial produce raised by those Powers who had not abolished, or who notoriously continued, the Slave-trade, and for its proclamation and punishment as piracy. Once more, France blocked the way and demanded delay, thus dooming the Congress to sterility in this as in other matters. It seemed that the only prospect of progress towards the complete suppression of the cruelty and waste of human life that beset the Trade, lay in concerted action between Britain and the United States, and Canning turned his attention to carrying forward to some definite result the negotiations which had been undertaken in 1820 and 1821. But little could be achieved, and a Convention negotiated by Stratford Canning, Huskisson and Rush in London in 1824 was so amended by the Senate before ratification as to be useless to secure the results aimed at, and was therefore abandoned by the British Government.

No further action of importance in the long struggle for the suppression of the Slave-trade took place until the Revolution of 1830 placed the more Liberal Orléans régime in power in France. In 1826, Brazil entered into a Convention with Great Britain promising to abolish the Trade in three years; and, in 1830, this promise was carried out. By her Treaty of November 30th, 1831, supplemented by a later Treaty, of May 22nd, 1833, France agreed to the reciprocal Right of Search to which she had so long demurred. The vessels that

were captured were to be carried in for adjudication before the competent Court of the country to which they belonged. These Treaties signified a great step forward, for they put an end to the use of the French flag for covering slave cargoes, which had been very common. France and Great Britain jointly urged upon the United States the adhesion to their Treaty, but without success, owing to the fear of the United States Government of alarming the Southern States.

When Andrew Jackson succeeded John Quincy Adams as President of the United States, on March 4th, 1829, it seemed likely that he would continue to be animated by strong anti-British sentiments and that America would enter upon a stormy period of foreign politics. His earlier career had been marked by an aggressiveness that had given rise to many complications, but the consequent expectations were not fulfilled, largely owing to preoccupations on the Mexican frontier. A difficulty arose with France in 1831 as to the payment of indemnity for injuries done to American ships during the Napoleonic Wars. It is only of interest here because, after a good deal of threatening and bellicose language on either side of the Atlantic, the difficulty was finally compromised in 1836 by the friendly offices of Great Britain as mediator. The period of Jackson's presidency was marked in the United States by the consolidation of the power of the pro-slavery party of the South and by the rapid extension of settlement in all directions, and especially in the south-west, which brought frontier questions into great prominence. Each of these developments had much influence on the course of Anglo-American relations and difficulties became acute under Jackson's successor, Martin Van Buren (1837–41), though their principal danger and solution supervened under the two following Presidents, Tyler and Polk (1841–49). The questions at issue were of two kinds—the one being of special interest to the South, in relation to the suppression of the Slave-trade and Great Britain's relation with Cuba, Texas and California, the other of more immediate interest to the North, as concerned with the boundary between British North America and the United States, especially in Maine and Oregon.

Gallatin had, in November, 1826, negotiated a Convention[1] finally arranging the sums to be paid by Great Britain as indemnities for American claims arising out of the War of 1812 according to the First Article of the Treaty of Ghent; and he took the opportunity

[1] *U.S. Treaties and Conventions*, pp. 424–6.

of the negotiations for the renewal of the Commercial Convention of 1818 to make a serious attempt to clear up all the outstanding Boundary disputes between the two Powers. Negotiations concerning the Oregon question had been attempted on the motion of the United States in 1823; but they arrived at no result. The British proposal, that the Forty-ninth Parallel should form the boundary so far as the Columbia river, and that the line should then pass down it to the Pacific Ocean, was rejected; and the counter-proposal was made that the boundary should follow the Parallel straight across to the Pacific. To this counter-proposal Britain made no reply, and, when the question was reopened on Canning's initiative in 1826, it was still found impossible to reach a definite settlement. On August 6th, 1827, therefore, it was agreed to continue in force for an indefinite period the arrangement for a joint occupation of the Oregon country which had been made by the Third Article of the Convention of 1818. This was to be continued without impairing the claims of either Party, and the Convention might be abrogated by twelve months' notice from either.

The Commissioners appointed under the Treaty of Ghent to delimit the frontier between Maine and New Brunswick disagreed radically in their interpretation of the Treaty and were discharged in 1822. Settlers from both sides were coming into the disputed districts and local difficulties were arising as to land and lumber grants. Maine was separated from Massachusetts in 1820 and erected into a new State of the Union; and this further complicated matters. In 1827, Gallatin succeeded in negotiating a Convention to refer the matters in dispute to the arbitration of the King of the Netherlands; but, when the arbitrator gave his award in 1831 in favour of a division of the disputed territory, the Senate refused to accept it, and the matter fell back into abeyance.

Under President Van Buren, the difficulties along the northern frontier became more troublesome and menacing, and they demanded much diplomatic attention and gave rise to much public agitation on both sides of the Atlantic, before they could be smoothed out. The rising of 1837 in Upper Canada under William Lyon Mackenzie found many sympathisers in the neighbouring State of New York, who did all they could to arm and supply the insurgents over the border, in defiance of the obligations of neutrality. In December, 1837, a force of insurgents assembled on an island on the American side of the Niagara River in preparation for a raid into Canadian

territory. They were supplied from the New York shore by means of a small steamer, the *Caroline*, and on December 26th a party of Canadian militia crossed the river and destroyed the vessel after a scuffle, in which an American was killed. This violation of the territory of the United States provoked a great outcry, especially along the Northern border, where great hopes were cherished for the success of the rebellion and the consequent annexation of Canada to the United States. President Van Buren at once strengthened his precautions against further breaches of neutrality on either side, but he was much attacked by his political opponents and the Press, because he did not threaten Great Britain with hostilities. In 1840, one Alexander McLeod, who claimed that he had taken part in the Canadian raid which had destroyed the *Caroline*, boasted of his exploits in New York City, and was arrested and imprisoned for trial before the State Courts on a charge of murder. The arrest aroused a great deal of feeling in England, and Daniel Webster, who had just become Secretary of State, was informed by a trustworthy private correspondent that there was but one feeling among all parties and all ranks: if McLeod should be condemned, it would be such an outrage upon international justice that the scabbard must be thrown away at once[1]. Palmerston wrote to the same effect to the British Minister in Washington.

> I have spoken most seriously to Stevenson on this matter, and have told him, speaking not officially, but as a private friend, that if McLeod is executed there must be war. He said he quite felt it; that he is aware that all parties have but one feeling on the subject, and he promised to write to the President privately as well as officially[2].

The British Minister's official protests in Washington against the arrest and trial took the ground that the attack on the *Caroline* was an act done under military orders and was, therefore, of a public character, so that persons engaged in it could not incur personal responsibility. Webster decided to accept this view of the matter, and the Federal Government attempted to secure the removal of the case from the State to the Federal courts. The *habeas corpus*, however, was refused, and feeling ran very high against the Federal authorities, who were accused of interfering unwarrantably in the internal affairs of a State and of truckling to Great Britain. Agitation arose all through the region bordering upon Canada in favour of

[1] Vernon Harcourt to Webster, March 12th, 1841. Curtis, *Life of Webster*, II. 62, *note*.

[2] Palmerston to Fox, February 9th, 1841. Bulwer's *Life of Palmerston*, III. 49.

warlike measures; but ultimately, in October, 1841, when the case came on for trial, McLeod, who was aided by the best legal advice that the Federal Government could secure, was able to prove an *alibi* and secure acquittal from the New York Court[1]. The danger thus passed over; but it served to keep alight the fire of the anti-British feeling in the Northern States to which many other causes were now contributing fuel.

Just as, in the South, Great Britain was the enemy, thwarting the legitimate designs of good slave-holding Americans at every turn by her Abolitionist principles and her incessant crusade against the Slave-trade, so, in the North, she was the only Power with whose claims Americans came into contact and who therefore excited all their patriotic enmity. The many questions that were still outstanding between the United States and Great Britain were of far greater interest to the American public than to the British, whose relations to America formed only a comparatively small part of their field of foreign affairs. But this attitude was gradually changing, owing to the renewed interest in Great Britain of the public at large in Canadian affairs. The agitation caused by the *Caroline* case, especially in New York State, was coincident with a recrudescence in New England of the question of the Maine Boundary which led not only to bitter anti-British feeling, but also to a conflict between the State and Federal authorities, such as marked McLeod's case. Both parties had by 1836 put aside the recommendations of the King of the Netherlands for the division of the territory's on the Maine border, and fresh offers for adjustment by President Van Buren were thwarted by the hostility of the authorities of the State of Maine to all attempts at compromise[2]. Constant difficulties were taking place in the disputed territory, owing to the exercise of authority by the rival Governments of New Brunswick and Maine and the arrest on one side or the other of officials engaged in carrying out their duties, which had to be apologetically overruled by the Imperial or Federal authorities[3]. In 1837, it was reported that the Colonial Governments were jointly planning to construct a railway through the disputed territory in order to bring Halifax into overland communication with Quebec. The United States formally protested against this plan and the

[1] For correspondence relating to the McLeod case see *State Papers*, XXIX. 1127 sqq.

[2] *Senate Executive Documents* 319, 25th Congress, 2nd Session.

[3] *State Papers*, XXII, XXIII, XXV, XXVII. Various correspondence with United States.

British authorities had to acquiesce and order the Colonial Governments to discontinue their operations[1]. In 1838, New Brunswick lumbermen were cutting timber in the forests along the Aroostook river, a tributary of the river St John; and an agent of the State of Maine who had been sent by the Governor with a small force to put a stop to their activities was arrested and imprisoned by the New Brunswick authorities. This arrest and others that followed were treated by Maine as acts of war; armed forces were raised, forts erected, and what was called somewhat grandiloquently the "Restook War" began. Feelings ran high on either side of the border, and Congress passed an Act authorising the President to undertake the military defence of the territory in dispute[2]. But neither Government wished to push matters to an extreme, and in 1839, through the authorised mediation of General Scott, an officer of the United States' regular army, declarations were secured both from New Brunswick and Maine that they would leave the matter to the negotiation of the Supreme Governments and would meanwhile withdraw their military forces[3].

The North-eastern Boundary dispute was not only concerned with Maine; for it had been found that, owing to faulty surveying in 1774, the actual boundary between the United States and Canada at the head of Lake Champlain did not coincide with the Forty-fifth Parallel, which had been agreed upon as the boundary in the Treaty of 1783. Owing to this, certain lands, including important fortified works of the United States at Rouse's Point, which had been regarded as American territory for sixty years, really lay on the Canadian side of the Border. There was also a boundary difficulty in the west as to the tracing of the line from Lake Huron to the north-western angle of the Lake of the Woods. This boundary was arranged by Article VII of the Treaty of Ghent, and the Commissioners who had completed the tracing of the line through the Lakes were directed to proceed to the further surveys necessary for its delimitation. The work began in 1822; but considerable differences of opinion appeared as to the line through Lake Superior, and in October, 1827, the Commission came to an end without reaching an agreement[4]. Three Boundary questions, therefore, remained at issue between the Powers besides the long-standing dispute as to the Oregon Territory.

[1] *State Papers*, XXV. 938–43. [2] *U.S. Statutes at Large*, V. 355.
[3] Sir John Harvey's account of this agreement is quoted by Peel in *Hansard*, LXVII. 1238. [4] *State Papers*, LVII. 823.

On March 4th, 1841, Daniel Webster became Secretary of State to President Harrison, Van Buren's successor, and he continued to serve under John Tyler, who became President on Harrison's death a month later. Webster was thoroughly familiar with the questions at issue and his statesmanship was equal to the difficult task of attempting a comprehensive settlement. Such a settlement was imperatively necessary, if the two English-speaking Powers were to be saved from drifting into war. Concerning almost every one of the outstanding difficulties there had been threats of hostilities, and on the Maine border there had been actual skirmishes; but nearly all the matters at issue admitted of arrangement by negotiation, and they would have been less dangerous, had they not been complicated by a fresh outbreak of the perennial difficulties as to the Right of Search.

Between 1833 and 1839 Great Britain secured Treaties granting her the right of search from Hayti, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, Mexico, Texas, Denmark and the Hanse Towns. On December 20th, 1841, by the conclusion of a Quintuple Treaty with France, Austria, Prussia and Russia embodying a mutual right of search, the network of Treaties that was to entrap the last of the elusive slave-traders was nearly closed. The principal Article of the Quintuple Treaty provided that

> the High Contracting Parties agree by common consent that those ships of war which shall be provided with special warrants and orders...may search every merchant vessel belonging to any one of the High Contracting Parties which shall on reasonable grounds be suspected of being engaged in the traffic in slaves[1].

This gave a free hand to the British naval officers engaged in the suppression of the Trade; but their efforts were nullified by the American loophole that still remained. The period during which the Quintuple Treaty was being negotiated was marked by a progressive acerbity in the relations of Great Britain and the United States on maritime matters, and the difficulties as to the Maine boundary and the McLeod case were undoubtedly made more dangerous and likely to lead to war by the concurrence of these questions.

On March 11th, 1840, an American naval officer commanding the United States naval force off Sierra Leone entered into an engagement with the British naval commander on the same station, binding them to assist each other and to detain all vessels under

[1] Palmerston was deprived by Guizot's delays of the satisfaction of signing the Quintuple Treaty that he had laboured so hard to secure. He was bitterly aggrieved. Ashley I. 411.

American colours employed in the traffic in slaves. If found to be American property, such vessels were to be delivered over to the commander of any American cruiser on the station; or, if belonging to other nations, they were to be dealt with according to the Treaties of Great Britain with those nations. This was, practically, an extension to vessels sailing under the American flag on the coast of Africa the constant practice of United States' cruisers in the Caribbean, who, as openly admitted by the American Press, were notoriously in the habit of examining all suspicious vessels, whether sailing under the British flag or any other. But when, in consequence of the above agreement, British officers became more active in the stoppage of slavers sailing under the American flag, a great outcry at once arose. The United States Government was deluged with complaints; but unmistakable evidence was obtained by Great Britain of the misuse of the flag[1] and this was made the basis of serious official protests. Palmerston conducted the correspondence in a tone of steadily rising temper, and, on August 27th, 1841, only a day before the Melbourne Ministry left office, he addressed to Stevenson, the American Minister, a Note of a most uncompromising character stating that

> the examination of papers of merchantmen suspected of being engaged in the Slave-trade even though they hoist a United States flag, is a proceeding which it is absolutely necessary that British cruisers employed in the suppression of the Slave-trade should continue to practice.

But, luckily for the prospects of peace, within a few days of his signing this Note, Palmerston was succeeded by the more conciliatory Aberdeen, and Stevenson by Everett. Aberdeen invited the adhesion of the United States to the "holy alliance" (as he called it on the very day of the signing of the Quintuple Treaty). His language was most conciliatory, and he expressly disclaimed any desire to infringe the Maritime Rights claimed by America[2].

The attempt to secure harmony, however, was obstructed by Lewis Cass, the American Minister in Paris, whose long-continued hatred of Great Britain made him suspicious of the motives of all her proceedings. In his opinion, it must be the purpose of Great Britain to arrogate to herself the right of policing the high seas, so as to menace the freedom of the United States upon the ocean. The uncompromising vigour of Palmerston's correspondence on the Right

[1] *State Papers*, XXIX. 629–56.

[2] Aberdeen to Everett, December 20th, 1841, in Webster's *Diplomatic and Official Papers*, p. 145.

of Visit (Search), had led President Tyler in his annual Message to Congress on December 7th, 1841, to state emphatically his views concerning the Freedom of the Seas, and to declare that

> however desirous the United States may be for the suppression of the Slave-trade, they cannot consent to interpolations into the maritime code at the mere will and pleasure of other governments. They deny the right of any such interpolation to any one or all the nations of the earth, without their consent[1].

This statement Cass pointedly, and on his own responsibility, communicated to the French Government on February 13th, 1842, with very strong protests against the conclusion of the Quintuple Treaty and the adhesion of France to it. The language of his letter was that of unmistakable threat.

> If the fact and the principle advanced by Lord Aberdeen are correct that these treaties...confer not only the right to violate the American flag, but make this measure a duty, then it is also the duty of France to pursue the same course. Should she put this construction upon her obligations, it is obvious that the United States must do to her as they will do to England if she persists in this attack upon her independence....They would prepare themselves with apprehension, indeed, but without dismay —with regret, but with firmness for one of those desperate struggles which have sometimes occurred in the history of the world[2].

Cass probably said more than he meant; but his tone was indicative of the actual state of affairs. Just before he wrote, a case had occurred in connexion with a cargo of slaves that had caused intense irritation against Great Britain throughout the southern States. In November, 1841, an American vessel, the *Créole*, was carrying a cargo of slaves from one American port to another when they mutinied and overcame the crew and murdered one of the passengers. The mutineers then carried the vessel into the British port of Nassau in the Bahamas. Even before emancipation in the British West Indies had been accomplished, slaves who escaped into British territory secured their freedom; and now the Colonial authorities, after arresting the murderers, freed the rest of the negroes in spite of the protests of the Americans in the harbour. They were prepared to resist the process of liberation by using force, but were prevented by the appearance of British troops. This was only the most notorious of a long series of cases in which, since Emancipation, fugitive slaves

[1] Pres. Tyler's Message to Congress, December 7th, 1841. Richardson, *Messages of the Presidents*, IV. 77.

[2] Cass to Guizot, February 13th, 1842, in Webster's *Dipl. and Off. Papers*, p. 179.

had gained their freedom on reaching the Bahamas, but the American Government could secure no redress[1].

The existence of slavery and the growth of the power of the party in favour of maintaining it were making it impossible for the United States to march in step with the other civilised Powers. America might officially protest her readiness to join in the suppression of the Slave-trade in her own way, but those who supported the party in power, the slave-holding interests, were determined to allow no obstacle in the way of their illicit supply of slaves and even to press for the legalised reopening of the traffic. Thanks to the consequent remissness of the United States Government in the enforcement of their own laws, the American flag had everywhere become the protection of slave smugglers, though they were stigmatised in the Statute-book as pirates. The traffic grew to enormously greater proportions than it had ever reached in its most prosperous legitimate days in the eighteenth century, and with it all the circumstances of cruelty incidental to its illicit nature. As a result of deliberate but unavowed policy, "the American Slave-trade finally came to be carried on principally by United States capital, in U.S. ships, officered by U.S. citizens and under the U.S. flag[2]." The efforts of all other Powers for its suppression were all but condemned to sterility, and the relations between Great Britain and the United States were poisoned for years by this most detestable struggle[3].

II. THE WEBSTER-ASHBURTON TREATY, 1841–1842

About the end of October, 1841, when the acquittal of Alexander McLeod removed one cause of acute danger to the good relations between the two countries, Secretary Webster proposed to the British Minister in Washington that the Maine Boundary question should be freed from the labyrinth of complicated historical argument in which it had so long remained and that entirely new negotiations should be opened for the fixing of a conventional line. This offer followed Palmerston's absolute rejection of previous American projects for

[1] Full details of the *Créole* case will be found in J. B. Moore's *International Arbitrations*, I. 411–12, 417. By the Claims Arbitration of 1853 the British Government were compelled to indemnify the owners of the slaves in spite of protest. Correspondence between Webster and Lord Ashburton in Webster's *Dipl. and Off. Papers*, pp. 83–95.

[2] W. E. B. Du Bois, *Suppression of the Slave Trade*, p. 162.

[3] Correspondence between Webster and Lord Ashburton, in Webster's *Dipl. and Off. Papers*, pp. 83–95.

settlement; but, as the Ministry had changed before it was received in England, it was far better assured of a favourable reception[1]. The situation on the frontier was so menacing and the British Government were receiving such disquieting reports from their officers in Canada that a serious attempt at compromise was necessary. Every month that passed was undermining British dominion in New Brunswick by the onward pressure of the population of Maine. It would be unwise to enter upon a new Commission that might last for years and must therefore, lead either to a loss of the disputed territory by constant encroachment or to the necessity for a resort to arms for its protection. Sir Robert Peel therefore determined to accept Webster's overtures and to attempt the opening of a comprehensive negotiation for a settlement of all the outstanding disputes between the two Powers. For accomplishing such an honourable adjustment the ordinary diplomatic channels were hardly sufficient, and the Cabinet therefore determined to despatch a special Mission to the United States. As has been mentioned, a most conciliatory disposition was shown by Lord Aberdeen to the American Minister in his despatch of December 20th, 1841, relating to the Right of Search; and this may be regarded as a foreshadowing of the action that was in contemplation. At a meeting with the Foreign Secretary on December 27th, after a few remarks from Lord Aberdeen on the difficulty of clearing up the points of controversy by a continuance of ordinary diplomatic discussions, Mr Everett was informed that the Government had determined to take a decisive step forward by sending a special Envoy to the United States with full power to make a final settlement of the matters in dispute. In the choice of the individual for the Mission Lord Aberdeen added that he had been mainly influenced by a desire to select a person who would be peculiarly acceptable in the United States. Ministers undoubtedly bestowed great care on the choice of their Envoy, and Aberdeen's statement really represented what they tried to effect. Some personages of long diplomatic experience, like Sir Charles Vaughan and Lord Heytesbury, were passed over in favour of Alexander Baring, Lord Ashburton, who, though he

[1] During the debates upon the Oregon question Webster was violently attacked for his action in regard to the negotiations relating to the Maine Boundary, etc. He defended himself before the Senate in April, 1846, in a long speech which furnishes an excellent summary of the intricate negotiations in the period before 1842 in relation to the Maine Boundary, the *Caroline* and McLeod case and the Slave-trade. (See Webster's *Dipl. and Off. Papers*, pp. 239–99.) For another view of the negotiations see Palmerston's speech of March 21st, 1843 (*Hansard*, LXVII. 1162–1218), and Peel's reply (*ibid.* 1218–1252).

had done great service to the State, had never served in a diplomatic post but was likely to be *persona grata* in the United States. His wife was an American born, he knew American life thoroughly and he was popular with many influential friends. There were some misgivings in England as to his supposed leanings to America; but, when the appointment was publicly announced, it was generally acquiesced in as satisfactory. Webster expressed the willingness of the United States Government to receive the Mission, and in February, 1842, Aberdeen drew up the Instructions which Ashburton was to take with him to America. To Everett he had expressed the view that the finding of a solution for the Right of Search difficulty was the most important of all, but in the very general terms of the Instructions this question appeared only late in the list, and Ashburton was informed that the purposes of his Mission were stated in the order of their importance; the North-eastern Boundary, the North-western, the *Caroline* incident and the Right of Search. In dealing with these matters he was given practically a free hand; but, under the influence of Colonial military opinion, Aberdeen on March 31st, 1842, sent him fresh and explicit Instructions concerning the Maine Boundary, which were designed to secure the freedom of the military road between Quebec and Halifax.

These Instructions, which would have very much increased the difficulties of his position in his first discussions, Ashburton did not receive for more than a fortnight after his arrival in Washington, and by that time he had availed himself to the full of the opportunity of free and informal conversation with Webster[1]. The Federal Government, in its turn, was hampered in its negotiations by the stubbornness of Maine and Massachusetts in defence of their extreme claims; and Webster, therefore, wished in the first instance to discuss other matters than the Maine Boundary. The American public expected that the special Mission had power to settle all outstanding questions. But such was far from being the case; and, had it not been that Ashburton was willing to take a good deal of responsibility upon himself and adopt unconventional methods, there is little doubt that the result would have been failure. Webster appears to have chosen the method of friendly conferences without the exchange of written papers, until the time came to record in detail the results reached. To this method Ashburton agreed, and both negotiators, at a later

[1] The best and most recent account of the Ashburton-Webster negotiations is by E. D. Adams, *American Historical Review* (1912), XVII. 764–82.

date, were severely attacked for adopting it. However, it afforded the only hope of success, for it was agreed that, after fifty-eight years of discussion, the Treaty of 1783 could not be carried out in strict conformity with its terms, and that the case was, therefore, one for agreement by compromise[1].

The Oregon matter appeared to Ashburton to be of little importance; and neither he nor Webster introduced it seriously into their discussions. The *Caroline* case was cleared up by a formal Note conveying the apology of the British Government for the violation of the independent jurisdiction of the United States, the proceeding having been due to the necessity of compassing the destruction of the vessel. The question of the *Créole* presented greater difficulty. Ashburton's Instructions were entirely silent with regard to it, but it had given rise to considerable public excitement in the South, and he therefore, on his own responsibility, entered upon a full discussion of the position of British Colonial officials towards American ships having slaves on board. Webster proposed an Article combining provisions of security against a repetition of the freeing of American slaves in British ports, and for the extradition of criminals, and thus enforcing on Colonial officials the duty of extraditing slaves accused of mutiny against their masters, as in the *Créole* case. But Aberdeen had decisively refused satisfaction to Everett's protests in London, and when Webster learned of this he saw that it was impossible to go further, though he was careful not to irritate southern sentiment by publishing the refusal, for this would have imperilled seriously the success of the whole negotiations.

A large part of the informal conversations between Ashburton and Webster was occupied with the Right of Search, the maintenance of which in American opinion involved the danger of the renewal of the impressment of seamen from American ships, should Great Britain again engage in naval war. Ashburton desired to dispel American suspicions, and he endeavoured to secure from Aberdeen a formal abandonment of Britain's ancient claims and urged most strongly the publication of a declaration on the subject. Aberdeen's reply was quite decided. He refused his assent on the ground that the abandonment of impressment would be "tantamount to an absolute and entire renunciation of the indefeasible right inherent in the British Crown to command the allegiance and services of its

[1] Ashburton to Aberdeen, June 29th, 1842. The references to the unpublished despatches may be found in Prof. Adams's article.

subjects wherever found[1]." He also refused to include the crime of mutiny and revolt on board ship in the proposed Article of the Treaty relating to extraditable offences. It was not until 1858 that the claim to a right of impressment was formally abandoned by Lord Malmesbury, Foreign Secretary in the Derby Cabinet, who declared that Great Britain accepted the principle of international law publicly laid down by the United States and "frankly confessed that we have no legal claim to the right of visit and search which has hitherto been assumed[2]."

In regard to the Slave-trade, Ashburton felt that he was able to make some real progress. Two American naval officers familiar with the conditions prevailing on the African coast in May, 1842, made an official report to Secretary Webster, giving their opinion on the feasibility of securing cooperation for the suppression of slave-trading by the joint cruising of American and British vessels. This report was very welcome to Ashburton, and he commended it to Lord Aberdeen, who generally approved it. The negotiations for the arrangement therefore went forward without a hitch, and by Articles VIII and IX of the Treaty, as finally concluded, provision was made for joint cruising on the African coast of American and British squadrons to enforce separately and respectively the laws, rights and obligations of each of the two countries for the suppression of the Slave-trade. These squadrons were to be independent of each other, but were to act in concert[3]. The result, however, was practically negligible, for the stipulation of the Treaty was never carried out by the United States for any consecutive period, and the controversies as to the right of visit continued. The party upholding slavery in Congress made several attempts to abrogate the Articles[4] and every obstacle was put in the way of cooperation. Great Britain was accused of the most selfish motives in her actions, and not until the very eve of the Civil War was any further effective step taken. In 1862, after the Abolition of Slavery in the United States, satisfactory concerted action was at last achieved.

The settlement of the Boundary questions, which was expected by the British Government to be a matter of great difficulty, and concerning which Lord Aberdeen was moved by Colonial pressure

[1] Aberdeen to Ashburton, June 3, 1842.

[2] A *résumé* of the more important documents relating to the claim of the right of impressment is to be found in J. B. Moore's *Digest of International Law*, II. 987–1001.

[3] *U.S. Treaties and Conventions*, p. 436.

[4] *E.g.* December 16th, 1850 (House); May 29th, 1854 (Senate). In 1856–7 the Governor of South Carolina was officially urging the reopening of the Trade.

to furnish Lord Ashburton with definite and restrictive Instructions, for the most part proved simple by the direct methods of compromise adopted by the two congenial negotiators. This involved, in most cases, merely the splitting of the difference and the balancing of a concession by the one side against an approximately equally valuable concession of the other. The Boundary through the St Lawrence and the Great Lakes was settled by mutual concessions and the grant of reciprocal rights of navigation. At the head of Lake Champlain, Lord Ashburton agreed to relinquish Great Britain's strict rights under the Treaty of 1783 and to recognise the *status quo*, in order to secure concessions on the Maine Boundary. The fort and lands at Rouse's Point, to which the State of New York attached much importance, remained therefore in American hands. The settlement of the North-eastern Boundary was delayed by a stubborn insistence of the States of Massachusetts and Maine in their demands. Webster ultimately bought out their claims by payments from Federal funds and was then, in the course of four days of personal discussion with Ashburton, able to agree upon a boundary. This was the last point left for decision, and the negotiators were hereupon ready to draw up the definite Treaties.

It was at first purposed to include the boundary settlements in one Treaty and the matters of extradition and the Slave-trade in another. But finally, in order to facilitate the passage of the latter clauses through the Senate, the whole was embodied in a single Treaty which was signed on the morning of August 9th, 1842, and ratified by the Senate after a three days' debate, in which Webster was violently attacked for his concessions and for his way of carrying on the negotiations. By this settlement, seven-twelfths of the disputed area in the north-east was allotted to the United States, *i.e.* less than had been awarded by the King of the Netherlands, and Webster could therefore be accused of abandoning clear American rights. But the value of the territory acquired by the United States was certainly greater than that retained by Great Britain; so that Ashburton could be attacked in Parliament for his "capitulation." These attacks did not fail to have effect, and the Treaty was the subject of acrimonious discussion on both sides of the Atlantic for many months. Palmerston was most bitter in his criticism both in Parliament and in the Press, and even went so far as to accuse Ashburton of undue partiality to American claims under the influence of his American wife[1]. But the

[1] For debates on Treaty see *Hansard*, LXVI. 113, LXVII. 1162, LXVIII. 599, 1159.

general sense of the House of Commons was against these censures, and ultimately, on Hume's motion, the thanks of the House were accorded to the Envoy. In the United States the Treaty was most loudly denounced by Southern advocacy, such as that of Benton and Buchanan. The discussions excited more public interest than they would otherwise have done, by reason of the tardily revealed fact that each Government had had in its secret possession a map supporting the contentions of the other as to the exact meaning of the Treaty of 1783 in respect to the Maine Boundary[1]. Into these controversies it is unnecessary to enter, but they had some effect in keeping alive the anti-British feelings of the educated classes in the Northern States.

III. TEXAS AND OREGON, 1840–1845

The conclusion of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty had been looked forward to by the British Government as promising to clear up the outstanding differences that beset Anglo-American relations; but in reality it was nothing of the kind, and was but the prelude to a period of far more acute difficulty and ill-feeling than had marked those relations for many years. For this many causes were responsible. The United States had entered on a period of aggressive expansion in the south and west, under the lead of men from the Southern States who were filled with the deepest suspicion of Great Britain, partly traditional, partly because of her enthusiasm against slavery and partly, also, because of her position in the Caribbean. The old animosity in the New England States largely passed away during the period that saw the growth of the Abolition movement; but a new element of anti-British feeling was being introduced with the great influx of Irish immigrants who came over in ever-increasing numbers. To this element in the electorate political parties found their readiest appeal lay in denunciations of British policy. The Irish provided the Democratic party with their strongest auxiliaries in the North for the campaign of anti-British sentiment which was a regular election device in the South and West.

Anglo-American relations were of comparatively slight interest to the British public, and American affairs were hardly understood by it. To even the best informed of British Ministers the inveterate American suspicion of their motives seemed inexplicable, for they knew that the whole electorate was averse to enlarging British public

[1] The details of this controversy with accompanying maps can be found in J. B. Moore's *International Arbitrations*, I. 154–7, and an article by Col. D. A. Mills in *United Empire*, n.s. II. 683–712.

engagements in the American Continents, and that the tendency of the time was rather to lighten Great Britain's Colonial burdens than to add to them. But suspicion of British designs on Cuba was constant in the minds of America's rulers. In 1837, in consequence of a reported loan from British financiers to Spain, coupled with a guarantee of rights over Spain and Porto Rico, Palmerston was pointedly informed that the United States would never acquiesce in the transfer of Cuba to any of the Great Maritime Powers. In 1840, and again in 1843, the American Ministers in Spain were warned to be on their guard against British intrigues with the Spanish Government and to counter them by every means in their power[1]. These suspicions of Great Britain's motives and of her plans for annexing the Spanish colony were entirely baseless, and the only desire of each successive British Ministry was to preserve the *status quo* in the Caribbean. There was undoubtedly a disinclination to see so aggressive a Power as the United States in possession of Havana; but no responsible person wished to add another great population of negroes to that for which Great Britain was already responsible in Jamaica and the other West Indian Islands, and whose rise to the status of free citizens was causing her so much anxiety.

The real centre of difficulty now lay not in Cuba, but in Mexico and Texas, where Great Britain was in a very perplexing position[2]. The south-western boundary of the Louisiana purchase of 1803 had never been exactly defined, and from the Treaty of 1819, whereby Florida was annexed to the United States, Texas was excluded. The Mexican hold upon this great and fertile boundary was of the slightest, and in 1827 the American immigrants who had entered the country from the north proclaimed their independence of Mexico and established an independent republic, with a view to securing annexation by the United States. In this hope they were disappointed; and for some years they had to maintain a strenuous defence against the attempts of Mexico to reconquer them. To secure aid in their struggle and a recognition of the independence of their republic, repeated Missions visited the United States and Great Britain, the former being reminded that recognition was a preliminary to annexa-

[1] Cf. Lawrence's edition of Wheaton's *International Law*, pp. 679–80. Stevenson to Sec. Forsyth, June 16th, 1837; Forsyth to Vail, July 15th, 1840; Webster to Consul at Havana, January 14th, 1843.

[2] The story of the long and complicated negotiations over Texas has been worked out from the original correspondence by Prof. E. D. Adams in his *British Activities in Texas*.

tion, and the latter that only recognition and assistance from Great Britain could prevent annexation and the great increase of the power of the United States in the Caribbean. The question became acute in 1838–39; for British subjects were assisting Mexico in the War in increasing numbers, and both sides were obtaining loans and military equipment from British sources.

In formulating his policy, Palmerston was moved principally by his desire to secure the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Caribbean and a reluctance to see a great extension of the influence of the United States over its shores. The reconquest of Texas by Mexico was patently impossible; but, if the two republics could be brought to agreement, they might jointly form a bulwark against the aggressiveness of the United States and the extension of slavery and provide an alternative source for the supply of cotton. The British mills were dangerously dependent upon supplies of raw material from the Southern States, and new sources would be of great value. In accordance with such a policy as this, Palmerston in 1840 decided to recognise the independence of the republic of Texas, and Treaties were negotiated granting commercial concessions, the prohibition of the Slave-trade and the Right of Search. But no dependence could be placed on the rulers of Texas, and the ratification of the Treaties was thus prevented until Aberdeen had succeeded Palmerston and was left to deal with the situation. In pursuance of his design for an accommodation of all outstanding difficulties with the United States, Aberdeen's idea was to secure joint action on the part of the three principal Powers with interests in the Caribbean and a mutual renunciation between them of aggressive designs. In concert with Guizot, he set on foot complicated negotiations for exercising pressure on Mexico to recognise accomplished facts and tried to secure the assistance of the United States in giving stability to the situation. But the inveterate distrust of British motives and the settled American aversion to joint action led to an uncompromising refusal. The most active parties in the South and in Texas were determined to secure annexation in order to increase the number of slave-holding States in the Union and balance the ever-growing power of the North.

Tripartite intervention to secure Texan independence having been refused, Aberdeen entered upon a line of policy that was very intricate. It was never clear, and often marked by signs of hesitation and vacillation. The main idea which he seems to have been pursuing was a balance of power in the Caribbean and the preservation of Texas

as a buffer-State against the advance of the United States. The difficulties were increased by the very injudicious proceedings of British Representatives and of unofficial travellers in Mexico and Texas. The highly-coloured accounts of these actions in the American Press convinced the American public of British enmity towards the United States and added largely to the danger of the contest concerning the Oregon boundary, with which the question of Texan annexation was closely bound up.

Aberdeen's policy was from the first doomed to failure; for no reliance whatever could be placed upon Mexico, which was a prey to chronic anarchy. No vital interest of Great Britain was concerned, whereas the people of the United States were resolutely determined to push their boundaries southwards and there was an overwhelming public opinion in favour of the annexation of Texas. This was accomplished in 1846 and led to the outbreak of the Mexican War and the resulting acquisition of California[1] and of vast new territories in the south-west. Any further possibility of political action in this region on the part of Great Britain was removed and the chapter was closed. Though little known to the British public, it had contained many elements of danger, and Aberdeen's tortuous policy in regard to it did much harm to the possibility of friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States.

The difficulties concerning Cuba, Texas and California have here been dealt with before the much better known controversy as to Oregon with which they were bound up, because its danger to the peace of the two countries, the United States and Great Britain, was greatly increased by the diplomatic intrigues that were concerned with the questions already treated. It was difficult for the general public in this country to understand why the Oregon question which had been dealt with amicably for years should suddenly spring into prominence with what was considered an outrageous attack upon British rights. But the American public regarded the dispute as intimately bound up with those concerning Texas and Mexico, and felt that British animosity and intrigue against the United States must be countered by the use of the same means in each direction. As was shown above, the widespread angry feelings against Great Britain were designedly fostered by the Democratic party in furtherance of its political aims in the Presidential campaign of 1844; and, when the

[1] For an account of the connection of Great Britain with the loss of California by Mexico see an article by Prof. E. D. Adams in *The American Historical Review*, XIV. 744–63. It is reprinted in his *British Activities in Texas*, pp. 234–64.

campaign had been won and President Polk entered upon office, he was faced, not only by the difficulties of the Mexican affair, but also by the troubles of a more violent anti-British popular agitation than had been witnessed for many years.

The contest for the possession of the Oregon Territory first became a question of practical politics in connexion with the Ashburton-Webster negotiations of 1842. Though by mutual agreement the question was put on one side by the two chief negotiators, and the arrangement of 1827 for joint occupation was continued in force, the news that negotiations of some sort were on foot moved the American colonists who had recently settled in the southern part of the Territory to send a delegate to Washington, in order to push their exclusive claims. In the spring of 1843, he returned with large numbers of American colonists from the middle West, who began farming in the valley of the Columbia River and disputed possession of the Territory with the factors of the Hudson's Bay Company and with certain Canadian colonists whom they had introduced, mainly into the valley of the Fraser River. Appeals for public support of their exclusive claims were made both by the Americans and by the Company, and, early in 1844, when the difficulties about Texas were at their height, resolutions were passed by both Houses of Congress demanding that all diplomatic correspondence on the Oregon question should be laid before them. Democratic speakers in the campaign of 1844 pressed American claims to the whole Territory, as far as the Russian border, in their most extreme form, and "Fifty-four Forty or Fight" became a popular war-cry. The campaign found its echo in the British Press; and, in contrast to the usual course of things, Anglo-American relations in the summer of 1844 began to excite considerable public interest in this country, though few here were aware of what was going on behind the scenes. A subtle diplomatic game was, in fact, being played by the American Secretaries of State in which they were fostering the public claim to the whole of the Oregon territory as far as 54° 40′, while behind the veil of diplomatic secrecy they were offering to compromise on the Forty-ninth Parallel to the Pacific. On the other hand, Aberdeen was publicly claiming the territory down to the Columbia River, while secretly he had proposed the Forty-ninth Parallel as the boundary as far as the Straits. Nothing but serious mutual distrust could result from such a policy.

In January, 1845, Pakenham, the British Minister, suggested a reference of the dispute to arbitration; but President Tyler would not

agree, and matters remained in suspense, until the new President, in his Inaugural Address on March 4th, bluntly warned off all other Powers from concerning themselves with the relations between the United States and Texas, and in the same breath went on to assert that the American title to the Oregon country was clear and unquestionable and would be maintained by every means[1]. So gratuitous an official defiance of the claims that Great Britain had been acknowledged to possess in the Treaties with the United States and by practically every American negotiator who had handled the question, could not possibly be disregarded by any British Ministry. The public and the Press were at once aroused. The United States might flout the decrepit power of Spain with impunity, and might carry on her diplomatic dealings with revolution-rent Mexico with as much bluster as was thought fitting; but Great Britain, with the future of her Canadian dominions at stake, was of a different mettle. Sir Robert Peel, as Prime Minister, would not let the situation become really dangerous if he could help it; but he felt bound to withstand in the most public manner the President's direct challenge to Great Britain's rights. When the subject of the Inaugural Address was brought before Parliament on April 4th, 1845, great care was taken to deal with it in a responsible way. The Earl of Clarendon introduced the question in the Lords and was replied to by Aberdeen; Lord John Russell raised it in the Commons, the reply being made by the Prime-Minister. With the exception of a few explanatory words from Palmerston, no other speeches were made—a sign that the situation was regarded by everyone as serious[2]. Peel's speech was the real official pronouncement of the Ministry. After giving a most conciliatory account of the negotiations that had taken place up to the close of Tyler's Presidency, he felt bound to express regret at the means of which the new President had availed himself to make known his views, and at the tone and temper in which he had referred to the differences with Great Britain. Both Peel's speech and that of Aberdeen closed with what was obviously a carefully agreed statement of policy.

"I feel it my imperative duty on the part of the British Government," said Peel, "to state in language the most temperate, but at the same time the most decided, that we consider we have rights respecting this territory of Oregon which are clear and unquestionable. We trust still to arrive at

[1] Richardson, *Messages of the Presidents*, IV. 381.

[2] *Hansard*, LXXIX. 115–24 and 178–201. Russell called the President's Address "a blustering announcement."

an amicable adjustment... but, having exhausted every effort to effect that settlement, if our rights shall be invaded, we are resolved and we are prepared—to maintain them."

The most serious moment in the relations of Great Britain and the United States since 1812 had been reached.

The next stage in the struggle began in July when Secretary Buchanan forwarded a long and inconsistent Note in which he advocated the claim of the United States to the whole of the territory up to the Russian border, and wound up by offering to compromise on the Forty-ninth Parallel. Unfortunately, the British Minister refused this offer without referring it to London, and in his Annual Message to Congress of December 2nd, 1845, Polk publicly announced this refusal and recommended the denunciation of the Convention of 1827 for joint occupation and the extension of Federal control over American settlers in all parts of Oregon. The President's language was very vigorous and seemed to leave no room for compromise; but, in reality, he was becoming so deeply immersed in his difficulties with Mexico that he was anxious to bring the period of bluff and counter-bluff to an end[1]. He persisted a little longer, however; Pakenham's request for a renewal of the July offer was refused, and a reference to arbitration was again declined. In his Message to the Senate in March, Polk drew attention to the military reinforcements that were being sent to British North America as being directed against the United States, and urged the Senate to consent to an increase of the American forces by land and sea. But this was really in preparation for the Mexican War, which was fast approaching, and, when the resolution for the abrogation of the 1827 Convention was passed by Congress, it was couched in a courteous form that admitted of a new attempt at compromise. Peel and Aberdeen had carefully held their hands during the later stages of Polk's fulminations; and the matter was finally settled by the presentation to the President of a complete Draft Treaty, assigning the whole of Vancouver Island to Great Britain and the right of navigation of the Columbia, but otherwise dividing the territory by the Forty-ninth Parallel from the Rocky Mountains to the sea. This was a reasonable compromise; for it left to the United States practically the whole of the Columbia River

[1] Polk to Congress, December 2nd, 1845. Richardson, *Messages*, IV. 395. The President reveals his principle of action in his *Diary*, January 4th, 1846: "The only way to treat John Bull is to look him in the eye....If Congress falters or hesitates in their course, John Bull will immediately become arrogant and more grasping in his demands."

valley where the American immigrants had made their settlements and to Great Britain that of the Fraser River. America obtained the harbours at the mouth of the Columbia and Puget Sound, while Britain had those on the Strait of Georgia and at the southern end of Vancouver Island. It was difficult for Polk to stay the popular agitation that had been aroused and to recede from his uncompromising earlier declarations; but he did so by casting the responsibility on the Senate, where he knew that he would have the weight of the moderating influence of Webster and Calhoun in favour of settlement. The Draft Treaty was accepted by the Senate on June 15th exactly in the form prepared by the British Government, and thus, with one small exception, the long process of the delimitation of the Canadian frontier from the Atlantic to the Pacific came to an end.

In his Annual Message of December 2nd, 1845, President Polk was led to recall to memory the Monroe Doctrine enunciated in 1823 and to read into it a meaning that was not contained in the original Doctrine. This was due to the diplomatic opposition of Great Britain and France to the expansion of the United States at the cost of Mexico, and proved of considerable importance at later periods. Starting from Monroe's Message, he proclaimed that the principle termed by European Sovereigns the "Balance of Power" cannot be permitted to have any application on the North American Continent and especially cannot apply to the United States.

> We must ever maintain the principle that the people of this continent alone have the right to decide their own destiny. Should any portion of them, constituting an independent state, propose to unite themselves with our Confederacy, this will be a question for them and us to determine without any foreign interposition. We can never consent that European powers shall interfere to prevent such a union because it might disturb the "balance of power" which they may desire to maintain upon this continent.

Monroe's words were then recited and Polk proceeded:

> Existing rights of every European nation should be respected, but it is due alike to our safety and our interests that the efficient protection of our laws should be extended over our whole territorial limits[1], and that it should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that no future European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted or established on any part of the North American continent[2].

[1] This phrase referred to Polk's claim that Texas and Oregon had belonged to the United States and were merely being *reannexed*.

[2] Richardson, *Messages*, IV. 399.

A further enunciation of this "Polk Doctrine," as it has sometimes been called, followed in 1848, when a far-fetched suggestion was made by certain inhabitants of Yucatan to the United States, Spain and Great Britain that their province should be saved from anarchy by annexation by one or other of those Powers. The President stated that he had received authentic information that such a step was in contemplation, and loudly reaffirmed his Declaration of 1845, but the danger was entirely delusive, for Great Britain had no intention whatever of listening to the Yucatanese appeal. These re-enunciations of Monroe's Doctrine, which had almost entirely been lost sight of, being put forward at the time when American policy inclined to a most aggressive expansiveness, caused the Polk form of the Doctrine to become the one remembered by the United States public for the rest of the nineteenth century. The pronouncements led to important debates in the Senate, which were carefully reported to the Foreign Office and closely considered by the British Ministers. They were recollected later, when the affairs of the Territories bordering the Caribbean again came to the fore.

IV. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS, 1843

The definite organisation of American and British Colonial Governments on the Pacific slope marks the fullness of the change that had taken place in the course of a few years and had brought the affairs of the Pacific well within the sphere of world policy. Missionary enterprise had been active in the region since the closing years of the eighteenth century, and Protestant missionaries from England and the United States had begun work in many of the island groups. Roman Catholic missionaries first came to the Hawaiian Islands in 1827, and their attempts to begin work there led to many difficulties which had to be quelled by the intervention of United States and British naval officers. The Roman Catholics were mainly supported from France, and after the accession of Louis-Philippe to power he began to take a considerable interest in their activities. In his view the doctrine of the "Balance of Power" that had hitherto been confined to the situation in Europe must now be regarded as entering into matters of policy in all parts of the world, and he held that France ought to make a place for herself even in the most distant regions. It was not requisite that she should seek to annex widely extended territories, but, to preserve her interests, she ought to establish for herself, in the new regions that were being thrown open

to European enterprise, ports of call and markets for the furtherance of French commerce and harbours of refuge for the ships of her mercantile marine. In pursuance of these plans, various stations were established on the African coast and a keen governmental interest was exhibited in missionary enterprises in the Pacific.

In 1833, Pope Leo XII divided the Pacific islands into two missionary dioceses of East and West Oceania, and entrusted certain French Orders with the task of undertaking the conversion of the natives throughout those regions. Difficulties as to their activities occurred in 1838 in New Zealand, where French adventurers were already contesting with British settlers the right to colonise the islands[1]. The British Government had shown the greatest reluctance to extend its control over New Zealand, and it was only the persistence of certain colonial enthusiasts, such as Edward Gibbon Wakefield, and the fear of being forestalled by the French, that ultimately compelled Ministers to cease their hesitation and in June, 1839, to announce their intention of annexing parts of New Zealand to the Colony of New South Wales and of appointing a Lieutenant Governor there. Certain fully authorised projects for the establishment of a French penal colony were thus forestalled, and New Zealand was definitely annexed to the British Empire. Guizot and his colleagues were convinced that they could not legitimately contest the British claims, and therefore looked elsewhere for a site on which to establish the projected French settlement in the Pacific.

In 1840, a scientific expedition that had been exploring the Pacific islands under Captain Dupetit-Thouars returned to France, and at the request of Guizot and his colleagues the Admiral (as he now was) indicated the Marquesas group as wholly suitable for the establishment there of a French naval station and for a convict prison. The suggestion was accepted, and in July, 1842, the Islands were occupied and formally annexed. But the designs of the French colonial enthusiasts were far wider and, with the ubiquitous activities of the Roman Catholic missionaries, productive of much trouble. For some years, they had been trying to subvert American and English influence in the Hawaiian Islands, and, in 1842, the native rulers appealed to Sir George Simpson, of the Hudson's Bay Company, who was visiting the Islands in the interests of the British trade

[1] For French plans of colonisation in New Zealand and elsewhere see C. Schefer, "La Monarchie de Juillet et l'Expansion Coloniale," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 6e Sér., t. 11, 152–84; also E. Blanchard, "La Nouvelle Zélande," *ibid.* 3e Sér., t. 49, 355–94.

from the Pacific coast to China. He consented to head a Mission to the United States and Great Britain to secure a guarantee of Hawaiian independence as a protection against French designs and was successful in his efforts. But unpleasant difficulties were added to Lord Aberdeen's other troubles with the United States in 1843 by an unauthorised acceptance of the cession of the group by a British naval commander, Lord George Paulet, who had been sent thither to restore order. This was especially annoying, as it happened in the middle of the Texas difficulties and led to a declaration by the American Secretary of State that the United States might feel justified in accordance with their principles in interfering to prevent Hawaii falling into the hands of one of the Great Powers of Europe —an entirely unacceptable extension of the Monroe doctrine into the Pacific[1].

On March 30th, 1843, Guizot, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, publicly announced in the Chamber of Deputies that the Government was preparing to embark on a policy of expansion oversea. France had no interest in the possession of vast territories; but a network of stations on the strategic and trade routes of the world was of great importance to her, and it was the intention of the Government to form by degrees around the globe such a network of strong naval stations at points judiciously chosen to further the spread of French trade and influence. The plan thus openly avowed was warmly received by the Chamber, and was necessarily of the highest importance to Great Britain in view of the conflict between British and French interests in the Levant and elsewhere. The establishment of such a system of strong points necessarily involved French interests in every oceanic group of islands that was not already in the possession of a strong Power. Difficulties with the Argentine Republic led to the search for a post in the South Atlantic; and the Falkland Islands were taken into consideration, only to find that they were already occupied by Great Britain, who was making provision by Act of Parliament for their settled government[2]. In the China Seas, Great Britain had occupied Hong-Kong, and it was suggested that France should set up a naval establishment on Basilan, one of the Sulu Islands to the south of the Philippines, in order to counterbalance the new colony. Basilan was well situated for commanding the route to China through the Straits of Sunda, besides acting as a basis for

[1] For details of these difficulties see *State Papers*, XXXI. 1029, etc.
[2] 6 Vict. c. 13, passed April 11th, 1843.

naval forces in the Pacific. But Spain successfully protested her prior occupation, and it was only in the Pacific that a real forward movement took place. Admiral Dupetit-Thouars, having completed the occupation of the Marquesas, undertook an extended cruise through the other island groups in order to watch over the interests of the Roman Catholic missionaries. The French were repeatedly in difficulties as to their proceedings in Tahiti, where the influence of the Protestant missionaries of the London Missionary Society was particularly powerful. In 1825, and again in 1836, the British Government had refused to proclaim a British protectorate over the Islands and this refusal Lord Palmerston again affirmed in 1839, though the independence of Queen Pomare and her little kingdom was fully recognised. Dupetit-Thouars, on his arrival in the Islands in 1842, demanded a large money compensation for certain injuries done to Roman Catholic interests and when Queen Pomare was unable to pay this and threw herself upon the French King's protection, he at once accepted her appeal and set up a Provisional Government. Guizot, with a view to recovering the prestige which he felt that France had lost in the New Zealand affair, sanctioned Dupetit-Thouars' action[1], and asked the Chamber to provide funds for the maintenance of French rule in the South Sea Islands. For this he was attacked by the Opposition, and in reply he went very far in supporting the designs of the Catholic missionaries in the Pacific and claiming them as agents for the extension of French influence and French interests. Why, he asked, should not French Catholic priests, with the support and protection of their Government, do for their country in the Pacific archipelagoes what English Protestant missionaries had long been doing under the protection of the British Government?[2]

Such a speech was unpleasant hearing for the friends of the great Protestant Missionary Societies; but Aberdeen saw that Great Britain, in view of her own previous proceedings, had no valid grounds for complaint, and he communicated to the French Government a formal recognition of the new protectorate. This showed clearly that Great Britain had no intention of pursuing an exclusive or forward policy in the Pacific; and, when in 1853 Napoleon III annexed New Caledonia, the appeal of the Australian colonists that Great Britain should protest was not acceded to, and no action was taken. The later

[1] *Moniteur*, March 20th, 1843.
[2] Speech in Chamber of Deputies, April 24th, 1843. Guizot's *Mémoires*, VII. 60.

difficulties of the Tahiti affair are referred to fully elsewhere and need not here be dealt with since they arose contrary to the expressed policy of the British Ministry and solely in consequence of the injudicious actions of the rival authorities in the Islands[1].

V. CENTRAL AMERICA: THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY, 1849–1856

The clearing up of the Oregon difficulty and the withdrawal of Great Britain from all concern with Texan affairs as soon as the annexation had been agreed to left the score with the United States nearly clear; but the clash of policy in the Caribbean was still to be feared, and before long, when Palmerston had succeeded Aberdeen, difficulties arose again. An indiscreet motion of Lord George Bentinck concerning the debts of Spain to her bondholders and his reference to her possession of valuable securities in Cuba and Porto Rico once more aroused American suspicion of British designs[2]. President Polk took advantage of some of Bentinck's letters on the subject to aid him in urging on the purchase of Cuba from Spain; but news of his secret overtures leaked out, and Spanish public opinion indignantly refused the offers. Matters relating to the Caribbean became of much more importance, owing to the discovery of gold in California and the great rush of emigrants across the Isthmus of Central America to reach the goldfields. Plans for the cutting of an inter-oceanic canal across the Isthmus at some point or another had been repeatedly put forward since the sixteenth century; but now they became of far greater importance in view of the enormous increase of traffic. In the politics and development of Central America Britain had always taken a close interest, because of the proximity of Jamaica and the other British West India islands, and with all the canal projects that were brought forward American, British and French interests were bound up. Since the eighteenth century Great Britain had held settlements on the mainland round Belize and had relations of an indefinite sort through the colony of Jamaica with the Moskito Indians who inhabited the eastern coast from Cape Gracias à Dios southward to the boundary of Costa Rica. The only practicable routes for an inter-oceanic canal were two—the one across the Isthmus of Panama through the territories of New Granada, the other through Nicaragua. This second route, though the longer,

[1] For a full account of the Tahiti episode, cf. *ante*, chapter v, pp. 182–5, and Appendix, C. II.

[2] July 6th, 1847. *Hansard*, XCIII. 1285.

was the more practicable of construction, because it lay partly along the course of the San Juan River which empties itself into the Caribbean across the Moskito Territory. The Moskito coast was under the general supervision of the British authorities at Belize, a region that having been the subject of a good deal of dispute with Spain in its earlier years was definitely organised under a Colonial Government in 1836[1]

Various groups of American speculators were endeavouring to secure concessions to build an Isthmian Canal; and, in 1846, New Granada consented to a Treaty with the United States, which was ratified in 1848[2], granting to that Power the exclusive right of any kind of transport across the Isthmus of Panama or that of Darien. This led to the building of the Panama railroad by American capital and its opening in 1855. A large part of the traffic to California was transferred to the new route, and the Railway Company prospered greatly, though the anarchical conditions prevailing in the country rendered the transit across the Isthmus a matter of some risk. In return for the Treaty, the United States guaranteed to New Granada her possession of the Isthmus, and undertook to guard the neutrality of all routes across it. This meant, in effect, that the United States assumed a protectorate over the most practicable of all the canal routes. The attempts of American concession-hunters to gain control of the Nicaragua route were frustrated by the support given by the British Colonial officials to the Moskito kingdom which held sway in the port at the mouth of the San Juan river, known commonly as Blewfields, but sometimes as San Juan. In the autumn of 1847, notice was given by the Moskitos to the Nicaraguans to withdraw from Blewfields, and, on January 1st, 1848, the Nicaraguan flag was hauled down there by the British Consul, acting as Protector of the Moskitos. This led, a few weeks later, to a military attack by the Nicaraguan forces and the seizure of certain British officials. In retaliation, British warships bombarded the port, compelled the release of the prisoners and, on March 1st, 1848, extorted a Treaty from Nicaragua recognising Moskito sovereignty under British protection at Blewfields and giving promises against the renewal of aggression[3]. Blewfields was shortly afterwards renamed Greytown in honour of the Governor of Jamaica, and more active steps were taken for the delimitation of the Moskito Territory. The news of these British

[1] *Parl. Papers* (1856), XLIV. 391.

[2] *U.S. Treaties and Conventions*, pp. 195–205. See Article XXXV. Communicated to Palmerston, November 24th, 1849. *Parl. Papers* (1856), LX. 11–12.

[3] *Parl. Papers* (1847–8), LXV. 152–3.

proceedings in Central America led President Polk to endeavour to counteract the movement and to preserve Central America inviolate from all European interference, in accordance with his strictest interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. With this end in view, an American Minister was despatched to Central America even before the close of the Mexican War, to promote an attempt to reunite the Central American republics under the influence of the United States. In 1848, speeches were made in the Senate directing attention to Great Britain's proceedings at Blewfields and claiming that they were evidence of designs against the integrity of America. Lord Palmerston, thereupon, informed the British Minister in Washington of the facts and instructed him to support the action taken, if enquiry were made by the American Government[1].

Throughout 1848 and 1849, obscure and complicated manœuvring was in progress in the Central American States between the British and American diplomatic Envoys there, of which only faint rumours reached the public ear and which even Lord Palmerston and the Foreign Office were unable to follow in detail. President Polk was succeeded in March, 1849, by the less bellicose Whig President Taylor, and John M. Clayton became Secretary of State in place of Buchanan. This lessened the danger of a conflict of interests in the transactions concerned with the projected Canal; and, in reply to a suggestion from the United States that Great Britain should join in guaranteeing its neutrality, Palmerston replied disclaiming any intention of forming British colonies in Central America and accepted the proposals of the United States as a renunciation on both sides[2]. The negotiations for a Treaty concerning the Canal were begun in London, but were soon transferred to Washington, where they were in charge of Sir Henry Bulwer, the recently appointed British Minister, who, having served in Spain, was familiar with Latin-American affairs. Unfortunately, the news of the aggressive action of certain British diplomatists in Central America had reawakened the suspicions of British good faith which had made matters so difficult in Aberdeen's time. No sooner had Bulwer signed a draft convention with Clayton[3] and forwarded it to Palmerston for approval, than

[1] The unpublished letters dealing with this matter are summarised in M. W. Williams, *Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy*, pp. 54–6.

[2] Palmerston to Laurence (American Minister in London), November 13th, 1849. *Parl. Papers* (1856), LX. 7.

[3] February 3rd, 1850. *Parl. Papers* (1856), LX. 34. See also Bulwer's letter, *ibid.* p. 41.

news arrived from Central America, which, in the opinion of the Democratic opponents of the Administration, proved that Great Britain was attempting to establish a Protectorate over Costa Rica and in regard to Honduras was flagrantly contravening the Monroe Doctrine as reasserted by Polk only two years before. President Taylor showed that he shared fears of this kind by his Message to Congress of March 19th, 1850[1], but on April 19th both parties came to an understanding and signed what is known as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, whereby it was agreed that "Neither [Power] will ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the [Canal] or in the vicinity thereof, or occupy, or fortify, or colonise, or assume or exercise any dominion over...any part of Central America[2]." The language of the principal clause was ambiguous and left room for a good deal of misunderstanding; and such was not long in arising. Some Democratic Senators were entirely dissatisfied with the Treaty and wished, by virtue of its provisions, to exclude Great Britain entirely from Central America and Mexico; while others thought they saw in it a full acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine and were willing to ratify. By Clayton's exertions behind the scenes, the necessary majority in the Senate was secured, and it was freely conjectured that Bulwer's obscure language in the Treaty was merely a device to 'save the face' of Great Britain by an ignominious withdrawal from her wholesale pretensions.

By a formal communication to Bulwer, however, Clayton definitely stated that, in the view of the United States Government Great Britain's renunciation of territorial interests did not apply to the settlement of Belize and its "dependencies." But still there was room for misunderstanding. The boundaries between this territory and the neighbouring Republic of Honduras had never been properly delimited, and a certain group of islands known as the Bay Islands in the Gulf of Honduras had during the Wars with Spain in the eighteenth century from time to time been occupied by British forces. In 1850, some American subjects were endeavouring to settle in the Islands, and Lord Palmerston gave directions to the British officials at Belize to prevent their doing so. On the death of President Taylor in July, 1850, Fillmore succeeded as President, and Daniel Webster became Secretary of State. He attempted to resume the task of clearing up all outstanding difficulties with Great Britain and

[1] Richardson, *Messages*, v. 37–8.
[2] Article VIII. *Parl. Papers* (1856), LX. 50–2.

to carry Clayton's work a stage further. Palmerston was ready to proceed with such negotiations; but the incessant squabbles among the officials of the two Powers in Central America, and especially at Greytown, repeatedly brought about fresh causes of complaint. In 1852, Webster proposed to Great Britain an agreement for a joint policy with regard to the tangle in Central American affairs, and his negotiations with Lord Malmesbury had advanced a long way when the American party in the republic of Nicaragua made a public appeal to the United States against British interference, and the news of a British occupation of the Bay Islands came to reawaken all the old American suspicions of Britain's good faith. The news was made public at the height of the Presidential campaign of 1852, and once more anti-British appeals played an important part in the election.

The British Government had to keep a most careful watch over affairs in the West Indies; for, over and above the difficulties on the Isthmus, the question of the Cuban Slave-trade had again become acute, owing to the notorious smuggling of American slaves and the filibustering expeditions that were being fitted out in the United States for assistance to the Cuban insurgents against the Spanish Colonial Government. In 1851, Palmerston instructed the British Ambassador at Madrid to propose to the Spanish Government a measure for the emancipation of the Cuban slaves, in order to put a stop to the traffic, and to content the Cuban people and strengthen their connexion with Spain as well as to "create a most powerful element of resistance to any scheme for the annexation to the United States." Orders were sent to the British and French cruisers in the Caribbean to prevent by force the landing of filibusters on the coast of Cuba with hostile intent; and these orders at once aroused the old intense public feeling in the Southern States against Great Britain's claim to the Right of Search, and a recrudescence of the belief that she was again desirous of seizing Cuba for herself, a belief that was strengthened by the many misrepresentations that prevailed concerning her policy in Central America. In January, 1852, Spain made an appeal to Great Britain to aid her in securing from the United States and France adhesion to a triple abnegation of all designs against Cuba, and a guarantee of her continued possession of the island, in face of the fresh expeditions to assist the Cuban insurgents that were being fitted out at New Orleans. Lord Malmesbury, in view of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, thought the time opportune

for securing such a self-denying agreement, and he therefore proposed to Webster the conclusion of a tripartite convention, wherein it should be stated that

> the high contracting parties severally and collectively disclaim, both now and for hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the island of Cuba; and they respectively bind themselves to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of any power or individuals whatever[1].

The French Government had expressed its willingness to agree, and made similar advances to the United States; but Webster's reply was a definite refusal to enter into any entangling alliance or agreement. A little later, the proposal was again brought forward by Great Britain and France in a joint Note, which clearly showed the policy underlying it to be a maritime one; but Everett, who had succeeded to the office of Secretary of State on Webster's death, rejected it with an exposition of American policy characterised by a frankness rarely to be found in a serious official document. Not only did he claim an intimate interest of the United States in Cuba, to the complete exclusion of all other Powers; but he went on to vindicate the "manifest destiny" of all European possessions in the Western Hemisphere to fall under the government of the United States. His arguments were as applicable to Canada or Jamaica, Martinique or Trinidad, as they were to Cuba, and the chorus of approval with which the publication of his letter was greeted in the United States, and which accepted it as a fair expression of American policy, had a very serious sound in British ears. In his despatch of February 16th, 1853, in reply, Lord John Russell entirely refused to accede to Everett's doctrines and stated:

> If it is intended on the part of the United States to maintain that Great Britain and France have no interest in the maintenance of the present *status quo* in Cuba, and that the United States have alone a right to a voice in that matter, Her Majesty's Government at once refuses to admit such a claim. Her Majesty's possessions in the West Indies alone, without insisting on the importance to Mexico and other friendly states of the present distribution of power, give Her Majesty an interest in this question which she cannot forego[2].

The Democratic candidate, Franklin Pierce, was elected to the Presidency in November, 1852, with a very large majority; and his

[1] The correspondence in respect of the tripartite convention is to be found in *U.S. Docs.*, 32nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Doc. 13. See also W. B. Lawrence's edition of Wheaton's *International Law*, p. 143.

[2] Lord John Russell to Crampton, February 16th, 1853, Lawrence's Wheaton, p. 146.

loudly expressed views in favour of expansion warned British Ministers that, on his accession to power in the following March, all their tact would be needed to preserve amicable relations. The British proposal of the tripartite convention was countered by the Senate with an enquiry into the proceedings in Belize and the Bay Islands. In March, 1852, the Islands had been organised under a separate Colonial Administration by royal letters patent and, when the Senate Committee reported, they denounced this seizure of a portion of the territory of the republic of Honduras as a flagrant violation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty; and claimed that even the main British settlement of Belize belonged of right to the republic of Guatemala. James Buchanan, the new American Minister in London, advised W. L. Marcy, the Secretary of State, to merge all the questions at issue with Great Britain into a whole. He urged that, if pressure were brought to bear concerning the Atlantic Fishery disputes and the demand for reciprocity in trade with British North America which was now coming to the fore, Great Britain would be compelled to abandon her pretensions in Central America and generally yield to the United States in the Caribbean, the most important matter in the eyes of the South. But Marcy, who came from New York and had the interests of the North at heart, refused to accept this plan, and the Canadian questions were kept quite distinct from those of the South.

The difficulties concerning British North America were almost entirely economic in character, and admitted of settlement far more easily than the other points at issue. In consequence of the reforms with which Lord Durham's name is associated, the North American Colonies were now on their way to self-government, and British Ministers were anxious to allow their desires the amplest play in foreign affairs which fully concerned them. Two questions were dominant; the first, the trouble concerning the Atlantic Fisheries, which was of great importance to Massachusetts, Maine and the Maritime Provinces and in which the Colonies held the master-cards; the second, the need of opportunities for the access of Canadian produce to lucrative markets, which the United States could grant or withhold. The change in the economic policy of Great Britain in 1846 deprived Canada of her favoured position for the sale of corn and lumber in British markets, and the abolition of the Navigation Laws in 1849 seriously crippled the trade of the Maritime Provinces with the West Indies. The Canadian Legislature appealed to the British Government

in 1846 to open negotiations at Washington for securing facilities for the sale of their products, and Mr Gladstone, as charged with responsibility for Colonial affairs, promised compliance. At the same time, the North American Colonies were given power to regulate their own tariff[1], and at once removed all differential duties against American goods. Negotiations for reciprocal concessions began in 1848, but made no headway in the face of American indifference. In the view of certain leaders of political opinion in the United States Canada's "manifest destiny" was sooner or later to be merged in the Union, and the rise of an annexationist party in 1849 in Upper Canada strengthened them in this belief. But the party upholding slavery in the South, dreaded the accession of new States to the North as likely to threaten their dominant control at Washington, and preferred to avert such a result by listening to Canada's appeals for Free Trade.

There had been a lull in the incessant disputes about Fishery rights between 1818 and 1836; but, in the latter year, the legislature of Nova Scotia passed a measure restricting the facilities formerly conceded to American fishermen and began to enforce an interpretation of the Convention of 1818 which the men of Maine and Massachusetts regarded as a flagrant violation of their rights. Matters became so strained on the fishing grounds and, as time went on, so dangerously threatening to the public peace, that, in July, 1852, the British Government informed the United States authorities that it was despatching certain naval vessels to enforce the existing regulations and to protect the Colonies from illegal encroachments on their rights by American fishermen. This step was countered by the despatch of a powerful frigate, under the celebrated Commodore Perry, to protect American rights; and the Maritime Colonies retorted by fitting out certain armed cruisers. If a collision were to take place, it was likely to be dangerous. In these circumstances, both sides saw the necessity for a bargain; and President Fillmore in his Annual Message of December 6th, 1852, announced that he was ready to enter upon negotiations with Great Britain on the subjects of the Fisheries, Reciprocity with Canada and Free Trade with the West Indies. A draft treaty was submitted by Mr Crampton, British Minister at Washington, to Mr Marcy in September, 1853; but for a time no progress was made. The Cabinet, therefore, resolved to send the Governor-General, Lord Elgin, to Washington to conclude the

[1] 9 and 10 Vict. c. 94.

negotiations and gave him full power to amend the draft treaty in any details in accordance with his knowledge of Canadian wishes. He was very cordially received by the American Government and public, and completed his task in ten days without difficulty. The Treaty was signed by Marcy and Lord Elgin on June 5th, 1854, and ratified after some delay by the Senate and by the legislatures of the various Colonies. It provided for a mutual use of the Atlantic coast fisheries, and for free markets for the interchange of raw materials on both sides of the border. It also granted the United States free navigation of the St Lawrence River and the Canadian Canals. The Treaty was to run for a period of ten years, but might then be abrogated after a year's notice by either party[1]. Considerable advantages were secured on both sides; but Canada, as the weaker, certainly benefited most; and the Treaty, coming as it did just before a period of great demand for her lumber and food-stuffs caused by the Crimean War, allowed her to sell her goods on rising markets and greatly accelerated her development.

The most noticeable point in Clarendon's long discussions with Buchanan about Central America was, perhaps, his exposition of the British attitude towards the Monroe Doctrine:

> With regard to the doctrine laid down by President Monroe in 1823 concerning the future colonisation of the American Continents by European States, as an international axiom which ought to regulate the conduct of European States, it can only be viewed as the dictum of the distinguished personage who delivered it; but Her Majesty's Government cannot admit that doctrine as an international axiom which ought to regulate the conduct of European States[2].

The inclusion of these sentences was incidental; but they reveal that British Ministers had been paying attention to the long debates in the United States Senate on the Monroe Doctrine that had been initiated owing to the Central American and Canadian difficulties and had marked the session of 1853[3]. Lewis Cass had moved a joint resolution strongly reaffirming the Doctrine and Polk's aggressive interpretation of it; and in the course of the debate attention had been directed to British action in Nicaragua and the Bay Islands. The true policy of the United States as summed up in the Doctrine had

[1] *U.S. Treaties and Conventions*, pp. 448–53. Signed June 5th, 1854. Ratifications exchanged, September 9th, 1854.

[2] Clarendon's Statement to Buchanan, May 2nd, 1854. *Parl. Papers* (1856), LX. 266–76. Quotation on p. 268.

[3] *Congressional Globe* (1853), XXVII. 103–26, etc.

been claimed to involve the expulsion of all British attempts at colonisation or the exercise of influence in Central America; and Clarendon's introduction of President Monroe's Message into his statement was, therefore, by no means gratuitous. Buchanan did not take up this challenge to what has since become a cardinal principle of American policy, but confined himself to detailed protests against the occupation of Belize, Greytown and the Bay Islands. His authority was seriously impaired by his injudicious action in regard to projects for the annexation of Cuba by the United States, and especially in his support of the unwarrantable actions of Pierre Soulé, the American Minister in Spain. The unmeasured terms of the Ostend Manifesto drawn up by Buchanan, Soulé and Mason, the Minister to France, in October, 1854, and its suggestions in support of slavery and against Great Britain and France did much to discredit the foreign policy of the Democratic party in power and to weaken their case as to Central America.

Into the extremely tangled events in Nicaragua and the exploits of American adventurers which led to the bombardment of the settlement at Greytown by a warship of the United States navy it is unnecessary here to enter[1]; but, had not both Powers been fully occupied in other directions, they might have given rise to very serious danger. The Central American republics were thoroughly alarmed at the growing interference of United States citizens in their affairs, and were making constant appeals for British help. But, though Lord Clarendon gave orders for the unobtrusive reinforcement of the British fleet in West Indian waters in order to guard against the raids of American filibusters, he would do nothing further, and was steadily conciliatory in his attitude towards the United States. On the other side, too, the public in the Northern States were generally averse to the exploits of the Southern fire-eaters and gave no backing to the policy of President Pierce and Secretary Marcy, which they regarded as mainly designed in the interests of slavery.

The general support that Marcy and Pierce had lacked was, however, accorded to them in connexion with the indiscreet proceedings of certain British officials in America in the recruiting of soldiers to serve against Russia in the Crimean War. At the beginning of the War, it was reported by observers in the United States that public opinion was strongly in favour of Great Britain in her quarrel; but the proceedings of the recruiting agents were so indiscreet, and they

[1] For details see M. W. Williams's *Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy*.

were so little on their guard against the snares of wilful mischief-makers, that American feelings were ruffled by what was regarded as a flagrant breach of the law. This state of affairs was made use of by some of the extreme Slavery party led by the Attorney-General of the United States, Caleb Cushing, to rally to itself popular support, and Lord Clarendon was accused in the most public way of deliberate deceit and wilful violation of the sovereign rights of the United States[1]. In October, 1855, *The Times* and other English newspapers announced in a somewhat aggressive way that the British squadron on the American station was being reinforced, and Buchanan took the opportunity to point out that this would be regarded by the United States as a provocation, and to ask that the additional cruisers might be withdrawn. But Clarendon courteously maintained that their only object was to guard against Russian privateers said to be fitting out at New York, and he refused to take any action. The revelations of the Central American correspondence came to the knowledge of the British public in the autumn of 1855, and it was amazed to find that relations with the United States were drifting into danger owing to disputes about matters of which it knew nothing and cared little. The trade with America, a matter of vital importance to British prosperity, might be jeopardised by a conflict about islands and territories of which hardly anyone knew more than the names. The sending of a British fleet to American waters in October, 1855, therefore, thoroughly alarmed the merchants and manufacturers, and consultations between men of very diverse political schools were held to devise the best way of bringing pressure to bear upon Lord Palmerston and the Government to compel them to an accommodation with the United States[2].

The work of the peace-makers was hampered by the bluster of the newspapers, which confounded the various issues at stake in a cloud of threats and bombast. Nor were matters rendered any easier by the attitude of the Government. Buchanan began, or at any rate largely extended, the practice of privately supplying information to the opponents of the Ministry, in order to serve the American cause[3]. Provided with such information, Roebuck brought forward the question of Anglo-American relations in the House of Commons in February,

[1] For a mass of correspondence on this subject see *Parl. Papers* (1856), LX. 387, etc.

[2] Buchanan to Marcy, November 2nd, 1855 and November 23rd, 1855. Buchanan's *Works*, IX. 446, 467.

[3] Buchanan to Marcy, February 15th, 1856, Confidential. *Ibid.* X. 48.

1856, and, though he was defended by Disraeli, was severely rebuked by Palmerston for daring to interfere in affairs of high policy. The American Press was clamouring for the recall of the British Minister at Washington for his alleged share in the recruiting scandals, but Lord Clarendon would not give way and stood by his subordinates. President Pierce and Marcy, therefore, took the bull by the horns and broke off diplomatic relations with Crampton and with certain British Consuls, whereupon a great outcry arose from the bellicose section of the London Press for a complete rupture of diplomatic relations. But the pressure of the peace-makers upon Lord Palmerston and the Ministry to acquiesce in the action of America as entirely within her rights was too strong to be resisted. The City, the manufacturing and mercantile interests, championed by Cobden and Roebuck, were in the forefront in exerting this pressure by their ostentatious friendliness to the American Minister Dallas on all public occasions[1]. But more moderate politicians joined them; Lord Stanley said publicly that the man in England who would venture to assail the institutions and Government of the United States would be regarded as a dangerous public enemy; Cardwell proclaimed that he could almost pledge the Commons of England to sustain the American Minister in the assertion of his country's international rights against any Ministry whatever, and eloquent voices were raised in the Church to the same effect with general approval[2]. Even *The Times* and *The Morning Post* moderated the exuberance of their language, and, on June 16th, Palmerston announced that no action would be taken for the removal of the American Minister and that no interruption of friendly relations would take place.

There is little doubt that Lord Aberdeen played an important part in securing this issue; for the Americans were in constant private communication with him. Cobden was jubilant and described the result as an American triumph over the English "governing classes" and the "braggart Press[3]"; but a cooler and sounder view was taken by Disraeli in an important speech, in which he surveyed the whole field of Anglo-American relations. He laid the blame for the difficulties of the Crampton affair and the troubles in Central America on the

[1] Cobden's letters reveal how carefully the movement to cement Anglo-American friendship was planned. See Hobson's *Cobden*, pp. 146 sqq. They may be placed alongside Buchanan's letters to Marcy and Dallas's letters (*Letters from London*, I. 22 sqq.). Nothing was left to chance.

[2] Dallas to Marcy. *Letters from London*, I. 20.

[3] Cobden to Richard, June 17th, 1856. J. A. Hobson's *Cobden*, p. 156.

shoulders of those who in turn had been responsible for the conduct of Britain's foreign affairs for so many years, and he continued:

> It would be wise if England would at last recognise that the United States, like all the great countries of Europe, have a policy, and that they have a right to have a policy.... The Monroe doctrine is one which...is not, in my opinion, suited to the age in which we live. The increase in the means of communication between Europe and America has made one great family of the countries of the world; and that system of government which, instead of enlarging, would restrict the relations between those two quarters of the globe, is a system which is not adapted to this age.... That is not a sound policy which is founded on the idea that we should regard with extreme jealousy the so-called "aggressive spirit" of the United States....If it is always to be impressed upon England that she is to regard every expansion of the United States as an act detrimental to her interests and hostile to her power, we shall be pursuing a course which, while it will not prevent that expansion of the part of the States, will involve this country in struggles that may prove of a disastrous character.... It is my opinion that all the United States have fairly a right to expect, they may obtain without injury either to Europe in general or to England in particular, and that it is the business of a statesman to recognise the necessity of an increase in their power, and at the same time to make them understand that they will most surely accomplish all the objects they propose to herself by recognising those principles of international law which in civilised communities have always been upheld, and to impress upon them that, instead of vaunting that they will build their greatness on the Monroe doctrine, which is the doctrine of isolation, they should seek to attain it by allowing their destiny to be regulated by the same high principles of policy which all the European communities that have a political system have invariably recognised[1].

Words of such weight, coming from the leader of the Conservative Opposition, are indicative of the fact that the bases of British policy in regard to the United States were being scrutinised as never before. It was not until a fortnight after Disraeli's speech that the House obtained the opportunity of a full debate, when, although the Government secured a vote of confidence, their critics had far the best of the argument. Lord Clarendon's mismanagement of American affairs, his long course of concealing their progress from the House and the public and the unsatisfactory nature of his apologies were severely denounced by Milner Gibson, Gladstone and others. So far as Anglo-American relations were concerned, the debate practically closed the matter; public opinion both in the House and in the country was

[1] Disraeli in House of Commons, June 16th, 1856. *Hansard*, CXLII. 1509–13.

overwhelmingly opposed to the secret diplomatic manœuvres of Palmerston and Clarendon, and a not unneeded lesson was administered to them.

The trouble connected with the recruiting affair was settled more easily than that concerning Central America, though both sides now perceived that it was not worth their while to drive matters to extremes. In October, 1856, a Treaty was signed by Clarendon and Dallas providing that the difficulties between the Central American States should be solved by the joint arbitration of Great Britain and the United States; but the Senate refused to ratify this, and entered upon a movement for the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the assumption of a free hand[1]. At length, in 1857, when certain of President Buchanan's supporters were loudly advertising their plans for securing the cession of the Isthmus of Panama to the United States, Lord Clarendon determined to try again the device that had succeeded in Ashburton's time and to send a diplomat, with an American wife and intimate American connexions, to enter into direct negotiations with Washington and the Central American republics. His choice fell upon Sir William Gore Ouseley, who had been employed in Argentina. But, unfortunately, the plan failed utterly; Ouseley delayed in Washington for many months, and, when forced by Lord Malmesbury to proceed to Nicaragua, he could effect nothing there, owing to the intrigues of French and American concession hunters. At last, the American Government came to understand that Great Britain could not be bluffed into relinquishing her rights in Belize; and, in November, 1858, Secretary Cass expressed to Lord Malmesbury his readiness for a compromise. The settlement was effected by a series of Treaties directly negotiated by Charles Wyke with the Central American States. Great Britain withdrew from her occupation of the Bay Islands and her protectorate over the region round Greytown, and arranged to delimit the boundaries between Belize and Guatemala[2]. So complete a surrender of Britain's political claims in Central America was naturally very agreeable to the United States Government, and, when communicated by Lord Lyons to Cass in August, 1860, the Treaties met with warm approval. The favourable provisions did not, as has sometimes been asserted, arise

[1] The complicated details of these negotiations have been worked out for the first time in M. W. Williams's *Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy*.

[2] Treaty between Great Britain and Honduras, November 28th, 1859; *State Papers*, XLIX. 13–19. Nicaragua, January 28th, 1860; *Parl. Papers* (1860), LXVIII. 541–73. *State Papers*, L. 96–106. Guatemala, April 30, 1859; *State Papers*, XLIX. 7–13.

from any weakness or weariness in the assertion of British rights in the face of persistent American hostility, but were manifestations of a definite change of policy in relation to Caribbean affairs, decided upon after full and detailed consideration.

The entry of Great Britain and France into the Crimean War brought once more within the field of practical politics those difficult questions concerning the Rules of Maritime War that had caused so much trouble at the beginning of the century. During the years that had intervened, the United States had on several occasions made proposals to other Powers for the abolition of privateering; but, later, they abandoned the idea and took up the position that the employment of privateers was essential to her for the support of her weak Navy. In the War with Russia, Great Britain acceded to the wishes of France, and neither she nor any other of the belligerents issued letters of marque. The European neutrals forbade their subjects to engage as privateers, and closed their ports to merchant ships taking letters of marque from a foreign Power. The United States refused to accept these principles and urged, instead, the immunity of private property at sea from capture. When the Congress of Paris had completed its work in the negotiation of peace with Russia, Count Walewski, the French Plenipotentiary, brought forward, at the sitting of April 8th, 1856, the proposal that the Congress should assimilate its labours to those of the Congresses of Westphalia and Vienna by laying down some great principle to govern international relations. At the earlier of those Congresses, the claims of Liberty of Conscience had been recognised, and at the second the Abolition of the Slave-trade had been furthered. The Congress of Paris might follow them by laying the foundation of a code of maritime law. Walewski proposed the inclusion in a joint declaration of four principles: (1) the abolition of privateering, (2) that the neutral flag protect enemy goods, except contraband, (3) that neutral goods under an enemy flag, except contraband, are not liable to seizure, and (4) that blockades can be binding only when effective. Lord Clarendon, who had been informed beforehand of the intention of France to bring these matters forward, at once announced the adhesion of Great Britain to the principles proposed, on condition that they were accepted in their entirety. On his return to England, however, he met with severe criticism as having abandoned certain of his country's most ancient maritime rights, without having any mandate to do so and without consulting Parliament.

The Foreign Secretary had to justify his proceedings in an important debate in the House of Lords on May 22nd, 1856, almost concurrent with the American troubles described above. His defence fell into two parts, each indicative of the change that was taking place in the relation of the British public to Foreign Policy. His opponents accepted the traditional claim that the Crown had the full power of concluding all treaties, even without the previous sanction of Parliament; but they maintained that Ministers had been lacking in candour in not affording to Parliament the least indication that they intended, while entering into negotiations for peace, to interpose a discussion on the quite distinct subject of Maritime Rights. Lord Derby claimed that it was an unwarrantable abuse of the royal prerogative to put forward the Government as the exponent of international law without any previous consultation of Parliament, and that such action was, if not illegal, certainly unconstitutional. To this view the Minister strongly demurred, and he went so far as to read in the House of Lords the written opinion of Lord Chief Justice Campbell to the effect that the British Government had assented to the Declaration of Paris in strict accordance with the Constitution, a defence universally regarded as a shirking of responsibility by taking shelter behind judicial authority. As to the merits of the Declaration, Clarendon had a better case, and generally convinced the House that circumstances had so changed that it behoved England to waive some of the extreme maritime claims which Pitt had enforced with so much vigour in 1801. He held that any disadvantages that Great Britain might suffer from her acceptance of the principles of "free ships, free goods" were outweighed by the advantages she drew from the abolition of privateering. Although Lord Derby characterised the agreement as the miserable "Clarendon Capitulation of Paris," and although there was a strong opinion in the country that Great Britain's maritime interests had been almost treasonably sacrificed to French persistence, yet the Declaration was an accomplished fact, and some comfort was drawn from Clarendon's implied promise that America, from whose privateers the greatest danger might be expected, would adhere to the Declaration.

In this expectation hopes were woefully disappointed. Nearly all the maritime States of the world to whom the Declaration of Paris was submitted for their adhesion signified their acceptance in the course of a few months. Only Spain, Mexico and the United States refused. In his refusal and his strong justification of privateering,

Marcy claimed that the only practicable course to pursue was to carry the Declaration further and protect from capture all private property at sea save contraband. He even went further still, and proposed to abolish the Law of Contraband entirely[1]. These suggested amendments brought the Declaration very prominently into the field of public discussion, and the questions at issue were warmly debated both in England and America and on the Continent. Marcy did his best to persuade other Powers to refuse to accede to the Declaration, contending that it gave undue advantages to Great Britain and France, as the possessors of great Navies. In his proposals for amendment he obtained no success, though he gained great popularity among the mercantile community in the United States as having carefully safeguarded their interests against the dangers lurking in the Declaration. Serious suggestions were put forward that the United States should go further and persuade the Powers to agree to the abolition of all commercial blockades, and this course greatly commended itself to the merchants of the Northern States. But, on Buchanan's accession to the Presidency, he determined to abandon all negotiations of the sort and merely to leave the United States unfettered by the Declaration. The general British sense of alarm concerning the negotiations found clear expression in the words of Lord John Russell. He showed that the comparison between private property at sea and on land was fallacious and full of danger, and pointed out that the chief way in which Great Britain had used her maritime supremacy to finish her Wars with Great Powers had been by the destruction of their trade[2].

Buchanan's Presidency was comparatively uneventful as regards relations with Great Britain; but it was marked by a final settlement of the perennial difficulties concerning the Right of Search, consequent on events in which neither Britain nor the United States had any direct concern. On June 25, 1857, the *Cagliari*, a Sardinian vessel, was searched and seized on the high seas by a warship of the kingdom of Naples. Her crew, including certain British subjects, were carried to Naples and there imprisoned with considerable cruelty. Lord Malmesbury demanded the release of the British subjects concerned, while the Sardinian Government claimed that the seizure was contrary to international law and called for the opinions of certain distinguished

[1] Marcy to Sartiges, July 28th, 1856. *Senate Exec. Docs.* 34th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 104, pp. 5–14.

[2] Lord John Russell in House of Commons, July 14th, 1857. *Hansard*, CXLVII. 1491.

English jurists as to the Right of Search on the high seas in time of peace. The opinions delivered by Drs Travers Twiss and R. G. Phillimore, which were largely supported by appeals to the writings of American jurists, were entirely adverse to the exercise of any such right, as being a contravention of inviolable national right[1]. Of this opinion advantage was taken in connexion with the discussions then in progress with the United States concerning the right of British naval officers to visit suspected slavers. The reply of Lord Malmesbury to questions on the subject in the House of Lords was quite decisive as to this long-standing controversy. He stated that Her Majesty's Government had taken the opinion of the law officers of the Crown on the whole question of the Right of Search, and continued:

> It is their decided opinion that by the international law in times of peace we have no right of search or visitation whatever. And, that being the case, we think we should be acting in a manner unworthy of the British Government if we delayed one minute communicating that information.

He went on to read a despatch in which Secretary Cass had communicated the views of the American Government on the question, and commended it as exactly expressing the views of the British Government as to the inviolability of vessels peacefully pursuing their lawful avocations. This definite proclamation of agreement between the two Governments on the old cause of quarrel was driven home in a further debate in the House of Lords on July 26th, 1858, when Lord Lyndhurst, late Lord Chancellor, followed by the Foreign Secretary, said finally, "We have surrendered no right at all, for no such right as that contended for ever existed. We have abandoned the assumption of a right, and, in doing so, we have acted justly, prudently and wisely[2]."

The relinquishment of these ancient maritime claims and the determined attempt at conciliation in Central American affairs marked closer relations between Great Britain and the United States than had ever before been reached. This result was not due, as has sometimes been stated, to any weakness in the assertion of British rights in the face of persistent American hostility; but it signified a definite change of policy in relation to Caribbean affairs, decided upon in deference to public opinion and after full debate. Whereas, at an earlier period any extension of the territory or influence of the United

[1] As to the *Cagliari* case, which at the time caused much excitement in this country, see Lord Newton's *Life of* (the second) *Lord Lyons*, I. 6–11.

[2] July 26th, 1858. *Hansard*, CLI. 2078–83.

States had been regarded with apprehension and some jealousy, it was now looked upon with approval, as likely to bring order out of anarchy and thus to open wider fields for British commercial enterprise and the sale of British manufactures. The new ideas could not have been better summed up than they were by Disraeli in his closing review of the session of 1856. He appealed for a consideration of our relations with the United States on broad and generous lines, and wound up by declaring his firm opposition to that litigious spirit of jealousy which looks upon the expansion of that country and the advance of these young communities with an eye of jealousy and distrust[1]. This change of policy in relation to America was not an isolated phenomenon; it was merely the most obvious indication of a change of method that had been urged upon the Foreign Office from many quarters. The pressure of public opinion could not effect all that was planned by those who organised it; but it succeeded in bringing about some of the changes desired, especially in the conduct of our relations with the United States and other American Powers, where circumstances were simpler than amid the thickets of Continental diplomacy.

[1] Disraeli in House of Commons, July 25th, 1856. *Hansard*, CXLIII. 1456–57.

BOOK III

FROM THE OUTBREAK OF THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION TO THE DEATH OF PALMERSTON AND THE RESIGNATION OF RUSSELL, 1848–1866

SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Viscount Palmerston.
December, 1851: Earl Granville.
February, 1852: Earl of Malmesbury.
December, 1852: Lord John Russell (afterwards Earl Russell).
February, 1853: Earl of Clarendon.
February, 1858: Earl of Malmesbury.
June, 1859: Lord John Russell (from July 1861 Earl Russell).
November, 1865: Earl of Clarendon.

UNDER-SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Lord Stanley of Alderley.
February, 1852: Austen Henry Layard (afterwards Right Hon. Sir A. H. Layard).
May, — : Lord Stanley (afterwards Earl of Derby).
December, — : Lord Wodehouse (afterwards Earl of Kimberley).
April, 1854: Right Hon. Edmund Hammond (afterwards Lord Hammond) (*Permanent*).
July, 1856: Earl of Shelburne (afterwards Marquis of Lansdowne).
February, 1858: William Robert Seymour Vesey Fitzgerald (afterwards Sir W. R. Seymour Vesey Fitzgerald).
October, — : James Murray (*Assistant*).
June, 1859: Lord Wodehouse (afterwards Earl of Kimberley).
August, 1861: Austen Henry Layard (afterwards Right Hon. Sir A. H. Layard).

CHAPTER VII

THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTION AND AFTER, 1848–1854

I. THE SITUATION AT THE OPENING OF 1848

THE year 1848—the *annus mirabilis* of the nineteenth century—opened with many presages of storm. The revolutionary impulses of democracy and nationality, distinct from one another, yet often allied, clearly threatened the destruction of the European system which had been established by the Treaties of 1815 and maintained, largely by the craft of Metternich, throughout a whole changeful generation. In England itself the democratic demands of the Chartists were being pressed to the point of rebellion. In Ireland the national movement, led by Smith O'Brien, was about to culminate in an armed rising. The unrest of the United Kingdom was, however, mild and moderate as compared with the furious spirit of revolt which seethed beneath the surface of Continental politics. All countries, except Belgium under the enlightened constitutionalism of Leopold I, and Russia under the stern but not unpopular autocracy of Nicholas I, seemed to be possessed by the demon of passionate disaffection. Portugal, to take the less important first, was torn by fratricidal conflicts between the factions of Queen Maria and the pretender Dom Miguel, complicated with ferocious political struggles of Reactionaries under Saldanha and Progressives under das Antas. Spain, too, was rent by civil strife; Carlists and Christinists waged with one another a war of irreconcilable violence and intrigue, while a new source of dissension had arisen out of Queen Isabella's unhappy marriage to her degenerate cousin Francis, whom a French faction supported and a British faction decried. Switzerland was still heaving with the after-swell of the *Sonderbund* tempest, the angry religious passions of which had been but superficially stilled, at the close of 1847, by the military prowess of Dufour. The heterogeneous dominions of the Habsburg monarchy, held together merely by the spell of the Imperial name and by the Metternich tradition, were all ripe for revolution—the Germans of Austria longing for democratic control over their neighbours; Czechs, Poles, Magyars, Roumans, Illyrians, Lombards and Venetians, alike eager for self-rule. Italy, divided among seven

masters, disgusted by the failure of a long series of sectional risings, and excited by the election of the supposed Liberal Pius IX in 1846, was manifestly preparing for a general and supreme effort to expel the Teutons, crush the despots, establish the Constitution, and achieve some sort of unity. Finally, France, where Louis-Philippe still reigned and Guizot was in power, was showing ominous signs of desperate revolt against the tediousness of the Orleans variety of royalism, the corruption of the official oligarchy, and the reactionary policy of Monarch and Minister.

The anxiety which this widespread unrest excited in the breasts of rulers is reflected in many of the memoirs and in much of the correspondence of the period. A very few references must here suffice. In August, 1847, Metternich, in profound alarm at the unexpected advent of a Liberal Pope, addressed a number of pathetic appeals to the Powers, urging them to remain united in resistance to the Revolution. On September 7th, 1847, Queen Victoria sent to the King of the Belgians a letter in which she said: "The state of politics in Europe is very critical, and one feels *very* anxious for the future." Four days later, the Prince Consort, writing to Stockmar, more precisely specifies the causes of anxiety: "The political horizon," he says, "grows darker and darker. Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal are in a state of ferment. I have worked out a long memorandum for Lord John Russell, which I should like to show you, in which I have tried to define the position of England with reference to the movements of Liberalism in Europe." The Prince's Memorandum did not entirely commend itself to either Russell or Stockmar, and while it was under discussion the horizon grew blacker still. On February 12th, 1848, before the great upheaval had effectively begun, Leopold of Belgium had reached the limit of despair respecting both mankind at large and the terrestrial globe. Writing to Queen Victoria, he said: "The human race is a *sad* creation, and I trust the other planets are better organised, and that we may get there hereafter."

While Leopold and his compeers were lamenting the degeneracy of the age, and—pending their departure to more perfect planets—were considering how this planet might be saved from submergence under the rising flood of Liberalism, Palmerston was steering Great Britain amid the dangerous shoals and eddies of a profoundly troubled sea of international affairs. He had succeeded Aberdeen at the Foreign Office in July, 1846, when the Ministry of Lord John Russell had displaced that of Sir Robert Peel. He had taken up the duties of his

high and responsible post not only with the satisfaction of a statesman whose deepest and keenest interests had always lain in the sphere of Continental politics, but also with the confidence of one whose innate self-reliance was reinforced by memories of two successful terms of previous service in the same department of State. First, under Earl Grey from November, 1830, to July, 1834, and under Lord Melbourne from July to December, 1834, and again (after the brief interlude of Peel's first Ministry) from April, 1835, to September, 1841, he had held the seals of the Foreign Office. During these eleven years of almost continuous authority, especially while the easy-going Melbourne was his nominal chief, he came to exercise over his Department a measure of control that fell little short of autocracy; but at the same time he attained a mastery over the details of diplomacy that made him incomparably the supreme expert in his own country on most matters of European concern. He regarded himself, and he was generally recognised on the Continent, as the heir of the tradition of Canning; that is to say, as the adversary of the Holy Alliance, the patron of nascent nations struggling for independence, the opponent of intervention for the suppression of liberty, and the mainstay of the Balance of Power. Metternich detested him, and it was with special reference to his activities that the Austrian statesman, writing to the King of Prussia on January 11th, 1848, spoke of "*l'attitude politique immorale de l'Angleterre et sa façon de proclamer la politique d'Éole inaugurée par Canning.*" In pursuit of the stormy policy of Canning, Palmerston had, in his earlier days of office, fostered the independence of Greece, partly because he sympathised with Hellenic aspirations, partly because he felt that the strength and essential integrity of the Turkish empire would be maintained rather than injured by the removal of this inflammatory appendage. Further, he had secured the separation of Belgium from Holland, and its neutralisation as an autonomous State—a triumph of clear thought and firm will which not only saved Europe from imminent and general war, but also delivered the Belgians themselves from the alternatives of subjugation by the Dutch and their Allies, or spoliation by the French. He had, also, negotiated, in the face of menacing antagonism at home and abroad, the Quadruple Alliance of 1834, which grouped the Constitutional Governments of Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal in mutual defence against the autocrats of Russia, Austria and Prussia, and in combined resistance to their protégés the Carlists and the Miguelists, who, in Spain and Portugal respectively, were

seeking to overthrow Liberal institutions and restore despotism and the Inquisition. Finally, he had, in 1840, achieved by his brilliant and decisive diplomacy a working agreement with Russia, Austria, and Prussia concerning the explosive problem of the Near East—an agreement which, once more, snatched peace out of the very jaws of war, checked the aggressions of Mehemet Ali, substituted a European protectorate over Turkey for the Russian dominance secured by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and by the neutralisation of the Straits and the Black Sea guaranteed a continuance of tranquillity in that quarter.

Masterly and triumphant, however, though Palmerston's policy undoubtedly had been during the period 1830–41, its success was marred by the grave drawback that it involved Britain in growing controversy with France, culminating finally in entire alienation. This was all the more regrettable because Palmerston recognised to the full the supreme importance of the maintenance of a Franco-British *entente cordiale*[1]. He had wished to use cooperation with France as the prime instrument of his diplomacy and rejoiced when, in 1834, the Quadruple Alliance had seemed to mark the attainment of his desire, and had linked the Constitutional powers of the West in a league strong enough to balance the confederacy of the autocrats of the East. When, later, he drew apart from France, it was with extreme reluctance and only because he felt compelled to do so by the irresistible pressure of events. If we ask what were the causes of the lamentable frictions which from 1835 to 1841 engendered increasing heat and growing exasperation between Palmerston and the Governments of Louis-Philippe, we shall probably have to admit that there were faults on both sides. On the one hand, the French did not honestly fulfil their obligations under the Treaty of 1834, but intrigued in the Peninsula with reactionaries and rebels. Instead of genuinely abandoning their old policy of European aggression, they, under the impulse of a revived Napoleonic cult, still schemed for extensions of their frontiers and enlargement of their influence. Above all, they did not heed British susceptibilities respecting the Mediterranean, but conspired with Spaniards, Moors, Italians, Greeks, Syrians and Egyptians, to diminish British naval ascendancy and undermine British interests

[1] Cf. Palmerston's speech in the House of Commons, June 1st, 1840: "No man in this house attaches greater value than I do myself to the intimate alliance of Great Britain and France. I believe that the alliance is not more advantageous to the interests of the two countries than beneficial to the security of the peace of Europe, and since I have had the honour of holding my present office, I have zealously endeavoured to promote the continuance of that alliance."

in the Near East. It was, indeed, the French intrigues with Mehemet Ali which, in 1840, completed the schism between the two neighbours, and caused the possibility of war to be seriously considered. Palmerston had lost all trust in the French Government; he felt that everywhere, in spite of professed friendship and even formal alliance, it was secretly plotting and assiduously working in antagonism to Great Britain. But if it be granted that the *bourgeois* monarch—whom in April, 1840, he characterised to Granville as "a man in whom no solid trust can be reposed"—gave ample cause for distrust, it must, also, be admitted on the other hand that Palmerston was not free from fault. He showed himself excessively suspicious, harshly unconciliatory, culpably regardless of the enormous difficulties with which the Orleans dynasty had to contend, unappreciative both of their efforts for peace and of their sacrifices for the sake of friendship, tactless and thoughtless, occasionally even grossly rude, in his dealings with French diplomatists. He had, apparently, brought over from the well-remembered days of the Revolutionary Wars an ineradicable prejudice against all the brood of the execrable Philippe Égalité. He disapproved of the way in which Louis-Philippe had secured the Crown in 1830. "If," he said, "he had been a very straightforward, scrupulous, and high-minded man, he would not now be sitting on the French throne." He treated the King's representatives with scant courtesy, even when they were of the eminent rank and world-wide celebrity of Talleyrand, now in his old age. In the Belgian crisis of 1830, in the Egyptian embroglio of 1840, in the varied diplomatic concerns of the intervening ten years—he steadily declined to make any concessions to French feeling, and showed himself contemptuously indifferent to the French plea that only some appearance of success abroad would make it possible for the House of Orleans to take root at home. Louis-Philippe, everywhere faced by evidences of Palmerston's unfriendliness, suspicion, and despite, came to regard him with malignant hatred, and grew into the belief that, while he was in power, no Franco-British *entente* was possible.

In these circumstances it was a matter of widespread relief when, in September, 1841, Palmerston went out of office on the fall of the Melbourne Ministry, and when Sir Robert Peel, the new Premier, entrusted the conduct of Foreign Affairs to Lord Aberdeen. Although the careers of Aberdeen and Palmerston had been curiously parallel—they were born in the same year, educated simultaneously at the same School and the same University, elected to Parliament on the same

occasion—the two men differed *toto cœlo*. Whereas the Irish Viscount was lucid, decisive, vigorous, self-reliant, the Scottish Earl was neither clear in thought nor coherent in language, and, above all, was deficient in will and devoid of decision in action. But, on the other hand, whereas Palmerston was pugnacious, unconciliatory, reckless of giving offence, Aberdeen was gentle and amiable in manner, anxious to be friendly with everyone, eager to please. The five years of his tenure of the Foreign Office were years of healing and reconciliation. Palmerston stigmatised his policy as "antiquated imbecility," and accused him of procuring pretences of friendship by wholesale surrenders of British rights. But, nevertheless, he relieved a dangerous tension, made the name of Britain once more tolerable on earth, and above all restored the broken *entente* between England and France. Under his mild and benevolent *régime* it became possible for Queen Victoria to accept an invitation to the Orleans Court in 1843, and for Louis-Philippe to pay a return visit to the Queen in the following year. He and Guizot, who conducted French Foreign Affairs during the whole period of Aberdeen's Secretaryship, struck up a friendship so intimate and confidential that they came to be more like colleagues in the same Cabinet than representatives of different Governments. It was while the two Ministers, in attendance upon their respective monarchs, were together in 1845 at the Château d'Eu that the unhappy project of the Spanish Marriages was mooted between them, and that Aberdeen was complacent enough to acquiesce in the French stipulation that the young Queen of Spain's husband should be a Bourbon, though under protest, and in consideration of the counter-concession that the second projected Spanish marriage (the Duc de Montpensier's) should be deferred.

The fall of Peel's Ministry and the consequent retirement of Aberdeen from the Foreign Office occurred (July, 1846) before the scandalous intrigues respecting the Spanish Marriages had reached their culmination. Lord John Russell became Prime Minister; and he brought Palmerston back to his old post. This change of Government had been for some time probable, and it had caused the liveliest anxiety in Paris. Before the close of the year 1845 Disraeli had visited the French capital, and had found both the King and Guizot filled with alarm. He had tried to reassure them, pointing out to them that Palmerston was "the first Foreign Minister who had taken the French intimacy as an avowed element of our national policy." They had remained unconvinced, and Disraeli had thereupon thought it well

to write to Palmerston a long and extremely able letter in which, with genuine magnanimity, he had suggested to his political opponent that some step should be taken to put an end to the French distrust of him. Perhaps in consequence of this communication, Palmerston paid a visit to Paris at Easter, 1846. He was well received by both Louis-Philippe and his Minister, as well as by Thiers, Montalembert and other eminent French party-leaders. He is said to have made an excellent impression upon all whom he met by the ease and frankness of his manner. Before he left "*ce terrible Lord Palmerston*" had become "*ce cher Lord Palmerston.*" The reconciliation, however, thus effected was unhappily a merely superficial one. Nothing had been done to remove either Palmerston's deep-seated suspicion of Orleanist designs, or Louis-Philippe's profound conviction that Palmerston was at heart his enemy. One of Palmerston's first acts on resuming the seals of the Foreign Office seemed to confirm the French King's belief. For on July 19th he had sent to Henry Bulwer, the British Minister in Madrid, a despatch in which he mentioned Prince Leopold of Coburg-Cohary (a near relative of the Consorts of the two Queens of England and Portugal) as one of three possible candidates for the hand of the Queen of Spain. The mere sending of the despatch did no harm; for it did not press the Coburg candidate as against the other two, who were Bourbons; and, further, it was intended not for communication to the Spanish Government but solely for Bulwer's own guidance. Palmerston, however, on the next day, handed a copy of these confidential Instructions to the French Chargé d'affaires in London, and allowed him to make a transcript. By this means the despatch reached the Governments of Paris and Madrid. It roused both of them to the extreme height of fury. Louis-Philippe regarded the mere mention of Leopold as a violation of the tacit agreement arrived at between himself and Aberdeen; Leopold, moreover, was the one person above all others whose marriage to the Queen of Spain he dreaded and opposed; he further suspected that the naming of Leopold by Palmerston presaged an active diplomatic campaign on his behalf. The Spanish Court, also, was deeply offended, not so much by Palmerston's references to the marriage as by some remarks which he made respecting Spanish politics and by indications that he anticipated revolution in the Peninsula. The effect, therefore, of Palmerston's indiscretion was to link the two Courts together in violent antagonism to Britain; to precipitate the engagement of the Spanish Queen to her impotent Bourbon cousin, the Duke of Cadiz; and to secure

Louis-Philippe's reluctant consent (on which the Spaniards insisted) that the marriage of Montpensier to the Infanta should be celebrated at the same time as the marriage of Cadiz to the Queen. He consented, knowing that he was breaking a clear promise, and he broke it because of his hatred and dread of Palmerston. Queen Victoria was entirely justified by facts when she remarked, in commenting on this unpleasant business: "If our dear Aberdeen had been still at his post, the whole thing would not have happened."

From the international point of view, and in itself, the Spanish Marriage intrigue was an exceedingly trivial affair, not worth one-tenth of the pother made about it[1]. Even at the time, sensible men took the view of Greville, who said: "I confess I can feel none of the apprehensions that my friends do. I don't believe the influence of France will be increased in Spain by the marriage." As a matter of fact, it was not; and all the efforts of Palmerston to raise the ghost of the Treaty of Utrecht were as vain as had been William III's efforts in 1700 to make a spectre out of the Will of the Spanish Charles II. The storm was limited to the diplomatic tea-cup; its really serious results—apart from the blighting of the life of the Queen of Spain—lay in the new and aggravated schism which henceforth divided the British Court and Ministry from those of Louis-Philippe. Palmerston felt that his worst suspicions respecting Orleanist faith were more than justified. He was not a man who readily forgot or forgave impenitent sinners, and he made no secret of his fixed intention "to humble France, and to make her feel her humiliation." Guizot and his master soon had bitter cause to regret the Pyrrhic victory which they had won. They found themselves everywhere thwarted by British influence; they found themselves isolated and friendless in a troubled Continent; they found themselves execrated in their own country by all patriotic people who condemned their wanton sacrifice of the solid advantages of the British Alliance in return for the doubtful dynastic gains of the Bourbon marriage and the Infanta's dowry; and, before long, they had reached the slippery slope which ultimately landed them in ruin.

The utter disintegration of the Alliance of the Liberal Powers, and the soon notorious alienation of Britain from France speedily had disastrous consequences in European affairs. In the first place, in November, 1846, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, without consulting either France or Britain, decided to suppress the Free Republic of

[1] Cf. note, chapter III.

Cracow, and to authorise its absorption into the Habsburg Empire. It had been for a long time a breeding place of revolution, and in particular during 1846 had been the centre of a rising on behalf of Polish Independence. In vain did Guizot seek the cooperation of Palmerston in a joint protest against this flagrant violation of a treaty-arrangement made by the Concert of Europe in 1815. Palmerston drew up a protest of his own and, "without waiting for Guizot," sent it off to Vienna. The French Minister was left to follow suit at his own convenience. He, too, in time lodged an isolated complaint, couched in very mild language, as he was now in no position to quarrel with the autocrats. Both Guizot's gentle rebuke and Palmerston's more vigorous denunciation were treated at Vienna with the diplomatic contempt which they deserved: unsupported by force, they had no other result than to display the disunion of the Western Powers and the impotence of each of them in isolation. Yet the case of the Western Powers was, on moral grounds, a strong one, and it is worth noting how Palmerston put it. He had no special reverence for the Treaties of 1815; it was Metternich's *rôle*, not his, to maintain their sacrosanctity. All he urged was, first, that if there was a valid cause for a revision of the Vienna Settlement, it should be heard and judged by all the Signatory Powers; secondly, that it was highly improper for the Power which more emphatically than any other proclaimed the inviolability of the Treaties on the Rhine and the Po, to take the lead in violating them on the Vistula. It was a strong case, but it was pleaded in vain. The Autocrats were not open to merely moral arguments. In the absence of Franco-British cooperation, no kind of pressure was at hand. Hence the republic of Cracow perished unaided (1846).

In the Peninsula, not only lack of cooperation, but positive antagonism soon began to mark the relations of British and French. In Spain, the Orleanist marriage-triumph was short-lived. The Queen and her degenerate consort speedily quarrelled beyond hope of reconciliation. The angry Queen turned the fury of her resentment against the French faction, which had forced her into the hateful union, and she found comfort and support in the British Minister, the Constitutionalists, the anti-Clericals, and the Liberal General Serrano. The discarded husband surrounded himself with Orleanists, absolutists and priests, and sought by their aid to secure reinstatement or revenge. In Portugal, simultaneously, appeal was made to British and French influence on opposite sides in a complicated Constitutional

and dynastic struggle. Queen Maria developed despotic tendencies, and found herself opposed by a revolutionary Junta which seized Oporto. France (with whom Spain was in agreement) was primarily concerned to suppress the Junta and restore the royal authority; while Great Britain made it her business to bring back Maria to Constitutional ways, and so remove the causes of dissension. In order to preclude French and Spanish intervention Palmerston pressed British mediation upon the Portuguese Government. "If the civil war," he wrote[1], "could be terminated in this manner by England alone, without Spanish or French interference, the honour of the Queen would be saved, the liberties of the Portuguese nation would be respected, and the tie between England and Portugal would remain unbroken." At first, the Queen rejected the proposed mediation, and there seemed no alternative to a combined British-French-Spanish demonstration against the Junta under the terms of the Quadruple Alliance of 1834. But on May 6th, 1847, Palmerston was able to announce "the Queen's acceptance of our terms," and to rejoice in a distinct diplomatic triumph over the forces of reaction.

During the course of 1847, Anglo-French antagonism became even more overt and conspicuous in the affairs of Switzerland. Two years previously, a long and embittered religious controversy between Protestants and Catholics culminated in the secession of the Seven Catholic Cantons from the Swiss Federation and their establishment of an independent league—the *Sonderbund*. Austria, Russia, and Prussia, all anxious for various reasons to dismember Switzerland, gave their support to the seceders, and Guizot, now more and more leaning to reactionary methods, brought France into line with them. It was proposed that a European Congress should be called and that the Swiss Constitution should be remodelled in the interests of the *Sonderbund*. Great Britain alone among the Great Powers, under Palmerston's masterly guidance, determined if possible to maintain the integrity of the Federation, and to secure the suppression of the *Sonderbund*. Guizot rejoiced at the isolation of Great Britain, and anticipated a notable victory over Palmerston. The situation, indeed, was for the British Minister one of extreme difficulty. He seemed to be faced by the alternatives of diplomatic humiliation or hopeless war. With piercing insight, however, he perceived a third course, by means of which both peace and honour could be secured. He saw that, if left to themselves, the Federal forces would reduce the

[1] Ashley, E., *Life of Palmerston*, II. 23.

Sonderbund. He made it his business to procure for them time to do so. Thus, in order to prevent foreign interference, he accepted the principle of the European Congress, and ultimately agreed that Great Britain should take part in it. But, before he reached that point of concordance (November 26th, 1847), he had succeeded in protracting negotiations so effectively that the *Sonderbund* had ceased to exist: on November 23rd it had been extinguished by the Federal General Dufour on the field of Gislikon. Hence, no Congress was held, and Palmerston had the satisfaction of seeing both the peace of Europe maintained unbroken, and British policy triumphant. He had played a remarkably bold, clever, and adventurous game in the interest of the Swiss Federation, and, singularly aided by good fortune, he had won an impressive success. He had managed the matter alone, with the courage and the confidence springing from a clear insight into existing European conditions, and from a proud assurance of the strength of Great Britain. But his victory left her in dangerous isolation. The four patrons of the *Sonderbund* were full of wrath at their discomfiture, and filled with hatred of Palmerston as the aider and abettor of revolution all the world over. Guizot's resentment, in particular, knew no bounds; for he had had to pay the penalty of his faithlessness. Regardless of hostile public opinion in France, he had broken the Entente with Great Britain, had withdrawn his country from the Quadruple Alliance of Constitutional Powers, and had placed it on the side of the autocrats. Only a very distinct and demonstrable diplomatic gain would have justified in the eyes of the supporters of the *bourgeois* monarchy so marked a departure from the Liberal principles of 1830; and, instead of gain, there had come humiliating loss. In Spain, in Portugal, and now in Switzerland, Guizot had been outmanœuvred, outwitted, and outfought by the superior knowledge, higher principle, and stronger will of the British Minister. Only one thing more was needed to complete Guizot's betrayal of the Constitutional cause, and fill to the full the cup of Orleanist offence, and that one thing, if we may trust the evidence of Count d'Haussonville[1], he prepared to do. He projected a Quadruple Alliance of France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia against Great Britain, and prepared plans for the invasion of the island kingdom. This excessive concentration upon foreign affairs, however, unduly distracted his attention from domestic politics. He failed to notice

[1] Haussonville, *Histoire de la politique extérieure du Gouvernement Français*, II. 381. Cf. Martin, *The Prince Consort*, II. 2.

the gathering omens of the revolutionary storm. Before he had completed his negotiations for the Quadruple Alliance, and before his ulterior schemes for the invasion of England were matured, the tempest had burst, and he himself was an exile, seeking refuge in the country against which his hatred had been concentrated.

II. THE REVOLUTION, 1848–1849

The dominant factor in British foreign affairs at the beginning of 1848 was undoubtedly the ubiquitous Anglo-French antagonism. At every Court in Europe, British diplomats instinctively ranged themselves on opposite sides to those of the representatives of the Orleanist monarchy. Indeed, the conflict extended to the Consular service, and throughout the world, wherever merchants congregated and seamen met, controversies and commotions occurred. All this was disastrous for the cause of Constitutional government on the Continent. For it broke the Quadruple Alliance of 1834 into atoms; gave the autocrats a new ally in Guizot, and left Palmerston alone, like a voice crying in the wilderness, to point the way of peace and progress, of ordered liberty and secure reform, which lay along the track of representative institutions—the *via media* between the Scylla of despotism and the Charybdis of revolution. No sense of solitude, it is true, perturbed Palmerston. He was fully capable of standing at ease in isolation, and entirely competent, in his own serene judgment, to give advice from his isolated eminence to all who might happen to need it. He regretted the alienation of France from Great Britain; but he held himself wholly free from blame in the matter. He was not conscious that he had shown any want of consideration to the *bourgeois* King and his Ministers amid the complicated difficulties of their unstable position, or that he had exasperated them beyond the limit of human endurance by his unmitigated accusations of dishonesty and bad faith. He attributed all the fault to the French; expressed the conviction that they in the end would be the people to pay the penalty for it; and went on his way with gay *insouciance*. It is, indeed, hardly possible to read the letters and despatches which he poured forth in a torrent during this crowded and critical period without coming to the conclusion that he thoroughly enjoyed the game of diplomacy, which he played with the skill and precision of an incomparable master. He seemed thoroughly to know the politics and parties of every Court and Cabinet in Europe; he appeared to be familiar with the leading statesmen of every land and to have an

accurate estimate both of their character and their capacity. He took an interest in the internal affairs of Continental States which was regarded by many, including his own colleagues and friends, as excessive; and he did not hesitate to intervene in the domestic disputes of our neighbours with exhortations and admonitions which not infrequently excited the liveliest exasperation in the breasts of the recipients. He desired to advance the cause of Constitutional government in the world, because he felt that by no other means could the reasonable demands of reformers be so satisfactorily met, the agitations of revolutionaries stopped, and the peace of mankind assured. Hence his agents had active intercourse with, for instance, Thiers in France, Serrano in Spain, das Antas in Portugal, and Mavrocordatos in Greece. No wonder that he was regarded by absolutist monarchs and reactionary ministers as a dangerous intriguer, a persistent intermeddler, an inveterate fomenter of discord. He was, of course, well aware of the detestation with which he was regarded in nearly all the chanceries of Europe; but the knowledge did not disquiet him. His motives were pure; his advice was disinterested and good; his language was free from ambiguity. If the monarchs and the ministers did not like the warnings and encouragements which he administered, so much the worse for them. Unmoved, therefore, he remained when he heard of the rage and fury of Louis-Philippe in Paris, of the Queen-Mother in Madrid, of Saldanha in Lisbon, of Otho in Athens, or even of the more formidable Nicholas and Nesselrode in Petrograd, reinforced by Metternich and Ferdinand in Vienna.

One country, however, there was which at the beginning of 1848, was causing Palmerston acute anxiety. In Italy he was keenly interested; he had spent some time in it as a boy; he knew its language well; he was acquainted with its history, its sufferings, its aspirations. No merely sentimental considerations, however, lay at the base of his solicitude: he had no consuming zeal for any of the great causes which possessed the souls of Mazzini, Garibaldi, Gioberti, or Cavour. What he feared was that the seething unrest in Italy would burst forth in such an eruption of revolution as would generate a European war. His prime concern was the preservation of the peace of the Continent. He was an elderly man whose memory easily ran back over the whole course of the long wars which the Convention, the Directory, the Consulate, and the Empire had waged during the fateful years 1792–1815: he himself had been the British Secretary at War from 1809 to the end. He recollected that one of the most

persistent and malignant causes of the conflicts of that awful quarter century had been the clash of France and Austria in Italy. He knew that the settlement of Vienna in 1815, which had restored Austria to an influence vaster than ever before, was intensely obnoxious not only to Italy but also to France as well. He dreaded lest the plains of Lombardy should once more become the source of a world-conflagration. So early as July 30th, 1846, almost immediately after his return to the Foreign Office, he wrote to Lord John Russell: "Italy is the weak part of Europe, and the next war that breaks out in Europe will probably arise out of Italian affairs." After describing the abuses which existed, particularly in the Papal States, he continued: "Leave things as they are and you leave France the power of disturbing the peace of Europe whenever she chooses." He believed, moreover, that France would not be very long before choosing so to disturb the peace of the Continent. "The ascendancy of the Liberal party at Paris, whenever it may happen, either by the result of an election or by the death of the king, will soon be followed by an outbreak in Italy." This outbreak would necessarily excite Austrian efforts at repression: "France and Austria would then fight each other in Italy, and France would have all the Italians on her side." The trouble, he was further convinced, would not end there: "The war begun in Italy would probably spread to Germany," and the whole European system would be imperilled[1]. At this date, Palmerston's Italian policy did not go beyond the very modest limit that the rulers of the peninsula—in particular, the King of Sardinia, the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, the Pope, and the King of the Two Sicilies—should be encouraged to grant Constitutional reforms to their subjects, in order that Italian revolution might be prevented; and consequent Austrian repression obviated; French desire for intervention frustrated; and the peace of Europe preserved.

In the interest of European peace, therefore, Palmerston, during the years 1846–48, encouraged the Italian autocrats to tread the path of Constitutional reform. The early acts of Pope Pius IX (elected June 16th, 1846), accordingly, met with his cordial approval, all the more so as other petty potentates of the peninsula showed a disposition to follow the papal lead. The reforming Pontiff released the political prisoners incarcerated by his predecessor, instituted a Council of State, appointed Liberal officials, projected the establishment of civil guards, relaxed the press censorship, and issued a Commission

[1] Cf. Ashley, E., *Life of Palmerston*, II. 12.

foreshadowing extensive judicial and administrative concessions to popular demands. These papal movements in the direction of Constitutional government, however, in proportion as they elicited satisfaction in Palmerston and enthusiasm in Italy, aroused alarm in Metternich and disgust in official Austria. The one thing for which the Viennese bureaucracy was not prepared was the advent of a Liberal Pope. After the first shock of amazement was over, it protested with increasing vehemence against the subversive surrenders made to the revolution by the Holy Father, and, when protests proved to be unavailing, it ordered the occupation by Austrian troops of the papal city of Ferrara (July, 1847). This aggressive act was greeted with such marked and ominous signs of disapproval by both Sardinia and France that Metternich felt constrained (August) to appeal to all the Great Powers to support him in combatting the Italian insurrection. The Italian movement, he said, was entirely destructive of the treaty-system established in 1815 under the guarantee of Europe; it aimed, ultimately, at the expulsion of the Austrians from their lawful possessions, and at the fusion of the States of the peninsula into a single body politic—an absurd object, since "Italy" was merely a geographical expression. Palmerston, who had not at this time come to think that the unification of Italy lay within the scope of practical politics, replied to Metternich's appeal by pointing out, first, that the Austrian call for the maintenance of the Treaties of Vienna would have come with better grace before, rather than after, the annexation of Cracow; secondly, that the Austrian alarm respecting Italy was groundless, because, so far as he was aware, there was no scheme afoot for uniting the Italian States into a single federal republic; and, finally, that the real danger to both Italian and European peace lay in the repression of the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the peninsula towards Constitutional government. He hoped, therefore, that the great influence wielded by Austria would be employed to encourage necessary reforms. He was, of course, well aware that the effect of this despatch would be not to convert, but to convulse, Metternich. He derived a malicious joy from the baiting of the master-statesman whose will had dominated Europe for a quarter of a century; and his joy may have been enhanced by the knowledge that he caused much embarrassment to the dull but worthy Lord Ponsonby, British Minister at Vienna, who viewed the world through spectacles provided by Metternich. Moreover, he did not remain content with urging a Liberal policy upon the ultra-Conservative

Habsburg bureaucracy. In November, 1847—in conjunction with Lord John Russell, whose zeal for Italian emancipation was purer than his own—he took the extraordinary step of sending a special mission under the Earl of Minto (Russell's father-in-law and Lord Privy Seal in his Cabinet), to give open encouragement to the Pope, the King of Sardinia, and the Grand-Duke of Tuscany in their Constitutional propensities, and to notify Austria and all others whom it might concern that any intervention on their part to obstruct Italian reform would not be regarded with indifference by Britain. "Her Majesty's Government," ran one of the clauses of the Instructions to the leader of this very extraordinary Mission,

> are deeply impressed with the conviction that it is wise for sovereigns and their governments to pursue in the administration of their affairs a system of progressive improvement; to apply remedies to such evils as, upon examination, they may find to exist, and to remodel from time to time the ancient institutions of their country, so as to render them the more suitable to the gradual growth of intelligence and to the increasing diffusion of political knowledge; and Her Majesty's Government consider it to be an undeniable truth that if an independent Sovereign, in the exercise of his deliberate judgment, shall think fit to make within his Dominions such improvements in the laws and institutions of his country as he may think conducive to the welfare of his people, no other Government can have any right to attempt to restrain or to interfere with such an employment of one of the inherent attributes of independent sovereignty[1].

It is obvious that the purpose of this unique political pilgrimage, which greatly perplexed contemporary observers, was to secure the carrying through, free from Austrian molestation, of such necessary reforms in Italy as would stave off impending revolution, and thus prevent French interference in the peninsula, and a general European conflagration.

Minto's mission was not wholly unsuccessful. Everywhere it was well received by the people, who took it to mean a greater measure of sympathy with Italian aspirations than Palmerston had intended to convey; while Minto's outburst, "*Viva l'Indipendenza Italiana*," whenever he was called upon for a speech, was taken to imply that Britain would help to drive the Austrians out. But Palmerston had no notion of active British help for such a purpose. He had not as yet come to the conclusion that Austria must evacuate the peninsula; although he had reached the conviction that Lombardy and Venetia were sources of weakness rather than of strength to the Habsburg monarchy and that if they *could* be shaken off, their loss to Austria

[1] *Parliamentary Papers relating to Italy*, p. 128.

would in the end be gain. Minto's mission, however, failed to accomplish its main purpose: it did not save Italy from revolution, from war, or from French invasion—the cause being first, that it was two years too late; and secondly, that it offered a pill altogether too small to cure the imminent earthquake. The day was gone when Italy could be satisfied with minor reforms conceded here and there by one or another of the petty survivors of the Middle Ages. Italy had become conscious that she was now not a mere geographical expression, but a nation. She demanded the expulsion of the Austrians, unification into a single State, complete democratic self-government. Palmerston had no conception of the extent and profundity of her discontents as was again made manifest in January, 1848, when, in order to reinforce Minto's remedies, he sent a Circular Despatch to the British representatives in Italy, urging them to combine in advocating Constitutional reform as the happy mean between Reaction and Revolution.

> You are instructed to say to the Minister that the direction of the progress of reform and improvement is still in the hands of the Sovereigns, but that it is now too late for them to attempt to obstruct reasonable progress; and that resistance to moderate petitions is sure to lead ere long to the necessity of yielding to irresistible demands.

Then, after continuing in this strain, he goes on, in a curious clause which serves to show how and why by many a foreign Government the British embassy or legation had come to be regarded as a hotbed of intrigue:

> To the popular leaders with whom you may have intercourse you should use language of the same tendency and arguments drawn from the same considerations. You should tell them that force put upon the inclinations of their sovereigns will produce illwill and repugnance which must lead their rulers on their part to be constantly looking out for an opportunity of shaking off the yoke which they may have been obliged to bear: that mutual distrust will thus be created between the governors and the governed: that this distrust will break out in overt acts on each side, intended perhaps defensively by those by whom done, but regarded as offensive by the other party: that open discord will thence ensue, and that foreign interference may be the ultimate result[1].

The last clause is the key to the whole matter. It was the foreign interference that Palmerston dreaded; the clash of the Great Powers in the plains of Lombardy; the spread of the conflict to the Rhine and the Danube; the embroilment of the world. He was right in his premonitions of danger. But he was wrong in supposing that the

[1] Ashley, E., *Life of Palmerston*, II. 3.

direction of events was "still in the hands of the Sovereigns." Even as he wrote, the hold of the Sovereigns was relaxing, and chaos was taking charge.

The year of revolution was inaugurated at Milan on January 3rd, when the Austrian garrison and the Italian populace came into conflict in the so-called "tobacco war"—a struggle arising out of a local boycott of the weed from which a large part of the Habsburg revenue was derived. It was not more than a riot, and it was soon suppressed; but it revealed to the world the fiery abyss of hatred which divided the alien Government from its Lombard subjects. More serious was the revolt of Sicily against the rule of the Neapolitan Bourbons, which broke out at Palermo on January 12th. The rebels, who soon drove the Neapolitan garrisons from the whole of the island except the citadel of Messina, demanded, first, separation from Naples, and, secondly, the Constitution of 1812. Lord Napier, the British Chargé d'affaires at the Bourbon Court, was disposed to use British influence to secure for the Sicilians both demands. Palmerston, however, did not agree with him. He was entirely in favour of the Constitution; but he wished to prevent the separation. He saw the peril to the general peace of the creation of new, weak, quarrelsome little States; he wished to strengthen Italy by federation rather than diminish by further schism such elements of union as remained in it. Before anything had been settled, the revolt spread to the mainland: on January 27th, Naples broke out into insurrection, demanding a Constitution. King Ferdinand saw that he must yield. On February 10th he promulgated a Constitution for the whole realm, closely modelled on that established in France in 1830—a monarchy, with a legislature of two Chambers. Then he sent off an earnest request that Lord Minto might be allowed to extend his mission from Rome to Naples, in order that he might mediate between the Sicilian rebels and their reformed King, and prevent the disintegration of the realm. Lord Minto proceeded to Naples, prepared to suggest a scheme of personal union, which had Palmerston's approval. On his arrival, however, he found himself helpless in the face of the reactionary obstinacy of the monarch and the radical unreasonableness of the revolutionaries. But, before his negotiations broke down, the effects of Ferdinand's surrender had been felt far and wide through the peninsula. In particular, the Pope, the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, and the King of Sardinia, all gave themselves up, night and day, to the study of the French Constitution of 1830, and prepared (in varying degrees of

unwillingness) to make concessions to the more clamorous popular demands. Palmerston was delighted: he felt that Minto had not toured in vain. But the measure of Palmerston's satisfaction was also the measure of Metternich's disgust, and, very soon, rumours reached England of extensive movements of Austrian troops. On receipt of this information, Palmerston wrote to Ponsonby at Vienna one of his most pungent and illuminating letters (February 11th, 1848). It reveals with unmistakable clearness the real ground of his interest in Italy, the deep source of his anxiety concerning European peace, the true nature of his policy towards the Habsburg empire.

"I send you," it begins, "an important despatch to be communicated to Prince Metternich, and I wish you to recommend it to his most serious consideration.... The real fact," it continues, "is that upon Metternich's decision in regard to the affairs of Italy depends the question of peace or war in Europe. If he remains quiet, and does not meddle with matters beyond the Austrian frontiers, peace will be maintained, and all these Italian changes will be effected with as little disturbance as is consistent with the nature of things. If he takes upon himself the task of regulating by force of arms the internal affairs of the Italian States, there will infallibly be war[1]."

After some weighty words respecting the nature of the threatened struggle, he proceeds: "In that War, whatever Louis-Philippe and Guizot may promise, the principal champions contending against each other would be Austria and France," and he asks Metternich to consider carefully what the effects in Germany and the Austrian empire of such a war would be. He reverts again to his alarm concerning France, assuring Metternich that "he may depend upon it that in defence of Constitutional liberty in Italy the French nation would rush to arms." He concludes by saying: "We set too great a value upon the maintenance of Austria as the pivot of the balance of power in Europe to be able to see without the deepest concern any course of action begun by her Government which would produce fatal consequences to her, and which would place us probably, against our will, in the adverse scale." Here we see Palmerston's overmastering dread of a European conflagration, his fear lest it should be started by a clash of Austrian and French arms in Italy, and his consequent ardent desire that Austria should not interfere with the constitutional movements going on in Italy. We, also, see Palmerston's desire to keep a strong Austria as "the pivot of the balance of power in Europe." When he wrote thus, on February 11th, 1848, it seemed to him that

[1] Ashley, E., *Life of Palmerston*, II. 63.

the peace of the world hung upon the wills of the rulers of Austria and France—Metternich, Louis-Philippe, Guizot. But how little was even Palmerston of a prophet! Within six weeks, all three were fugitives, and exiles in England.

The Italian Revolution which began in January, 1848, comparatively peaceful and Constitutional in its early progress, was entirely surpassed in importance by the French Revolution, violent and destructive, the news of which burst upon the astonished nations at the close of February. Even that tremendous upheaval began to lose part of its significance, when, before the end of March, it was known that Vienna, Budapest, Prague, Milan, Venice, Munich, Berlin were all simultaneously aflame with insurrection; that Ministers were falling, monarchs abdicating, empires collapsing, the whole European system dissolving. The Italian Revolution had never passed out of hand: Palmerston felt quite competent to control it by means of Normanby at Paris, Ponsonby at Vienna, Abercromby at Turin, Hamilton at Florence, Napier at Naples, and Minto in Italy at large[1]. The French Revolution and the consequent European cataclysm were very different matters. These baffled diagnosis and defied management. The Powers that remained upright and stable amid the quaking world—and, apart from the small newly-created State of Belgium, they were only two, viz. Great Britain and Russia—could for a time do little more than stand aside and gaze in helpless anxiety at the passage of the portent. The beginning of the catastrophe was the unexpected crumbling into nothingness of the apparently substantial fabric of the Orleans monarchy. "No monarchy or monarch," said Greville, writing on the first receipt of the news, "fell with such superhuman rapidity...up to the very moment at which the explosion took place...no human being dreamt of a revolution and of the dethronement of the King." Yet those behind the scenes knew of the rottenness veiled by the fair show in front—knew that dynastic selfishness, ambition, corruption, despotism, obstinacy and pride, combined with a foreign policy at once unpopular and unsuccessful, had destroyed any foundations of either affection or respect on which the *bourgeois* monarchy had ever rested. So early as the middle of 1847, Lord Normanby had warned Palmerston that "nothing could save the dynasty of July but an immediate change of men, and

[1] On February 17th, 1848, Lord Lansdowne, on behalf of the Government, moved in the House of Lords a Bill for authorising diplomatic relations with the Papal Court.

measures of reform at once prompt and sincere." In November, 1847, the Prince de Joinville wrote to his brother the Duc de Nemours, "we are bound to look into the future, and it alarms me." What the Prince feared was that the growth of his father's autocratic obstinacy would precipitate a rebellion. His fears were justified, and precisely at a moment when the old King's spirits were depressed by the death of his favourite sister, his vitality lowered by a severe attack of influenza, and his nerves shattered by numerous vexations and alarms. Louis-Philippe, his family, and his Ministers, met the crisis of February 24th–26th with fatuous resourcelessness, feebleness, and folly. Their own incompetence and pusillanimity converted a mere Cabinet convulsion into a first class revolution. Guizot, in at last vacating his office, dragged down with him the dynasty, and plunged the Continent into chaos.

Palmerston heard of the fall of Guizot with unconcealed satisfaction; nor did the news of the ignominious flight of Louis-Philippe which immediately followed cause him any regret. He had no ground for loving either of the pair, and he was well aware of the league which they were endeavouring to build up against Great Britain. He was, of course, much concerned to know what sort of government France would adopt, and as usual the chief source of his anxiety was the problem of the maintenance of European peace. His first instructions to Normanby, dated February 26th, 1848, were: "Continue at your post. Keep up an unofficial and useful communication with the men who from hour to hour (I say not even from day to day) may have the direction of events, but commit us to no acknowledgment of any men, nor of any things. Our principles of action are to acknowledge whatever rule may be established with apparent prospect of permanency, but none other." He then went on to state what were his two immediate fears. The first was that the rest of Europe should meddle with France; the second that France should assail the rest of Europe. As to the one, he was bold enough to say, "We will engage to prevent the rest of Europe from meddling with France"; and he accordingly wrote a series of despatches to Berlin, Vienna, Petersburg, etc., urging in the most emphatic language the policy of strict neutrality. As to the other, he vehemently impressed upon the French Provisional Government the need of moderation both in word and in deed. He reprobated their denunciation of the Treaties of 1815; he warned them against aggressions which he heard some of the wilder spirits were planning against Baden, Belgium, and Lombardy. When

out of the Parisian chaos Lamartine emerged as a centre of restored order, Palmerston made it his policy to support and comfort him. He thought, and rightly thought, that he intended peace, even though the republican form of government which he represented was by nature belligerent. "I firmly believe Lamartine to mean peace and no aggression," he wrote to Westmorland at Berlin. "The only chance for tranquillity and order in France, and for peace in Europe, is to give support to Lamartine," were his words on the same date (February 29th, 1848) to Ponsonby at Vienna. Lamartine duly appreciated Palmerston's recognition; kept his fiery colleagues in check; and turned down an Irish deputation under Smith O'Brien which came to solicit French patronage. There can be little doubt that Palmerston's strong and lucid policy of preventing both incursions and excursions, was a dominant factor in the maintenance of the peace of the Continent during the troubled weeks that followed the fall of Louis-Philippe. The King of Prussia wrote to Queen Victoria: "I bless Providence for having placed Lord Palmerston at the head of your Foreign Office, and keeping him there at this very moment." The Queen's reply is not recorded; but she probably admitted that the blessing was due to Providence rather than to herself.

In the early days of March, 1848, Palmerston's main interest was divided between France and Italy, although the death of Christian VIII of Denmark at the beginning of the year had brought nearer the outbreak of the Danish-German quarrel, which gave him many hours of anxious thought. In France Lamartine's Provisional Government seemed to be settling down hopefully and peacefully to its socialistic experiments. In Italy the process of Constitutional concession was accelerated by the Paris news. Charles Albert promulgated his Sardinian Charter on March 5th, the Pope his grant of liberties to the States of the Church on March 14th. Lombardy, however, continued to cause alarm to Palmerston: he still feared Italian insurrection, Austrian repression, French intervention, and a widespread European commotion. "If the Austrian Government," he wrote to Ponsonby, "does not mitigate its system of coercion in Lombardy and grant liberal institutions, they will have a revolt there; and if there shall be a conflict in Lombardy between the troops and the public, and much bloodshed, it is to be feared that the French nation will break loose in spite of Lamartine's efforts to restrain them." Within three weeks of the writing of this note, and long before Austria could (even if she would) make any change in her system of coercion, the revolt

which Palmerston predicted had broken out, not only in Lombardy but in every part of the Habsburg dominions. On March 13th Vienna itself rose in tumult, demanded a Constitution, and drove the once omnipotent Metternich to seek safety in panic-stricken flight. Two days later, the tidings of this event, which conspicuously marked the end of an era, caused Hungary, Bohemia, Croatia, and Illyria to break out in rebellion. Then followed Italy's turn. On March 18th, Milan rose and expelled its Austrian garrison; on March 22nd, Venice followed the example and proclaimed itself an independent republic once more; on March 23rd, Charles Albert of Sardinia, deeming that the hour of Italy's deliverance had come, declared war upon the shaken Habsburg Power. The horror of the general conflict which above all things Palmerston dreaded seemed to be drawing near. At the same time, the infection of revolution spread to Germany. In Berlin, Frederick William IV, less than three weeks after he had blessed Providence for Palmerston, had to accept the principle of Constitutional government and to agree to the convocation of a German National Parliament. Munich passed through a crisis which drove King Lewis I from the throne of Bavaria. Saxony, Baden, and several minor States, were involved in the maelstrom of change. The troubles of the Peninsula, also, were renewed. The whole European system seemed to be dissolving. It was impossible to believe that amid such a conflict of elemental passions the peace of the world could be maintained. On March 31st, 1848, Greville wrote, "Everybody now thinks there must be a war somewhere, out of such immense confusion and excitement."

It was Palmerston's main concern to prevent this all-but-inevitable war from breaking forth; to isolate the local conflagrations, and let them burn themselves out without involving the Continent in their combustion. That the general peace was as a matter of fact preserved during all this mad year, was due in no small degree to Palmerston's calm and masterly handling of affairs. Appeals poured in upon him from all sides—desperate cries for help from distressed potentates, insistent demands for aid from struggling patriots. It is recorded that "during the year 1848 no less than 28,000 despatches were received at or sent from the Foreign Office[1]." In the midst of the vast and miscellaneous mass of business which this fact indicates Palmerston kept an easy control of the main lines of policy. Throughout all the palpitations of the period he retained an even and unagitated

[1] Martin, *The Prince Consort*, II. 64.

pulse. The man on whose judgment he especially relied—Sir Stratford Canning—assured him, as a result of many journeys and enquiries, that the heart of the Continent was sound; that the Revolution was but "a patty-pan ebullition"; and that it would not have occurred at all, if the monarchs and Ministers of Europe had had sense enough to introduce Constitutional reforms in time. Palmerston estimated the revolutionary leaders at their true worthlessness, rightly calculating that in a few brief months they would all have lapsed into impotence and oblivion, and feeling that nothing serious was to be feared, provided only that a general war could be avoided. The two chief perils to peace were in his opinion, first, that France should break loose on behalf of revolution; second, that Russia should intervene in support of autocracy. He wished to keep on good terms with both Powers, in order that—by advice, persuasion, and proposals for joint mediation, conferences or congresses—he might hold them in check until the crisis should be passed. As further safeguards against aggression, whether from the despotic east or from the democratic west, he earnestly desired the consolidation and firm settlement of the Central European States. He wished Denmark (where Russian intrigue was very active) to be on good terms with Prussia; he wished Germany to become unified, provided only that it should not become so by means of a *Zollverein* injurious to British commerce; he wished the Austrian empire north of the Alps to be maintained and strengthened as a barrier to Russian expansion in the Levant; he wished the integrity of Turkey to be upheld as the only guarantee of the peace of the Near East. The way of stability and strength for all these Central Powers was, he was convinced, that of Constitutional reform, along which Britain had reached her position of secure tranquillity amid the convulsions of the Continent. Hence, he iterated and reiterated with a frequency that became monotonous his exhortations to the dynastic despots to make timely concessions to national democracy.

Italy, however, was the country which, during 1848, continued to give Palmerston the most peculiar anxiety. The revolts of Lombardy and Venetia against the Austrian hegemony threatened complications of the most formidable kind. First, Sardinia—in spite of the most strenuous protests of Abercromby in Turin and Palmerston at Westminster—threw in her lot with the Insurrection, and the dreaded flame of war was actually kindled. Next, the newly Constitutionalised peoples of Naples, Rome, and Tuscany compelled their rulers to join the national cause. Then, the populace of Parma and Modena expelled

their Dukes, and surged to the standard of liberation. The Austrian Power in Italy seemed doomed, when above three fortresses only—Mantua, Verona, Legnago—the eagles of the Habsburgs still flew (May, 1848). The reverberations of these tremendous shocks caused ominous movements beyond the Alps. On the one side, the Tsar showed signs of an intention to mass and march his millions in defence of the rights of his Habsburg brother; on the other side, the French republicans strained at the leash of their Provisional Government, and showed a passionate desire to fly to the aid of the Italian patriots. It seemed as though the scenes of 1800 were to be reenacted, and Russians, Austrians, French and Italians were to be embroiled in the Lombard plains. At the end of May, it appeared to Palmerston that the only way in which European peace could be kept was for Austria to accept defeat in Italy, and to evacuate it. The departure of Austria from the peninsula would be, he felt, an advantage not only to Italy (where the Habsburgs and their garrisons were but hated foreigners), but also to Austria herself, whose power (so necessary to the maintenance of the balance in Europe) was weakened rather than strengthened by the occupation of regions so alien, so distant, and so hostile. This view is well expressed in a letter which Palmerston wrote to the King of the Belgians on June 15th, 1848. The same letter, also, indicates what sort of a reconstruction of Italy Palmerston anticipated and favoured at that date.

"I cannot regret," he says, "the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy. I do not believe, Sire, that it will diminish the real strength, nor impair the real security of Austria as a European Power. Her rule was hateful to the Italians, and has long been maintained only by an expenditure of money and an exertion of military effort which left Austria less able to maintain her interests elsewhere. Italy was to her the heel of Achilles, and not the shield of Ajax. The Alps are her natural barrier and her best defence. I should wish to see the whole of Northern Italy united into one kingdom, comprehending Piedmont, Genoa, Lombardy, Venice, Parma, and Modena; and Bologna would, in that case, sooner or later unite itself either to that State or to Tuscany. Such an arrangement of Northern Italy would be most conducive to the peace of Europe, by interposing between France and Austria a neutral State strong enough to make itself respected, and sympathising in its habits and character neither with France nor with Austria.... Such an arrangement is now, in my opinion, inevitable; and the sooner the Austrian Government makes up its mind to the necessity, the better conditions it will be able to obtain. If Austria waits till she be forcibly expelled—which she will soon be—she will get no conditions at all[1]."

[1] Ashley, E., *Life of Palmerston*, II. 83.

So wrote Palmerston in the middle of June, 1848. The events of the next two months were to show that he profoundly misjudged the situation—underestimating the recuperative power of Austria, over-estimating the patriotic capacity of disunited Italy. But if he miscalculated, so also in the same way did most of the statesmen of the West, as well as nearly all the rulers of the Austrian empire itself, except the veteran Radetzky, the resolute commander who, behind the last fastnesses of the Quadrilateral, waited for the hour of reaction. Count Ficquelmont, the disciple and successor of Metternich, was in May so firmly convinced that, with revolution raging in every part of her dominions, Austria could no longer maintain herself in Italy, as to send Baron Hummelauer to Great Britain to solicit the mediation of Palmerston on her behalf. Palmerston asked what terms Austria was prepared to offer. Hummelauer replied (May 23rd) that Austria was ready to concede to Lombardy a separate Constitution within the empire. Palmerston said that things had gone much too far for that offer to be acceptable. Hummelauer then (May 24th) made a second proposal, viz. that Lombardy should be entirely free, but that Venetia should remain as an autonomous state within the Habsburg empire. Palmerston thought that this was an offer good enough to serve as a basis for negotiation; but the British Cabinet, to Palmerston's regret, rejected it as inadequate. Then Palmerston himself, on behalf of the Cabinet, proposed (June 3rd) that Austria should consent to relinquish "not only Lombardy, but also such portions of the Venetian territory as might be agreed upon between the parties, Austria receiving pecuniary compensation for her cession." Hummelauer answered that he must absent himself, in order to obtain further instructions from his Government; and there the matter ended. For when he returned to Vienna, things were beginning to wear a brighter aspect for the Habsburgs, and soon the need of mediation had passed away. Before the end of June Radetzky had recovered the Venetian mainland; on July 25th he inflicted on the Lombards and Sardinians the tremendous defeat of Custozza; on August 6th, he reentered Milan, and on the 9th Charles Albert was compelled to abandon the contest. The Austrian dominance was, as by miracle, reestablished throughout Northern Italy.

The tragic collapse of the Italian cause in the summer of 1848 gave rise to a new source of anxiety for Palmerston. The Sardinians, in their terror and despair, appealed to the French to come to their assistance; and in France there was an almost irresistible movement

in favour of the proposed venture[1]. Now, it was Palmerston's prime concern to keep the French from coming into conflict with the Austrians in Italy. He was, therefore, determined to do his utmost to prevent the French troops from crossing the Alps. He recognised, of course, that he could not restrain them by any mere protests or threats. He could only hold their military ardour in check by offering them an alternative mode of procedure which should appear equally likely to effect the purpose which they had at heart. This alternative was a joint mediation of the British and French Governments on behalf of Italy. He first mooted this mode of mediation in a despatch to Normanby at Paris, dated July 18th, 1848, confessing quite frankly that he was more concerned to restrain the French than to assist the Sardinians. On August 7th, he instructed Normanby to make the formal proposal to the French Government. He was not devoid of genuine interest in the Italian cause; he detested the Habsburg mode of rule in Lombardy, and felt it both necessary and inevitable that Austria should ultimately withdraw north of the Alps. But he was no enthusiast in the matter, and he now proposed joint mediation less in the interest of Italian nationality than in that of European tranquillity. He suggested as a basis for an Austro-Sardinian settlement terms substantially the same as those offered by Hummelauer himself on May 24th: viz. (1) cessation of hostilities; (2) amnesty; (3) Austrian surrender of Lombardy to Sardinia; (4) grant of a separate Constitution, under Austrian suzerainty, to Venetia. Sardinia, of course, readily accepted the offer of mediation on so favourable a basis. Austria did not formally decline it; she entered into discussions about it which were intended to mark time until the military and political situation north of the Alps should have become more clearly defined. As the autumn progressed and the Habsburg power reestablished itself in Vienna, Bohemia, Croatia, and apparently in Hungary too, the Austrian Government became less and less disposed to accept a mediation which it rightly recognised as unfriendly, and continued to procrastinate and evade a definite reply. Palmerston's position became a difficult one. The French grew restless, and he had to protest in the most emphatic language against their projected armed intervention (October, 1848). It was the Sardinians themselves, however, who in the end brought the matter to

[1] General Oudinot reported to Cavaignac that, unless he were allowed to lead his army into Italy to the aid of Charles Albert, the army would march there without him; and indeed that many of his officers had already started. Ashley, E., *Palmerston*, II. 88.

an issue. In spite of Palmerston's most earnest appeals and solemn warnings, they, on March 12th, 1849, denounced the Armistice with Austria and embarked on the War which ended, eleven days later, in the disastrous defeat of Novara. Palmerston's mediation scheme had failed in its ostensible object: the Austrians had never accepted it, and the Sardinians had profited nothing by it. But it had succeeded to admiration in its prime purpose, which had been to keep the French from intervening in Italy and thus precipitating a European war.

Although Palmerston's main preoccupation during the twelve months which followed the flight of Metternich from Vienna was with the affairs of Northern Italy, he was nevertheless compelled to watch closely the revolutions and the reactions which agitated the rest of the Continent. The regions which more particularly claimed his attention were Sicily, the Papal States, the Habsburg Dominions, Denmark, the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, and Germany.

First among these was Sicily, which was a continual source of anxiety from the day when it rose in revolt (January, 1848) to the day when its own follies and crimes restored it to the Bourbon tyranny (May, 1849). The main peril here, as in Northern Italy, was lest Austria should listen to the prayers of King Ferdinand, and France to the appeals of the insurgents, and lest a clash should in consequence ensue between the Great Powers, in which Austria (necessary though she was to the Balance of Europe) would be annihilated. Palmerston, however, granted to the Sicilian patriots a recognition and support more open and complete than he accorded to any other body of insurgents whose success was doubtful. This was due, not to the fact that he was on exceptionally bad terms with "King Bomba," or that he regarded the Bourbon rule in the Two Sicilies as beyond the bearable limit of corruption and oppression, but rather to the circumstance that the "Constitution of 1812" which the Sicilians were demanding had been promised to them by their King, and had been guaranteed by Great Britain. This guarantee gave him, he considered, the right and indeed the duty of upholding it. He, therefore, through the Resident Lord Napier and the Envoy-errant Minto, urged upon the Neapolitan Government the policy of a frank fulfilment of the pledge of 1812. At the same time he pressed upon the Sicilian irreconcilables the need for moderation in their demands, and above all the necessity for accepting some

kind of union with Naples. With the King he had a measure of success: on March 6th a royal Decree recognised the principles of 1812. With the insular leaders he had none: on March 18th they issued an ultimatum which meant the virtual separation of Sicily from Naples. The King rejected the ultimatum, and the Sicilians replied by declaring his deposition (April 13th) and by offering the Crown of the island to the Duke of Genoa, second son of Charles Albert of Sardinia (July 11th). At that date—a fortnight before the catastrophe of Custozza—Sardinia was in no position to undertake new adventures, or to challenge fresh enemies. The response to the Sicilian invitation was delayed until the issue of the Lombard campaign was decided. The Austrian triumph compelled the Duke of Genoa to decline the proffered throne. It also left the King of Naples free to reassert his authority over the insurgent island. At the end of August he began a reconquest which was marked by barbarities so horrible that, first, the French and British Admirals in the Mediterranean intervened to enforce an armistice, and secondly, the French and British Governments joined in mediation. Once again, Palmerston's main purpose in associating himself with France in diplomacy was to prevent her from breaking the European peace by a rash excursion against the hateful Bourbons—an excursion which would have brought Austria certainly, Prussia and Russia probably, into the field on behalf of Ferdinand. But Palmerston's sympathies were openly on the Sicilian side: indeed, in November, 1848, he even went so far as to connive at the sending to them, indirectly, of a supply of munitions from Woolwich Arsenal—a grave departure from the duty of neutrality for which he had to make a humiliating apology to the Neapolitan Government. He strove with the aid of France, first, to secure for the Sicilians the Constitution of 1812; secondly, to persuade them to retain their connexion with Naples. He suggested that, if they could no longer tolerate "Bomba," they might accept some unobjectionable member of his family as Viceroy. The Sicilians, however, proved obdurate even in adversity: they were resolved on independence or nothing. Hence Palmerston could do little for them. The French zeal for them, moreover, began, early in 1849, to cool. Louis-Napoleon, when elected President of the French Republic, found it desirable to cultivate the friendship of the clergy, and to pose as the protector of the Pope. French policy in respect of Italy thus became from this date less revolutionary, less nationalist. It tended more and more to become reactionary and to concentrate on the problem of the Papal

States. Palmerston became perplexed and suspicious. Finally, partly because of the defection of France, and partly because of the intransigeance of Sicily, he abandoned his attempt to mediate (April, 1849). King Ferdinand II held on his course unchecked; in May, 1849, he recaptured Palermo and quenched the revolution in blood. Palmerston had failed in his efforts to secure a Constitutional settlement of the quarrel between the Neapolitan Bourbons and the Sicilian patriots; but he had succeeded in his primary purpose of preventing this local conflict from growing into a European conflagration.

The Papal States next claimed his attention. During the years 1848–9 they had passed through a series of remarkable transformations. Palmerston was interested in these changes mainly as they affected the international position of the Pope, and particularly in so far as they threatened to bring about French and Austrian intervention in Central Italy. At the beginning of the period, Minto was still in Rome, trying, on the one hand, to encourage Pius IX to anticipate revolution by means of reform, seeking, on the other, to secure papal aid for the British Government in its efforts to keep the rebellious Irish clergy under control. His influence helped to obtain the admission of laymen to the Roman Government on February 11th, 1848, and the grant of a sort of Constitution on March 14th. The Pope was forced by the pressure of Roman opinion to send troops to join the Lombards and Sardinians in the fight for Italian liberation; but he dreaded the results of a struggle with Catholic Austria, and, on April 29th, he proclaimed himself neutral and recalled his troops. This abandonment of the Liberal and national cause led to upheavals in the States of the Church, which culminated, on November 15th, 1848, in the assassination of the Pope's Constitutional Prime-Minister, Count Pellegrino Rossi. This horrid deed precipitated anarchy, and completed the conversion of Pius IX to the cause of reaction. He sought means of escape, and timely invitations reached him from France, Austria, and Naples. He chose to accept the Neapolitan offer of asylum, and accordingly on November 24th he fled from Rome to Gaeta. The flight of the Pope was followed by a couple of months of wild confusion in the States of the Church. Finally, on February 5th, 1849, the Roman Republic was proclaimed. This was intolerable to the Catholic Powers, and France, Austria, and Naples all prepared themselves to intervene on the Pope's behalf. Each of the three was anxious to secure that dominant position in Central

Italy which the restoration of the Papal rule would ensure. Palmerston was filled with perturbation. He saw that the projected triple occupation of the States of the Church was due less to common zeal for the Papacy than to deep-seated rivalries and animosities, and he perceived that it would inevitably be followed by strife. For the Roman republic he had no sympathy or regard: he recognised that it had no prospect of permanence or peace. He tried to persuade Mazzini to come to terms with Pius IX and arrange for his rehabilitation as a Constitutional ruler. Having failed to influence the resolute republican, he strove to limit active intervention on the Pope's behalf to Italian troops, being desirous of obviating, if possible, both French and Austrian incursions. But his efforts seemed doomed to failure. On February 18th, 1849, an Austrian army actually occupied Ferrara and threatened a rapid advance on Rome. The French, meanwhile, in feverish haste prepared to despatch an expedition from Toulon to Civita Vecchia. In vain Palmerston protested and implored. He was, however, very cautious in his language, for, as he told Normanby explicitly in an important despatch of February 27th, it was above all things necessary to maintain the Anglo-French entente. Over Austria he had no control; the one hope for European peace was to work with France, so as not to lose the power of restraining her. On this occasion, as on so many others, fortune was kind to Palmerston. The Austrian march on Rome was checked by an unfavourable turn of events in Hungary, and by the renewal of war in the plains of Lombardy. The Habsburgs had again to fight for their own existence, and during the critical summer months of 1849 ceased to be able to make any effective move in Central Italy. When they formally proclaimed (June 12th) their intention not to advance beyond Ancona, Palmerston's worst anxieties were relieved: there was no longer any immediate fear of a collision between their troops and the French. Thus, he watched, without undue alarm, though with an annoyance which he freely expressed in his confidential correspondence, the progress of the French intervention in Rome. On April 25th Oudinot's forces had disembarked at Civita Vecchia; on July 3rd, after adventures which we leave aside, they occupied the Eternal City, and prepared the way for the return of Pius IX in the spring of 1850. During this period, Palmerston's efforts were directed towards persuading the Pope to confirm the Constitution which he had conceded in 1848: he hoped that thus he might reconcile Pius IX and his outraged subjects, and so secure for the errant pontiff a

welcome back to Rome which would make the continued presence of French troops in the City a superfluity and an offence. Pius IX's days of Liberalism and popularity were, however, over. The Temporal Power of the Papacy was restored and, for the remaining twenty years of its continuance, was supported by Napoleonic bayonets.

The comparatively peaceful settlement of the problem of the Papal States was undoubtedly due to the fact that the preoccupation of Austria elsewhere left the French free to operate alone in Rome. First, the renewal of the Sardinian War in March pinned Radetzky to Lombardy; and when, after Novara, he showed signs of fresh activity in Central Italy, new troubles in Hungary drew the whole strength of the Habsburg monarchy to the regions north of the Alps. In these regions, the most remarkable fluctuations of fortune had been taking place. Towards the end of 1848, the dissensions of the Democrats, the narrow particularism of the nationalists in the various parts of the empire, combined with incompetence and treachery, had enabled the Habsburgs once again to divide and rule. They had signalised their recovery of power by removing from the headship of their House the feeble and much-compromised Emperor Ferdinand—whom Palmerston spoke of in despatches to the horrified Ponsonby as "the animal *implumis bipes*, a perfect nullity, next thing to an idiot, a mere man of straw, a Guy Faux"—and by putting in his place his nephew, the eighteen-year-old Francis Joseph (December 2nd, 1848). The Hungarians refused to recognise the new ruler, in whose appointment they had not been consulted. Their refusal had been anticipated, and indeed desired. Before the close of the year they were attacked by an Austrian army reinforced by strong contingents from the subject Slavs and Roumans, to whom the Magyars, with incredible inconsistency and unwisdom, denied the liberties which they demanded from Austria for themselves. Within two months, Hungary was overrun and apparently completely reduced by the invaders: on March 4th, a Constitution was promulgated which marked the end of Hungarian independence. But the Austrian triumph was premature. The Constitution of March 4th roused the Hungarian nationalists to redoubled efforts, while, at the same time, it alienated from the Austrians the Slavs and Roumans. Within two more months (April and May, 1849) the Magyars under Kossuth and Górgei had recovered all that they had lost, and had driven out the invaders. But they, too, made a mistake even more fatal to themselves than the issue of the March Constitution had been to their enemies. On April 14th

they denounced the Habsburgs, proclaimed the Hungarian Republic, and appointed Kossuth Governor-President. This unnecessary and ill-advised act brought 200,000 Russians across the Carpathians (June). Another two months saw the surrender of the last Hungarian army at Vilagos (August 13th), and the flight of the republican leaders to Turkey.

Such in bare outline was the course of events. Our concern is with Palmerston's attitude towards them: how did he regard these kaleidoscopic changes of Magyar fortune? Until the disastrous declaration of April 14th, 1849, he took little interest in them. They were internal troubles of the Habsburg empire which seemed to illustrate and enforce the lessons which he had so often administered to Continental autocrats on the necessity for introducing reform as a prophylactic against revolution. In vain did Kossuth send Ladislaus Szalay to England to plead the Hungarian cause (December, 1848). Palmerston refused to see him, and informed him through his Under-Secretary that any communications he might wish to make should be made "through Baron Koller, the representative of the Emperor of Austria at this Court." Palmerston's despatches to Ponsonby at Vienna during the same period are largely lectures on the merits of Constitutional government: they point out the errors of the Habsburg and Bourbon systems, and show that "the results of such false policy are that men like Metternich and Guizot meet in exile in London... and that ancient empires like Austria are thrown into anarchy and confusion, and are brought to the very verge of dissolution." After April 14th, 1849, however, Palmerston's indifference to the Hungarian cause was transmuted into active disapproval. He did not want an independent Hungary, still less one with a republican government. What he desired was the strengthening, not the weakening, of the Austrian empire in Central Europe. He regarded the Habsburg monarchy as the very basis of the Balance of Power on the Continent, and the main barrier against Russian aggression in the Near East. What he wrote to Stratford Canning on May 7th, 1849, is typical of scores of his utterances:

> We of course attach great importance to the maintenance of the Austrian Empire as an essential element, and a most valuable one, in the balance of power, and we should deeply regret anything which could cripple Austria or impair her future independence[1].

[1] See the late Charles Sproxton's brilliant (and, alas, posthumous) essay, *Palmerston and the Hungarian Revolution* (1919), p. 85.

He amplified this statement in the House of Commons on July 21st, 1849:

"Austria," he said, "is a most important element in the balance of European power. Austria stands in the centre of Europe, a barrier against encroachment on the one side, and against invasion on the other. The political independence and liberties of Europe are bound up, in my opinion, with the maintenance and integrity of Austria as a great European power; and therefore anything which tends by direct or even remote contingency to weaken and to cripple Austria, but still more to reduce her from the position of a first-rate Power to that of a secondary State, must be a great calamity to Europe and one which every Englishman ought to deprecate and try to prevent[1]."

Precisely the same language was used by him in informal conversation with the Hungarian Pulszky who came to England in 1849 in order to stir up popular feeling on behalf of the Magyars. He told him frankly that he regarded the Austrian empire as "a European necessity, and the natural ally of England in the East," so that "if it did not already exist, it would have to be invented"; he therefore advised the Hungarians, through Pulszky, to reconcile themselves with the Habsburgs, "because in the frame of the European State-system it would be impossible to replace Austria by small States." Hungary held a very different place in the Habsburg empire from that occupied by the Italian Provinces. *They* were sources of debility and distraction; alien bodies whose removal by even a painful surgical operation would in the end conduce to health and vigour. Hungary, on the other hand, was an essential member of the monarchy; its amputation would involve permanent disablement, or even death. It was, therefore, to no purpose at all that the Republican Government sent Colonel Bikkesy to London to secure recognition and support (July, 1849). Palmerston declined to receive him officially, and although, when a private meeting was arranged, the Colonel held out most attractive offers of commercial concessions, Palmerston refused to give him any encouragement at all. By that time, the Russians were in the full tide of their invasion of Hungary. British public opinion, roused from its long lethargy by the appeals of Pulszky and by the stories of the barbarities perpetrated during the re-conquest by the Austrians and their allies, began to express itself clearly and loudly on the Hungarian side. Palmerston shared the popular indignation at the atrocities of Haynau and his fellows: he wrote to Ponsonby (to whom his words were gall and wormwood); "The Austrians are really the greatest brutes that ever called themselves

[1] Sproxton, C., *op. cit.* p. 21.

by the undeserved name of civilised men." But his sympathies for the suffering Hungarians did not deflect him a hair's breadth from his policy, which was to maintain by all possible means the integrity of the Habsburg power north of the Alps. He felt that incalculably greater evils would accrue to the world if the Austrian empire were to be dissolved and Central Europe thrown into the melting-pot, than any which could be inflicted by the momentary fury of sanguinary conquerors. He therefore watched the process of the Russian invasion of Hungary without protest and without alarm. Much as he deplored and reprobated the needless ferocity which attended the Austro-Russian recovery, he regarded the destruction of the Hungarian republic, and its reabsorption into the Habsburg empire, as necessary. He was surprised that Russia should be so quixotic and shortsighted as to assist gratuitously in reerecting the chief barrier to her own advance on Constantinople—a surprise which Russia herself came to feel during the negotiations which preceded the Crimean War; but since she chose this course, Palmerston gratefully acquiesced. When the Turks, who were enthusiastically on the Hungarian side, grew restless and seemed disposed to intervene and cut the Russian communications in the Principalities, Palmerston bade Stratford Canning hold them in check and prevent them from meddling. Not until the fall of the Republic was assured and the surrender of Vilagos well in sight, did Palmerston allow his feelings of humanity, his detestation of the Viennese camarilla, and the pressure of English public opinion, to cause him to take any step on behalf of the oppressed Magyars. He then, through Ponsonby, made an offer of mediation (August 1st, 1849): it was, of course, rejected. When, however, the struggle was over, and Kossuth and his colleagues were fugitives in Turkey, he joined France in energetic support of the Sultan in his refusal of a peremptory Austro-Russian demand for their surrender. He perceived that a more than personal issue was raised by the demand; that indeed the Eastern Question itself was involved. He, therefore, associated himself closely with France; assured Canning in Constantinople that the Turks could count on the fullest "moral and material" assistance; and plainly told the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors that insistence on their demand would mean war. Thus the lives of Kossuth and his companions were saved, and at the same time the Peace of Europe was preserved. On October 17th, 1849, the Russian Chancellor informed the Turkish Representative in Petrograd that the claim of extradition had been abandoned. Palmerston had achieved

a triumph of decisive diplomacy in the very quarter where, five years later Aberdeen allowed the country to drift into the Crimean War.

The Tsar, of course, intensely resented the rebuff which the Turks were thus, with French and British support, able to inflict upon him; and his irritation was increased during the following year, when the Turks were encouraged to resist a further demand for the internment of the refugees. Russia and Great Britain, in fact, found themselves on opposite sides in respect of a great many issues of contemporary politics. They represented antagonistic principles of government; they had conflicting interests in Asia and the Levant; they pursued irreconcilable lines of policy in central and southern Europe. Great Britain desired a reformed Turkey, a strengthened Austria, and a united Germany; Russia preferred a corrupt Turkey, harassed by discontented subject people; an autocratic Austria dependent on Muscovite aid for its hold over its alien races; a disturbed Germany open to Romanoff intrigue. Nicholas I, therefore, regarded Palmerston, and still more Stratford Canning, with intense dislike and animosity. Palmerston, on his side, had a haunting dread of Russia, based partly on memories of the Napoleonic period, partly on his knowledge of subterranean Russian activities during the succeeding thirty years, partly on mere suspicion engendered by the mystery which still enveloped the Muscovite Tsardom. During the whole of 1848 and 1849, while he was resisting Russian designs in south-eastern Europe, he was engaged in negotiations whose purpose was to prevent the increase of Russian influence in Germany and in the Baltic. Mention has already been made of the Schleswig-Holstein Question in January, 1848, and of the outbreak of the German Revolution in the following March. The two became complicated together, and the complication gave rise to one of the most intricate diplomatic problems that Palmerston was ever called upon to face. His fundamental interest in it was to find a solution which, while keeping the peace, should prevent Russia from interfering, and enable Scandinavia and the German North to cooperate in the defence of the Eastern Mark against the Pan-Slavonic peril. The perplexities of the Schleswig-Holstein Question, so far as they affected British Foreign Policy, are dealt with in a connected form in another section of this Work[1]. It will suffice to say here that the prospect of the childless death of Frederick VII, King of Denmark and Duke of Schleswig, Holstein

[1] Chapter XIII, below.

and Lauenburg, raised the question whose final issue could not but be: Should the Duchies, in whole or in part, be permanently included in the Danish monarchy, or should they be absorbed into Germany? Meanwhile, the resistance of Schleswig fortified by considerations of legal right, against incorporation in Denmark was warmly supported in Germany at large, and to this feeling was joined a widespread desire to include the whole of the united Duchies in the new German empire in course of foundation at Frankfort. A revolt against Denmark broke out at Kiel in March, 1848; a Provisional Government for the Duchies was set up under the Prince of Noer, a brother of the Duke of Augustenburg; an appeal for aid was made both to Prussia and to the German nation, in response to which a joint Prussian and Federal force invaded the Duchies, broke the Danish resistance, and advanced into Jutland (April, 1848). This German movement excited vehement protests from Russia, who was supported by Sweden and Norway. The Tsar himself, apart from his claims to the Succession, as head of the elder line of the House of Gottorp, was strongly opposed both to the enlargement of Germany, and also to her appearance as a naval Power in the Baltic. So energetic and menacing was the attitude of Russia, supported on this occasion by Sweden, that the Prussian Government at once ordered the evacuation of Jutland, and accepted an offer from Palmerston to mediate between themselves and the Danes. Palmerston was by no means an impartial mediator on this occasion: he was strongly on the Danish side; objecting decidedly, first, to the weakening of Denmark, and secondly to the extension of the *Zollverein* to the great northern ports. The Prince Consort who, together with Queen Victoria, took the German side in this dispute, accurately expounded the Palmerstonian view to which he was opposed when he said in a letter to Stockmar:

> The fixed idea here is that Germany's only object in separating Holstein with Schleswig from Denmark is to incorporate them with herself, and then to draw them from the English into the Prussian commercial system; Denmark will then become a State too small to maintain a separate independence, and so the division of European territory and the balance of power will be disturbed[1].

Palmerston was convinced of the importance of keeping Denmark strong enough to act as an effective guardian of the straits which gave access to the Baltic: he did not want either the Germans or the

[1] Martin, *The Prince Consort*, II, 314.

Russians at Kiel; still less did he want to have them fighting one another for its possession. So fearful was he especially of any increase of Russian influence in the western Baltic that, when Denmark suggested that Russia should be associated with Britain in the projected mediation, he firmly declined to allow it. On June 23rd, 1848, he proposed a Truce, during which both Danes and Germans should withdraw from the regions in dispute, and leave the administration in the hands of a temporary commission of seven. He further made various suggestions for the definitive settlement of the conflict; but these the Danes, confident of Russian support, rejected. In spite of the obstinacy of the Danes, the Prussians, much alarmed by the unexpected hostility which their aggression had caused, concluded with them the Truce of Malmoe (August 26th, 1848) on the general lines suggested by Palmerston. A Conference was then called to London and negotiations were resumed. They dragged on, here and at Berlin, accompanied by spasmodic fighting and occasional truces, until, finally, the Peace of Berlin (July 2nd, 1850) shelved the conflict for the remaining thirteen years of the reign of Frederick VII. But this Peace, which merely restored the *status quo ante bellum*, left the ultimate fate of the Duchies undecided: it surrendered their population to the vindictive severities of the Danish administration, and the German inhabitants of Schleswig in particular to a persecution of their nationality, and, by outraging German opinion, it sowed the seeds of the War of 1864. Once again Palmerston's mediation had failed in effecting any settlement on the lines of the policy he had at heart. But, once again, he had achieved temporary success: he had prevented the Prusso-Danish War from spreading; he had effected this without direct Russian intervention; and he had, momentarily at least, preserved Denmark from forfeiting her place in the existing political system of Europe, and in that of the Baltic Powers in particular.

Side by side and closely bound up with this Schleswig-Holstein Question had been the question of the unification of Germany which had been raised by the Berlin Revolution of March, 1848, and the consequent calling of a German National Parliament. Palmerston had, in general, a friendly feeling towards Germany and he could not but favour a union which would make her more secure against Russian or French attack: but he was not keenly interested in her national aspirations. In September 1847 he had had occasion to express his views on the subject, for the Prince Consort, who was greatly occupied with it, had laid before him a long Memorandum

thereupon and had asked his advice[1]. He had replied: "Both England and Germany are threatened by the same danger and from the same quarters. That danger is an attack from Russia or from France separately, or from Russia and France united." "Hence," he had continued, "England and Germany have mutually a direct interest in assisting each other to become rich, united, and strong." But, he added, he could not favour or further a unification of Germany based on the Prussian *Zollverein*, because this organisation "maintained a system of prohibitory duties against English manufactures, which were thereby put at a great disadvantage." When, on April 21st, 1849, the German National Parliament offered the crown of a democratic empire to Frederick William IV of Prussia, Palmerston regretted that he did not accept it. "We should have had no objection," he wrote, "to see Prussia take the first place; on the contrary, a German union, embracing all the smaller States, with Prussia at its head and in alliance with Austria as a Separate Power, would have been a very good European arrangement." But, he considered, Frederick William having made the great refusal, the next best thing was for Prussia to "come to an agreement with Austria for reconstructing the German Confederation on the principle of 1815." This is what was actually attempted less than two years later.

III. THE FALL OF PALMERSTON AND AFTER, 1850–1852

Throughout the preceding pages, the policy whose course we have followed has been Palmerston's policy, and we have only incidentally noted that Palmerston's policy had powerful opponents in this country, as well as vehement detractors abroad. In truth, his personality dominated the international scene at this time in a manner which has had few parallels before or since. Just as during the crisis of 1848–9 Great Britain alone stood firm among the Great Powers of the West, so Palmerston towered above all others as the man whose mind comprehended the complex situation, and whose will determined the path of British diplomacy. He did not always show far sight; but he invariably showed clear sight. He was not always right, but he was invariably confident, consistent, and calculable. He surveyed affairs calmly; he came to decided conclusions; he made up his mind what to do, and he did it with immense energy and unfaltering resolution. His decisions were not the inspirations of genius; they were merely the indications of commonsense. There was, however,

[1] See Martin, *The Prince Consort*, I. xxi.

a great deal too much genius at large in Europe in 1848; common-sense was precisely the quality most lacking. Hence it was an immeasurable boon that Palmerston, with all his superficialities, limitations, and asperities, was at the head of the Foreign Office during the year of Revolution. There can be little doubt that his firm handling of the numerous and complicated problems that came before him for settlement, whatever errors in detail he may have committed, was the chief factor in the maintenance of the general European Peace. The leading lines of his policy were approved by his colleagues in the Cabinet, and they received the cordial support of the Prime-Minister, Lord John Russell. But they were determined by Palmerston himself, with singularly little regard to the opinions of anyone beside himself, and with a conspicuous absence of discussion either in Council or in Court. Hence it not unfrequently happened that prominent members of the Government, and even Russell himself, were placed in an extremely difficult predicament, because of their ignorance of Palmerston's doings, and their inability to control his sayings. But if those who in substance agreed with him found his autocratic ways embarrassing and his diplomatic methods indefensible, it can easily be understood that those who disapproved of his policy, or could not imagine what were his intentions, should have denounced his indiscipline as intolerable, and his public manners as monstrous. It is curious what a chorus of resentment is supplied by the memoirs of the time: Guizot, Brougham, Stockmar, Martin, Metternich, Cobden, Malmesbury, Greville, Spencer Walpole, Granville, Aberdeen, Bright, Gladstone, Disraeli, all of them on one count or another condemn the vivacious Minister for Foreign Affairs. To the pacificists he is a firebrand; to the Whigs a meddler; to the Tories a revolutionary; to the Constitutionalists an insubordinate; to the pundits a puzzle; to the Radicals a traitor; to foreigners an Englishman—or possibly something even worse, for

"*Hat der Teufel einen Sohn,*
So ist er sicher Palmerston."

(So ran a German couplet of the day.)

But the most serious complaints come from the highest quarters: they are to be found in the *Life of the Prince Consort* and in the *Letters of Queen Victoria*. It may be worth while to examine some of the grounds of the widespread antagonism to Palmerston and his policy, and in particular to trace the course of that conflict with the Court which led in 1851 to his summary dismissal.

Complaints against Palmerston related first to what we have called his public manners, secondly to his methods, thirdly to the substance of his policy. The first need not detain us long. He was unquestionably irritating. He kept important and pompous personages waiting in his anteroom; he left letters, and those not always trivial ones, unanswered for months; finally, when he wrote, he frequently employed expressions which by their undiplomatic pungency roused their recipients to an ecstasy of fury. Lord Ponsonby, for instance, told Lord John Russell that "he had received from Palmerston letters which are not to be submitted to by any man," and it would be easy to cull from his despatches to Vienna, Paris, Athens, Naples, Lisbon and Madrid passages containing unpleasant truths so unpleasantly put as to be nicely calculated to excite the extremest exasperation in the chanceries to which they were addressed.

More serious, however, than any such defects of manner were the arbitrary and unconstitutional methods which Palmerston adopted in his conduct of foreign affairs. Within his own department he was almost as autocratic as a Tsar in Russia. The Queen and the Prince Consort were constantly complaining of advice ignored, instructions disregarded, memoranda neglected, wishes flouted; and still more of business transacted without their knowledge, of despatches sent out as to which they were never informed, of letters forwarded in spite of the severe disapproval of the Sovereign or the Prince, and with passages which they had erased deliberately reinserted. Too much will not be made at the present day of these royal lamentations and indignations: it will be generally agreed that the young Queen, her conscientious Consort (who drafted her letters for her), and the estimable Stockmar whose counsel was constantly sought by both, were exceeding the due limit of interference in the proceedings of Cabinet government. Palmerston was justified in refusing to have his policy determined by them; but he might with great advantage have observed with more care the forms of courtesy in his dealings with his Sovereign and her intimate advisers. In vain were rules of procedure drawn up by the mediatorial Russell; Palmerston did not observe them. But what was perhaps most galling of all was the way in which he received the memoranda of the Court, expressed the most humble gratitude for them and the most cordial agreement with the principles advanced in them, and then acted in diametrical opposition to everything which they advocated. Far more

serious, however, than Palmerston's indifference to the influence of the Court, was his impatience of restraint on the part of the Prime-Minister and the Cabinet. He conducted the affairs of his Department with an extreme of independence and insubordination which, as we shall see, necessitated, and more than justified, his dismissal in 1851. Few, indeed, except Lord John Russell, would have tolerated his intractability so long. It was all the more indefensible because no man was more stern and inflexible than Palmerston himself in exacting complete obedience from his own subordinates. His constant recommendation of Constitutional government to foreign potentates failed to make him at home either submissive to his superiors, or regardful of his inferiors. He had the instincts of an autocrat.

It is probable, nevertheless, that neither the defects of Palmerston's ways nor the arbitrariness of his system of action would have caused the breach with the Court and the crisis in the Cabinet which precipitated his fall, if there had not lain behind all these things substantial and irreconcilable divergencies of policy. So long as the differences were merely with the Court, or with such political opponents as Aberdeen, Stanley, Bright or Urquhart, Palmerston stood secure: when, in the matter of Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état*, Russell and the Cabinet had to repudiate him, he fell. As to the Court, ever since he resumed the seals of the Foreign Office in 1846, the Queen and the Prince Consort had been expressing dissent from his proceedings. Thus, for example, they wanted to be friendly with Louis-Philippe, and blamed Palmerston for the distrust and hostility which led to the Spanish Marriage quarrel; they favoured a Prussian regency over Germany, and resented Palmerston's antagonism to the *Zollverein*; they took the Austrian side in the Italian controversy, and were ashamed of Palmerston's patronage of Sardinians and rebels; they were opposed to Minto's Mission, which they regarded as an insult to the Habsburgs, and were incensed at Palmerston's calm contempt of their remonstrances; they favoured the Conservative advisers of the young Queens of Spain and Portugal and were disgusted at Palmerston's dealings with the Peninsular radicals; they vehemently maintained the Augustenburg pretensions in the Schleswig-Holstein dispute, and were indignant at Palmerston's support of the Danes; and so forth almost indefinitely. So completely antagonistic, indeed, were the principles of the Court from those of Palmerston, that if he had begun to modify his proceedings in deference to royal pressure he could hardly have stopped short of a total abandonment

of the course which he had elected to pursue. There were but two alternatives before him: either to proceed steadily on his predetermined path quietly ignoring the attempts of the Court to divert him to other ways, or else to decline openly to be influenced, and so to challenge the Court to a conflict, the issue of which could only have been disastrous to the Crown. He patriotically preferred the method of peaceful perseverance, and braced himself to endure, with such patience and courtesy as he could command, the remonstrances and memoranda which descended upon him.

Now and again, he committed mistakes which sorely tried not only the temper of the Queen, but also the equanimity of the Cabinet. On March 16th, 1848, for instance, he sent, in direct defiance of Russell, a letter to Sir H. Bulwer in Madrid, so replete with good advice to the Queen of Spain as to how she should conduct her government that it led to the peremptory dismissal of Bulwer from his post. Again, his connivance (without the cognisance of his colleagues) in the supply from Woolwich Arsenal of arms which he knew were ultimately destined for the Sicilian insurgents (November, 1848) led to explanations and apologies in the highest degree damaging to the dignity and reputation of the Ministry. Similarly, his Italian policy so greatly incensed Austria that, when Francis Joseph was made Emperor in December 1848, to the British Court alone no representative was sent to announce his accession—a slight which Queen Victoria felt acutely. These annoyances of 1848 and 1849 were, however, altogether distanced by the grave matters of dissension which arose in 1850 and 1851. On the one hand, Palmerston's independence of action became so marked and so offensive to the Court that the Queen (with the assistance of the Prince Consort and Stockmar) drew up the famous Memorandum of August 12th, 1850, which demanded from the Foreign Secretary, under pain of dismissal, first, "that he will distinctly state what he proposes in a given case, in order that the Queen may know as distinctly to what she has given her royal sanction"; secondly, that "having once given her sanction to a measure, it be not arbitrarily altered or modified by the Minister." This Memorandum (of which the full text is to be found both in the *Life of the Prince Consort* and in the *Letters of Queen Victoria*) was reinforced in an interview between the Prince and the offending statesman on August 14th. In this interview, the Prince made the important confession which he himself thus records: "The Queen had often—I was sorry to say latterly almost invariably—differed

from the line of policy pursued by Lord Palmerston[1]." This confession, which went wholly beyond the ground covered by the Memorandum, is enough to show that the essential objection of the Court was not to the manners of Palmerston, or to the methods of his diplomacy, but to the substance and the essence of his policy. He accepted the royal and princely rebukes with a meekness that excites amazement; he promised amendment in his mode of procedure; but, although the Prince pressed him hard on the question of the Duchies, he refused to commit himself to a policy of which he disapproved. Hence the fundamental differences between himself and the Court remained unreconciled, and within sixteen months events brought the quarrel to a head.

Four events, in particular, belonging to the years 1850–1 filled full the cup of Palmerston's offending. The first preceded the issue of the Queen's Memorandum dealt with above, and was indeed one of the prime causes of its being sent: this was the notorious dispute concerning Don Pacifico which occupied the six months January–June, 1850. The other three speedily followed: they were, first, the attack on General Haynau (September, 1850); secondly, the reception of Kossuth in England (October, 1851); finally, the *coup d'état* of Louis-Napoleon (December, 1851). They need not detain us long; for, although the first called forth one of the most illuminating debates on British diplomacy ever held in the House of Commons, and although the last was an episode of far-reaching importance in European history, they were not, any of them, conspicuous as eliciting exemplifications of any novel lines of policy on the part of the British Foreign Office. Their significance, so far as we are concerned, lay mainly in the influence which they had on Palmerston's career.

Don Pacifico was a Portuguese Jew who, because of the accident that he had been born at Gibraltar, was able to claim to be a British subject. He resided at Athens, where he was Portuguese Consul-General, and there, during Easter 1847, his house had been gutted by an anti-Semitic mob. He claimed £81,000 damages from the Greek Government, and, when he could obtain nothing, sought the support of Britain. Palmerston was already on very bad terms with the Athenian Administration: several other disputes had been dragging on for years. It was clear that no settlement would ever be reached by negotiation; for the Greeks had the support of both France and Russia in their resistance. Hence, early in January, 1850—after

[1] Martin, *The Prince Consort*, II. 308.

twenty months of futile palaver—Palmerston took the decisive step of ordering the Mediterranean fleet to enter the harbour of Piraeus and seize sufficient Greek shipping to secure payment of the claims. This action was successful: on April 26th, the Greek Government yielded, and made a settlement. The episode, however, caused the most intense irritation on the Continent. Russia indignantly protested in terms of studied insolence, and threatened to withdraw her ambassador. France, who had vainly endeavoured to mediate, actually recalled Drouyn de Lhuys from London. The timid expected war, and severely condemned Palmerston as a politician who, after sacrificing principle for peace in 1848–9, was now endangering peace for pelf—for a paltry debt due not to Great Britain at all, but to an alien and outrageous adventurer. The Queen, through Prince Albert, wrote bitterly to Russell (May 15th). The House of Lords, on Stanley's motion, emphatically censured Palmerston's procedure (June 17th). In the House of Commons, however, after a tremendous three-days' debate, in which every front-rank statesman took part, Palmerston achieved a signal personal triumph by making it appear that the point at issue had not been a petty sum of money, but the safety of British citizens and the honour of the British flag throughout the world (June 21st–24th). The country, too, was with Palmerston; and he attained a popularity as "Minister for England," which remained undiminished to the day of his death. His estimate of the situation proved, as usual, to be correct. The vapours of irritation did not condense into the tempest of war: Russia did not recall her Ambassador, and Palmerston soon found means of mollifying France, and luring Lhuys back to London notwithstanding his failure. There is no doubt, however, that relations with Russia, already strained respecting the matter of the Hungarian refugees, were still further exacerbated by this episode. Crises of this sort, even when they are safely passed, do not leave things as they found them; and Palmerston, successful as he was in keeping the skin of peace unbroken, inflicted on many a sensitive organism in Europe internal injuries which slowly festered into later eruptions.

The Haynau incident was a trivial one. It caused friction, nevertheless, between Britain and Austria, the Court and the Ministry, Russell and Palmerston. Haynau was a Habsburg General, notorious for his barbarities in Italy and in Hungary. He imprudently (after warning by Metternich) visited England, was recognised, and mobbed. Palmerston presented formal apologies to the Austrian Ambassador

and the Viennese Government; but he so worded his despatch to Vienna as to show that his sympathies were entirely on the side of the mob. The Queen insisted on the redrafting of the despatch; she was informed that what she had before her was merely a copy, and that the original had already gone. Lord John Russell then had to take the matter up. After a good deal of bluster, Palmerston was compelled to submit to the humiliation of recalling his offensive despatch, and substituting a mild revision. There were open rejoicings at Court. From Osborne, on October 19th, 1850, came a letter to Russell:

> The Queen is very glad of the result of the conflict with Lord Palmerston.... The correspondence, which the Queen now returns, shows clearly that... Lord John has the power of exercising that control over Lord Palmerston, the careful exercise of which he owes to the Queen, his colleagues, and the country, if he will take the necessary pains to remain firm.

In the following autumn, precisely the same parties were involved in a squabble which threatened to involve the withdrawal of the Austrian Ambassador from England, and the summary dismissal of Palmerston by the Queen herself. Once again the matter in dispute was trivial, but it brought into conflict obstinacies and incompatibilities which made further cooperation between Court and Foreign Office almost impossible. Was Kossuth, or was he not, to be received by Palmerston? The Hungarian leader had landed in England on October 23rd, 1851, and had at once begun a series of savage denunciations of the Emperors of Austria and Russia: he wished, indeed, to rouse British opinion, and to embroil this country with his enemies. He had asked, and had readily obtained, an appointment to meet Palmerston, to whose influence in 1849 he undoubtedly owed his life. The nature of his language and the tendency of his activities in England caused the Queen (who was anxious to maintain her friendship with the two Emperors) to form and to state the strong opinion that any official or semi-official recognition of him here would be highly improper. Russell and the Cabinet concurred, and Palmerston was ordered to cancel the engagement. As before, he blustered, but obeyed. The immediate crisis was tided over. But within three weeks it had again developed. Palmerston did not, indeed, see Kossuth: but in the middle of November he received a deputation of Finsbury Radicals, and expressed himself as "extremely flattered and highly gratified" by an address in which the Habsburg and Romanoff autocrats were described as "odious and detestable assassins" and "merciless tyrants and despots." The Queen was intensely angry, and

Russell considerably annoyed. The question of Palmerston's dismissal was seriously considered, and only the embarrassing popularity both of himself and of Kossuth caused the incensed monarch and her Minister to hesitate. While, however, the matter was still in suspense, Palmerston had the misfortune to commit a still more flagrant indiscretion, and one in respect of which he could not count on the support of Radical opinion. He expressed, without any warrant outside his own conscience, approval of the *coup d'état* of Louis-Napoleon which occurred on December 2nd, 1851.

Into the chequered history of the Second French Republic from its establishment by Lamartine in February, 1848, to its subversion by Louis-Napoleon in December, 1851, it is unnecessary for us to enter. Palmerston had recognised it; supported it; tried to keep on cordial terms with it, and to cooperate with it. He endeavoured on the one hand to guard it from attack, and on the other hand to prevent it from assailing its neighbours. He vastly preferred it to both the red Communism of Louis Blanc, and the tricoloured Bourbonism of Louis-Philippe. Towards the end of 1851, he was much perturbed by rumours which he heard of a widespread plot for its destruction and for the restoration of the House of Orleans. In a Memorandum written in 1858, he stated the grounds on which he concluded at the time, and on which he continued to believe, that such a conspiracy was actually on foot; it ends with the words, "All this clearly proves that if the President had not struck when he did, he would himself have been knocked over." He probably exaggerated the peril of an Orleans rising. Far more formidable was the danger of a civil war between the President and the Assembly; that is, between the Army and the disillusioned Democrats and Socialists whose political power had passed away. The situation in December, 1851, was undoubtedly critical. Palmerston had good cause to dread disorder, and he was profoundly relieved when he heard that Louis-Napoleon's blow had taken effect first, and by one effective stroke had shattered the adversaries of his authority. The news was brought to him on December 3rd by Count Walewski—a son of Napoleon I—the representative of the French republic in London. In the informal conversation which ensued he did not attempt to hide his satisfaction, or to conceal his conviction as to "the necessity and advantage for France and Europe of the bold and decisive step taken by the President." On the same day—a fact not always remembered—he wrote privately to the Marquis of Normanby in Paris, expressing in emphatic

terms the same personal opinion respecting the *coup d'état*[1]. The President, he said, was assailed both by Orleanists and by Burgraves; he "was quite right to knock them down first." The cause, no doubt, of his haste to communicate his private views to Normanby was the knowledge that the latter was on notoriously bad terms with the President, and so might be disposed to show embarrassing disapproval of his action. On the next day (December 4th) the news of the *coup* reached the Queen at Osborne, and she at once expressed to Russell her private view, viz. that "Lord Normanby should be instructed to remain entirely passive." This royal opinion was laid before the Cabinet the same afternoon by Russell, together with despatches from Normanby detailing the events of December 2nd and asking for instructions. The Cabinet adopted the Queen's attitude, and accordingly on December 5th Palmerston officially instructed Normanby as follows: "I am commanded by Her Majesty to instruct your Excellency to make no change in your relations with the French Government. It is Her Majesty's desire that nothing should be done by her Ambassador at Paris which would wear the appearance of an interference of any kind in the internal affairs of France." It is obvious that Palmerston still apprehended some manifestation of hostility to Louis-Napoleon on the part of Normanby. The despatch was written solely for the guidance of Normanby, who had no occasion to communicate it to the French Foreign Office: all he had to do was to obey it. He chose, however, to communicate it (December 6th) and, Malmesbury tells us in his *Memoirs*, he "insinuated to M. Turgot, French Foreign Minister, that our Government did not approve of the *coup d'état*." If he did so, he not only exceeded his Instructions of December 5th, but also totally ignored Palmerston's letter of December 3rd. In any case, he received a rude shock when M. Turgot replied to the effect that "M. Walewski had already informed him that Lord Palmerston entirely approved of what the President had done." Hereupon, he retired in high discomfiture and dudgeon, and instead of attributing his rebuff to his own officiousness, partiality, and maladroitness, he laid the blame on Palmerston.

> If your Lordship, as Foreign Minister, holds one language on such a delicate point in Downing Street, without giving me any intimation you had done so—presenting afterwards a different course to me, namely, the avoidance of any appearance of interference of any kind in the internal affairs of France—I am placed thereby in a very awkward position.

[1] Ashley, E., *Life of Palmerston*, II. 202.

Palmerston replied:

> There has been nothing in the language which I have held, nor in the opinions which I have at any time expressed on the recent events in France, which has been in any way inconsistent with the Instructions addressed to your Excellency.

The conflict of voices had, indeed, arisen in Paris and not in London. On December 3rd, Palmerston had said precisely one and the same thing to Walewski and to Normanby—and what he had said in no way clashed with the Cabinet's Instructions of December 5th. But, on the one hand, the French Minister (eager for recognition) had exalted Palmerston's message into an official approval of the *coup d'état*, while on the other hand the British Ambassador (prepossessed by ill will) had ignored it altogether. Hence the painful scene at the French Foreign Office on December 6th. In normal circumstances, the sequel would naturally have been the recall of Normanby—a recall which, as a matter of fact, took place shortly afterwards at the request of Louis-Napoleon. But circumstances were not normal. The quarrel concerning the reception of Kossuth and the Finsbury deputation was at its height, and, as we have seen, the position of Palmerston in relation to both Court and Cabinet had become impossible. But he would not resign, or accept promotion[1]. Therefore, it was necessary to dismiss him, and a pretext for dismissal had, if possible, to be found on grounds where he could not count on Radical support. The question of the *coup d'état* served admirably: Louis-Napoleon was the *bête noire* of advanced Liberals. Hence, the occasion was seized. An acrimonious correspondence took place between the Prime-Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Palmerston defended himself with less than his usual skill; he was apparently more concerned to justify the *coup d'état* to the Radicals than his own conduct to the Constitutionalists. Finally, on December 19th, 1851, he was superseded.

Never again did Palmerston return to the Foreign Office, although until the day of his death, fourteen years later, he continued to exercise from other positions a powerful influence over the international relations of Britain. This, therefore, seems to be the point at which it is most appropriate to attempt a statement of the general principles which guided him in his conduct of foreign affairs. Formulated with the necessary brevity, the following features more especially manifest themselves. First, he considered it to be his chief duty to safeguard

[1] Russell offered him the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland.

British interests. In a short, but notable speech, delivered on March 1st, 1848, in reply to an attack of the Russophobe Urquhart, he said, "I would adopt the expression of Canning and say that with every British Minister the interests of England ought to be the Shibboleth of his policy." Not that he regarded the interests of Great Britain as antagonistic to those of other countries. On the contrary, he considered that the causes for which Britain stood—Constitutional government, free trade, abolition of slavery, development of industry —were fraught with inestimable advantages for the whole of humanity. Secondly, he concluded that in the circumstances of his day one of the prime interests both of Great Britain and of the world was the maintenance of peace. He, therefore, laboured, as we have seen, to prevent the local conflicts of the revolutionary years 1848–51 from developing into a general war; and he laboured with conspicuous success. Thirdly, he held that the surest guarantee of peace was the establishment of a permanent balance of power; that is, stated differently, the prevention of any one State from assuming a position of hegemony in the World. Now, the States whose ambitions he most dreaded were Russia and France. In order, therefore, to place a curb upon Russian aggression he felt it desirable that Denmark and Germany in the north, and still more the Austrian and Turkish empires in the south, should be strong and in agreement. Similarly, in order to keep France within bounds, and to frustrate the designs of the Chauvinists against the Treaties of 1815, he held it necessary to support Belgium, foster German unity, maintain the Swiss Federation, constitutionalise Italy, and pacify the Peninsula. But, fourthly, while he believed that the Russian peril could be met only by organised resistance, he had a strong faith that in France there were Constitutional and moderate elements by cooperation with which the ends of peace and balance of power could be secured. Hence, as we have before observed, he made friendship with France a prominent feature of his policy. In spite of repeated disappointments and disillusionments he strove to work in amicable accord successively with Louis-Philippe, Thiers, Guizot, Lamartine, and now at length with Louis-Napoleon.

The seals of the Foreign Office of which Palmerston was deprived were conferred upon Earl Granville, who had served his apprenticeship in foreign affairs under Palmerston himself (1837–41). He was a *persona grata* at Court, having been closely associated with Prince Albert in promoting the Exhibition of 1851. His manners were

attractive; his tact unfailing; he was unlikely to display that masterful independence which had made Palmerston obnoxious to the august. The Queen, however, thought fit to guard against contingencies by making, through Lord John Russell, a most unusual request from the new Secretary. On December 28th, she wrote:

> The Queen thinks the moment of the change in the person of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to afford a fit opportunity to have the principles upon which our Foreign Affairs have been conducted since the beginning of 1848 reconsidered by Lord John Russell and his Cabinet.

She then went on severely to criticise Palmerston's policy both as to its form and as to its substance; and concluded:

> The Queen wishes therefore that a regular programme...should be submitted to her, and would suggest whether it would not be the best mode if Lord John were to ask Lord Granville to prepare such a paper and to lay it before her after having revised it. This would then serve as a safe guide for Lord Granville, and enable the Queen, as well as the Cabinet to see that the Policy, as in future to be conducted, will be in conformity with the principles laid down and approved.

Russell was obviously embarrassed by this amazing proposal. He replied that "the traditionary policy of this country is not to bind the Crown and country by engagements unless upon special cause shown, arising out of the circumstances of the day." Nevertheless, with that easy complacency which led him to avoid, whenever he could, all troubles not of his own creation, he instructed Granville to draw up a Memorandum the platitudes of which may be read in the first volume of Lord Fitzmaurice's *Life of Earl Granville*.

The most immediate and pressing question with which the new Secretary had to deal was, of course, the question of the British attitude towards Louis-Napoleon and his fellow-conspirators. As Greville tells us, and as was inevitable in the circumstances, Palmerston's dismissal "had produced a disagreeable impression at the Élysée." The agitation there was, however, speedily calmed by the assurance that Palmerston's removal had been due to domestic disturbances merely, and that British "policy towards France would continue to be of the most friendly character, and that there was nothing the Government more desired than to see a stable and settled Government in France, and that they had every wish for the stability of the present French Government." Besides thus reassuring the French Government and its supporters, the reconstructed Cabinet could do very little; for Granville's efforts to guide his conduct according to

the principles expressed in his Memorandum were cut short within two months of his appointment by the fall of Lord John Russell's Ministry. On February 20th, 1852, Lord Palmerston had his "tit-for-tat" with his former chief, and secured his defeat on a Militia Bill.

After a week of uncertainty, Lord Derby succeeded in forming a Conservative Cabinet, in which the Foreign Office was assigned to Lord Malmesbury. Although the third Earl of Malmesbury had little of the outstanding diplomatic ability of his grandfather James Harris, the first Earl, his appointment was in one respect a good one. He had been for several years on terms of close intimacy with Louis-Napoleon; had visited him (April, 1845) in his prison at Ham; had welcomed him to England on his escape, and had aided him in the days of his adversity. Malmesbury's appointment, therefore, more than compensated for any loss of cordiality in Anglo-French relations which had been caused by Palmerston's overthrow. The Prince-President wrote as soon as he heard the news: "*Je ne veux pas tarder à vous féliciter du poste élevé où la confiance de la Reine vous a appelé, mais je m'en félicite surtout pour les bons rapports qui doivent en résulter pour les deux pays.*" Malmesbury's own inclinations were reinforced by the advice of Palmerston (who had been the ward of the first Earl, and was a near neighbour and friend of the third Earl in Hampshire). Palmerston offered to call upon the new Foreign Secretary. "Of course," says Malmesbury in his *Memoirs*, "I gratefully accepted his offer, and he came to my house in Whitehall Gardens giving me a masterly sketch of the *status quo* in Europe, and some general hints as to my procedure. The pith of them was 'to keep well with France.'" The Duke of Wellington emphasised the same point: "Mind you keep well with France." But both the statesman and the soldier warned Malmesbury that, although no doubt Louis-Napoleon wanted to remain on good terms with Great Britain, the weakness of his position and his imperative need for popularity might impel him into belligerent ways. They therefore urged circumspection and military preparedness. Their warnings were not unnecessary; for during 1852 France was extremely Chauvinist: in May, for example, Malmesbury was told that Persigny at Paris was "blustering about war and empire." Various specific questions speedily arose—demands upon Switzerland for the surrender of French refugees; confiscation of the property of the Orleans family; claims upon Turkey concerning the Holy Places—on all of which the British Foreign Office dissented from the French Government. Only an almost excessive complacency on the

part of Malmesbury prevented trouble. More serious was the prospect of a French invasion of Belgium, which presented itself early in the year. On a matter so vital to Great Britain as this, it was impossible for even Malmesbury to show any sign of surrender. In the autumn, a direct attack upon England seemed probable. Louis-Napoleon was concentrating all his efforts upon the task of converting his plebiscitary Presidency into a hereditary Empire. He was in the hands of the Army, and the Army was burning to revenge Waterloo, and sweep away the humiliating Treaties of 1815. Malmesbury, however, continued to insist that, personally, the President desired to remain on friendly terms with Great Britain. "I believe," he wrote to Derby, "that he is convinced that war with England lost his uncle the throne, and that he means to try peace with us." It is probably due to the good understanding between the British Minister and the French President, and to Malmesbury's tactful management of the difficult situation, that the Gallic Chauvinists ultimately consented (though with no very good grace) to divert their hostility from Great Britain, and to act with her in resistance to Russia in the East. On December 2nd, 1852, the long-expected declaration of the Second French Empire was made. The President, subject to confirmation by the Army and the nation, assumed the title of "Emperor Napoleon III." Both the imperial title and the numeral "III" caused a good deal of anxious debate, and much memorandum-writing. On Malmesbury's advice Queen Victoria recognised both title and numeral, leaving it to her Ministers to make clear through the ordinary diplomatic channels that they acknowledged no hereditary connection of the Second Empire with the First. On December 4th, 1852, the Queen—with how much discomfort we do not know—wrote a formal epistle to the parvenu, beginning "Sir, my Brother," and ending "Your Imperial Majesty's good Sister." Thus Malmesbury safely steered the State through the difficult waters of Anglo-French diplomacy during 1852. Before the close of the year (December 17th) Lord Derby's Ministry fell. Malmesbury remained at the Foreign Office for a few days longer, pending the appointment of his successor. His last despatch to Paris (December 20th) referred to a question which was, during the following year, destined to assume a monopoly of importance: "I must beg of you," he writes to the Ambassador, "to do all you can to show Drouyn de Lhuys that the Holy Places question, if roughly handled, is one that may bring on trouble and war." Before we pass on to trace the lamentable process by which, under the

divided Administration which succeeded the Tory Cabinet of Derby, this "Holy Places question" actually led to war, we may note that Malmesbury, though primarily occupied with the maintenance of good relations between France and Great Britain, had yet other difficult problems to deal with. But these were only tributary to the main current of British foreign policy. They were the Prussian claim to Neufchâtel; a dispute between Abbas Pasha of Egypt and the Sultan of Turkey concerning the right of capital punishment; the question of the Greek and Danish Crowns; a vehement Austrian demand for the surrender of Italian refugees; and a claim of compensation from the Tuscan Court for injuries done to a British subject named Mather. Malmesbury dealt with them all tactfully and efficiently. Most of them were satisfactorily settled. The Eastern dispute, however, was an exception. The quarrel between Abbas and his Sovereign became complicated with the Franco-Russian conflict concerning the Holy Places and so helped to precipitate the Crimean War, to the preliminaries of which we must now turn.

IV. THE PRELUDE TO THE CRIMEAN WAR, 1853–1854

On the fall of the Derby Cabinet, Lord Aberdeen became Prime-Minister, as head of a Coalition Government composed of Peelites and Whigs. Palmerston was persuaded to accept office as Home Secretary. The Foreign Secretaryship was placed in the hands of Lord John Russell, who accepted it, however, only temporarily, on the understanding that he should be free as soon as the Ministry was established to surrender it to Lord Clarendon. This transfer actually occurred at the end of two months, viz. on February 22nd, 1853. That period, brief as it was, nevertheless saw a series of events of the greatest importance—events that went far to determine the course of British policy which culminated in the Crimean War. It was Lord John Russell who rejected a proposal of the Tsar Nicholas I to settle the Eastern Question by means of an Anglo-Russian agreement; and it was he who sent Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Constantinople to resist Russian designs. Incidentally, too, in the process of correspondence, he gravely embarrassed subsequent diplomacy, first by alleging (January 28th) that France was solely to blame for stirring up all the trouble about the Holy Places, and for initiating talk of war; secondly, by admitting (February 9th) that Russia, in claiming a protectorate over the Greek Christians in the Turkish empire, was but fulfilling a task "prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty."

The policy of Nicholas I towards Turkey oscillated between the two poles of protection and partition. When, as during the years 1833–41, Russia was able to establish a dominant influence over the Porte, Nicholas made it his business to maintain the integrity of the dominions of the complacent and useful Sultan. When, however, the Sultan ceased to be submissive, the Tsar welcomed complaints from his Christian subjects; fomented discords in his realm; formulated schemes for his extinction, and for the division of his heritage. Now, since 1841—thanks to Palmerston's skilful treatment of the Mehemet Ali affair—Russian influence at Constantinople had been declining, and British influence (associated after 1848 with that of France) had been supplanting it. This fact was revealed to the world by the Turks in a variety of ways; in particular, by opposition to the Russian occupation of the Principalities in 1848, by the refusal to surrender the Hungarian refugees in 1849, and by concessions to the French in the matter of the "Holy Places" during the years 1850–2. It was this last which roused the Tsar to ungovernable fury; it stirred the long dormant antagonisms between Greek and Latin Christians; it filled the Russian people with the sanguinary zeal of Crusaders. The dispute itself was trivial enough: it has been appropriately described as a "churchwardens' quarrel," and it has even been said that any competent stage-manager could have composed it in half-an-hour: but Russia in religion, as in so much else, was still medieval, while in France a romantic reaction (the reflex of the Revolution) had revived the cult of long-forgotten piety. The French, it is true, had valid claims to the custody and use of the Holy Places. The *Gesta Dei per Francos* accomplished during the Crusades had given them the guardianship; in 1535 their prescriptive rights had been recognised; in 1740 formal Capitulations (granted by the Sultan in gratitude for French diplomatic aid against Austria in the previous year) confirmed their exclusive privileges. But the contemporaries of Diderot and Voltaire had not been careful to preserve their ecclesiastical prerogatives, and during the subsequent tumults of the Revolution the French claims over the Holy Places had entirely dropped out of sight. Hence the Greek Christians, still primitive in devotion and zealous in pilgrimage to the Sacred Shrines, had been free to encroach. They had secured from the Porte a number of firmans conceding rights inconsistent with the obsolescent Latin claims; and, further, the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji (1774) had conferred upon Russia, their great leader, certain vague powers of protection over

Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman empire, which powers the Tsar was now determined to press to the extreme limit of domination. The revival of French interest in the cradle of Christianity may be traced back as far as 1822 (when the Society for the Propagation of the Faith was founded at Lyons). But it was not until Louis-Napoleon was preparing for his *coup d'état* that active measures were taken to enforce the terms of the antique Capitulations. Needing the support of the strong Catholic party headed by Montalembert, the President not only aided in restoring Rome to the Papacy in 1849, but in May, 1850, sent General Aupick to Constantinople to demand the reinstatement of the Latins in the Holy Places, together with the exclusion of the Greek intruders. For two-and-a-half years a furious conflict raged in Byzantium round the bewildered and terrified Sultan; and finally, in December, 1852, the French by superior violence prevailed, and "on Wednesday the 22nd of the same month the Latin Patriarch, with joy and with a great ceremony, replaced the glittering star in the sanctuary of Bethlehem, and at the same time the key of the great door of the church, together with the keys of the sacred manger, was handed over to the Latins[1]."

Palmerston had been in office at the beginning of this dispute, and he had at once perceived the possibilities of disaster which it presented. He had, accordingly, directed Normanby to warn the French Government of the danger of the course it was pursuing, and urge it to moderate its unreasonable demands. Nothing, however, that Normanby said was likely to have, or actually had, any influence with either President or priests, and the quarrel ran its course, culminating, as we have just seen, in a French triumph during the very month in which Louis-Napoleon proclaimed himself Emperor. The wrath of the Tsar was prodigious. He refused to recognise the upstart's numeral; he declined to call him Brother; he sounded Britain with a view to the maintenance of the Treaties of 1814–5, according to which the Bonapartes were to be for ever excluded from the French throne; above all, he resolved to reassert the Greek claims to the Holy Places, reestablish the Russian dominance over the Near East, and punish the Sultan for his perfidy. The situation of the Turks at the beginning of 1853 seemed to invite the use of extreme severity against them. Not only were they harassed by the menace of Russian armies and French fleets—they were further distracted by lawlessness in their Asiatic provinces, and by open disaffection

[1] Kinglake, A. W., *The Invasion of the Crimea*, I. 53.

among the Christian peoples of the Balkans. To add to their troubles, the Montenegrins showed themselves so aggressive that it became necessary for the Sultan to send an army to reduce them to obedience: in January, 1853, the flower of the Ottoman forces under Omar Pasha were locked up amid the defiles of the Black Mountain, engaged in mortal conflict with the unconquerable bandit-heroes of the principality. The time seemed to the Tsar to be ripe for the final settlement of the Eastern Question: the Montenegrins cried for aid to the Head of their Church and the father of their race; the Orthodox Christians of the Balkans clamoured for deliverance; the Greek priests of Palestine called aloud for the recovery of the keys conceded to the Latins. Accordingly, early in January orders were issued for a concentration of Russian troops on the frontiers of the Danubian Principalities. Nicholas I was, of course, well aware that in making this military move he was throwing down a direct challenge to Napoleon III; but he had no fear whatsoever of anything that the French could do, provided only that Great Britain remained neutral in the struggle. And he had the most perfect confidence that she would so remain, if not positively and actively befriending him in the matter. For, first, he was on terms of exceptional cordiality with the British Court; secondly, he believed that Great Britain had ceased to be militant, and had, under the influence of Cobden and Bright, become entirely commercial and pacific; and, thirdly, he knew that Aberdeen, the new British Prime-Minister, detested Napoleon III, and was extremely well-disposed towards himself. Nay more, he thought himself justified in assuming that Aberdeen approved of the policy which he was about to pursue. For, in 1844, he had visited England, when Aberdeen was Minister for Foreign Affairs, and he had discussed with him extremely frankly and confidentially the course Russia and Great Britain should jointly follow, in the event of the demise of the Sick Man. He believed that they had come to an agreement; for Aberdeen, with characteristic timidity and indecision, had failed to make his dissent intelligible. The Tsar, on his return to Petrograd, had caused Nesselrode to embody the substance of the conversations in a Memorandum which he duly transmitted to England. It was received without protest, deposited in the Foreign Office archives, and never revealed until, ten years later, on the eve of the Crimean War, it was laid before Parliament, and published in the *Eastern Papers*[1]. The Tsar, therefore, not without some reason, in January,

[1] Part VI (1854).

1853, calculated on the concurrence of Aberdeen. Accordingly, on the 9th of the month, he had with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British Minister at Petrograd, the first of four conversations of the highest importance (the series extending over six weeks) which unreservedly revealed the purposes of his mind. He frankly and confidently asked for British cooperation: he cared very little, he said, what line the French might think proper to take in Eastern affairs; when Britain and Russia were agreed, he was quite without anxiety as to the rest of Europe; it was immaterial what the others might think or do. The specific proposals, however, which he finally (February 21st) laid before Great Britain for her acceptance were decidedly startling. He suggested that the European provinces of Turkey should be emancipated and then organised as independent principalities under Russian protection; and that Great Britain, if she liked, might take Egypt and Crete. It was to Lord John Russell that the first tentative proposals of the Tsar were communicated by Sir Hamilton Seymour. He politely, but coldly and quite definitely, rejected them. The Ottoman empire, he said, was not so moribund as His Majesty supposed; the Russian scheme would hasten that very dissolution which the British Government wished to avoid, and believed avoidable; Great Britain coveted no part of the Turkish dominions; the proper method for dealing with the Eastern Question was not a secret Anglo-Russian agreement, but an open Conference of all the Powers. The Tsar was surprised and annoyed at the nature of Russell's response to his advances. Nevertheless, he proceeded to formulate the more precise and alluring temptation summarised above. This came before Lord Clarendon, a few days after he had taken over the seals from Russell. He evidently felt himself bound by the language of his predecessor; for he merely repeated in more elegant phraseology the substance of what Russell had written the month before. It has been powerfully urged by many historians and publicists that a golden opportunity of settling the Eastern Question by arrangement with Russia was thus lost at the beginning of 1853; that, however unacceptable the specific propositions of the Tsar might have been, on no account should the chance of an understanding with Russia have been allowed to slip away. It is, certainly, unfortunate that this great possibility should have been presented to the Foreign Office when Lord John Russell was in possession of it. He regarded himself as a mere *locum tenens*, and was eager to divest himself of his duties in order to concentrate his energies on Parliamentary Reform; he was in no

mood to face large problems of foreign policy or make critical decisions concerning them. Moreover, he was on uneasy terms with Aberdeen, whose place as Premier he was eager to assume. Hence, we may well believe that the despatches of Seymour from Petrograd received from neither Russell nor Aberdeen the anxious consideration they deserved. And yet we may well doubt whether cooperation with Russia for the settlement of the Eastern Question was then feasible. Russian ambition was at that date too high and too self-centred; British dislike and suspicion of Russia were too deep-seated; the attitude of the other Powers was too doubtful, and the vitality of Turkey too vigorous, to leave it probable that the unimaginative apathy of Russell led to any substantial departure from the normal line of British policy. At any rate, he was content to pursue the traditional plan of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman empire.

It would appear that, secret as the Tsar wished his January meditations to be kept, some inkling of them leaked out. For not only London, but also Paris, Vienna, and Constantinople decided on prompt and significant action. Lord John Russell persuaded Lord Stratford de Redcliffe (a notorious opponent and personal adversary of Nicholas) to return to the Ottoman Embassy which he had recently resigned; Napoleon III withdrew the irritating La Valette from the Porte and sent the more acceptable de Lacour in his stead; Count Buol despatched Count Leiningen on a special Mission to Constantinople respecting the Montenegrins, urging a speedy and complete withdrawal of the Turkish troops, lest worse calamities should befall, in response to which Mission the Sultan immediately acceded to the Viennese demand, and recalled Omar Pasha, who extricated the remains of his army with considerable difficulty and heavy loss. Thus, at the end of February, 1853, the Tsar found himself faced by a new situation. The prompt intervention of Austria and the instant obedience of Turkey had deprived him of his best excuse for an invasion of the Ottoman empire, viz. the Montenegrin embroglio. He was intensely annoyed, but he was not dismayed, or diverted from his purpose. There still remained, as a second ground for action, the question of the Holy Places; while, even beyond that, there could be found a third in the Tsar's general claim to be the Protector of all Greek Christians throughout the Ottoman dominions. The Holy Places question was a less good *casus belli* than the Montenegrin matter, because it brought in France as a hostile principal. The Protectorate claim was still more exceptionable, because it would certainly excite

Austria and Prussia, as well as France; it was therefore, for a time, kept carefully out of sight. So far as Great Britain was concerned, however, Nicholas expected no opposition either in the matter of the Holy Places, or in that of the Protectorate. As to the one, Great Britain had hitherto intervened only in order to preach reason and moderation to the aggressive French; as to the other, both Aberdeen in 1844 and Russell, on February 9th, 1853, had seemed to admit the validity of the Emperor's claim.

Confining himself, therefore, in the first instance, to the question of the Holy Places, and assuring the Chanceries of Europe that he had no further designs whatever, the Tsar sent Prince Menshikoff to Constantinople to restore forcibly the lost Russian ascendancy. Menshikoff, having ascertained on his way that the army on the Pruth and the navy at Sevastopol were ready for instant action, reached the Porte on February 28th, 1853. He made a most alarming entry into the Turkish capital; caused a Cabinet crisis by refusing to have any dealings with the Foreign Minister who had made the concessions to the French in the matter of the Holy Places; and held such high and insolent language to the Sultan himself as to lead to a belief that an immediate Russian attack upon Constantinople was to be apprehended. The demands, too, which he made upon the Ottoman Government increased the alarm; for not only did he require a prompt restoration of the Greek rights over the Holy Places; he went further and insisted on a secret Russo-Turkish alliance, coupled with "an addition to the Treaty of Kainardji whereby the Greek Church should be placed entirely under Russian protection." These formidable supplementary demands (which gave the lie to the Tsar's assurances to the Chanceries) so perturbed the Grand-vizier that he took the fateful step of laying them before Colonel Rose, the British Chargé d'affaires, and begging his support in offering resistance to them. Colonel Rose either caught the panic of the Vizier, or fell into a trap astutely laid, for he actually went so far as to send an urgent summons to the British fleet to come from Malta to Vourla (March 6th, 1853)[1]. Thus was Great Britain first brought into the quarrel. The results were disastrous: first, Russia was amazed and alienated; and, secondly,

[1] It may be noted that at this date the telegraph, which already connected London with Vienna, had not been extended to Constantinople. Colonel Rose had to act without consultation with his Government: he summoned the fleet on his own responsibility. It is true that the Admiral refused to obey his summons, and that the Government promptly rescinded his orders. But the mischief had been done.

France was rendered so suspicious of British intentions that she sent her own fleet to Salamis (March 20th). In view of the fatal consequences which accrued from this and subsequent movements of the fleets, we may well ask—as the French Ministers asked Lord Malmesbury at the Tuileries on that same March 20th—why Colonel Rose had acted without even consulting his French colleague at Constantinople. If he had done so, any Franco-British misunderstanding at this stage would have been avoided; the French fleet would not have left Toulon, and thus a formidable challenge would not, at this critical moment, have been thrown down to Russia. For the effect of the active intervention on the Turkish side of Colonel Rose and the French Admiralty was, on the one hand, to cause Menshikoff to redouble his efforts to secure the required concessions, and, on the other, to stiffen Turkish resistance and to make it less careful of diplomatic civility.

Nothing beyond exacerbation of temper had been accomplished by five weeks of wrangling negotiations, when, on April 5th, 1853, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe arrived upon the scene. He had called at Paris and Vienna on his way out, and had achieved a complete agreement with the two imperial Governments as to the general lines of policy to be pursued. He learned, without surprise, that behind Menshikoff's demands concerning the Holy Places lurked the all-important claim of the Tsar to the Protectorate over all the Greek Christians in the Ottoman empire—a claim which of itself explained Menshikoff's military manifestations, and the menacing propinquity of the Russian army and navy. He found, to his satisfaction, that the Turkish Government had already decisively rejected the protectorate demand, although it was still seeking to adjust the difference between the French and Russians concerning the Holy Places, in which its interest was merely Islamic. He discovered, too, without regret, that Great Britain had to some extent committed herself to the Turkish cause, by reason of Rose's precipitate summons of the fleet; for he felt that nothing less than the Eastern Question in all its magnitude and vast importance was being raised by Menshikoff and his master, and he believed that the fate of the British empire itself depended upon the prevention of a Muscovite hegemony over Turkey. He dealt with the diplomatic tangle in a manner incomparably skilful. He carefully separated the matter of the Holy Places, concerning which Russia had valid grounds for complaint, from that of the protectorate, concerning which her demands were novel and monstrous.

He prepared himself to advocate unlimited concession in respect of the first claim, but to urge uncompromising resistance to the second. He had no difficulty in bringing round his French colleague, de Lacour, to his views, with the result that on April 22nd, 1853, the long-drawn squabble of the rival "churchwardens" was finally disposed of; the problems of keys, stars, doorkeepers, gardens, domes, and outbuildings being all settled to the satisfaction of the Orthodox. Menshikoff was in great embarrassment. The only questions respecting which he had ostensibly come to Constantinople, viz. the Montenegrin embroglio and conflict for the custody of the Sacred Shrines, had now been completely composed. He was, therefore, compelled, in order to avoid an ignominious departure, to disclose the real object of his Mission, in all its nakedness. This, after some preliminaries, he accomplished, on May 5th, 1853, in the form of an ultimatum accompanied by the draft of a Sened or Convention, drawn up as between the Sultan and the Tsar, which purported to secure for ever to the Orthodox Church and its clergy "all the rights and immunities which they had already enjoyed, and those of which they were possessed from ancient times." The objectionable features in this document were, first, the vagueness of its language, and, secondly, the fact that it made the rights of Ottoman subjects dependent on a Convention with a foreign Power, which would thus secure recognition of a claim to some sort of a protectorate. Lord Stratford was convinced of the necessity of a refusal to concede any such recognition. At the same time, he was anxious to obtain for the Greek Christians all possible guarantees for good treatment by the Turks, so as to remove all substantial cause for interference on the part of Russia. He, therefore, on the one hand, persuaded the Sultan to issue a firman promising to maintain all the privileges of his tributary subjects; and, on the other, secured the unanimous support of the Ambassadors of the other three of the four Great Powers (France, Austria, Prussia) in advising the Porte to refuse to sign the Convention. Menshikoff, sobered by the resistance which he had roused, professed a willingness to accept, instead of the formal Convention, a mere diplomatic Note to the same effect (May 20th, 1853). The four Ambassadors, together with the Turkish Ministers (who were now as truculent as they had previously been terrified) thought that even this offer should be refused. Accordingly, Menshikoff, on May 21st, utterly discomfited, and breathing forth threatening and slaughter, packed up his baggage, and sailed away to Odessa. So ended the first act in the drama.

The curtain was not rung down for long. The return of the baffled Menshikoff to Russia was followed by a terrific outburst of wrath on the part of the Tsar. "I feel," he said, "the smart of the Sultan's fingers on my cheek." He meditated an instant declaration of war against the Ottoman empire. His more cautious Minister, Nesselrode, however, strove to restrain him, pointing out that, unless he were careful, he would have the four Powers as well as Turkey on his hands. The result of Nesselrode's pacific counsels was a compromise —a half-measure that was neither peace nor its opposite. On May 31st, 1853, he sent a despatch to Constantinople intimating that, unless Menshikoff's Note were accepted without qualification within eight days, the Russian troops would cross the Pruth and, "by force, but without war," occupy the Danubian Principalities. Meantime, in Britain the news of the stormy and menacing termination of Menshikoff's Mission was causing a similar conflict[1]. The schism in the Cabinet—where Aberdeen was supported in his pacific policy by Gladstone, while Palmerston's bellicose attitude was backed up by Lord John Russell—resulted in a compromise, which was announced on May 31st, 1853, in important despatches by Lord Clarendon (who at this time stood in the mean between the two factions). The action of Turkey in rejecting Menshikoff's Note was approved; Stratford's conduct of affairs was commended; in view of the probable Russian attack upon Turkey, the fleet was ordered to Besika Bay at the entrance of the Dardanelles, and Stratford was authorised to summon it to Constantinople in case of urgency. Just enough was done to irritate the already infuriated Tsar, but not enough to make him pause one instant on his mad plunge towards war. On June 22nd, the Russian occupation of the Principalities actually began. The Turks regarded it as a belligerent act, and burned to repel it by force. But strong and effective pressure was brought to bear upon them by Stratford, under Clarendon's direction, and they refrained from all warlike demonstrations. This unexpected passivity on the part of the infidel again baffled the Muscovite designs. The Tsar, who had

[1] Malmesbury in his *Memoirs* gives us a vivid picture of the scene. Under May 29th, 1853, he writes: "Prince Menshikoff, it is said, has left Constantinople. Lord Clarendon is very uneasy, but Lord Aberdeen, with childish obstinacy, refuses to believe that Russia intends any aggression, and will not send our fleet to Constantinople. I met Lord Palmerston in Pall Mall this afternoon. He stopped me to speak to him, and began at once upon the departure of Prince Menshikoff. He walked his horse by me till we got to Waterloo Place, where we stopped and talked for a quarter of an hour. Lord Palmerston spoke very openly on the subject, on which his policy quite agrees with ours. He is for decided measures against Russia; so that between him and Lord Aberdeen there is a complete difference of opinion.

anticipated a short and glorious campaign which would make him master of the Orient, found himself, with his armies immobile on the north bank of the Danube, no nearer than before to dominion over Turkey. Meanwhile, the presence of the Russians in the Principalities provoked a unanimous protest from the Powers. The Tsar had expected the protest of the French, whose fleet had accompanied that of Great Britain to Besika Bay, and he regarded it with contempt. The formal British protest, in its turn, came as no surprise to him: he heard with equanimity that Clarendon had spoken to the Russian Ambassador in London of "the dangers which the occupation of the Principalities would bring upon the relations between Russia and England"; since he was assured that Aberdeen continued to express the utmost detestation of the Turk, the profoundest distrust of Napoleon III, and the firmest determination that on no account should Great Britain be dragged into war. What surprised and distressed the Tsar was the protest of Austria and Prussia. He had confidently counted on the friendship of Austria: had he not saved her in 1849, and did she not stand in need of his help against Franco-British machinations in Italy? As to Prussia: Frederick William IV was his brother-in-law and his admiring disciple; and Prussia required his guarantee against the predatory designs of the new Bonaparte. All this—or something like most of it—was true. But Austria was more influenced by the Russian menace to the navigation of the Danube and the Straits, and by the alarming prospect of Russian dominance in the Balkans; while Prussia was unwillingly drawn into the Austrian train by her fear, if she stood aloof, of bringing down upon her unsupported self an immediate onslaught of the French. Hence, in June, 1853, the four Powers spoke in unison and protested against the Russian occupation of the Principalities.

So formidable a demonstration caused even Tsar Nicholas to pause. He professed himself ready to listen to the proposals of reason. Accordingly, the diplomatists of Europe set to work, especially in Vienna, Constantinople, London, Paris and Berlin, to frame schemes by means of which (1) the Tsar's face might be saved, (2) the Principalities cleared of Russians, (3) the independence of Turkey assured, and yet (4) peace preserved. Diligence and ingenuity succeeded during the second half of 1853 in producing not less than eleven projects of pacification[1]. By far the most satisfactory of them all was

[1] Details of these may be found in Stanley Lane-Poole's *Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe*, II. 278 sq.

that formulated by the four Ambassadors at Constantinople, and accepted by the Turks on July 25th. If this could but have been communicated by telegraph to the European capitals, almost certainly there would have been no war. The Tsar was now anxious to escape from the peril into which his fury had led him; and he was in a mood to accept anything within reason placed before him by the unanimous Powers. Even if the Constantinople scheme had not been adopted in its entirety, it would at least have stopped the issue of what proved to be the source of all the later woe—the disastrous Vienna Note of July 28th. But the draft of the Constantinople Note reached Vienna just one day too late. The assent of the Powers had been given to the Vienna Note, and they refused to reopen the question. About this Vienna Note, there are several remarkable features. First, it was originally drafted in Paris, where for the moment a party averse from war with Russia was in the ascendant; secondly, it had been communicated by Austria privately to the Tsar, and put into its final shape in accordance with his views; thirdly, it had not been communicated to Turkey; and finally, it differed hardly at all from the Note of Prince Menshikoff which the four Powers had unanimously rejected. How Lord Clarendon came to accept it, and to accept it without consulting Lord Stratford on the matter, is hard to understand. Yet that is what he did; and he sent orders to Stratford to press its acceptance on the Porte. Stratford was placed in an extremely difficult position: he had officially to recommend what he privately disapproved. For the Note could not have been worse drafted: it was, as Sir Theodore Martin says[1], "tainted to the core by the vagueness of language, the danger of which, in the Convention proposed by Prince Menshikoff, had been so strongly condemned": it left Russia free to claim that very protectorate which it was the prime purpose of the Powers to prevent. There is no evidence that Stratford departed by a hair's breadth from official propriety. He informed the Porte that his Government, together with those of the other Powers, earnestly desired the Turkish acceptance of the Note—to which the Russian assent was already assured. He added that, of course, the Turks could interpret it as they thought fit, and that he felt sure they would have the support of the Powers in repudiating any Russian claim to a protectorate based upon it. But the Ottoman Government recognised the peril of the ambiguous phraseology of the Note. The diplomatic education of the Sultan and his Ministers during the

[1] Martin, *The Prince Consort*, II. 512.

preceding four months of cooperation with "the great Elchi" had been so complete that there was no need for them to ask him for his private views concerning the deplorable document. On August 19th, the Grand-vizier announced that Turkey could accept the Note only on condition that three amendments, calculated to conserve the Sultan's sovereignty, were added. The four Powers, seeing the point of the amendments and agreeing with them, but professing to believe that they made no essential difference in the Note, asked the Tsar to allow them. But Nicholas I, who had given his formal assent to the original Note on August 10th, indignantly refused to permit any modification whatsoever (September 7th).

Now occurred that lamentable schism in the Concert of Europe out of which grew the Crimean War. So long as the four Powers were unanimous, Russia dared not break the Peace of the Continent. But when the Tsar's decision of September 7th was made known, unanimity no longer reigned. Austria and Prussia took the Tsar's view and decided to press the unamended Vienna Note upon the Ottoman Government; France and Britain, on the other hand, took the Sultan's view and decided to press the Turkish amendments upon Russia. The Tsar made the most of the schism. He diligently cultivated his fellow-autocrats of Central Europe: he visited Francis Joseph at Olmütz before the month of September was out; he invited both him and Frederick William to Warsaw; he subsequently returned the Prussian king's visit by going to Berlin. So completely did he persuade the two Sovereigns of his sincerity, and win them over to his side, that they reduced their military establishments, and rejoiced to be out of the crisis. Meantime, however, France and Britain were more and more deeply implicated in it. Both of them now were inextricably committed to antagonism against Russia, and neither of them was able any longer to restrain the Turks, who were now "spoiling" for a fight in which they were secure of such powerful allies. On October 11th Queen Victoria wrote to Clarendon:

> As matters have now been arranged, it appears to the Queen that we have now taken on ourselves in conjunction with France all the risks of a European war, without having bound Turkey to any conditions with respect to provoking it. The hundred and twenty fanatical Turks constituting the Divan at Constantinople are left sole judges of the line of policy to be pursued, and made cognisant at the same time of the fact that England and France have bound themselves to defend the Turkish terri-

tory! This is entrusting them with a power which Parliament has been jealous to confide even to the hands of the British Crown[1].

The Prince Consort, in a Memorandum of October 16th, in the same sense remarked: "It is evident that the Turks have every inducement not to let this opportunity slip of going to war with Russia, as they will probably never find so advantageous a one again, as the whole of Christendom has declared them in the right, and they would fight with England and France actively on their side." As a matter of fact, the Turks had not allowed the opportunity to slip. On October 4th, they had forwarded an ultimatum to Gortchakoff, the commander of the Russian army of occupation, requiring him to clear out of the Principalities within fifteen days on pain of hostile action. He received it on October 8th and at once rejected it; hence, Turkey and Russia passed into a state of war on October 23rd.

Critical as the situation now was, not even yet did Franco-British diplomacy despair of restoring peace with honour. Of the ardent desire of Aberdeen to escape being dragged into war there can be no doubt: he deplored the drift of things; but he had wholly lost control over them. The conduct of Napoleon III is more open to question. The apologists of the Second Empire, P. de la Gorce and E. Bapst, quoting his utterances, contend that he sincerely strove for peace. But his acts belied his words; by movements of his fleet, to which the British fleet was constrained to conform, he constantly frustrated negotiations, and made a conflict almost inevitable. As a matter of fact, he needed a war for dynastic purposes, and, as Émile Ollivier tells us, "if the Emperor came out cautiously for war, it was for the very reason that he wanted war." In the circumstances, the diplomatists had an almost impossible task. Nevertheless, they laboured for peace, and none more arduously than Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. It is an entire error to attribute to him, as some have done, a passion for war. True, he had a clear policy, viz. at all costs to prevent the Tsar from obtaining his Protectorate, and thus making himself Suzerain over twelve millions of the subjects of the Sultan. But he laboured to achieve this purpose by peaceful means, that is, by the combined diplomatic pressure of the four Powers, whose cooperation he had himself initiated on May 20th, 1853. And, lest anything should frustrate the process of negotiation, he strove, almost beyond the limits of human endeavour, to hold the straining Turks in leash. Perhaps the greatest triumph of his personal influence in

[1] *Letters of Queen Victoria*, II. 456.

Constantinople was accomplished in October, 1853, when, on the one hand, he persuaded the Ottoman Government to accept a new scheme of pacification which he had drafted, and, on the other, held them back from active hostilities while it was being considered. Two things, unfortunately, prevented it from achieving success. Austria and Prussia declined to adopt it; and the divided Aberdeen Cabinet refused to insist on the suspension of active hostilities for more than "a reasonable period"—a lamentably vague term, which the Turks, who were left to interpret it as they chose, treated as equivalent to "a fortnight." The Ottoman armies under Omar Pasha, encamped on the southern shore of the Danube, were, in fact, burning with desire to cross the river and attack the Russians, whose military position in the Principalities was one of extreme weakness. On October 28th—that is, five days after the expiration of the Turkish ultimatum to Gortchakoff—they opened a campaign which speedily drove the Muscovite forces into rapid retreat. The condition of things on the Danube soon became at once so dangerous and so humiliating to the Tsar that, on the one hand, abandoning the limit which he had placed upon Russian military activity, he decided to invade Turkey proper; on the other, heedless of the challenge which he thus threw down to Great Britain and France, he ordered his Black Sea fleet to operate on the Turkish coasts. The new military movements, which commenced with the siege of Silistria, once more alarmed Austria and caused her to mobilise her armies on the Russian frontier; the new naval movements, which culminated in the destruction of a Turkish fleet in the harbour of Sinope on November 30th, 1853, roused popular indignation in Great Britain to a pitch that made the maintenance of peace no longer possible.

Yet even now, in December 1853, since, once again, the four Powers appeared to be in harmony, a last effort was made to settle the quarrel by diplomatic means. A second Vienna Note was drawn up, accepted by them all, and presented to the Tsar on January 13th, 1854. But all hope of its acceptance had before this been destroyed by the movements of the French and British fleets. Since, six months before, they had anchored in Besika Bay, they had, under reiterated pressure of Napoleon III, supported by Palmerston in the British Cabinet, been steadily advancing towards the scene of conflict. On October 22nd, 1853, they had passed the Dardanelles; on January 4th, 1854, they entered the Black Sea, with orders to compel all Russian ships of war to return to the harbour of Sevastopol. The news of this

entry and this order reached the Tsar on January 12th. It touched his pride to the quick, and made the communication of the second Vienna Note, which reached him next day, seem little less than an insult added to an outrage. He unhesitatingly rejected the Note, and in return made counter-demands wholly unacceptable to the four Powers. An absolute deadlock had, in fact, been reached. Yet, even so, one more effort, ostensibly in the interests of peace, was made. The Emperor Napoleon III was allowed by the French and British Governments to address an autograph letter to his "good friend and brother," Nicholas (January 29th, 1854). The substance of this epistle was unexceptionable: it proposed that hostilities should be suspended, the Russian forces withdrawn from the Principalities, the French and British fleets recalled from the Black Sea, and fresh negotiations opened between Petrograd and Constantinople direct. But, if the substance was sound, the language was such as would appear (at any rate to present day readers) nicely calculated to pour oil upon the blazing fires of the Tsar's wrath and resentment[1]. "If, from a motive difficult to understand," it concluded, "your Majesty should refuse this proposal, then France as well as England will be compelled to leave to the fate of arms and the chances of war that which might now be decided by reason and justice." The Tsar replied, in intense irritation, that "Russia would prove herself in 1854 what she had been in 1812"—a retort which did not tend to soothe the susceptibilities of the new Napoleon. During the first week in February, the Russian Ambassadors were withdrawn from London and Paris, and, in consequence, the British and French Ambassadors were recalled from Petrograd. Only the formal declaration of war remained to be made. In vain Austria, backed by Prussia, pleaded for delay and offered to support the Allies in fresh diplomatic efforts. Neither Napoleon nor the British public now desired peace. On February 27th, a Franco-British ultimatum was presented to the Tsar. He did not consider it consistent with his dignity to answer it. Accordingly, on March 19th a state of war supervened. It was formally proclaimed in Paris on March 27th, and in London on March 28th, 1854.

Few series of events have excited more controversy than that, summarised above, which resulted in the Crimean War. In the present chapter restriction of space has rendered it impossible to do more than indicate the salient features of the conflicting policies; and it may well be that factors of cardinal importance will by some be held

[1] Kinglake, *Crimean War*, II. 51.

to have been ignored. But in any case, incomplete as the survey has necessarily been, it is hoped that enough has been said to supply an answer to the questions, Who was responsible for the War? and, Why was it fought? As to the former of these questions, it is impossible to assign responsibility to any one person, or to any one nation. Rarely have peace and war lain so evenly in the balance for so long a time, and the impression is again and again irresistible that, if only any one circumstance out of a score had been other than it was, the War would have been avoided. If only Napoleon had not raised the question of the Holy Places; if anyone but Nicholas I had been reigning at Petrograd; if Orloff rather than Menshikoff had been sent to Constantinople; if any Prime-Minister but Aberdeen had been in office in Britain; if Russell had not been in the Cabinet; if Stratford had not been sent back to the Porte; if there had been a telegraph between Stamboul and Vienna, or if there had *not* been one between Vienna and London; if the fast of Ramazan had not retarded the Note of July 25th just twenty-four hours too long; if the fleets had entered the Dardanelles a day later than they did; or if the final Austrian proposal for delay had reached Petrograd a day earlier than it actually arrived there—and so on, almost indefinitely. A sinister fate seemed to hang over Europe, rendering vain all the efforts of the wise and good to prevent the deplorable calamity. If, beneath this black cloud of destiny, we seek to find out who among mortals were most to blame, it seems that we must assign preeminence in responsibility to Napoleon III. He, without any excuse of genuine religious zeal, for mere dynastic reasons, raised the demon of fanaticism in the East; challenged Nicholas I; embroiled Great Britain; again and again spoiled hopeful negotiations by menacing movements of his fleet. He wished to win Catholic support for his unstable Throne; to displace the Tsar as central sun of the European system; to wipe out the memories of the Moscow disaster of 1812; to break up the Holy Alliance, and to rescind the Treaties of 1815. For reasons such as these he wanted war—and a war in which that respectable Power, Great Britain, would be on his side. Nicholas I seems to stand second in order of responsibility. His pride, his obstinacy, his violence, his duplicity, his fixed determination to obtain his protectorate; in particular, his sending of Menshikoff, his invasion of the Principalities, his attack on the Turkish fleet at Sinope—these things, and others like them, roused in statesmen such as Stratford and Palmerston an incurable distrust and an invincible antagonism, while in the British public they excited

a hatred and loathing that could be appeased by nothing save war. Third in this scale must be placed Lord Aberdeen, the amiable and pacific British Prime-Minister—unkindly characterised by Kinglake as "a good man in the worst sense of the term." His weakness, hesitancy, indecision; his compromises in the Cabinet; his surrender to French pressure; his half-measures and half-apologies for them; his unwilling moves towards war, and his pitiful assurances that he was resolved on peace—all these created so dense a fog of bewilderment and illusion, that the country drifted into war without knowing it. When one remembers how the Queen liked Aberdeen and disliked Palmerston, her words in a letter of December, 1853, to Clarendon become extremely significant: "Lord Palmerston's mode of proceeding always had that advantage, that it threatened steps that it hoped would not become necessary; whilst those hitherto taken, started on the principle of not needlessly offending Russia by threats, oblige us at the same time to take the very steps which we refused to threaten." Thus at last was Palmerston vindicated in the very quarters where he had been least favourably judged. As to his part in these transactions: he consistently advocated clear words and strong measures. Not that he desired war. On the contrary, he believed that, as in his own period of foreign control, the best way of maintaining peace was plain speaking and decisive action. But, nevertheless, he felt that the matter at issue, viz. the integrity of Turkey, the independence of its Government, the prevention of the protectorate of the Tsar, the exclusion of Russia from the Levant, were worth a war, if they could not be secured without one. Such, too, was the view of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, a man of extraordinary ability and power, although obsessed by distrust of Muscovite designs and by belief in the perfectibility of the Turk. He strove to secure the frustration of the Russian plot by means of the joint notification by the four Powers; but when, as the result of the unhappy Vienna scheme, the peace-compelling Concert of Europe was dissolved, he without hesitation or alarm prepared to face the emergency of war.

There remains the question: was the matter at issue worth a war? At first sight it might appear that it was not. For it is now clear that Stratford and Palmerston were wrong in their belief in the possibility of Ottoman reform. The Crimean War gave the Turks another day of grace; but they threw it away with more wanton abandonment than any of which they had been guilty before. Moreover, the map of Europe shows that the proposals for peaceful partition made by the

Tsar to Aberdeen's Government in 1853 were substantially the same as those now actually carried into effect after seventy years of agony. Yet, it is, notwithstanding all this, probable that unless, whether by diplomacy or by war, the Tsar's designs had been defeated, everything would have been different at the present day. Beyond doubt, the judgment of the late Earl of Cromer carries weight: "Had it not been for the Crimean War, and the policy subsequently adopted by Lord Beaconsfield's Government, the independence of the Balkan States would never have been achieved[1]." Whether or not the independence of the Balkan States was worth the expenditure of blood and treasure which the Crimean War entailed, is a question still remaining to be answered.

[1] Earl of Cromer, *Political and Literary Essays*, 1913, p. 275, quoted by Schmitt, *American Historical Review*, XXV. No. 1, p. 46.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CRIMEAN WAR AND THE FRENCH ALLIANCE, 1853–1858

I. RECAPITULATORY[1], 1851–1853

SIR HAMILTON SEYMOUR was, as has been stated, sent to Petrograd in 1851, at a time when our relations with the Tsar seemed to be as satisfactory as was possible between two empires acutely discordant in principle, and in Asia predestined rivals. The remoteness of Russia, her stability in times of revolution, the memory of her aid against Napoleon, above all our tendency, in spite of all *ententes*, to regard France as our enemy—all these were factors in promoting an Anglo-Russian understanding, which Nicholas furthered by every courteous attention to Great Britain.

Inevitably, that understanding was tempered on our part by suspicion of Russian aims and methods. British statesmen believed that Russia designed to annex the Baltic kingdoms, to conquer Turkey and to take as much of Asia as she chose. The wisest of them saw, with Sidney Herbert, that "her relations with Circassia, Georgia, Persia are the same as ours with Rangoon, Scinde, the Sikhs and Oudh.... The public here are right in thinking of Russian aggression, but wrong in attributing it to a wonderful foresight, skill and design. The Russians are just as great fools as other people; but they encroach as we encroach in India, Africa and everywhere—because we can't help it." Her aggression we proposed to check, so far as means permitted, if and when it was attempted. Meanwhile, France was the Power that could injure us, and our statesmen, therefore, watched France with a strained attention that could hardly be devoted to Russia. The defects of a Constitution which could allow us five Foreign Secretaries within fifteen months were not remedied, in respect to Russia, by that permanent position of the Prince Consort[2] which contributed much towards a fuller understanding in this country of Central and Western Europe.

The appointment of Sir Hamilton Seymour to Petrograd was the outcome of this general situation. In January, 1851, the Ambassador whom the Tsar wished to receive and whom Palmerston wished to send

[1] Cf. the preceding Chapter; and see Prefatory Note to the present Volume.
[2] The title was not conferred on him till July 2nd, 1857.

was Lord Cowley, by common consent one of the most quick-sighted of our diplomatists. "Straightforward himself," says Lord Malmesbury, "he easily discovered guile in others who sought to deceive him, and this was well known to such." It is possible that Lord and Lady Cowley might have penetrated the secrets of the Tsar in time to stifle war. It is possible, too, that Nicholas wished for his presence—not, as the Queen surmised, because in Germany he acted as a check upon Russia, but because he might aid Russia in investigating the ground before her projected move in Turkey. But the Queen, while agreeing with the Foreign Secretary that Russia would, for some time at least, exercise a predominating influence upon European affairs, insisted that Berlin and Frankfort should not be slighted. In the end, Seymour went to Russia and Cowley to France.

The new Ambassador brought to Petrograd no diplomatic genius, but a well-schooled diplomatic talent. His Mission justified the Russian Chancellor's earlier impression of him as a diplomatist "*de la bonne vieille roche*." After a quarter of a century in the service, he accepted with a minimum of official complaint the physical and social climate of a capital at once unhealthy and adverse to British policy. With the Tsar, round whom everything revolved, he had but one opportunity of conversing freely upon public affairs between October, 1851, when he landed, and December of the following year. "We ought to have a military man at St Petersburg," Malmesbury opined. Seymour, however, kept all unfavourable impressions and unverifiable suspicions to himself, observed perfectly all due forms, put up silently with lies—or what were practically such—of all kinds, procured, at the risk of his agent's life, the Russian Navy list, wrote official despatches in support of much that the Chancellor urged upon him—in a word, fulfilled eminently well the routine duties of his place. When he transcended routine in his official communications, it was usually to offer observations upon the affairs of Europe, which his long residence upon the Continent or special knowledge of some countries might suggest. The weaknesses in his service arose chiefly from his dependence for information upon Nesselrode, or the Prussian General von Rochow, and from the unelastic character of his mind, which ran constantly upon coalitions in restraint of France. To any idea that the Tsar might be "*plus prudent que loyal*" he was completely blind. In a country where "it is hardly possible to arrive at the truth of any circumstance which occurs" he found Nicholas impetuous, generous, with an "innate abhorrence of all baseness and dishonesty,"

"providentially far less aspiring than the bulk of his subjects." He even credited the Tsar with having won a commanding position in Europe by remarkable consistency in "making a regard for national rights and a respect for national conventions the basis of his foreign policy." From a British point of view, he considered, Tsar and Chancellor could not be better.

An Ambassador holding these views was naturally not distasteful to the Russian rulers. When, therefore, in April, 1852, a struggle was in progress in Constantinople with regard to the authorisation of a railway in Egypt which Great Britain desired, it was easy for Seymour to approach Nesselrode, who laid down the principle that Eastern questions should be treated at leisure. The Ambassador, however, was insistent, and, two British messengers having arrived in one day, the Tsar invited him to dinner, and discussed in Nesselrode's presence the difficulties which had arisen between the Sultan and the Pasha. Right, he said, lay clearly with the Sultan, and added, "We have to do with a sick man, great precautions (*ménagements*) are necessary, or we kill the patient whom we are endeavouring to keep alive." Seymour, of course, concurred. Until the last days of 1852, no further hint is visible as to the Eastern movement of 1853. During the autumn, Nicholas reviewed great and well-found forces in southern Russia and learned with his own eyes how strong Sevastopol had become. In November, Russia asserted against the Porte the independence of Montenegro, and, at the end of December, Nesselrode styled the dispute with France regarding the Holy Places "*une très mauvaise affaire*." But when, on the fall of the Derby Ministry in December, Baron Brunnow reviewed the relations between his country and our own, he could claim that the sky was clear. As for Turkey, he referred to Nesselrode's Memorandum to Aberdeen of 1844, which declared that, to preserve peace, the Sultan's empire must be maintained. He laid special stress upon the new complication in the Levant, which, he maintained, had been unnecessarily brought about by the violence of the French Ambassador at Constantinople. France, he declared, had forced the Porte to elude the performance of what had been promised to the Greek Christians with regard to the Holy Places. To this Russia could not be indifferent. Great Britain, he might justly have assumed, could hardly be anything else.

At that very time, however, Tsar and Chancellor were evolving a design to which Great Britain could not be indifferent. Encouraged by public feeling in Russia, and at the same time challenged by the

interference of France and Austria with the Turks, Nicholas determined to resume the advance of Russia towards Constantinople. The moment seemed especially propitious, inasmuch as his persistent adversary Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had lately quitted the Turkish capital, hoping never to return, while in London Derby and Malmesbury had given place to an unstable coalition under his old friend Aberdeen. Convinced that Great Britain might be cajoled and bribed into acquiescence and that no other Power could frustrate what Russia and she had agreed on, he elaborated in a private Memorandum the probable results of a Russian diplomatic or military assault upon the Turks. The least bad of all possible bad combinations, he concluded, would give him Moldavia, Wallachia and the Dobrudja, while Serbia and Bulgaria would be independent. Constantinople might become a free city, Russia garrisoning the Bosphorus and Austria the Dardanelles. To Austria he assigned the coasts of the Archipelago and Adriatic; to Great Britain, Egypt and perhaps Cyprus and Rhodes; to France, Crete and the islands of the Archipelago. Complete freedom of trade was to prevail, and the Turk might form a kingdom in Asia Minor. These results, in the Tsar's opinion, might not be reached till after the defeat of a French expeditionary force; but he counted upon victory in the field.

In the first days of the new year (1853) Paskievitch, the former conqueror of the Turks, was summoned to his master's side. Rumours of an approaching descent upon Moldavia and Wallachia were current: some said that these principalities should be seized as an offset to the British expedition to Rangoon: fifty thousand men were reported as mobilised at Odessa, and at Sevastopol a considerable fleet. While the Austrian Ambassador could not induce Nesselrode to speak of Turkey, the Tsar extended unwonted favour to the feeble representative of France. On January 8th, the open threat to Turkey drew from Seymour a Memorandum of protest. This was followed, on the next evening, by the first of the famous series of overtures made by the Tsar to Great Britain. Meeting the monarch at the Grandduchess Helena's reception, the Ambassador signally vindicated the Queen's opinion of him as equal to acting under most difficult circumstances. Daring to retain the hand held out to him in farewell, he begged for some reassurance regarding Turkey. The Tsar, unable either to refuse the request or to call his Chancellor to his aid, declared that they had a very sick man on their hands, and that before his death the two Powers must take the necessary precautions for the

Succession. The inevitable sequel, on January 14th, amounted in effect to a considered manifesto of the Tsar's Turkish policy. Renouncing the dreams of Catharine the Great, which embraced Constantinople, he held firmly to his right to protect the Christian subjects of the Porte, and would not disclaim a temporary occupation of the capital. He begged for a communication from our Government.

It has been seen how Lord John Russell's trenchant and courteous statement of policy proved inadequate to the needs of the situation. Rejecting a separate agreement with Russia for the settlement of a question of European concern, it declared that the danger of the dissolution of Turkey was remote, and might only be accelerated by the means suggested for preventing it. Great Britain, however, pledged herself never to negotiate in the matter without consulting the Tsar. "England is rarely befooled," writes a French critic of these transactions; "but when she is, it is not by halves." The slumber of the Government was prolonged for some three months more, during which the threat to Turkey became difficult, if not impossible to recall. For this misfortune there were many reasons—some personal, some Constitutional in their nature. Aberdeen, who declared that the presence of the Turks in Europe was a disgrace, was characterised "most of all by an entire absence of suspicion." After his quarrel with the Court, Palmerston had been, by his own desire, relegated to Home affairs. Lord John Russell was deeply preoccupied by problems more akin to the chief interests of his own statesmanship. Competent observers regarded the Tsar as honest, outspoken, and rather unintelligent. The Russian diplomatists, renowned for skill and charm, spared no pains to accentuate the natural tendency of the British to jealous watchfulness of France.

In spite of all, the indications of Russia's purpose showed themselves too plainly to have admitted of misconstruction. The plan now prepared for the disappearance of Turkey was only a revised edition of the plan which had issued in the disappearance of Poland. Had not the attention of Aberdeen's Government been focussed chiefly on the questions of its own existence and of our relations with France, had even a single Foreign Secretary's term of office lasted for a term of years, the Tsar might not have blundered. In fancied security, however, without even waiting Great Britain's answer, he despatched Prince Menshikoff to make the Turk his vassal. The object of his Mission was wrapped in mystery. The curiosity of his friends he rebuked by declaring that he was to ask the hand of a daughter of the Sultan

for a Russian prince. Nesselrode assured Seymour that Menshikoff was a Moderate, and that his Mission had no significance. More than forty years later, it could still be believed that the Tsar had instructed Menshikoff without the Chancellor's knowledge, and that the violence of the Envoy was his own. In fact, however, he carried with him six Instructions drawn up in Nesselrode's Chancery on February 8th, 1853. Next day, when Lord John Russell was describing the dissolution of Turkey as a remote contingency, Menshikoff set out to claim for his master that unlimited authority over all the Orthodox subjects of the Porte for which many of their notables had petitioned. On February 28th, the Envoy, with a brilliant retinue, landed at Constantinople amid the plaudits of many thousand Christians. So patent and so irresistible seemed the menace that both the British and the French Chargés d'affaires demanded the approach of their fleets; but, as has been seen, Admiral Dundas refused to leave Malta and received the approval of the Queen. The French, however, argued that, although the Government of Great Britain might hang back, the nation must approve an action designed to keep the Russians from Constantinople. Without consulting London, therefore, they sent the Toulon fleet to Salamis, followed within a few days by their Ambassador, de Lacour. Napoleon's instructions to him made it certain that on the question of the Holy Places no breach with Russia would take place.

In Great Britain, meanwhile, a current of apprehension was rising which reached, last of all, those in the highest places. Their optimism may in part be explained by the fact that the dispute about the Holy Places had dragged on for years, and that, according to the Russian Government, this alone was the subject of Menshikoff's Mission. Brunnow, indeed, professed to disclose the Instructions, but suppressed that which demanded a treaty to safeguard the Orthodox Churches. But it required an Aberdeen both to believe that the Tsar's overtures arose from anxiety caused by the present difficulties of Turkey, and to disarm the criticism of the Queen that his mode of proceeding at Constantinople was not such as would be resorted to towards a sick friend. In mid-April, after two months at the Foreign Office, Clarendon ventured to deride the suspicions of the French. Not until the end of May did he, in "utmost alarm," despatch a brief to Seymour contrasting the "explicit, precise and satisfactory assurances" of Russia with Menshikoff's proceedings. For some months, then, this country suffered from an abnormal ignorance of the real situation.

Before resigning the Foreign Office, Russell had decided that there should be sent back to Constantinople a diplomat of unrivalled skill and authority in Eastern affairs, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Lord Stratford, indeed, in many ways resembled an independent potentate rather than an ordinary public servant. Forty years had passed by since he had brought about, single-handed, a Treaty which powerfully contributed to the downfall of Napoleon. During that time, in both hemispheres, he had again and again embarked on special Missions. But the chief scene of his activity had been Constantinople, where, in the course of five Embassies, he had gained for himself and Great Britain an influence probably unique. His imposing presence, and his imperious will and temper, no less than his unwearying exertions, his profound knowledge of affairs and his sincere desire for the welfare of Turkey—all these combined to maintain Great Britain, so long as she spoke through him, almost in the position of a benevolent despot in control of the Turk. Although he was nearer seventy than sixty years of age and had toiled amazingly in the East for decades, his manhood remained unquenched. Nearly a quarter of a century later, the painter of his portrait found him frail indeed, but still imperious and majestic.

In sending Stratford to Constantinople, Aberdeen and his colleagues were perfectly aware that they were employing a statesman whose knowledge of the questions in dispute far surpassed their own, and who had narrowly missed becoming Foreign Secretary under Derby. They were likewise aware that the Tsar disliked him so bitterly as to have refused to receive him at his Court as the Representative of Great Britain. They could not fail to know that weeks must intervene before the expression of their own judgment upon the Eastern situation could reach Constantinople, and that, in the meantime, the situation itself might have changed. When, knowing these things, they allowed him to draw up his own Instructions, they implicitly conceded to him the exercise of a very wide discretion. Ostensibly, and in reality, he set out to restore the moral influence of Great Britain in the face of the "dictatorial if not menacing attitude" which France and Russia had assumed, while inducing those Powers to show forbearance and the Porte to act with prudence and initiate reform. On his way, he enjoyed the advantage of personal conference with Napoleon and with the leading statesmen of Austria, while, as he neared Constantinople, he was met by the news of the first month of Menshikoff's Mission. Before he landed, on April 5th, he had

penetrated the Tsar's design—that is, at least eight weeks earlier than it had become clear to his Government. While others talked of the Holy Places, Stratford wrote, "The Russian demands and accompanying demonstrations seem to mean the acquirement once and for all of a preponderating influence with all the Greeks in their train, or some act of territorial encroachment by way of substitute." As inference deepened into certainty, his confidence in his own insight was not likely to decrease.

British policy now waited upon the issue of Stratford's Mission. He found that, through Menshikoff, Russia had demanded satisfaction as to the Holy Places, intermingling with this demand, in deep secrecy, a further one which, constructively, would commit the Porte to recognise a Russian Protectorate over the Greek Churches in Turkey. The fatal compensation was to be a Russian Defensive Alliance. The Turks needed no inspiration from without to decline proposals which would have made Turkey in Europe, what the Tsar claimed Moldavia and Wallachia had already become, a dependency of Russia. It was only doubtful whether, if faced by her overwhelming power, they would sustain their refusal by force of arms.

Stratford used his best endeavours to prevent the decisive question from being put. Under his influence, the problem of the Holy Places was promptly settled, and the Porte consented to guarantee "by direct sovereign authority" the spiritual privileges of the Christians. Menshikoff, however, disclosed the fact that the conclusion of a treaty of guarantee formed "the chief object of the solicitude" of the Tsar. The opinion of the Representatives of the four Great Powers, and the genuine desire of Russia to avoid a breach, induced him to reduce this demand to a mere Note—but a Note which recognised the special interest of the Tsar in the preservation of Turkey and of Orthodox privileges in Turkey, and provided for a subsequent negotiation. Encouraged by Stratford's announcement that, in case of danger, he was instructed to request our Mediterranean fleet to be in readiness, the Turks stood firm, and, on May 21st, as has been seen, the Russians left Constantinople. "All now depends upon our Cabinet at home," Lord Stratford wrote. "Will they look the crisis fairly in the face, and be wise enough, as well as great enough, now that it has unavoidably occurred, to meet it fairly and settle it for ever?"

Unhappily, no one could describe our policy as wise or great. Its aim appeared to be to persuade the Tsar peacefully, that the preservation of Turkey was advantageous; its method, the undis-

criminating support of every plan of accommodation. Again and again, the Cabinet refused to look the crisis fairly in the face. On May 31st, Stratford received what the Premier styled a fearful power —the authority to call up the fleet to Constantinople, thus breaking the Treaty of 1841, which closed the Dardanelles to foreign warships. It was well known, however, that he was privately desired not to take this step. On June 8th, Clarendon telegraphed to Seymour: "the form of a treaty is alone objectionable. Russia can in other ways get anything she is entitled to claim." At the same time, the Foreign Office hinted that a Russian aggression beyond the limits of her existing Treaties with the Turks might lead to war. A fortnight later, the Queen thought that the Oriental Question was at a standstill, and that the Tsar must enable us to help him out of the difficulty. Meanwhile, the British and French fleets had anchored side by side in Besika Bay.

These half-hearted measures, however, fell far short of turning Nicholas from his purpose. Menshikoff's failure only made him regret that he had accepted his Chancellor's plan of an imposing negotiation, in lieu of his own method of simply terrorising the Turks. Stratford, he believed, had acted against Instructions. Should the British Government, by a gross breach of faith, approve his action, this would not deter the Tsar from fulfilling his duty to Russia. With a strange misjudgment of the situation, he appealed to France to procure the submission of Turkey. Refusing to receive a Turkish Plenipotentiary or to await the good offices of a Conference, he, in July, seized Moldavia and Wallachia as the defender of the Orthodox faith. Once established in the Principalities, Russia enjoyed the advantage of the accomplished fact, while Turkey lost revenue and prestige, increased her expenses and ran the risk of Christian insurrections everywhere. Having advanced to the Danube, the Tsar counted confidently upon the submission of Turkey or its dissolution.

These considerations, and the fact that no nation concerned wished for war, ripened the diplomatic harvest. On August 3rd, after a chequered history, proposals known as the Vienna Note were accepted by the Tsar. "I think," wrote Aberdeen, "this settles the affair." As events were to prove, the Vienna Note was one of eleven distinct peace plans which failed to settle the affair. Its history, however, admirably illuminates the factors which governed our foreign policy. No member of the Cabinet can be said to have looked the crisis fairly in the face, with a firm determination to settle it for ever. A minority,

headed by Palmerston, believed that "our position, waiting timidly and submissively at the back door while Russia is violently threatening and arrogantly forcing her way into the house," was humiliating to France and Great Britain and unfavourable to the cause of peace. These Ministers would have striven to avert war by making this country an avowed principal in the quarrel. Their natural sagacity put them (speaking roughly) in the right; but how little they understood the essence of the quarrel is shown by the fact that Palmerston himself largely drafted proposals of settlement which would have given the Tsar the victory. The majority in the Cabinet were with Aberdeen. Between the two, always arguing for some decisive action, hovered Lord John Russell. He was prepared to stifle the dispute by enforcing the judgment of the Powers upon the Turks, but withdrew from this position when the implications of that judgment were made clear. Perceiving as he did that the Tsar's original demand was for concessions "such as could only be made as the fruit of a successful War," his mind was too lucid for him to blame Stratford for exposing dangerous obscurities, while his character was too straightforward to allow of his shrinking from consequences.

The crisis which the Vienna Note was designed to remove may thus be succinctly stated. Some eighty years earlier, after a victorious War, Russia had secured the insertion in the Treaty of Kainardji (1774) of a promise that the Sultan would protect the Christian religion in his States. Although British Ministers erred in thinking that the Tsar was Pope and head of the Greek Church, he was in a very special sense its chief Defender. As such, and as wont to draw thence great profit for his empire, he was eager that the inevitable extensions in practice of what Kainardji granted should now be hardened into right. Through Menshikoff, he had put forward claims upon which, if granted by the Porte and not repudiated by Europe, he could have founded a virtual Protectorate over Turkey. In face of opposition, he was prepared to refine his demands to the point of preserving his existing rights in fact and of asserting, however obscurely, his title to occupy a special position in regard to the Orthodox subjects of Turkey. This would merely postpone the Russian victory; but to make the claim and then withdraw it as unfounded would be to accept defeat. The Sultan, on the other hand, might without giving himself away redress the grievances of his Christian subjects and extend their privileges, provided that this was not done in palpable compliance with the exercise of any right of interference by the Tsar.

The Powers had each its special private interest to consider: all desired peace and all shared in the collective purpose that the solution of the Eastern Question should not be abandoned to a single State. Stratford, at this time the brain and pen of the Turks, worked with a far clearer sense of the issue than any other non-Russian statesman against the mere adjournment of a peril which was certain to recur. The Vienna Note was drawn up at a moment when the situation was aggravated by the presence of the French and British fleets outside the Dardanelles and of the Russian army upon the Danube. The Turks had, however, refrained from declaring war, and projects of accommodation from Great Britain, France and Austria were laid before the Tsar. To the Russians the mediation of Austria was preferable, and on July 28th Count Buol despatched to Petrograd a short Note, based upon Napoleon's, which the Representatives of the four Powers at Vienna held that both Tsar and Sultan should accept. "If," the Sultan was to declare, "the Emperors of Russia had always shown their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Ottoman empire, the Sultans have never refused to consecrate them anew by solomn acts which attest their ancient and constant benevolence towards their Christian subjects." The Sultan now declares that his Government "will remain faithful to the letter and spirit of the stipulations of the treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople relative to the protection of the Christian religion," and, besides other promises, will "cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to other Christian rites by Convention or special grant."

The Note had barely left Vienna, when there arrived a Turkish ultimatum, which the Representatives of the four Powers at Constantinople had approved. With the sanction of France and Great Britain, this was returned, and the assent of the Turks to the Vienna Note was demanded. The assent of Russia had been given so early as August 3rd. The Tsar could welcome a document which refrained from demanding the evacuation of the Principalities and sanctioned the exercise of his active solicitude for his fellow-Christians in Turkey. He seems to have contemplated placing its author, Napoleon, in the position originally destined for Great Britain with regard to the dissolution of the Ottoman empire. To Paskievitch, however, he expressed a doubt as to whether the Turks would consent or Stratford contradict himself. To France, the Chancellor made no doubt of their acceptance; but to Austria he spoke with more reserve.

"The fatal facility of the electric telegraph," which had secured Clarendon's hasty assent to the Vienna Note, placed Stratford and the Turks in a most difficult position. No man, certainly no Giaour, could control indefinitely the popular demand that the invasion of the Principalities should be resented by war. The time for diplomacy was short, and diplomacy had produced a project in which Stratford and the Turks saw a virtual Russian Protectorate, well knowing that to the Russians this was equally clear. In the discharge of his duty to his Government, however, the British Ambassador recommended the Note to the Porte, at first unconditionally, and later on condition that they should construe it themselves and rely upon the four Powers to support their construction. His intimates knew well that he thought the conduct of his Government infamous[1]—an opinion which the Opposition honestly shared; and, doubtless, the Turks understood that an Ambassador must sometimes argue against his own convictions. While the Representatives of France and Austria pressed for their adhesion to the Note, the Prussian revealed his personal preference for the ultimatum. Before the end of August, the Turks resolved to accept the Note, with three modifications designed to preserve the sovereignty of their country from partition.

The Turkish modifications, qualified by France as insignificant and as leaving the sense of the Note intact, and by Aberdeen, with undoubted sincerity, as "not of great importance," prevented a peaceful settlement of the dispute. The Tsar was prepared to evacuate the Principalities if the Note remained intact. But the Turks insisted upon declaring that

(1) "if the Emperors of Russia have always shown their active solicitude *for the religion of the Greek Orthodox Church*, the Sultans have never ceased to watch over the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the religion and of that Church in the Ottoman Empire, and to consecrate them anew, etc."

(2) "The Sultan will remain faithful to the *stipulations* of the Treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by that of Adrianople, relative to the protection of the Christian religion *by the Sublime Porte*." Finally,

(3) the Sultan will "cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted now or in future to other Christian communities *being subjects of the Porte*."

Though "puerile," "wilful" and "wrong-headed" were among the epithets contemptuously showered by the four Powers upon the modifications and their authors, the Tsar and the Chancellor were implored

[1] Cf. Bapst, *Les Origines de la Guerre de Crimée*, p. 435 n.

to prove their greatness of soul by indulging the scruples of self-love which had given rise to the proposals. Nesselrode, however, insisted that it was inconsistent with the dignity of his master to admit changes made by the Turks in a project which he had already accepted—changes, too, "which are not so insignificant as they have appeared to be at Vienna." The latter reason indeed was better founded than the former. Technically, Austria as mediator had enquired of Russia whether she would accept a Note, if Turkey could be induced to present it. The failure of the mediator to fulfil the condition exactly was followed, in the natural order of things, by a second attempt to adjust the dispute on terms barely distinguishable from those which had been accepted. But, to the amazement of all Europe, the Russian refusal on September 7th was accompanied by an examination of the Turkish modifications which, in Prince Albert's phrase, "has shown the cloven foot and let the cat out of the bag," proving the Vienna Note to have been a trap set by the Russian Ambassador, through Buol. The modifications, Nesselrode clearly demonstrated, did away with that which the Vienna Note had unwittingly maintained—the Russian right of intervention to protect the Orthodox in Turkey.

But for this revelation, which amply vindicated the recalcitrance of the Turks, the Powers would have adopted a compromise devised by Stratford. They would have urged the acceptance of the Note, with the assurance of a collective guarantee that it gave to Russia no right of interference between the Sultan and his subjects. The Tsar, who was at this time personally most active in endeavouring to propitiate the rulers of Austria, of Prussia and even of France, consented at Olmütz to accept the original text, together with a written declaration that Russia intended no interference in Turkish affairs. But Clarendon could no longer honourably invite the Turks to sign; and, before new Instructions could arrive, Stratford and de Lacour had, in fact, failed to induce them to accept such a substitute for force. On October 4th, the Sultan summoned Gortchakoff to evacuate the Principalities. One week later, Russia and Turkey were formally at war.

Hostilities between Russia and Turkey, however, only stimulated the eagerness of many statesmen to extinguish the conflagration before it could kindle Europe. Stratford evaded premature Instructions for summoning the fleets to Constantinople, devised yet another Note, and strained all his influence over the Turks to procure a ten days' respite. Clarendon and Buol fathered other projects. But no diplomatic documents would now restrain the martial ardour of the Turkish

nation. Before the end of October, while the Western fleets lay off Constantinople, Omar Pasha crossed the Danube to victory, and from the Caucasus the news was also favourable. The most moderate of Turkish Ministers felt the enthusiasm of a Holy War. On November 2nd, the Tsar, whose fervent appeals to his fellow Sovereigns were always based upon their common faith, proclaimed a new crusade to his people. "God alone knows how and when it will end," he wrote to Paskievitch. In answer to Brunnow's question, Clarendon promised that war should not impede the export of material for the projected Petrograd-Warsaw Railway.

At the end of November, however, it was still true to say that, as Clarendon had phrased it four months earlier, we were drifting into a war. The vigorous analysis of Prince Albert still held good. "We cannot look on and see the Porte destroyed by Russia; active assistance is European war! To leave the Porte in the lurch is death to the Ministry; to declare war is not much else." It was something to find all parties agreeing that Russia was in the wrong, and almost all holding that we must not suffer her to approach Constantinople. Russell's view, "that if we are to act in conjunction with France as principals in the War, we must act, not for the Sultan, but for the general interest of the population of European Turkey," was too powerfully supported to be overridden. The Queen's desire that the Turks should be informed in writing "that we have *no intention* of being used by them for their own purposes" expressed in a few words what some of her Ministers expressed in many. But between these dicta and a Policy there lay a gap which no Englishman could bridge—and the Premier least of all. What statesman with a grasp of realities could have written as Aberdeen wrote to Gladstone on December 3rd: "We have now happily established a more decided union and concert of the Four Powers, which will enable us to hold a firm language to Russia, and perhaps induce the Turks to listen to reason; so that peace may still not be impossible"? Nesselrode, at least, admitted that the Eastern Question had passed beyond diplomacy.

The Tsar, however, at once alarmed by the prospect of an Anglo-French Alliance and gratified by victory in the Caucasus, consented, on certain conditions, to accept the good offices of the four Powers; and in December Stratford persuaded the Turks to declare their concurrence with this plan. Aberdeen might force himself to believe that the Tsar's profession of willingness to make all the sacrifices compatible with the religious sentiment of his people, his duties as

a Sovereign and his personal dignity, would bring Russia to consent to terms such as would induce the Turks to abandon their Holy War. The notion was perhaps hardly more fantastic than the supposition that his good friends Prussia and Austria would coerce the Tsar, if Russia should refuse. Those who share these beliefs may hold that the disaster of November 30th determined the extension of the War. On that day, the greater part of the Turkish naval forces was annihilated in the open bay of Sinope. The squadron had sailed without a British or French convoy, in reliance on the tacit understanding that Russia would nowhere attack except in self-defence. The slaughter of four thousand men made the British demand for war irresistible. On December 27th, Clarendon notified Russia that it was not the Turkish squadron alone which was deliberately attacked, and that our naval forces proposed to assume control of the Black Sea. So much had been wrung from Aberdeen by the threatened resignation of Russell, the actual resignation of Palmerston and the fierce and unbridled demands of public opinion. "In a case of this kind," said the Premier, "I dread popular support," and the strange half-measures that Great Britain adopted were sacrifices offered to preserve a Ministry which was consciously out of sympathy with the nation. If war should come to pass, Aberdeen would retain the heavy burden of office in the hope of limiting its scope and of bringing it to an early close.

Although the new year opened without serious hope of peace, the formal breach between Russia and the Western Powers was still delayed for nearly three months. The Tsar received successive affronts which stiffened his attitude of defiance. When the notification regarding the Black Sea was made to the Russian Admirals, it was borne by a British frigate into the innermost penetralia of Sevastopol. Again, when Russia enquired whether the supplies for her forces might be carried by sea between her own ports, she was answered in the negative. The climax was reached, when Napoleon, in a personal letter, urged the evacuation of the Principalities in return for that of the Black Sea and the conclusion with Turkey of a Convention to be submitted to the four Powers. The Tsar, on his part, attempted to bind Austria in a manner which showed that he contemplated a partition of Turkey, while his reply to the project of mediation indicated a considerable advance upon Menshikoff's original demands. Early in February, the Russian Ministers quitted London and Paris, and at the end of the month Great Britain and France demanded the speedy

evacuation of the Principalities. On March 12th, the two Powers became allies of Turkey, and, on March 28th, they formally entered upon that "operation in support of the public law of Europe" which is known as the Crimean War.

No historian of our Foreign Policy can well postpone beyond this point an attempt to grapple with the question which then perplexed our statesmen—that of the aims and prospects of a War with Russia. According to Prince Albert, indeed, British policy was one of pure feeling.

> "The Government," he explained to the King of the Belgians, "is a popular Government, and the masses upon which it rests only feel, and do not think. In the present instance their feeling is something of this sort: 'The Emperor of Russia is a tyrant, the enemy of all liberty on the Continent, the oppressor of Poland. He wanted to coerce the poor Turk. The Turk is a fine fellow; he has braved the rascal, let us rush to his assistance.'"

As yet, however, the masses were not fully represented in the Commons, while the Premier was a Scottish nobleman wholly out of sympathy with democratic ideas. Great Britain went to war because even Aberdeen could not contend that she could with justice refrain from doing so. More than five months earlier, he had approved Gladstone's view that the absorption of power by Russia which would follow the downfall of Turkey would endanger the Peace of the World, and must be opposed by us at whatever cost. What had long tortured the consciences of those charged with the conduct of our negotiations was their belief that war might have been avoided by firm language and a more decided course during the preceding year. It is possible that, six months or a year earlier, a Palmerston might have induced Russia to draw back, and it is probable that the Tsar, but for his illusions regarding Great Britain, would not have moved when he did. But what Stratford alone among statesmen outside Russia appears to have adequately grasped was that the Russian movement towards Constantinople was not the affair of a Tsar or a particular occasion, and that, sooner or later, Europe would be compelled to acquiesce in its consummation, or to resist it in arms. Stratford perceived that what existence was to Turkey position was to Russia, a Power itself the result of "national tendencies and national traditions ably directed by a Government which, partly sympathising and partly affecting to sympathise, employs them for the twofold purpose of dynastic despotism and political aggrandisement." But even Stratford did not

fully perceive that, although the Tsar might control the moment for a new assault upon the Turk, the point might easily be passed when he could not check such an assault without endangering his own throne. Nicholas thanked God that he resembled his grandmother, Catharine the Great, in nothing save the profile, and he expressly renounced the dreams which prompted her to name his brothers Constantine and Alexander. But, in fact, he, like Catharine, knew well that the loyalty of the masses was doubtful, that grievous wrongs existed which the Crown had not the power to check, and that the Tsardom needed the suffrage of the educated and the wellborn. Among these, excluded as they were from democratic participation in home affairs, there prevailed a more lively interest in foreign policy than among their equals in European lands, while among the active Slavophil party, as also among the innumerable clergy, the crusading spirit was unquenched. The War made Nicholas popular as he never had been before, and he dared not surrender.

The British, however, with few exceptions, saw the cause and the sustenance of the struggle in the Tsar himself. They were, mainly, united in demanding the integrity of Turkey. Some, like Palmerston, believed that its administration might be reformed; others, like Russell, that this was unlikely, if not impossible; others again, like Aberdeen, that the presence of the Turks in Europe was a disgrace. No Englishman proposed that, if the Christian subjects of Turkey rebelled, they should be put down by British soldiers; while some, like Gladstone, definitely declared the contrary. It was impossible that a Ministry holding opinions so varied should draw up in advance any precise conditions which they would require before concluding peace. Great Britain, of course, agreed with the decision of the Vienna Conference of May 17th that the evacuation of the Principalities and the integrity of Turkey should be the first object of the four Powers. But, although visions of the end of the War varied, from Palmerston's redrawing of the map of Europe and Stratford's inclusion of the Crimea among the "buffer" States down to the mere restoration of the *status quo*, all British statesmen professed that the way to peace was comprehensive violence swiftly applied. Their own nation envisaged its sacrifices mainly as naval effort and cash payment, and might be relied on as fully as it had been against Napoleon. The House of Commons soon became "quite unmanageable, showing utter want of confidence in the Government and a determination to support nothing but the War." Armies on the Russian scale, however,

it was beyond our power to produce; and, although the Navy might disturb the enemy at widely separated points, it could nowhere strike a mortal blow. For land-fighting, allies were indispensable.

The Turkish Alliance at least was wholehearted and secure against temptation. With an army kindled by the Prophet and a Government under the eye of Stratford, the Turk refuted Gladstone's sneer that he was the Anchises to our Aeneas in the conflagration. Aided with arms, money, ships and advice, he might be trusted to occupy the Russians on the Danube, and to keep the Caucasus aflame. Alliance with him, however, implied the covert hostility of Greece, the peril of Christian rebellions and, above all, the determination of millions of Russians to wage war to the last man and the last rouble. Great Britain and the Turk could not hope for victory without the aid of France.

The wholehearted Alliance of France meant that we could employ our entire force in the struggle, for she alone besides Russia was to us a source of danger. A wholehearted alliance between two Powers, each ambitious to possess the principal influence in the East, might seem, in Palmerston's phrase, like a compact between two men in love with the same woman. During the past two years, British Ministers had been slowly making up their minds that, in his persistent overtures to Great Britain, Napoleon III was sincere. The singleness of his will contrasted sharply with our divisions, and a feeling arose that Great Britain never did what was obviously wise until prompted by France. But Napoleon could hardly claim to impersonate the educated public opinion of his country. Even as Emperor, Wellington's words held good of him, "He must keep up his popularity; and then God knows what he may do." The nation had been averse from war, and even the Tsar's impolitic taunt that 1854 would resemble 1812 would hardly reconcile her in permanence to spend blood and treasure for remote and sentimental ends. There was, further, the essential divergence to be reckoned with, that Great Britain was still wont to regard the settlement of 1815 as the Charter of Europe, while to France it seemed an infamy to be obliterated. Our Government could not feel perfectly at ease in the Alliance with a monarch whose dynastic needs might compel him to cry halt, or whose personal preferences induce him to proclaim far-reaching revolutions. Nor was France as an ally commended to the Queen and her consort by the manifest French longing for the Rhine frontier at the expense of Germany. The history of the War, nevertheless, is the history of the Anglo-French Alliance.

II. THE CRIMEAN WAR, 1854–1856

Technically, the War of Great Britain against Russia began when the Tsar declined to answer the ultimatum of February 27th, 1854. Instead of undertaking to evacuate the Principalities by April 30th, as Great Britain and France demanded, he invaded the Dobrudja towards the end of March. The Western Powers, as Allies of the Turks and of each other, were thus drawn into the existing Russo-Turkish War. They had been careful to stipulate, by a Treaty concluded on March 12th, for the complete subordination to themselves of the Ottoman forces, military and diplomatic, engaging for their part to assist the Sultan in the defence of his realm and independence. As between themselves, they agreed, on April 10th, to renounce all private profit and to spare no sacrifice for the defence of Turkey and of Europe. Other Powers were to be invited to join in the Alliance. For nearly two years, a great part of the history of British Foreign Policy follows the fortunes of these invitations[1].

Although by nature philosophical rather than sanguine, Clarendon was not wholly proof against the normal British illusion that foreign nations may well be proud to fight for a cause which has been sanctified by British adhesion. To Austria, to Prussia and to Sweden, he addressed confident admonitions to join the Coalition against their gigantic neighbour. Austria, indeed, menaced as she was by the Russian advance to the Danube, had given great hopes of her accession. Three months after, in the first days of March, Napoleon had spoken of it to the Legislative Assembly, she addressed to the Tsar a demand for the evacuation of the Principalities that fell little short of an ultimatum. To the very close of the War, she was to prove herself anything but the tool upon which Nicholas had counted in 1852. Sorrowfully banishing from his cabinet the statuette of Francis Joseph, he claimed that he and Sobieski, the earlier saviour of Vienna, had been the two unwisest of Polish Kings. But Austria's position contained elements of difficulty, both temporary and permanent, so great that she could hardly be expected to decide wholeheartedly to break with Russia. Her young Emperor felt the imposing personality of the Tsar, while too often Palmerston was justified in the assertion that Buol, his Prime-Minister, meant Meyendorf, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna[2]. A powerful party at Vienna looked

[1] Cf. Greville's *Journal*, II. 302, as to the vigour with which "We beat up for allies and even mercenary aid against Russia in every direction."

[2] Ashley, E., *Life of Palmerston*, II. 288.

up to Nicholas as the pillar of Authority against Revolution. The unquestioned head of the Slavonic world, moreover, had it in his power to shatter the fabric of a State so largely Slavonic, and angry Russian nationalists declared that the road to Constantinople lay through Vienna. The poverty of Austria's exchequer and the instability of her Italian empire constituted further arguments against adventure.

From Prussia even less was to be expected. The scant courtesy with which both sides strove to secure Frederick William IV by threats attested their opinion that his State was too weak to be honest. The King was ready to write much, and to say much, in order to break what he regarded as the shameful alliance between France and Great Britain; but diplomacy and armed intervention were separated by a gap which he was hardly the man to overstep. Lack of immediate concern with the Near East, the traditional obsequiousness of the Hohenzollerns towards the Tsars, Russian prestige at the lesser German Courts, divided counsels at Berlin, the prospect of great financial profit if Russia were blockaded—all these considerations dictated an ostentatious neutrality as the profitable course for Prussia. On April 20th, 1854, she entered upon an offensive and defensive Alliance with Austria whereby the two Powers mutually guaranteed their respective territories for the whole duration of the War. Should Russia incorporate the Principalities or cross the Balkans, Prussia might be called upon to cover with 200,000 men the movements of an Austrian army. Austria thus gained some addition of security in her dominions and of weight in her admonitions to Russia, but burdened herself with a timorous counsellor and partner, whenever any forward movement might be in contemplation. Early in May, Frederick William assured his Russian kinsman that he would never turn against him, adding that he knew for certain that Austria would not attack. Prussian policy justified the indictment of a British Ambassador at Berlin: "It is impossible to make these people understand the duties and responsibilities of a Great Power; and their chief thought in this question appears to be the chance of playing a great card hereafter in Germany, when the War shall have lasted a few years[1]."

As a naval Power hoping to strike at her enemy from the Baltic, Great Britain naturally courted Sweden. King Oscar's policy, like his father's, had been to propitiate the Tsar and to develop the resources of his own States. It might well be supposed, however, that

[1] Martin, *The Prince Consort*, III. 12.

the nation of à Charles XII, led by a Bernadotte, might strike a blow for deliverance from the Russian peril and perhaps for the recovery of Finland. Sweden, indeed, followed up a declaration of neutrality in December, 1853, by refusing the Tsar's requests to close her harbours to all ships of war and to promise in no case to fight against Russia. She, further, drew Clarendon's attention to the aggressive designs of Russia, especially that of securing an outlet to the North Sea by way of the Varanger Fiord. But his blandishments somewhat alarmed a dynasty with so much at stake, and the King turned to Austria, whose lead he was resolved to follow[1].

Negotiations with Denmark and with Spain proved equally unfruitful, and the hour for the accession of Sardinia had not yet struck. In France, however, Great Britain possessed an Ally, unfamiliar indeed, but more valuable than all the neutral Powers combined. The adhesion of France left Great Britain no potential foe save the United States. Her nearness to Italy and to the Rhine provided the best possible guarantee against surprise by Austria or Prussia. Her matchless Army gave the Allies power to act effectively on land, while Paris contributed much to the effective direction of the Coalition. "It is our fate," complained Russell, "never to adopt an onward movement from within; but, when it comes from France, we submit to do what is right and politic[2]." The belief that France was the enemy, indeed, was the less easily uprooted since important personages and classes in France were manifestly filled with hatred of Great Britain. But Napoleon desired the Alliance with a sincerity often questioned, but never successfully impugned; and the new French Constitution placed in his hands all real authority. Great Britain, therefore, could fight with Russia so long as the power and will of Napoleon remained unshaken.

To state this truth is to disclose the fundamental weakness of the Alliance; for, in the long run, the French people would insist on a voice in its own affairs. A short and decisive War might fling away but little money and spill but little blood, while happily erasing the memories of Moscow and of Waterloo. Russia, however, remote and flanked by neutrals, offered few chances of a swift decision. A prolonged struggle must bring home to the French the fact that they were making material sacrifices without hope of material compensations, that their new empire was not "the peace" which they had desired,

[1] E. Hildebrand, *Sveriges historia*, VI. i. B. 83 etc.
[2] S. Walpole, *Life of Lord J. Russell*, II. 221 (to Clarendon, May 10th, 1854).

and that they were called upon to fight for liberty abroad without enjoying it at home. In such a case France must either acknowledge failure or strive for rewards that were unlikely to commend themselves to Great Britain.

Great Britain, on the other hand, entered the War as a nation substantially united in an honest cause. Turkish integrity, as many of her statesmen owned, was merely a formula for British interests. "Nobody here," Greville agreed with Clarendon, "would care one straw about the Russian occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia[1]." But British interests, primarily India and the Levantine trade, could hardly have aroused the national resolve and passion which unfalteringly sustained the War. It was at bottom the defence of popular liberty against menacing reaction, incarnate and triumphant in the Tsar, that brought Great Britain into the field. Not for the last time, the nation, rendered vocal by its Press, pronounced a clearer judgment than its statesmen upon the rights and wrongs of humanity. The Tsardom, busy in the extirpation of liberty among the Russian and non-Russian peoples under its sway, had lately proved its ability to dictate the same terms to central and northern Europe. It recognised no limits to its destiny. "Our frontiers march with us," was the cry of the conquering Slavs. In Europe, Bomarsund and Sevastopol hinted plainly at the Sound and the Dardanelles as future stages on the journey, and the men whose fathers had won Trafalgar and Waterloo resolved to block the way.

To misapprehension of the deeper causes of the War may be ascribed the attempts, both contemporary and of recent years, to charge individual statesmen with having needlessly brought it on. The part played by Stratford, a favourite scapegoat, has been vindicated in a previous Chapter. Palmerston's alleged love of fighting has also been cited, with the amazing statement added that, if we had not fought Russia, we should almost certainly have been made to fight France or America instead[2]. It is true that Palmerston, whose optimism sometimes led him to see facts as he wished them to be, had once declared that Russia was a great humbug, and that if we went fairly to work with her we should throw her back half a century in one campaign[3]. It is true, also, that Palmerston, like Russell, supported Stratford in his determination that the Eastern Question, once

[1] C. C. Greville, *Journal*, I. 72 (June 22nd, 1853).
[2] G. M. Trevelyan, *Life of John Bright*, p. 187.
[3] Ashley, E., *Life of Palmerston*, I. 316 (in 1835).

raised, should not be adjourned on ambiguous conditions. Whatever influence Palmerston possessed, however, he owed partly to his knowledge of foreign affairs, but far more to his inborn sympathy with the nation. It was they, not he or any other man, who really made the War.

For nine months, war was waged under a Premier who clung to office chiefly in order that he might limit the operation of the conflict. Aberdeen, the faithful friend of Nicholas, regarded war against Russia as hardly less unnatural than war against Scotland, and his own share in it as unfitting him to build a church[1]. His scruples found some echo in the Cabinet, while Russell, who did not share them, was intent on reforming the Franchise, and Palmerston had the Home Office upon his hands. Clarendon, indeed, proved a careful and reasonable Foreign Secretary, while Gladstone and his fellow Peelites brought high ability to the work of their Departments, and Granville was an unfailing source of mutual good feeling. But, at a time when speed and vigour were all-important, the Cabinet lacked cohesion and resolution, while, in matters of organisation and armament, nepotism and the long Peace had produced their inevitable effects. During the summer of 1854, the War was not so conducted as to further mutual confidence between the Allies, or to induce wavering neutrals to join them, or to intimidate the enemy.

Great Britain had entered the War to rescue the Turk and to paralyse Russia. Thanks in part to her diplomacy, the former task was substantially accomplished before the end of August. Austria, in agreement with the Turks, had brought 200,000 men under arms, and thus secured the evacuation of the Principalities by Russia. These were thenceforward garrisoned by Austrians and Turks, the original objective of the French and British troops being thus removed. Meanwhile, the movement in support of Russia, Christian insurrection against the Turks, had been checkmated by Austrian negotiation[2] and Allied force. In May the Piraeus had been occupied, and without Greek assistance the insurgents were doomed to collapse.

For the moment, Turkey had been saved—but for the moment only. It was idle to suppose that so unwonted a combination as had brought about the Russian retreat could stay in permanence the onward march of Russia. This was clearly hinted by the silence of

[1] Cp. Martin, *The Prince Consort*, p. 517; Stanmore, *Aberdeen*, p. 303 etc.

[2] *Russian Diplomatic Study*, 1. 492 etc. The trustworthiness of this work may be gauged from the statement, on p. 451, that William Palmer was an English agent sent to show that the Russian Church had departed from the lap of Greek Orthodoxy.

the Tsar, when called upon by Austria to join with the four Powers in devising guarantees for the permanent inclusion of the Turkish empire in the European system. And since a Turkey supervised by Europe seemed to be the only alternative to a Turkey absorbed by Russia, it became comparatively easy to formulate the further objects of the War. Early in August, the four Powers presented to Russia collective proposals for the settlement of the Eastern Question. These, which became famous as the Vienna Four Points, comprised: first, the substitution of a European Guarantee for a Russian Protectorate over Serbia and the Principalities; second, freedom of navigation in the mouths of the Danube; third, the revision of the Treaty of 1841 regarding access through the Straits to the Black Sea; fourth, the abandonment of the Russian claim to protect certain Turkish subjects, and the establishment of a collective European understanding for safeguarding the concessions made to them in matters of religion.

It may be doubted whether even a hostile Alliance of the four Powers would have induced Russia to make so abject a renunciation of her political and religious ideals. Apart from the sincere belief of Nicholas in his divine commission to dictate to Europe, the nationalist and Slavonic currents among educated Russians ran strong. Many regarded themselves as true crusaders. Many, too, held that the right of Russia to protect kindred races of her own faith was a real international right vindicated by many Wars and acknowledged by many Treaties[1]. And Russians who read the history of their State as the hard-won triumph of civilisation against Tartars and Turks could not find it easy to understand, why they should halt or even retrace their steps for the convenience of alien Powers. To accept the Four Points without striking a blow would have been a national abdication.

In declaring that Russia would defend herself until more acceptable terms could be offered, moreover, Tsar and Chancellor had good reason to calculate that she was exposed to no great danger. From the Principalities her armies had prudently retired. In Poland, her most vulnerable part, she was protected by the character of the Prussian King and by the semi-paralysis of Austria which the policy of Prussia brought about. On the side of the Baltic, Cronstadt had defied the Allied fleet, and the easy destruction of the fortifications of Bomarsund fell far short of the victory which might have overcome

[1] *E.g.*, *Russian Diplomatic Study*, I. 187; Khomiakoff to Palmer (Birkbeck, *Russia and the English Church*, p. 168); Kluchevsky, *Kratkoe posobie po russkoe istorie*, p. 147 etc.

the hesitations of Sweden. British naval activity in many widely-separated seas caused Russia some embarrassment; but, on the whole, the Allies had manifested a lack of preparedness for war that might well encourage her resistance. In these circumstances, unable to hector Prussia into war and forced to witness the partial disarmament of Austria, the Allies staked all upon an attempt to draw the eye-tooth of the Bear by a sudden descent on the Crimea.

The policy of this bold adventure was in many respects unimpeachable. Sevastopol embodied Russian military pride and triumphant aggression against Turkey. It lay in a conquered and alien country, hardly more accessible to the Russian forces by land than to the invaders by sea. Its conquest would protect Turkey in Asia, give the Black Sea to the Allies and deeply humiliate the Tsardom. At Michaelmas, within ten days of the first landing, the place was believed to have fallen. Next month, although this report had proved unfounded, Aberdeen was told that his answer to a congratulatory address ought to be a song of triumph. In six months, at small cost in life or treasure, the menace to Constantinople had been dispelled, the Russians driven from the Principalities, the Åland Islands seized, the Allies transported to the Crimea, the battle of the Alma won, and Sevastopol, as was believed, brought to the very verge of capture. These successes naturally influenced the hesitating neutrals. Sweden held out hopes of a powerful diversion in the north, if Russia could sustain a new campaign. It seemed that Austria was approaching a breach with the Tsar, and even that the Prussian King, impelled by fear, was shuffling in her train. On November 5th was gained the new victory of Inkerman. Before the end of the month, although Sevastopol still held out, the Tsar accepted the Four Points as a basis for negotiations. Thanks to his evident weakening and to the threats of the British and French Ambassadors to leave Vienna, Austria signed a Treaty of Triple Alliance on December 2nd. Although as yet she was bound to no share in the offensive, her plans for mobilising 300,000 men had compelled the Tsar to divert reinforcements from the Crimea and to contemplate the evacuation of Bessarabia. The doubtful attitude of Prussia, the accession of Sardinia to the Allies (January 26th, 1855), the termination of the Parliamentary crisis by the advent of Palmerston in the place of Aberdeen, the Russian failure against the Turks at Eupatoria and the sacrifice of the Black Sea fleet—all these disasters sapped the bodily strength of Nicholas, and, on March 1st, he succumbed.

Soon, however, the easy hopes that the exchange of Nicholas for Alexander would bring peace were proved delusive. A new Tsar could not begin his reign by surrendering the Black Sea. Within three weeks, the Russian Plenipotentiary at Vienna, where the Peace Conference was in session, had informed Russell that his country would consent to no naval limitation. The Third Point, to which the Allies attached the greatest weight of all, thus stood rejected, and meanwhile Sevastopol had survived an intense bombardment. So long as the German Powers stood aloof and the Black Sea could be made a Russian lake, the remaining three Points would lack guarantees and there was no alternative to a continuance of the struggle. And the attitude of the German Powers had been the bitterest memory of Vienna. While in April the Franco-British Alliance was cemented by the visit of the Emperor and Empress to this country, Austria was making grotesque proposals which showed the Western Powers how little they could count upon her aid. Great embarrassment was caused, however, by the fact that both Russell and the French Plenipotentiary, Drouyn de Lhuys, had personally approved one of Buol's chimaeras. This would, at best, have perpetuated that Russian preponderance in the Black Sea which the Third Point was designed to terminate. As an alternative to artificial limitations of naval strength, Prince Albert opined that, if the German Powers would give a diplomatic guarantee for the future of Turkey which would substantially place her under a European Protectorate, material guarantees might be dispensed with. The Cabinet and Napoleon concurred; the Austrian proposal was rejected; Drouyn de Lhuys resigned; Russell remained in office. Early in June, the Vienna Conference came to an end, and the Allies, never ceasing to rail against Austria, continued their endeavours to conquer peace. An expedition to the Sea of Azoff destroyed vast supplies and isolated the Crimea from the east; but, on June 18th, progress towards Sevastopol suffered a severe check. Four weeks later, Russell, whose inconsistency Buol had exposed, saved the Ministry by resigning. In spite of parliamentary attacks by the Peace party, Great Britain remained firm for the War, and the waning conviction of the French was sustained by the victory of the Tchernaya and a brilliant visit of British royalty to France, both in August. Next month, after a simultaneous French success and British check, Sevastopol fell; but neither this nor minor successes in various fields brought any overture from Russia. At the end of November, she captured Kars, "the bulwark of Asia

Minor." In Napoleon's words, it became apparent to all the world that, although the Allies "could do Russia serious mischief, they could not subdue her with their own unaided means[1]." A bold appeal to her subject nationalities being out of the question, the sole hope of conquering her seemed as of old to be the Austrian Alliance.

In November, however, a Treaty was signed with Sweden which undoubtedly affected the situation. The Western Powers, England in particular, had shown praiseworthy caution as to the promise of Finland, in which important sections of Swedish opinion would have found a tempting bait. Sweden, on her side, had steadily declined to jeopardise her Army and her future for the proffered subsidy of five million francs a month. The actual Treaty, despite the Queen's confession that she required some explanation as to the advantages which it offered to Great Britain[2], served, beyond question, as a timely threat against Russia and a check to her designs upon the Northern seas. The King of Sweden and Norway pledged himself not to grant her any territory or right and to notify to France and England any Russian proposal for such a transaction, these Powers undertaking, in that case, to come to his assistance with adequate forces by land and sea. The Russian statesmen, no less wounded than surprised, were prompt to perceive that in the next campaign they might expect a new enemy in the field and Petrograd itself to be endangered. At this juncture, Austria again produced an ultimatum. At the end of the year, after much controversy between France, which welcomed it, and Great Britain, which vindicated the right to amend it, the Austrian Ambassador laid it before the Tsar. The terms were those of the Four Points, with the Third hardened into the complete neutralisation of the Black Sea. A slight rectification of the Moldavian frontier was also demanded, and the right reserved to the Allies to safeguard Europe by an extended draft. Early in January, 1856, Russia accepted the Four Points, but nothing further. Austria, however, stood pledged to break off relations if the ultimatum were rejected, and the King of Prussia urged Tsar Alexander to submit. On January 16th, he complied. The agreement of all parties was registered at Vienna, and, on February 25th, the Representatives of the belligerents and of Austria met in Congress at Paris. The French capital was commended to Great Britain largely by her trust in Napoleon and distrust of his

[1] Martin, *The Prince Consort*, III. 394.
[2] *Letters*, July 27th, 1855 (to Clarendon).

Ministers, and by the advantage of the presence of Cowley, her ablest diplomatist, as the colleague of Clarendon.

The diplomacy of the Congress proved, as had been expected, by no means smooth and easy. The longing of the French for peace, the indisposition of Austria for war, Napoleon's lack of interest in several demands which the British deemed vital, above all, the dislike by many Frenchmen for our Alliance—these were powerful obstacles to swift success. As so often happens to Coalitions, success aroused the self-seeking of the members and tended to loosen the bonds between them. France had avenged 1812 and revived her martial renown. If she fought on, it would be for the revision of the Treaties of 1815 and the emancipation of subject nationalities in Europe. In any case, she was far from desiring the permanent hostility of Russia which her subservience to Great Britain must entail. Great Britain, on the other hand, still smarted under her failure at the Redan. With no desire to disturb the Treaties of 1815, she felt that her actual operation in support of the public law of Europe would not be perfect without a fresh campaign. She now disposed of a vast Fleet and a well-found Army, 80,000 strong; her resources were undrained and fresh allies were expected to join in the destruction of the weakening foe. Her statesmen therefore watched with a jealous eye the Russian overtures to France, and in January, 1856, bluntly notified their Ally that they had no intention of agreeing to any conditions of peace that would not fulfil the objects of the War[1].

When Russia accepted the Austrian ultimatum, however, the longing of France for relief outweighed the preference of Britain for full success. "The Emperor could not, if he would, continue the War," ran Cowley's prompt verdict, and he told Napoleon that, with the exception of himself, he could not name a Frenchman who was a cordial supporter of the British Alliance[2]. "Whatever Palmerston in his jaunty mood may say," Clarendon opined, "we could not have made war alone: for we should have had all Europe against us at once, and the United States would have followed[3]." In these circumstances, the accomplishment of the British diplomats in February and March, 1856, must be pronounced admirably successful.

[1] Clarendon to Cowley, January 18th.
[2] To Clarendon, January 18th and 29th.
[3] Maxwell, Sir H. G., *Life of Clarendon*, II. 118 (to Canning).

III. THE CONGRESS OF PARIS AND AFTER

The Congress of Paris between Russia, the four Allies and Austria was opened on February 25th. Thanks to the exertions of Clarendon and Cowley and to the reputation of Palmerston, it was preceded by a series of British successes. The Emperor had presided at a Council of War, and stood committed to a definite plan of campaign, in case the negotiations failed. The British view that the admission of Prussia to the negotiations would be an unmitigated evil had prevailed, and she was only invited to accede to the General Treaty. Sardinia, on the other hand, received an invitation to attend, though her participation was nominally limited to matters concerning herself. Napoleon had been disposed to consider the admission of the Germanic Confederation, hoping thereby to raise up a Power which with the support of France and Britain might hold Austria and Prussia in check. He was, however, persuaded that, unless France desired to strengthen Germany, its States should be left to their interminable jealousies and discords[1]. Russia had promised for the Åland Islands —what she had firmly refused when she acquired them—a pledge that they should remain unfortified. Perhaps the most resounding success, however, was achieved by Stratford, whose career in the latest months of the War had been somewhat clouded. He was blamed for the disaster at Kars, having, it was said, neglected to reply to one-hundred-and-fifty despatches from General Williams, its heroic defender. "I only received the whole of them at the conclusion of the siege, in one packet[2]," was his indignant rejoinder; but slander was not silenced. So bitter became his disputes with his French colleague that Napoleon's Ambassador in London was empowered, in case of need, to tell the Emperor that he would be recalled for the next fault[3]. Four days before the Congress, however, he procured from the Sultan a *hatti-houmayoum* (or Decree), in favour of the subject Christians, which left nothing to be desired but its execution. Besides the most complete religious equality before the law, the Porte promised the reform of police and prisons, of coinage and taxation. Even propaganda against its own faith was countenanced, since the punishment of apostates from Mohammadanism, though defended by Walewski[4],

[1] Cowley, February 9th (to Clarendon).
[2] Higginson, *Seventy-one Years*, p. 329.
[3] Lord Fitzmaurice, *Life of Granville*, I. 135.
[4] Cowley to Clarendon, January 31st, 1856. Cowley insisted on something to satisfy public opinion.

was now renounced. Difficulties arising out of the Fourth Point were thus averted by a brilliant diplomatic stroke.

Fortunately for Great Britain, the real President of the Congress was Napoleon; for his figurehead, Walewski, proved more Russian than the Russians themselves. Cowley, though perhaps he failed to penetrate the Emperor's designs, was accustomed to manage him admirably; while Clarendon, as one of his friends when in exile, found his difficulties lightened by the imperial favour. The British Foreign Secretary, well seconded by Cowley, proceeded with firmness and caution to contend for the due registration of every point to which the negotiating Powers had previously assented. The weight of Austria was consistently thrown into the British scale; while constant protests were necessary to keep France from turning the balance in Russia's favour. French lukewarmness, indeed, frustrated the British design of an enquiry into the state of the populations east of the Black Sea[1] and made it difficult to cope with the Russian demands for large compensation in respect of the surrender of Kars. Buol, happily, did not reject the idea of modifying the Bessarabian frontier; but, on the general question of the Principalities, both he and the Grand-Vizier opposed the national Union while many Powers desired. Union under a hereditary Prince, it was contended, would mean Russian influence in place of Austrian and Turkish. "A second kingdom of Greece would in fact be created[2]"; and such an argument had peculiar weight with Great Britain. The Congress, therefore, confined itself to general stipulations with regard to the principles of their administration, the Sultan undertaking to consult a Moldavian and a Wallachian Assembly with regard to the wishes of the people. Arrangements for the neutralisation of the Black Sea—a plan which Gortchakoff had styled "so strange that one is astonished to see the fate of nations confided to men such as those who have conceived it[3]," were rendered more difficult by the shiftiness of the Russians, who one day asked for half-a-dozen ships within the size of corvettes, and the next, for fifteen corvettes and six frigates[4]. Clarendon, however, was accustomed to work for fourteen hours a day; and he was well supported at home. Palmerston regarded him as the indispensable Foreign Secretary; the Cabinet could not but approve his

[1] With a view to checking Russia by securing their independence. Cowley to Clarendon, January 27th, and *passim*; and Greville, *Journal*, II. 33.

[2] Cowley to Clarendon, March 5th.

[3] Rogers, *Speeches of John Bright*, p. 508.

[4] Cowley to Clarendon, February 27th and 28th.

courteous correctness; while the Royal pair were anti-Russian and not too pro-Napoleonic. By the middle of March, the bases of the Treaty had been agreed on, and the work of drafting its clauses could begin.

At this juncture, the birth of the Prince Imperial made Napoleon the founder of a dynasty and drove him half out of his mind with delight. In the later days of the Congress, Clarendon describes him as "enchanted with his son, dying for peace; does not care sixpence for the terms, and is only anxious to do that which may be agreeable to the Emperor Alexander[1]." At a time when the Russians were contesting every point, and when the international character of the 1841 Treaty had compelled Great Britain to sanction the admission of Prussia, such an attitude could not lighten the British task; but on March 30th the main instrument was signed. By its terms, all occupied territories were to be restored. The Porte was admitted to the European Concert, and its independence and territory guaranteed by the Signatory Powers. Friction between itself and any among them must be referred to the others for their mediation before resort was had to force. The Powers took appreciative cognisance of the recent *hatti-houmayoum*, but expressly renounced all right of joint or several interference in the internal affairs of Turkey. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were closed to foreign warships in time of peace; but each Signatory Power might send light vessels there for the service of their Ambassadors, and two such to protect the new freedom of navigation upon the Danube. Elaborate provisions were made for the control of this navigation and for the neutralisation of the Black Sea. The strip of Bessarabia which was to be ceded by Russia to Moldavia was defined. To Moldavia and Wallachia the Signatory Powers guaranteed their privileges and immunities under the suzerainty of the Porte, renouncing any individual right of protection or interference. Their future Constitution was to be arranged at Paris, after the wishes of their populations had been ascertained by the Porte and the remaining Powers. They were to be protected by national forces, the Suzerain interfering only after agreement with the other signatories. Serbia gained a like status, impaired only by the continued obligation to receive a Turkish garrison. Provision was made for tracing the frontier between Russia and Turkey in Asia Minor, and for new treaties, especially in respect of trade, to supersede the old one-sided agreements. Sanction equivalent to that of the

[1] Lord Fitzmaurice, *Life of Granville*, I. 173 (to Granville).

main Treaty was also given to three appended Conventions, one for the revision of the arrangement of 1841 regarding the Straits, another for the policing of the Black Sea by Russian and Turkish flotillas, and the third for the disarmament of the Åland Islands.

These attempts to settle the Eastern Question by fettering Russia did not, however, exhaust the contribution of the assembled Powers towards the settlement of Europe. All that could be done by generosity towards those vanquished in the War or distressed by its continuance was conceded without stint. The blockades of the Russian ports were raised without waiting for the ratification of the several Treaties, and arrangements were made for the earliest possible evacuation of the Crimea, the Principalities and the town of Kars. Nearly three weeks elapsed, after the formal signature, before the Plenipotentiaries dispersed; and within that time much was done and more attempted. Poland and Italy, "the two envenomed wounds of Europe," had aroused both the sympathy and the cupidity of Napoleon, who would gladly have pledged the Congress to the revision of the Treaties of 1815. But Clarendon, imbued before the War with the belief "that grab was in our friend's mind, whenever the opportunity offered[1]," convinced him that revision was impossible without previous arrangement with three or four Powers, while Russia warned him against interference in Poland, a region which the new Tsar professed to regard with favour. The British Minister, however, ardently seconded the design of Cavour to ventilate the grievances of his country. At the session of April 8th, he stigmatised with vigour the misrule in Rome and Naples, and Cavour exposed the dangers arising from the Austrian occupations in the north. Six days later, Clarendon championed the cause of compulsory mediation before resort to war; but Great Britain found no real supporter among the leading Powers. The resolution that "States between which any serious misunderstanding may arise should, before appealing to arms, have recourse, as far as circumstances may allow, to the good offices of a friendly Power" was a confession of previous failure, though it might serve to facilitate future recourse to the principle which underlay it.

International Maritime Law, on the other hand, underwent a notable development in the next session. The famous Four Points of the Declaration of Paris were subscribed by the assembled Powers, who also undertook to invite the adhesion of other States to the new code as an indivisible whole. According to this pronouncement

[1] Maxwell, Sir H. G., *Life of Clarendon*, II. 208.

(1) Privateering is and remains abolished. (2) The neutral flag covers enemy goods, except contraband of war. (3) Neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag. (4) Blockades, to be binding, must be effective, that is, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the ports or coasts of the enemy. From the point of view of British policy the Declaration has been vehemently assailed. Lord Derby styled it "the humiliating Clarendon capitulation of Paris," cutting off the right arm of the country[1]. It cannot be denied that the grave problems which it professed to settle were not argued in the open, and the conclusions were reached in secret. But the first and the last points condemned practices which were notoriously the occasion of mercenary and lawless violence, while the second and third merely registered that partial satisfaction of neutral claims which, for the term of the War, Great Britain and France had found it politic to concede. The Declaration steered a middle course between the antiquated severity of full belligerent rights and the too indulgent doctrine that private property upon the high seas is sacrosanct. With equal sagacity, Great Britain refused to strain the law by attempting to determine in advance the classes of goods which a belligerent may seize in virtue of their great utility to his enemy. The Londoners who hissed the Peace when the heralds proclaimed it at Temple Bar were absolutely ignorant of what their Representatives had achieved.

Clarendon had, in fact, brought back from Paris something more than the published Treaty. At the very close of the Congress, the long-sought Alliance with Austria had at last come into being. In secret, and finally somewhat to the distaste of Napoleon, Great Britain, France and Austria bound themselves to treat as a *casus belli* any future infraction of Turkish integrity and independence. Statesmen who, like Bunsen, saw in Italy the unavoidable object of the next War to be resolved upon by Napoleon[2] might well doubt the probability of a lasting concord between France and Austria. For the time being, however, any definite league to protect the work of the Congress seemed better than none, and the Treaty, when it came home to Russia, at least tended to keep Alexander and Napoleon apart.

Has the policy of Britain in entering and in quitting the Crimean War stood the test of time? During its course, in spite of some sharp protests, no War was ever more popular; yet few have in after years

[1] F. Piggott, *Declaration of Paris*, p. 26.
[2] *Memoirs*, II. 259 (to Cobden, July 4th, 1856).

received more widespread condemnation. Salisbury's classic verdict that we were backing the wrong horse, has been echoed by most of those who are unacquainted with the facts of the case, and by many better instructed. "I did not condemn the Crimean War," he wrote long afterwards, "because our grounds for fighting were insufficient, but because it was not our interest to undertake the championship of a Power so clearly moribund as Turkey[1]." In 1854, however, it may fairly be replied, the moribund condition was not manifest. The Turks, it is true, were Asiatics; but other Asiatics have proved themselves progressive, and a progressive Turkey might have lived on as an invaluable unit of the great White Race. On what grounds could the statesmen of 1854 assign to the Turk a character permanently inferior to that which the Jews and Finns, the Bulgars and Magyars in Europe were soon to prove themselves entitled? Sultans Mahmud and Abdul-Madjid had instituted important reforms; Reschid, the mainspring of regeneration, lived on; Stratford had brought about useful changes; Turkey lay far more open to the West than Russia in the days of Peter.

But, if Turkey, nevertheless, were moribund, it by no means followed that her inheritance should fall to Russia. Bright, who looked down upon most Ministers[2], declared that, had the final Russian proposals been accepted, "the whole matter would have drifted on to its natural solution, which is that the Mohammadan power in Europe should eventually succumb to the growing power of the Christian population of the Turkish territories[3]." Later Russian history, however, suggests that, had Great Britain followed Bright, those populations, barbarous and mutually hostile as they were, would have swiftly found themselves comprised within the Russian empire. "The Sclavonians," Palmerston judged rightly at that moment, "do not possess the conditions necessary for becoming the bones and sinews of a new State[4]." The tragedy of Poland and Ukrainia, it may confidently be believed, would have been repeated in Roumania and Bulgaria, had Britain stood aloof[5].

To the policy actually followed there were but three alternatives—non-intervention, partition or adjournment. Great Britain might, as

[1] Gooch, *Life of Lord Courtney*, p. 376 (to Courtney, October 2nd, 1899).
[2] Absalom Watkin, *Journal* (November 22nd, 1855).
[3] Rogers, *Speeches*, p. 454 (March 31st, 1854).
[4] Ashley, E., *Life of Lord Palmerston*, II. 287.
[5] See Appendix D for Lord Cowley's sketch of the comparative state of the Eastern Question before and after the War, and Lord Lyons's comment.

Bright and Cobden desired, have declared the Eastern Question no concern of hers. To them, the isolation of the United States was glorious, and the Peninsular War officious and indefensible. The Russians, in their view, might seize Constantinople, perhaps even Copenhagen, without making it either the duty of the interest of Britain to oppose them. An overwhelming majority of the nation, however, held that duty both to herself and to her neighbour compelled a more active course. "To prevent the Russians from becoming masters of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, from employing Greek sailors in their navy, and then at their will commanding the route to India through Egypt[1]" seemed a worthy British object. To guard the liberties of Europe and the Law of Nations might be judged no less imperative. Russia, a Power often brutal but sometimes superbly altruistic, regarded herself as the guardian "immutably, loyally, chivalrously faithful" of the settlement of 1815 in the East. Her position, she claimed, must be exclusive; but as to its harmlessness she proffered the sacred engagement of the Tsar[2]. Great Britain, on the other hand, saw in her a swollen militarist Power, based on slavery, combating Liberal ideas, both at home and abroad; swallowing region after region within her frontiers, wielding the hegemony in Scandinavia and Germany, allied with cruel reaction in Austria, coveting India, bringing on disaster in Afghanistan, demanding the illegal surrender of refugees, designing the subjugation of Turkey. In most respects, she was beyond British control; but, as Britain had protected the refugees, so she would now protect the Sultan. Had she perceived, as Nicholas perceived, that Russian serfage was doomed; had she known, as he dimly suspected, that no Tsar could for long isolate an empire which Peter, Catharine and Alexander had opened to the West; had she comprehended, as he could not comprehend, that the Tsardom had outlived its historic mission and was doomed—in no case would she have chosen inertia. Her attitude towards such a revelation would have been her answer to the diagnosis by a physician in 1853 that the Tsar had only two more years to live—Great Britain must hold to facts, not speculations[3].

Specific British interests, however, might have been safeguarded by the partition of Turkey, and the Tsar offered Egypt and Crete. The acceptance of such proposals honour forbade, and it seems never to have been even talked of. Had Great Britain been tempted thus to

[1] Stockmar, II. 517. [2] *Russian Diplomatic Study*, I. 3, and *passim*.
[3] Vitzthum von Eckstädt, *St Petersburg and London*, I. 31.

break the Law of Nations, the crime might well have been avenged by France and a general war occasioned.

The third alternative, however, the adjournment of the Question, tempted several statesmen at the time, and many have since regretted its rejection. By a subtle and ambiguous concession of principle, diplomacy in 1853 might have secured the evacuation of the Principalities and liberal promises for the future. This course, to their honour, British statesmen declined to take. War, wrote Clarendon, "for such a cause as two sets of Barbarians quarrelling over a form of words is not only shocking but incredible[1]." But, when the underlying realities had been made clear, neither he nor his colleagues would shirk their duty. "Of course a patch-up would be the least troublesome thing now," he declared at the beginning of the New Year; "but I believe it would be only playing the Emperor's game and allowing him to make monster preparations for monster objects[2]." Britain did not drift into war, but chose it. "We are drifting into war," was Clarendon's definition of the position at a moment when "the time of war had not come, but the time of measures for averting it had expired[3]."

The choice cost Britain some 25,000 lives and £50,000,000 sterling—perhaps one-tenth part of the total sacrifice. Was the result worth the bill? Exact political arithmetic is impossible, since in judging a war in the light of history we cannot with certainty isolate its effects. Half a century after the Crimean struggle ended, one dispassionate British statesman was tracing to it the affliction of Europe by five great wars, while another glorified it as the source of Italian and German Union[4]. A table drawn up by Cowley shows clearly how the Allies had transformed the situation in the East[5]. The general situation had been no less strikingly improved. "The Emperor Nicholas," wrote Prince Albert three years before the war, "is at present complete master of Europe. Austria is only an instrument; Prussia a dupe; France a nonentity; while England...is less than nothing[6]." No one could deny that at its close a far more salutary distribution of power prevailed. A "usurpation as great as any

[1] Maxwell, Sir H. G., *Life of Clarendon*, II. 26 (October 9th, 1853).
[2] *Ibid.* II. 37 (January 2nd, 1854).
[3] W. E. Gladstone, *Eng. Hist. Review*, 1887, p. 288.
[4] Spencer Walpole in *Camb. Mod. History*, XI. 324; Lord E. Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, I. 99.
[5] See Appendix, with Lord Lyons's note.
[6] Morier, *Life and Letters*, I. 170 (from the Duke of Coburg's *Aus meinem Leben*).

attempted by Napoleon" had, as Stockmar hoped, been so vigorously opposed as to convince Nicholas and his people "that Russia cannot alone dictate laws to Europe," and this by the Western Powers without what many regarded as the indispensable assistance of the Germans[1]. Their bold reconnaissance in force, moreover, had revealed the true character of what seemed in 1854 "that great grim shadowy power which sits brooding over Europe and Asia, and of which no man knows really whether it be strong or weak[2]." Russia might recover; but no future Nicholas was likely to admonish Europe with "Tremble ye nations and obey, for God is with us." No Russian Nationalist, indeed, could cease to think of Constantinople as Tsargrad, nor forget that Oleg had hung his shield upon its gate; and it may well be that 1917, like 1856, has only postponed the fulfilment of a vision which in 1914 the Western Powers consented to share. But, ostensibly and for the time at least, Russia had yielded. She might recover Bessarabia and the Black Sea, but hardly the control of the Eastern Question. Looking back in 1874, her Foreign Office declared that the real fundamental causes of the War had been the importance attached by Nicholas to the maintenance of the relations with Turkey created by History and Treaties, and, on the other hand, the wish of the Powers to end this *tête-à-tête* by obliging Europe in the future to intervene[3]. Tried by this test, it is not doubtful by whom the War was won. A generation later, it could be laid down that collective authority on the part of the Powers to regulate the disintegration of Turkey had been exercised systematically since 1856[4].

It would be idle to assert that the Crimean War knitted a perfect union of hearts between the French and British peoples. It would be no less idle to deny that common efforts in an unselfish cause weakened their old estrangement. British children in Paris found that to the French they were no longer figures of fun[5]; British statesmen had no longer to wrestle with their subordinates' belief that France was everywhere the enemy. The performances of the two armies before Sevastopol, moreover, had dispelled the illusion that as fighting men the French were hopelessly inferior. At a time when Napoleon could at an hour's notice march 50,000 men to Cherbourg and fling

[1] *Memoirs*, II. 507.
[2] L. Wolf, *Life of Lord Ripon*, I. 80 (from Ripon's *Journal*).
[3] *Russian Diplomatic Study*, II. 410.
[4] T. E. Holland, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question*, p. 2.
[5] Sir H. Rumbold, *Recollections*, I. 13.

them upon the almost defenceless shores of England[1], mutual respect between the two peoples formed a powerful aid to peace.

On the Continent, the proof that Great Britain both could and might intervene effectively to support a principle gave her some years of high prestige. To this, in no small degree, Italy owes her freedom. At home, on the other hand, the War left a legacy of distaste for Continental adventure, which for nearly sixty years set free the surplus energies of Great Britain to be exercised across the ocean. Upon Russia the blindfold surgery of the Allies conferred the benefits which they had vainly hoped that Turkey would receive. The military autocracy confessed its failure, and for nearly a decade Western institutions were showered upon the people. Meanwhile, the rise of Bismarck dissipated for many years the fear, however well founded, of a Russian menace to Europe. Lastly, the respite from Russian aggression, and the European control of the Eastern Question which Great Britain and France had secured, gave time for the Christian nations in Turkey to prepare. Roumania and Bulgaria at least owe their ultimate independence to the compulsory quiescence of Russia, and the Balkan League, then as little dreamed of as the German Empire, is the offspring of the Congress of Paris.

It is hardly necessary to say that the decisions taken at Paris could not be carried out with perfect smoothness, especially since two strenuous campaigns had left all the Powers uneasy and prone to friction. The Russians, indeed, evacuated Kars; but they destroyed its fortifications—an outrage which they repeated at Ismail and Reni in Bessarabia. What Great Britain regarded as their chicanery in tracing the new Moldavian frontier provoked a characteristically Palmerstonian rejoinder—the despatch of a British fleet into the Black Sea. Austria, for her part, delayed the evacuation of the Principalities, and Britain tried to incite the Turks to press her to be gone[2]. Russia, meanwhile, was courting France, and all the skill of Napoleon was needed to allay British suspicions of his good faith. Those who had won the War were naturally disappointed by the gloom which followed on the Peace. "I don't at all see our way out of the Russian and French difficulties," wrote Clarendon a few months after leaving Paris, "we are in active quarrel with Mexico and Peru; we are about to break with Naples and to declare war against Persia[3]." Others found himself and

[1] Greville, *Journal*, II. 158.
[2] *E.g.* Cowley to Clarendon, April 3rd, 1856.
[3] Maxwell, Sir H. G., *Life of Clarendon*, II. 131 (September 12th, 1856).

Palmerston "too scolding," and charged them with having tried by bullying to get out of difficulties caused by carelessness in the negotiations[1]. At the Lord Mayor's banquet of 1856, the Corps Diplomatique was represented by the Ministers of Mexico and Hayti—a striking proof of British isolation[2]. At home, Greville noted the reaction after the fever of the War—"a torpor and an apathy such as I never remember to have seen before[3]."

During the two-and-twenty months of Palmerston's premiership after the close of the Congress, the Franco-British Alliance was subjected to strains which sometimes threatened its continuance. By the end of February, 1857, three such, arising respectively from Naples, Bessarabia and Greece, had been successfully resisted. Ferdinand II of Naples, insisting on his Divine right to govern as he pleased, established police supervision over the French and British diplomats in his dominions, on the ground that they favoured Revolution. Palmerston clamoured for revenge; Russia, for non-intervention. Napoleon admired the King's courage and could not approve of a republican agitation. In October, 1856, however, he brought himself to join with Great Britain in breaking off diplomatic relations with a Government that despised all friendly counsel.

The dispute regarding the frontier between Moldavia and Bessarabia proved more embarrassing; for, while Great Britain gave a verdict against Russia on every point; the French Emperor, while leaving her "to act the part of the extortioner, while he acted that of the generous victor[4]," having in part approved her case. The choice of a person or body to arbitrate was long debated. Finally, however, a curious transaction suggested by Persigny, the French Ambassador in London, solved the problem. At the end of the year, a minor Congress met at Paris, into which Sardinia was admitted, on the understanding that her vote would be given against Russia. Prussia being excluded, a majority of four Powers against two was ensured. The Emperor thus secured an excuse for giving way; while Russia had consented in advance to accept territorial compensation. It was further agreed that, within three months, the Austrians should quit the Principalities; the British fleet, the Black Sea; and the Russians, the ceded strip of Bessarabia. In wishing Napoleon and the *bonne entente* a happy New Year, the Queen could express her satisfaction that the difficulties

[1] Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, I. 216.
[2] Malmesbury, *Memoirs*, November 12th.
[3] *Journal*, II. 55.
[4] Queen Victoria, in 1859. *Letters*, July 13th.

arising out of the execution of the Treaty of Paris were now entirely smoothed away[1].

For the new year (1857), however, were reserved the problems of Greece, the Principalities, and the survival of the *bonne entente* itself. In Greece, disappointed, bankrupt and disorderly as she was, French and British soldiers still watched over the public peace. Russia, the third protecting State, demanded evacuation, and at the end of February, 1857, they quitted the Piraeus. The three Powers then resumed their thankless task of bringing order into the Greek finances[2].

The organisation of Moldavia and Wallachia presented a far more controversial question. From principle, and from complaisance towards Russia, France desired that the two Roumanian provinces should be allowed to unite. From loyalty to the Treaty and from complaisance towards Austria and the Porte, Great Britain opposed their union. The friction was increased by a conflict at Constantinople, where Thouvenel, the French Ambassador, found himself opposed by Stratford and his Austrian colleague. The latter, Prokesch-Osten, denounced the Roumanian aspirations in unusually far-seeing terms.

"Such a country," he declared to Thouvenel, "would be a terrible weapon in Russia's hands against Austria and Turkey. The Roumanians would soon regard the suzerainty of the Porte as shameful and unjust, and their country as too small. They would work for an independent State embracing the Bukowina, the Roumanian part of Transylvania and the Banate, with the Balkan for boundary.... A fine example for Serbia!"

A fine example, also, he might well have added, for Bulgaria and for "Greater Greece." British statesmen could not look on unmoved while France and Russia thus hastened the dissolution of Turkey. Stratford and Prokesch-Osten, however, found themselves opposed by a solid phalanx of their colleagues. In July, the elections to the Moldavian Assembly were duly held, but the result was a Unionist defeat. Thouvenel, declaring that the Government had contrived that the electorate should not represent the people, demanded that the elections should be annulled forthwith. The Porte refused compliance, and found, in August, that its diplomatic relations with France, Russia, Prussia and Sardinia were broken off. Neither Stratford nor Palmerston, fresh from a triumphant General Election, was likely to lack hardihood; but the Alliance was palpably in danger. The marriage of Morny, the Emperor's half-brother, to a Russian wife reinforced in the inner circle at Paris that Russianism for which Walewski had long

[1] *Letters*, December 31st, 1856.
[2] Cf. *below*, Chapter XIV.

been notorious. Persigny, indeed, had almost ceased to correspond with a chief who hated the Court of London so heartily. Russia, of course, neglected no occasion, whether in society or diplomacy or by special Missions, whereby France might be won. At the same time the *rapprochement* between Great Britain and Austria was becoming daily more intimate. Palmerston had never committed the common fault of underrating the importance of Austria to Europe, and now, as the Saxon Minister wrote from London, nobody stood up more frankly and firmly for the Austrian Alliance than Lord Clarendon, who had found in Sir Hamilton Seymour a representative at Vienna as active as he was zealous[1]. That this *rapprochement* was not directed against Russia was proved by the welcome given to the Grand-duke Constantine in England, and by British overtures to the Tsar regarding common action in China. But it was equally clear that France would resent any threat to her own position as Great Britain's chief Ally. To preserve the Alliance, to settle the question of the Principalities, to propitiate Great Britain on the eve of his conference with Alexander, and perhaps to win British sympathy for his wider designs, Napoleon pressed for permission to pay a visit to the Queen, which had been contemplated since the spring. Four days in August were, therefore, spent at Osborne by the Emperor and Empress, accompanied by the Walewskis, Palmerston, Clarendon and Persigny being summoned to the meeting. So strict were the police precautions that unauthorised communication with the mainland was cut off and Persigny arrested.

Considering the characters of the participants, and the fact that two days earlier the Queen had inveighed against the evident inclinations of France and Russia to dictate to us with regard to the Oriental Question[2], the quasi-Congress of Osborne must be pronounced successful. On the question of the Principalities, Palmerston yielded much. Stratford was instructed to press for the annulling of the Moldavian elections, and Great Britain undertook not to oppose the wishes of the Assemblies for union in matters military, financial and judicial. Diplomatic intercourse with Turkey could therefore be resumed in full. At the same time, so friendly an atmosphere was created that, a few days later, the Queen and the Prince Consort were able to perform the delicate task of inspecting Cherbourg, then newly fortified at vast expense. According to the Saxon Minister, however, the Prince assured him in later years that Napoleon's main object in the visit

[1] Vitzthum von Eckstädt, *St Petersburg and London*, I. 220.
[2] *Letters*, August 4th, 1857.

had been to win Britain for his anti-Austrian plans. "I told him," added the Prince, "that it was against all the traditions of this country to bind our hands for future eventualities, especially with a neighbour powerful enough to create such eventualities at any moment." Napoleon, therefore, resentfully turned towards Russia[1].

Some six months later, an alien criminal attempt occasioned the fall of Palmerston and brought France and Britain to the verge of war. Through the remainder of 1857, the Government had been fully occupied with a commercial panic which caused the Bank Charter Act to be suspended, the outbreak of the Great Indian mutiny and the progress of a quarrel with China[2]. But the popularity of Palmerston had withstood all these shocks, which had left his foreign policy unaffected. In the Principalities the Unionists had gained the day, and the recall of Stratford in December paved the way for their ultimate victory and for the decline of British influence at Constantinople. On January 10th, 1858, four Italian refugees from London arrived in Paris, where their leader, Orsini, possessed a store of bombs manufactured in Birmingham. He had himself travelled by way of Belgium, preceded by a notification from the London police of his person, route and purpose. He was, nevertheless, able, four days later, to lie in wait for Napoleon at the entrance to the Opera. His design was to supersede the Empire by a Social Democratic Republic which should transform Europe: his achievement, ten persons killed, some hundred and forty wounded, a minor Reign of Terror and most bitter attacks on Great Britain. These last were made on public occasions by persons in so high a position as Morny's, and fire-eating military addresses to Napoleon were printed in the *Moniteur*. On January 20th, Walewski sent Persigny a despatch recounting several recent attempts at assassination which had been prepared on British soil, and declaring it unthinkable that Great Britain should continue to shelter men who had put themselves beyond the pale of humanity[3].

Persigny, who knew both countries, almost despaired of the maintenance of the Alliance. Englishmen were quick to resent the threats from across the Channel, and slow to alter their laws at the instance of a Prince who had himself been a refugee. Derby held out no hope of exceptional legislation against foreigners who had done nothing criminal in this country. The Duke of Cambridge thought the law adequate as it stood. Palmerston observed that it was impossible to surrender

[1] Vitzthum, von Eckstädt, *St Petersburg and London*, I. 215.
[2] See Chapter IX below.
[3] Quoted in S. Walpole, *History of Twenty-five Years*, I. 114.

refugees to France and not to Austria, while, if London were closed to Mazzini and his tribe, they could find a fresh base of operations in New York[1]. Russell gave true expression to public opinion, when he declared that the threats published by order of the Emperor ought to have made any Minister who had a regard for national dignity decline to enter into any speculative question with a view of altering the law of Conspiracy[2]. On February 1st, when Persigny feared that even the Emperor would not be able to keep the peace[3], Granville wrote: "A war with France would not surprise me[4]." Malmesbury, however, judged more accurately the probable outcome of a controversy with a well-armed neighbour, at a moment when British resources were taxed to the utmost for the reconquest of India[3]. On February 9th, Palmerston brought in a Bill changing conspiracy to murder from a misdemeanour into a felony punishable by hard labour or transportation. "The Bill will pass," wrote the Queen three days later, "and Lord Derby has been most useful about it[5]." Although Russell denounced it as humiliating and shameful, it passed the first reading by 299 votes against 99. Palmerston, whose normal majority of 100 was by far the largest since the Reform Bill, received further encouragement when his India Bill was brought in by 318 votes to 173. On the next night, February 19th, however, he fell a victim to one of those parliamentary surprises which threaten all consistency of foreign policy in a democratic State. The newspapers published Walewski's despatch of January 20th; the Radicals upbraided Palmerston for cowardice; the Peelites argued powerfully against the Bill; the Conservatives seized the chance of snatching a victory; and, other grievances against the Ministry contributing, they lost their heads, and in heat and hurry, laid themselves open to defeat. The hostile amendment, which was carried by 234 votes to 215, had been skilfully designed to mitigate, so far as words could, the defiance to France involved in censuring a Government for attempting to give her satisfaction. The House, according to the terms of this amendment, heard with much concern that it was alleged that recent attempts upon the life of the Emperor had been devised in England. It expressed its detestation of such guilty enterprises. It professed readiness at all times to

[1] A. Stern, *Geschichte Europas*, 1815–1871, VIII. 287 (based on Persigny's despatches).
[2] S. Walpole, *Life of Lord J. Russell*, II. 303 (to Sir George Grey, February 2nd).
[3] Malmesbury, II. 94.
[4] Fitzmaurice, I. 288.
[5] *Letters* (to the King of the Belgians).

remedy proved defects in the Criminal Law, but regretted that the Government had not anticipated its proposal by some reply to the important despatch of January 20th. Thus censured, Palmerston insisted on resigning office. Derby, his successor, of course, withdrew the Bill, and Persigny quitted London. Fortunately for the Conservatives and for Britain, however, they possessed in Malmesbury a Foreign Secretary who had been from his youth a close friend of Napoleon, and in Cowley an Ambassador who was for certain purposes more truly his agent than Walewski himself[1]. The Emperor's desire for peace prevailed, even in face of the acquittal by a London jury of the conspirator against his life. His nomination to the London Embassy of the Crimean veteran Pélissier delighted both Court and people[2]. In August, 1858, amid brilliant fêtes at Cherbourg, the Sovereigns of France and Great Britain once again did homage to the *bonne entente* between the two Powers.

[1] Cp. Greville, *Journal*, II. 7, and *passim*.

[2] Greville, however, styles Pélissier "a military ruffian, who knows no more of diplomacy than he does of astronomy" (*Journal*, II. 181).

CHAPTER IX

INDIA AND THE FAR EAST, 1848–1858

I. LORD DALHOUSIE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION, 1848–1856

THE year 1856 marks the climax of a policy of Sunni Muslim consolidation in two areas, and, in each, under British leadership[1]. One area lay to the east, the other to the west of Shiah Persia. The Crimean War had been brought to a successful conclusion by the Peace of Paris in March, and Turkey was established, once again, as an independent Power. In February, Oudh, the sole remaining Shiah province of the Mughal empire, had been annexed to the dominions under the control of the East India Company—in other words, of the Diwan of Bengal. The Company had concluded with the Amir of Afghanistan and the Khan of Kalat defensive alliances in 1854–5, and thereby brought into diplomatic unity both the strength of Akbar's empire and the acquisitions of Aurungzeb. When Dalhousie left India, Bahadur Shah II, through the agency of his vassal the East India Company, theoretically controlled an empire of which Akbar and Aurungzeb had dreamed, but which neither had achieved. Akbar never held the Deccan; Aurungzeb lost the Northern Provinces; neither of them conquered Burma. All three areas were controlled by the East India Company as virtual *Vakil-i-mutlaq* (Lieutenant-Plenipotentiary) of the Mughal Emperor, now disdainfully regarded as "the pensioner or titular King of Delhi." For him, then, arose the question whether the great vassal, in its hour of victory, would retrace its technically treasonable step of 1843 (when it had refused to observe the ritual of allegiance), by assigning *sua fortia facta gloriae ejus*, or would transfer its allegiance from its Suzerain *de jure* to its Sovereign *de natura*. A change in its Governor-General may have led to the formation of hopes which Canning's policy speedily dispelled[2].

It is, then, from his dual position as a Mughal vassal and a British

[1] A general reference seems convenient here to two papers by the writer of the present Chapter. It is throughout based on (i) "The Political Theory of the Indian Mutiny," in the forthcoming *Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc.* (Fourth Series, vol. v.), where authorities are quoted, and on (ii) "The Historical Antecedents of the Khilafat Movement," in *The Contemporary Review*, May 1922. The latter article is an extra-Indian view; while the former represents the Delhi point of view.

[2] Cf. Kaye, *Sepoy War*, II. 29 ff.

Ambassador that Lord Dalhousie's Administration derives its significance and characteristics. Pitt's India Act of 1784 had transferred the control of the Home Government of the East India Company to the British Crown; but it could not legally affect the Company's status in India. Wellesley, in 1803, asserted that, in his diplomatic capacity as a Representative of the British Government, he had proclaimed British protection over the Mughal Emperor, whom he called the King of Delhi, thereby concealing the feudal aspect of the step (the return to the loyal service and protection of his overlord the Mughal Emperor, from whom he concealed the diplomatic aspect of his action). The diplomatic view was recorded in English, the feudal in Persian, and later Governor-Generals were guided by the English version. Five years before Lord Dalhousie's arrival, Lord Ellenborough had brought to a close the Mughal policy of the Company by stopping the presentation of *nazr* and the acceptance of the *Khil'at* as derogatory to the dignity of Queen Victoria[1]. Lord Dalhousie, therefore, regarded himself entirely as a representative of the British Government, as a Viceroy of the Queen of England while Bahadur Shah still regarded him as his own representative, the Diwan of Bengal—a Nawab of the Mughal empire.

But the Mughal suzerainty over the Company was not the only concealed overlordship involved. Persia claimed the Mughal Emperor as a vassal, and this relationship the Mughals had concealed. Both Babur and Humayun had entered India as Persian *amirs*. Akbar had disowned the religious and political overlordship (1579); but, whenever Persia, or one of her vassal States, was sufficiently strong to reassert the suzerainty over the Mughal, she intervened in Indian affairs, and usually in response to an invitation from India. Dalhousie's arrival in India took place at a time when a revival of Persian imperial claims was beginning to take place. Russian pressure ceased in 1846, somewhat abruptly, about four years after the return of Dost Muhammad as Amir of Afghanistan, now recognised by the Governor-General. He was, moreover, the anti-Persian candidate. Persia, therefore, in the East, was suffering, as Poland had suffered in the West, partition with the same result—a revived loyalty in the core of the empire. For territorial recuperation she was looking to her lost

[1] The first *overt* act of the rejection of Mughal suzerainty had already occurred in 1835, when the East India Company ceased to issue coins in the name of the King of Delhi, and began to coin rupees bearing the effigy of King William IV. For the significance of the *Khil'at* (robe of honour, symbolic of the acceptance of suzerainty) and *nazr* (an offering symbolic of a vow of allegiance) cf. the writer's "Two instances of *Khil'at* in the Bible," in the *J. Theol. Studies*, XXIII. 197 ff. *seqq.* (January, 1922).

provinces—Afghanistan, India, and those regions absorbed by Turkey[1], —just at the time that the Mughal Emperor, angered by the stoppage of *nazr*, was ready to welcome the reassertion of her suzerainty. The relations between the two movements were obscured by the dual control of British Eastern policy.

Here again appeared a political illusion. Dalhousie, from his knowledge of Western diplomacy and his ignorance of Eastern political conditions, regarded Persia as the tool of Russia, at the time when she was struggling to free herself from Russian influence[2]. There, too, is to be seen the parallel working of Eastern feudal law and Western diplomacy, the fuller records of which tend to obscure the existence of its rival. The shallow dictum that "after all, the result was the same" is adequately refuted by the extent and ferocity of the Mutiny. Lord Dalhousie's administration, then, may be classified under three heads, each having a dual significance, British and Mughal.

1. The consolidation of the East India Company's fiefs in Bengal; it appears (*a*) as Mughal Diwan of Bengal, theoretically and officially a Sunni Muslim *nawab*, (*b*) as the agent of the British Government governing British territory.

2. The consolidation of the Mughal Emperor's fiefs as his chief vassal, and the reabsorption of rebel States, by means of the principle, "the Emperor is heir to all," or of simple conquest, or of constitutional action (*e.g.* Tanjore, the Punjab, and Oudh, respectively). On the other hand, it appeared to extend, by the doctrine of "lapse," the dominions and "protection" of the British Government and so was as an enemy to the Mughal State. The climax is reached in the attempt to apply the "doctrine of lapse" (*i.e.* the rule that "the Emperor is heir to all") to the Mughal Succession.

3. The consolidation of the Sunni Mughal empire against the menace of a reassertion of Persian suzerainty, which implied a victory of the Shiah doctrine of Islam. This was completed by the alliance of Bengal with Afghanistan, about a year after the Mughal Emperor embraced the Shiah creed, thus relinquishing the Sunni leadership to the Diwan of Bengal. On the other side, the policy appears as part of the Anglo-Russian feud, as a check to the Russian advance in Central Asia.

For convenience these three heads may be distinguished as "Company," "Mughal" and "Foreign" respectively, the whole being regarded as a process of peaceful penetration.

[1] R. W. Stevens to Lord Clarendon, Tabreez, August 12th, 1853 (R.O.–F.O. 60/186); November 16th, 1853 (*ibid.*), November 19th, 1853 (gives Russian promises in event of Russian victory—Sulaimaniah, Baghdad and Kotur). Lord Clarendon to C. A. Murray, No. 2 F.O., November 20th, 1854. C. A. Murray to Lord Clarendon (Private), January 5th, 1855.

[2] Sir H. Willock to Lord Palmerston, December 1st, 1838 (F.O. 60/187). Lord Clarendon to W. T. Thomson, April 20th, 1854; (F.O. 60/188) acknowledging W. T. Thomson, No. 19, January 25th, 1854. Dalhousie wrote exactly the opposite statements only *four days later*, viz. January 29th, 1854. See *Private Letters of Marquess of Dalhousie*, ed. J. G. A. Baird, p. 285.

1. *Dalhousie's "Company" Administration*

The internal policy of Dalhousie had the immediate effect of raising the prestige of the India Board and the Governor-General. Always deferential in tone when he addressed the former, he insisted on a similar deference from his own subordinates. His masterful personality, his love of work and his official training at home drew all Departments under his direct supervision, if not under his direct control. Sir Charles Napier, the Commander-in-Chief, and even Sir John Lawrence, in the Punjab, were made to understand that to Dalhousie belonged the decision of policy. The introduction of the telegraph assisted him in this policy of centralisation, which was to give to his successor that unity of control which he needed for dealing with the outbreak of 1857–8. He directed, in varying degrees, the policies of Bombay, Madras, Agra and Lahore, while he delegated the government of Bengal to Sir Frederick Halliday (April 28th, 1854)[1]. From the Indian point of view the step is interesting constitutionally, since it was merely by the process of *niabat* (appointing a deputy) that Dalhousie freed the Company from the local limitations of its original position (*diwan*) and thus enabled it to assume an imperial rôle as *vakil-i-mutlaq* of the Mughal Emperor. This title was translated, in the diplomatic language of the West, as Paramount Power. The most important effect, therefore, of the step lay in the realm of what was termed "Foreign Affairs," in Mughal imperial Administration; for automatically the rajas and nawabs of other States, even the King of Oudh, sank to the level of a lieutenant-governor. The step involved no assumption of new powers on the part of Dalhousie; it was merely an acknowledgment of his dual position as the most powerful Minister in the Mughal State and as the head of one of the provincial Administrations.

The constitutional and administrative unity of control thus gained was reinforced by more material bonds. The introduction of a regular postal service and the electric telegraph provided a very real link between the Governor-General and outlying provinces, while the introduction of railways and the improvement of roads facilitated movement and heralded an era of still closer relations[2]. Military Boards were superseded by Departments under responsible officers, and definite proposals were put forward for the increase of the

[1] Lee Warner, *The Life of Dalhousie*, II. 246–51.

[2] *Ibid.* II. 191–4, 366, 381. Cf. H. Bosworth Smith, *Life of Lord Lawrence*, I. 467, 477, 479ff. and II. *passim*, for their value in the Mutiny.

European element in the Company's service, to counterbalance the reduction in British troops. Although he allowed British troops to be despatched to the Crimea, he urged the maintenance of an adequate force of Europeans to counterbalance the Sepoys[1].

Throughout, the main feature of the constructive reforms was a tendency to consolidation and centralisation. The reforms, which fall within the realm of morality and humanitarianism, on the other hand, had an opposite effect, for they offended the religious susceptibilities of Hindu opinion. The suppression of *saṭi* and human sacrifices, together with the legalisation of remarriage to widows, was regarded as an encroachment on their religious liberty, unparalleled since the days of *jizya*, now long forgotten[2]. In addition, education and missionary activity excited the worst apprehension as to the religious policy of the Government. Within the Company's provinces, therefore, while the Government was being consolidated, the subject population (both Hindu and Muslim) was being alienated for reasons which were mainly religious.

2. *Dalhousie's "Mughal" Policy*

It was, however, in the rôle of *vakil-i-mutlaq* within the Mughal empire that Dalhousie's greatest work was achieved, and that work automatically laid the foundations of future trouble. His humanitarian reforms had been foreshadowed in the seventeenth century, his "Mughal" administration was a reversion to the law of that age. Not since the seventeenth century had the rule that "the Emperor is heir to all" been enforced with such consistent success, for the "doctrine of lapse" is but one phase of that rule. Delegations of authority were personal and died with the recipient. A natural heir could not succeed without a regrant; the automatic succession of an adopted heir was out of the question. In Hinduism, however, adoption has a religious as well as a political significance, and submission of claims to a non-Hindu was an offence, while non-recognition was a peril to the soul. Here again, the policy of Dalhousie, characteristically Mughal, tended to drive the Hindu into the arms of the Mughal Emperor. The plea that his actions were governed

[1] His minute of 1854, which dealt with this subject was lost in a pigeon-hole at Leadenhall Street. Lee Warner, *op. cit.* II. 275.

[2] Sir R. Temple regarded this view as a post-Mutiny invention (*Men and Events*, p. 105). *Saṭi* was the self-immolation of a widow on the funeral pyre of her husband (*v.* Sleeman's *Rambles and Recreations*, ed. V. A. Smith, pp. 18–31). *Jizya* was the poll-tax levied by Muslim rulers on infidel subjects. Under the Mughals it was levied only during the years 1680–1720.

by treaty-made law failed to convince those who suffered of its moral rectitude[1]. Further, its main application was to Mahratta States (*e.g.* Tanjore, Satara, Nagpur and Jhansi) and to Mahratta princes, as in the case of the pension of Nana Sahib—the sense of grievance lingering from the Mahratta Wars being thereby rekindled[2]. Dalhousie's duty, from the Emperor's point of view, would have been to appoint new *subahdars* (viceroys); but the annexation of the States by Bengal, placed the Company in the position of a usurper. In his "Mughal" policy, therefore, as well as in his "Company" policy, there appears the same tendency to drive together the Hindu and the Mughal. The Company forgot its allegiance, the Hindu his grievances.

The policy towards the Muslim provinces was based on considerations of finance or misrule. The treatment of Arcot is in miniature the treatment of the Mughal empire. From the position of a subordinate *amaldari* (toll-collector) of Madras the Company had risen, through various grants of office and *jagir* lands, to that of Diwan of the Carnatic, thereby gaining complete control over the revenue administration. They then claimed the right to set aside the Nawab on the grounds that he was a pensioner and a *fainéant*. In 1801 and 1835, they failed; but in 1855 they refused to recognise Azam Jah and set him aside[3].

The case of the Deccan was similar to that of Oudh, but less aggravated. There were two sets of claims. The Company was debtor to the Nizam on account of *pishkash* (tribute) and revenue. Cornwallis and Wellesley had been unable to meet the demand, and, by means of doubtful accountancy based on military forces supplied and non-tenure of certain *sarkars*, they had postponed payment until they had converted a debit balance into a substantial credit[4]. By Dalhousie's time the amount "due to the Company" stood at half a million sterling, which the Nizam could not immediately pay. He

[1] For discussions of "lapse," see Lee Warner, *op. cit.* II. 145 ff.; Temple, *op. cit.* 105 ff. T. R. E. Holmes, *A History of the Indian Mutiny* (ed. 1885), p. 36 n. gives a list of references.

[2] The case of Nana Sahib was not exactly the same as the other cases. A pension, not a State, was involved. On its effect on Nana Sahib's conduct, see Holmes, *op. cit.* p. 232.

[3] "Sham kings" was Dalhousie's expression. Lee Warner, *op. cit.* II. 106 ff. takes the ordinary view, which overlooks the priority of the "King of Delhi." For Akbar Shah and Bahadur Shah's attitude, see Kaye, *op. cit.* II. 6 ff. A *jagir* is a grant of the revenues of a piece of territory in lieu of direct cash payments for services.

[4] Cf. I.O. Home Misc. 634, p. 233. Bengal *Secret. Cons.* March 23rd, 1787. A *Sarkar* (lit. *sar* = head, *kar* = work) is the headquarters of any office or government. In the Mughal empire the word is almost invariably confined to *local* government.

offered to pay by instalments and to return the military contingent as an unnecessary source of expense; but Dalhousie insisted on the cession of Berar whereby "the British Government...secured the finest cotton tracts which are known to exist in all the continent of India[1]." The Nizam was mortally offended, and but for his death in May, 1857, it is almost certain that the Deccan would have supported the Mughal Emperor.

The deposition of the "King" of Oudh should be distinguished from the annexation of the province by Bengal; for the two acts had distinctly different effects on Indian opinion. The Court which tried Bahadur Shah in 1858 was unable to understand why the "King of Delhi" was pleased with the deposition of Wajid Ali Shah; for, to them, no other reason than revenge appeared to account for the support given by Oudh to the Mughal. They forgot that the assumption of royalty, by the Nawab Wazir, had given great offence in Delhi and also, if Bishop Heber was not mistaken, to the people of Oudh. Since the Battle of Buxar (1764), the Nawab of Oudh had been a steady ally of the Company. It was not, however, until the substitution of the pro-British Sa'adat Ali Khan for the anti-British Wazir Ali in 1797, that the Company gained any real ascendancy over the affairs of the province[2]. This advantage Wellesley exploited to the full, and by the Treaties of 1799 and 1801 forced the Nawab to disband most of his own forces and to maintain an increased contingent of the Company's. The necessity of large cash payments resulted in the breakdown of the *jagir* system and consequent disorder in Oudh. The pressure for payment, combined with the Resident's interference in the internal affairs of Oudh, rendered administration extremely difficult, and matters drifted from bad to worse. The authors of *Dacoitee in Excelsis, or the Spoliation of Oude*, were almost certainly two of the Company's officers, and they furnish an interesting commentary on the reports of Sleeman and Outram, whose unanimity, which proved to give the final impetus to annexation, they allege to have been based entirely on their common use of Sleeman's notes. Owing to Wajid Ali's refusal to sign a treaty which reduced him to a

[1] Baird, *op. cit.* pp. 434–5.

[2] The minute of Sir J. Shore (*Papers Presented to House of Commons*, 1806, xv.), if read in the light of Sa'adat Ali Khan's correspondence with Wellesley, appears less convincing than it was to Wellesley. For convenient summaries of the History of Oudh in its relations with Bengal, see Lee Warner, *op. cit.* II. 300; H. C. Irwin, *The Garden of India*, pp. 77–155; Sir Henry Lawrence, *Essays, Military and Political*, pp. 61–137.

roi fainéant, he was summarily set aside. The Company's administration, never popular in Oudh, began under the injudicious guidance of Coverly Jackson, who confirmed the worst fears of the landowning classes, among whom were many of the Sepoys of the Company[1]. For this appointment, however, Dalhousie was not responsible.

The annexation, however, produced an effect in the "Foreign" relations of Dalhousie. Oudh was the chief representative of Persian and Shiah influence in India and in constant communication with Persia, where Murray had hinted in 1855 the probability of British pressure on the Shiahs in India as a reprisal for his exclusion from the Taziah ceremony[2]. For over a century, too, the Court of Oudh had been the refuge of discontented Mughal princes from the restraints of Court life and British supervision at Delhi; so that between Lucknow and Delhi there grew up considerable intercourse, and the adoption of the Shiah confession by Bahadur Shah, whether a genuine conversion or not, tended to strengthen this bond. In removing Wajid Ali, the Company removed the "King," the stigma of disloyalty, and by its annexation fastened that stigma upon itself, at a time when Bahadur Shah was fitted by creed and birth alike to lead the cause of loyalty thus set free.

To complete the record: Dalhousie had, since 1849, been intriguing[3] with the Mughal Princes to put an end to the kingdom of Delhi and the Mughal Succession. This rendered the annexation of Oudh ominous. The intrigue was based on the principle of "lapse"—for which the Mughal Emperor was the ultimate source of authority—but the danger was only made clear by the annexation. Dalhousie was not to blame for his misunderstanding of the situation, which was due to his purely English training; and Western writers, whether of Parliamentary papers or of histories of India, seemed to have conspired to obscure the nature of Mughal sovereignty and the tenure by which the various Companies held their lands in India. The Company was, indeed, a Muslim official drawing its authority from the personal authority of the Emperor. As his authority was primarily religious, any attack on that authority was of the nature of sacrilege. Mughal authority was, therefore, shaken at its source and, with it, the Company's authority, just at the moment when the Mughal empire had reached its fullest extent.

[1] Cf. Norgate, *From Sepoy to Subadar*, ed. D. C. Phillott, pp. 111–114.

[2] C. A. Murray to Sadr-i-Azim, September 6th, 1855 (encl. 4 of No. 52 to Lord Clarendon). C. A. Murray to Lord Clarendon, No. 62, October 1st, 1855.

[3] *I.e.* from Bahadur Shah's point of view.

3. *Dalhousie's "Foreign" Policy*

In the consequences of the annexation of Oudh is found the link between Dalhousie's "Mughal" policy and his "Foreign" policy; but here an additional factor intervenes in the control of diplomacy by the Foreign Office, which approached the question from a pro-Turkish point of view[1]. The effect of the diplomacy is seen in the outbreak of war in 1856. The approach of India, however, was somewhat different. The conquest and settlement of the Punjab and Peshawar[2] had brought the British system into contact with Afghanistan and various Pathan tribes to the east of that province. Afghanistan comprised roughly the old Persian and Mughal *subahs* (provinces) of Kandahar and Kabul, with pretensions to Herat. The fear of Persia reestablishing her hegemony by Russian aid and the dissensions between the Persian Government and British Embassy probably suggested to the Afghans, early in the year 1854, the advisability of an alliance with Bengal[3]. By the Treaty of 1855, Shah Jahan's loss of 1644 was made good and the whole Sunni Mughal State, under British leadership, presented a united front to Persian aggression. For, although Persia itself was weak, in India the memories of Nadir Shah still lingered, and, in addition, Persia was believed to be able to command Russian support. Dalhousie, agreeing with the early views of the Foreign Office, believed her to be the tool of Russia; but in that respect they may have overestimated Russian influence, for Persia had not forgotten the Treaty of Turcomanchai (1828) and regarded the Crimean War as an opportunity to wipe out the disgrace and indemnity and perhaps to regain some of her lost provinces. She therefore approached Great Britain and France with an offer of alliance, but only to be rebuffed and thrown back on Russian support[4]. Thus was lost perhaps the greatest opportunity Great Britain has ever had, not merely of identifying herself with the Muslim world, but of enlisting its united support to stay the advance of the Slav. Further, it threw Persian influence into opposition to her policy in India on the eve

[1] *Supra*, p. 405. Also Lord Clarendon to W. T. Thomson, No. 33, April 20th, 1854.

[2] *Supra*, p. 213. On the growing friction see Lord Clarendon to C. A. Murray, No. 22, April 11th, 1855.

[3] Baird, *op. cit.* p. 311 *et passim*. Lord Clarendon to W. T. Thomson, No. 6, January 17th, 1854.

[4] Lord Clarendon to C. A. Murray, Nos. 87–88, December 31st, 1855. W. T. Thomson to Lord Clarendon, No. 7, January 20th, 1855 (and enclosures). Same, No. 33, March 18th, 1855. C. A. Murray to Lord Clarendon, No. 9, April 23rd, 1855.

of a great crisis, to which, in fact, it may have contributed[1]. The annexation of Oudh and the intrigues against the Succession drove the Mughal Emperor to seek the support of his former Suzerain, as had his ancestor Humayun in face of a similar menace from Bengal[2]. Moreover, the reports of Crimean disasters spread to India; the Russians, now favourable to Persia, were believed to be more than a match for the British—so that, when Dalhousie left India, the Shah of Persia and his vassal the Mughal Emperor were in accord and ready to move together to reassert their authority over their "infidel" vassal, the East India Company. Dalhousie, by his annexation of Hindu States, by his treatment of the great Mughal *subahdars* of Arcot, Hyderabad and Lucknow, and by his policy towards Delhi had caused a revival of Mughal loyalty; but, by granting Herbert Edwardes a free hand in his dealings with the Amir of Afghanistan[3], he had driven a wedge into the coalition growing up against him.

In the east, Dalhousie accomplished the long cherished desire of the Nawabs of Bengal, the defeat of Burma and the annexation of Pegu. The Burmese and their vassals had long been troublesome neighbours of Bengal, which was in some respects a "mark" against their advance. But it is within the realm of British policy that the causes of the War are to be found. It will be seen that the principle involved was identical with that in the China War of 1857—the unwillingness of oriental monarchs to recognise the Western claim of the right of protection over their natural subjects, and the like unwillingness of the merchant to submit to the laws of the country in which he was domiciled—for the political theory of sovereignty in the East is territorial. Further, there was his inability or unwillingness to accept the low status in native society in which his calling, as an alien merchant, placed him[4].

Difficulties with the Burmese kingdom arose very early in the Company's rule of Bengal, and, beyond fruitless diplomacy and the Burmese War of 1824–6, no steps had been taken to secure the removal of the trouble. Moreover, Burma laid claim to Bengal as a former possession of its subject state Arakan. In 1851, the Treaty of Yandabo had become a dead letter, and matters reached a crisis. The

[1] C. A. Murray to Lord Clarendon, No. 45, August 20th, 1855 (with encl.). *Trial of the King of Delhi*, p. 155. Mirza Najaf's mission would arrive in Persia early in 1855, if the interval of one year is correct.

[2] W. Erskine, *The History of India under Babar and Humayun*, II. 275 ff.

[3] *Memorials of the Life and Letters of Sir H. B. Edwardes*, I. 235–59.

[4] Lee Warner, *op. cit.* I. 413–6.

cases of Sheppard and Lewis brought the Rangoon merchants to memorialise the Government of India on November 28th, 1851, with a warning as to the necessity for secrecy[1]. In January, Dalhousie despatched Commodore Lambert with letters to the King of Ava and the Governor of Rangoon; but their reception was so hostile that Lambert blockaded the river mouth. Dalhousie, though desirous of a peaceful settlement, was never very hopeful; but he continued negotiations, and it was not until February 28th that anything like an ultimatum was sent. April 1st was the date fixed for compliance with the claims advanced; otherwise, "the British Government will have no alternative but immediate war." The terms were not complied with, and General Godwin opened hostilities on April 6th[2].

The precautions taken against cholera defeated the King of Ava's old ally; and Godwin's generalship resulted in a successful campaign and the occupation of Pegu as far as Prome. Dalhousie would not permit any advance farther up the river. The King of Ava refused to sign a treaty or send plenipotentiaries to negotiate, but on an indication that he would acquiesce in the annexation of Pegu, Dalhousie issued the proclamation declaring it to be under British Protection and warning the King of Ava that a restoration of the old relations of friendship formed an essential condition of the cessation of hostilities (December 20th, 1853)[3]. Dalhousie's moderation and insight in this campaign enabled him to lay the foundations of a strong State. Pegu at heart was anti-Burman; the minimum hinterland, compatible with the safety of the ports, was occupied, and the revenue of Pegu was the only possibility of obtaining indemnity for losses before and during the War. The new province was connected by road and telegraph with Bengal and its administration entrusted to a chief Commissioner (Major Arthur Phayre), to be conducted on lines similar to that of the Punjab[4]. When the King of Ava sent presents to Dalhousie to mark the resumption of previous relations, "the return presents which the G.-G. was expected to send, were alluded to in Burmese terms which indicate the offering of an *inferior to a superior*." The letter was returned and the King changed his attitude[5].

In summing up the effects of Dalhousie's administration, the outbreak of the Mutiny is liable to deflect the judgment. The Mutiny was the outcome of a misunderstanding lasting over more than half a

[1] Lee Warner, *op. cit.* I. 414. Baird, *op. cit.* p. 187.
[2] Lee Warner, *op. cit.* I. 416–27. Baird, *op. cit.* pp. 185, 193 *et seq.*
[3] Lee Warner, *op. cit.* I. 437 ff. Baird, *op. cit.* pp. 231, 237, 251–2, 258.
[4] Lee Warner, *op. cit.* II. 1–7. [5] Baird, *op. cit.* pp. 320, 325.

century, and its meaning was only revealed to India within the previous fifteen years. Hence, to assign the causes of the Mutiny to Dalhousie's policy, as a censure on the individual, is unjust; but in so far as Dalhousie represented the East India Company in its diplomatic capacity, his policy, from its sheer efficiency, was a most potent contributory cause of the outbreak, which received its final impetus from Canning's refusal to recognise the Mughal succession, when help seemed at hand to reestablish the Emperor's authority. It is only on such a background that Dalhousie's policy could have affected the issue; for in his policy, there is no step which had not been foreshadowed or attempted in the days of the Mughal empire's glory—and then without ill-effect. It was the efficiency of Dalhousie which rendered the Diwan of Bengal an intolerable vassal by revealing the danger of its excessive power. He raised the prestige of the Government of India higher than it had been for nearly three centuries, and increased the extent of its territories beyond what it had ever been, though by his neglect of the Emperor he threw that monarch into the arms of discontented Princes and unemployed nobility. For this, however, the blame does not rest with Dalhousie. The position of the Company had been understood in England in 1813; it was thirty years later that Ellenborough revealed it to India. From that date the challenge was inevitable, unless the Company returned to Mughal allegiance. That the authority either of Queen Victoria or of Bahadur Shah must succumb, Dalhousie perceived, and he advised accordingly; but his advice was rejected.

II. THE INDIAN MUTINY, 1857–1858

The Indian Mutiny cannot be isolated from the Crimean War and the Anglo-Persian War, for it is but the third act in a drama of which they are the first and second[1]. In the Crimean War, Russia and Turkey were the principals, Persia the passive and Great Britain the active, seconds. Throughout Persia's attitude is anti-Turkish and her offer of alliance against Russia was only due to temporary wavering. It was but the old Perso-Byzantine feud reinforced by the antagonism of Shiah and Sunni. When the principals retired, however, the long smouldering feud between Great Britain and Persia broke out into open warfare. The alleged diplomatic discourtesy to the British Crown was but the *casus belli*, which happened, however, to be appropriate. If the Shah of Persia had formed a lowly estimate of

[1] Cf. Holmes, *op. cit.* pp. 70–72.

the powers of the British Envoy, he surely had the right to tell his *Sadr-i-Azam* (Prime-Minister), though Murray's resentment was roused on this, and on other occasions[1]. The incident, however, provided the excuse which brought negotiations to a deadlock resulting in War. Persia had a real grievance in the interference of the Embassy in its internal affairs and "the attempts to improve the lot of the suffering subjects of Persia" were a menace to the State. The desire of Persia at this time to extend an effective rule over her lukewarm vassals raised the question of Herat, owing to its proximity to Afghanistan and India, to an undeserved prominence. The attempt to regain the nominal allegiance of the provinces of Kabul and Kandahar with a view to the reestablishment of Persian control over Delhi had aroused still further the anxiety of the Foreign Office and the East India Company[2]. Hence the declaration of War in 1856 and the despatch of Outram's expedition had a very real effect in checking Persian action in India, while the extortion of a recognition of Afghan independence placed a southern boundary on Persian expansion and attached the Sunni Amir to British interests in India; for he saw that he had more to fear from a Persian empire including Tehran and Delhi in its range than from a British empire in India. Moreover, Great Britain was the ally of the Sunni Sultan of Rum—the Khalifah of the Prophet of God.

But Persia had, to some extent, prepared her attack on the British position in India, and evidence of that preparation appears at the close of the third stage. The Shah's efforts to win over Afghanistan in 1855 had ended in his betrayal to the British, who at the same time thwarted his attempt to regain the allegiance of Muskat; and, as a result, the Herbert Edwardes Treaty was concluded. The Shah, however, found in the need of Bahadur Shah II an opportunity of imitating the example of his predecessor Shah Tahmasp in Humayun's hour of distress. He therefore promised not only Persian but Russian support; and a firman was sent to call the Faithful to war against the Infidel, whose power would then be crushed[3]. Further, the ill-feeling

[1] Great Britain was not fortunate in her representatives at Tehran. The *Sadr-i-Azam* wrote to W. T. Thomson that from his tenacity over trifles "the Persian Ministers often became doubtful of the friendship of England." C. A. Murray's conduct in the Taziah incident revealed a narrowness of view not conducive to good feeling. In both cases, Persia was subjected to petty interference which no State could tolerate.

[2] C. A. Murray to Lord Clarendon, No. 45, August 20th, 1855 (and encl.) (F.O. 60/203); also Lord Clarendon to the India Board (Confidential), October 16th, 1855, and Sheil's comments enclosed in Murray's letter (F.O. 60/206).

[3] *Trial*, pp. 120 ff.

in Shiah Oudh was opportunely aggravated by the administrative policy of Coverly Jackson, and the distrust excited among the natives of Oudh in the Company's Army. Finally, Bahadur Shah had identified himself with Persian and Shiah interests in November or December, 1853, by acknowledging the Shiah doctrines and placing standards at the shrine of Shah Abbas in Lucknow. His subsequent denial enabled him to retain the loyalty of the Sunnis to their Mughal Khalifah, while the suspicion of its insincerity prevented his forfeiting Shiah support. The denial came through the Company's Resident at Delhi and the Shiah poet Ghalib[1]!

This aspect of the Mutiny (perhaps the most important, for it provides the most probable solution to the question of a possible plan), has been overlooked or belittled by historians, and it was clearly overlooked by those who had to meet the issue and try the King of Delhi. The fact is accounted for by the divided control of British Foreign Policy in the Muslim world; for the Foreign Office appeared incapable of coordinating the two areas, Persia and India, owing to the belief that India recognised herself to be part of the British empire. The Company, too, had lost sight of the nature of Persian interests in India—if, indeed, these were ever known to it. The hope of Persian aid, however, vanished; for not only had Persia been defeated, but Afghanistan and Kalat blocked the way.

In India, too, what the Shah of Persia had feared, the Mughal Emperor had found in operation—the usurpation by the British Government of the control of the internal affairs of State. In Persia it was under the cloak of the Embassy, in India of the Company; and in view of the apparent absorption of his empire by the British Power, Bahadur Shah, or his supporters, determined to strike a blow to check the process[2]. The Infidel Company seemed to be engaged in an organised attack on religion—both Hindu and Muslim, with a view to proselytism to Christianity; hence, any overt act would furnish a pretext for the outbreak. That act appeared in the issue of a new rifle and the Greased Cartridges[3]. Behind all lurked the propa-

[1] *Trial*, pp. 154–5. The letters which passed on this occasion have recently been found in Rampur State Library MSS. (Persian Histories), No. 229. They confirm the evidence of Hakim Ahsan Ullah. I am indebted for this information to Mr B. H. Zaidi, Fitzwilliam Hall.

[2] Kaye, *op. cit.* II. 12 ff.

[3] Bahadur Shah summed up the situation in a quatrain:

Na Iran ne kiya na Shāh Russ ne
Angrez ko tabah kiya kartoosh ne

[Neither Persia nor the Czar of Russia ruined the English, but the Cartridges.] Sir W. Muir, *North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, Records of the Intelligence Department, I. 454.

gandist, whose policy was based on the deeper issues involved; in the cartridges he had an argument which would appeal to all.

Further, the Company's Native Army was really its feudal *tabinan* (contingent) and part of the Mughal Army. Badly mismanaged, irritated by constantly changing rules of service, pay and drill, the Company's forces had developed what was almost a tradition of mutiny, and some historians have endeavoured to trace the development of 1857 from the Sepoy Mutiny of 1806 at Vellore. On the other hand, the Sepoy had the confidence of his officers and rulers, and later events are held to show how far that trust was misplaced. "At least four mutinies are recorded during the thirteen years preceding the outbreak"; but, fourteen years before the outbreak, the Company had renounced its loyalty to the Mughal Emperor. If the Sepoy had changed, so had the Company. Further, the extension of the Company's territories had involved the Sepoy in warfare beyond "the black water"—the Indus and the sea, and the new recruiting regulations threatened to make that service incumbent on all. To the Hindu, therefore, service must ultimately have meant loss of caste[1]. But one practical reason remains for the selection of the Company's Army for the outbreak—the necessary supply of arms was to be found there and there alone, for all other States had been disarmed. Hence, the Company had gained both financial and military control of the Mughal empire, while it alone possessed the necessary arrangements of staff and central organisation.

It was on these two points that the Mughal effort broke down—finance and staff. The authorities of Delhi were unable to control the forces at their disposal or to pay their armies; therefore, the whole movement became localised either in the main efforts of Delhi, Cawnpore and Lucknow, or in the minor outbreaks in the provinces. Further, in overthrowing the Company's organisation, the Mughal Emperor was casting away his only hope of any effective control. His choice seemed to lie between political suicide and political suffocation[2].

From this point it is possible to trace the development of a policy for combating the Mutiny. Essentially a united protest against infidel encroachment[3], from this cause it had resolved itself into a collection of local risings. Its only centres were Delhi, representing the Mughal

[1] Kaye, *op. cit.*, devotes Book II. to a discussion of the Army and its Mutinies. Cf. V. A. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, pp. 712 ff. Holmes, *op. cit.* c. ii.

[2] *Trial*, pp. 39 ff., 50 ff., 161.

[3] This statement leaves open the disputed question of an organised outbreak.

interest, Lucknow, the home of the Shiah, and Cawnpore, the home of Nana Sahib, the claimant of the office of Peshwa of the Mahrattas. The main object, therefore, of the Governor-General was to maintain his advantage of central control and, by localising the main rising, to prevent the Mughal forces from acquiring such an advantage[1]. To effect this, all communications with other parts, and particularly with the Deccan, had to be cut off. At first, though, this course was not clear to Canning. He may, perhaps, be excused his early inability to perceive the gravity of the outbreak and the early indecision of his policy. Of his principal adviser, Halliday, however, the same cannot be said; for, had the same nerveless policy, which characterised the Bengal Administration, directed affairs in the Punjab, it is difficult to conjecture the outcome. This indecision was, fortunately for the Company, counterbalanced by the prompt decision of local officers, and, moreover confined to those provinces which were most "Anglicised."

The second object was economy of troops. Localising the area of military activity assisted this measure; it tended, however, to blind some to the need of disarmament of the Sepoy Army. For their disarmament was disarmament of the Mughal forces; and, while there might be a danger of the disease spreading, the local feeling of Oudh, the main recruiting area of the Company, tended to draw disbanded Sepoys to that area. Wherever disarmament was promptly undertaken—as in the Punjab and at Patna—there was seldom further trouble, and the increased difficulties at the centre relieved the pressure in outlying parts and reduced the outbreak to manageable dimensions.

For reasons both geographical and chronological, the policy of the Punjab[2] takes precedence; for, before Calcutta was awake to the fact that the Mutiny had broken out, the Sepoys at Lahore had been disarmed. While Halliday advised caution, John Lawrence and his lieutenants had acted. From the Persian point of view, the Punjab was of peculiar interest. The Treaties of Alliance with the Khan of Kalat in 1854 and with the Amir of Afghanistan in 1855 and 1857 had secured the west and the north of the province not only from attacks from the Asiatic side, but also in the possession of a foundation on which Lawrence could build up a united, anti-Mughal State to

[1] Cf. John Lawrence to General Anson, May 13th, 1857, ap. Bosworth Smith, *op. cit.* I. 480–1.

[2] Holmes, *op. cit.* cc. x, xi. Bosworth Smith, *op. cit.* I. 478ff.

work against Delhi. In 1857, Lawrence played a rôle not unlike that of Ahmad Shah Durrani a century earlier, when working against Delhi on the basis of loyal Afghan support; for

> there was hatred of the Sikh for the Mohammedan who had persecuted him and whom he had persecuted in turn. There was the contempt of the hardy Punjabi whatever his caste or his creed, for the less manly races of Oudh and Bengal. Finally, there was the hope of plundering the revolted city, the home of the Mogul, under the *Ikbal* of the Company.... His first duty was to secure the safety of his own province....His second, and hardly second to his own mind...was to make his own province the means of retaking Delhi[1].

Lawrence was at Rawalpindi when the news of the outbreak arrived and Montgomery was in charge at Lahore. At his instance, General Cobbett completed the disarmament of the Sepoys at Lahore. By May 13th, however, Lawrence had stated his policy to the Commander-in-Chief—concentration on the recovery of Delhi, disarming of the Sepoys and the utilisation of all available Gurkha and European regiments so that a picked brigade might march from Ambala to Delhi without delay.

The attitude of Lawrence towards Delhi is significant; he saw its importance in the eyes of India, for there he received his apprenticeship. Halliday's training had been on the Bengal side, therefore to him Delhi meant much less. Lawrence understood, too, the need of unity of control and purpose. On May 19th, he wrote to General Anson: "What we should avoid is isolation, and the commanders of stations each looking to his own charge and not to the general weal." Mughal inability to avoid this danger was a large factor in the ruin of their cause, as has been shown already.

To give effect to this policy, he organised a "movable column" at Rawalpindi, to march to Jhelum, and thence as need demanded. Forsyth, the deputy Commissioner of Ambala organised the Sikh Sardars of the cis-Sutlej States—the Nawab of Karnal and the Rajah of Jind undertaking to maintain communications with Meerut. The mutiny of the Sepoys at Nowshera and Mardan precipitated the disarmament of the four regiments at Peshawar on May 22nd. The influence of Nicholson and Edwardes was sufficient to ensure the support of the neighbouring tribes when once a decisive blow had been struck. With the back of the Mutiny broken, General Barnard (Anson's successor as Commander-in-Chief) was able to leave the Punjab for Delhi with the first force raised by Lawrence, in less than

[1] Bosworth Smith, *op. cit.* I. 470. *Ikbal* means *prestige*.

a month from the outbreak. The rest of Lawrence's energies and time was spent in maintaining a steady flow of troops towards Delhi. Bartle Frere, Commissioner of Sind, supported him with all his available troops and maintained the communications between Karachi and the Punjab. By the prompt action, therefore, of Lawrence and the officers of the Punjab, the Jumna was made the western boundary of the effective outbreak.

Two other questions vexed Lawrence, finance and the retention of Peshawar. Definite warnings were issued on the subject of finance, against the shortsighted policy of enlisting troops who could not be paid. The local resources of rajahs and merchants were to be utilised, in lieu of troops, for the raising of loans, and Edwardes in this respect achieved a remarkable triumph at Peshawar whereby he succeeded not merely in raising his loan but in exciting the admiration of the frontiersman, who rejoices in the humiliation of the *banya* (money-lender); and in securing the allegiance of the moneyed classes by giving them a stake in British interests.

To the south of the Punjab lay the Great Indian Desert and the Rajput States. Most of these States were under some agreement of protection with the Company, which had, through its agents, succeeded in reestablishing the authority of the Rajah over his turbulent vassals; moreover, they were anti-Muslim in sympathy and untouched by the application of "lapse." The campaigns of Akbar were still remembered, when Tod compiled his *Annals of Rajasthan*, only forty years earlier. The oppression of the lower ranks of society by the baronage had also been reduced. The effect of the Company's policy had been the repression of the subvassals, whereby both rajah and ryot gained. Feudal rebellion, therefore, was the only complication to be feared and that within limited bounds. The region was under the control of General George Lawrence, who persuaded the rajahs that their welfare lay in the success of the Company, and secured Ajmer, the one doubtful point, by substituting a garrison of hillmen (Mairs) for the Brahman Sepoy guard; so that, when the mutinies at Nasirabad and Nimach broke out, they were suppressed with ease and led to no serious consequences[1].

To the south and east of Rajputana lay the Mahratta areas of the Bombay Presidency, of the Central India States, Berar and Nagpur.

[1] *Reminiscences of Forty-three Years in India*, by Lieut.-Gen. Sir George Lawrence. Ed. W. Edwards, pp. 278 ff. Holmes, *op. cit.* c. iv, corrected by C. L. Showers, *A Missing Chapter of the Indian Mutiny*, pp. 11 ff., 49 ff., c. vii. On the attempts of Gwalior's Vakil to stir up strife at Udaipur, pp. 70 ff.

This area separated the two great Mughal areas of Hindustan and the Deccan, and it was imperative that order should be maintained, not merely for its own sake, but lest the infection should spread to the Deccan. It was the region where Dalhousie's policy of annexation had been most severely felt, and it was therefore a source of anxiety.

Gwalior remained loyal, despite the mutiny of the Company's troops, mainly owing to the wise administration and tact of the Political Agent, Charters Macpherson, who secured the Rajah's support of the British cause, and a promise to keep both his own army and the mutineers in his own territory, thereby limiting the drift towards Delhi. At Jhansi, not only the garrison but the whole city rose against the British and threatened to lead the way in a general rising of Bundelkhand. Here, all turned on the action of the Rajah of Rewah. Lieutenant Osborne, however, succeeded in securing from the Rajah, not merely a promise of neutrality but an offer of troops to maintain order. He was therefore able to repel Kunwar Singh's men from Dinajpur, and to quell a mutiny at Jubbulpore; moreover, he had maintained intact the line of communication between Bombay and Calcutta[1].

To the east and the north of the Central Provinces lay Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, the headquarters and centre of the Company's strength[2]. Here the trouble was less complicated. In Orissa, always an anti-Mughal region, it was almost negligible. Bengal had long been cut off from Mughal influence, and it was reconciled to the Company's rule. Bihar, however, was the centre of a strong Muslim movement and its capital, Patna, stood at the junction of the Gogra and Ganges, two possible routes from the disaffected area. Moreover, the region was denuded of European troops. It was essential, though, that the line of communication from Calcutta to Delhi should be maintained. But in this region, except by Tayler of Patna, disarming was regarded as undesirable; therefore, it was the scene of more guerilla warfare than was necessary. Kunwar Singh, a zamindar aggrieved by the action of a settlement officer, which the Courts refused to reverse, led a considerable rebellion. Most of the trouble was suppressed by contingents of troops which passed on their way to Allahabad, at the other great junction of rivers—the Jumna and the

[1] Holmes, *op. cit.* cc. iv, xiv, xv; T. H. Thornton, *General Sir R. Meade*, pp. 16–92; Showers, pp. 2 ff., 68 ff., 74 ff. For danger of Mahratta League under Nana Sahib, pp. 82–3.

[2] Holmes, *op. cit.* cc. iii, v, vi, contains an excellent account of the disputes and useful references, particularly in the case of Tayler of Patna.

Ganges. This stage of the conflict, together with the reduction of Delhi, Cawnpore and Lucknow, belongs to the realm of military history, and the tale has often been told. In Oudh the War was both a mutiny and a war of independence. To the north lay Nepal, which remained pro-British throughout and placed its army at the Company's disposal.

Outside this ring, and sheltered by it, lay the Carnatic and the Deccan, the former looking to the latter to take the lead—a curious survival of the prestige of Hyderabad[1]. Had the Deccan joined with Delhi, there can be little doubt of the issue; but an effective Mughal empire under Delhi was as little welcome as an effective empire under Calcutta. So far as the Muslim population was concerned, it was waiting for the Nizam to take the lead. The *jihad* was proclaimed in a mosque in Hyderabad itself. The young Nizam would certainly, but for Salar Jang's influence, have thrown in his lot with Delhi. The situation was saved, however, by the Prime-Minister's warning to the Resident, who was consequently prepared to check the onslaught of the mob when it arrived. The result was the collapse of the movement.

The Mutiny, so far as British Foreign Policy is concerned, ceased with the Proclamation of Allahabad on November 1st, 1858, after the trial and deposition of Bahadur Shah and the passing of the Act of Parliament vesting the rights, territories and powers of the Company in Queen Victoria. Henceforth, the history of India, both theoretically and practically, falls within that of the British empire.

III. THE CHINA WAR OF 1857–1858

The principle underlying the China War is the same as that underlying the Burmese War—the claim on behalf of merchants to maintain at the Court of the Emperor an ambassador representing their Sovereign and therefore free from the restrictions which bound subjects and their agents at the imperial or provincial Courts. The claim was resisted as subversive of the rights of monarchy, for oriental kings regarded as subjects all persons within their dominions or States under their protection[2]. Further, the danger of admitting merchants to any privileges had already been seen in Asia. But the mercantile

[1] Holmes, *op. cit.* c. xvi. *Notes on the Court of Haidarabad* (Calcutta, n.d.); Syed Hossein Bilgrami, *The Life of Sir Salar Jung*, pp. 35 ff.

[2] Cf. T. Walrond, *Letters and Journals of James, Eighth Earl of Elgin*, p. 227 Yeh to Elgin, December 14th, 1857; ap. *Parl. Papers*, 1857–8, No. 2322. Cf H. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, I. 64, 531.

calling was not regarded as honourable; if to this the defect of alien birth and nationality were added, there could be little doubt of the nature of the opposition. For this reason, it has been a misfortune to Great Britain and the West generally that they were introduced to the East through the persons of merchants.

If this aspect of the case be borne in mind, the incident of the lorcha *Arrow* is invested with a definite political importance, which justifies the strong line taken by Commissioner Yeh. In Canton, the Second Article of the Treaty of Nanking (1842) was most fiercely resented, and the policy of the Government was supported by the inhabitants of the City. They not only took every opportunity of insulting Europeans generally, and perhaps the British in particular, but organised anti-foreigner riots in other treaty ports[1]. Further, the Taiping Rebellion necessitated strict control of the importation of arms and ammunition, and here suspicion fell on the use of foreign flags. The European doctrine of Consular protection, therefore, appeared definitely as a form of alien sedition, while the claim of a foreigner to speak on equal terms with an Emperor regarded as divine, was an outrage.

Against this doctrine were ranged the commercial interests of Europeans and Americans, and the increasing importance attached to the dignity of national flags in international diplomacy. The lorcha *Arrow* was flying the British ensign and she had been boarded by Chinese officials who had hauled down the flag. This action was treated as a public insult to the British, despite the fact that the owners of the ship were Chinese and technically at fault. But the fact that an amicable settlement was out of the question, owing to the uncompromising attitude of both parties, illustrates the reality of the issues involved. The Chinese Commissioner felt that the British were undermining his authority, while the state of the Europeans was rapidly becoming intolerable, owing to Chinese popular antipathy against them. But, against the British point of view, there still remained the circumstance that the Chinese boarded the lorcha with the object of arresting pirates who were known to be there. Resistance to the action, therefore, on the grounds of protection appeared in the light of aiding and abetting crime, and the support of armed ships tended to confirm the opinion[2].

[1] Morse, *op. cit.* pp. 419–37. S. Lane Poole, *Sir Harry Parkes in China*, pp. 118 ff., 140 ff.

[2] Lane Poole, *op. cit.* p. 150. Cf. Yeh to Lord Elgin, cit. n. 1.

The essential facts were that the lorcha *Arrow* belonging to a Chinese—Fong Ah-Ming of Victoria, Hong Kong—had been registered according to the provisions of the Treaty of Nanking, but the license had expired. The Chinese Commissioner Yeh of Canton suspected that a notorious pirate, Li-Ming-Tai, was on board and sent four officers to arrest him and the crew. They hauled down the British ensign under which the lorcha was sailing and (despite the protest of her master, Thomas Kennedy, and of the Acting Consul, Harry Smith Parkes) carried them off prisoners.

Parkes had gone out to China almost straight from the presence of Palmerston, whose policy was "not to descend from the relative position we have acquired," and he had "won his present ascendancy mainly by never giving in, never allowing himself to be slighted, but always resolutely maintaining the dignity and honour of his country before the eyes of the Chinese." He had already protested against the tenor of a Chinese patriotic "anti-foreigner poster." He reported the matter as an infraction of the Treaty of Nanking to the officials involved and claimed to have jurisdiction over the prisoners. He was laughed at and assaulted. The representation of the case to the Imperial Commissioner resulted in a personal examination of the prisoners by Yeh himself, who decided that three of them were guilty and offered to return the remaining nine innocent persons. The offer was refused, and the case was placed in the hands of Sir John Bowring, who required a public apology and a public restoration of the crew to the vessel. He must have known that this demand involved an *impasse* to all negotiations, and the Commissioner's reply that the lorcha was not a British vessel seems incontrovertible. A foolish reprisal took place; and when this merely produced ridicule, Parkes visited Bowring in Hong Kong for further Instructions[1].

As a result of a conference, at which Admiral Sir John Seymour was present, an ultimatum was sent to Commissioner Yeh on October 21st, 1856, requiring the public restoration of the twelve men and an official apology. The twelve were released, but not in the form required by Parkes's letter of October 8th. Hereupon, on October 23rd, hostilities were opened by the occupation of the Barrier Forts of Canton which was effectively blockaded, so that by

[1] Morse, *op. cit.*, Lane Poole, *op. cit.*, c. v, n. 2. Morse advances (I. 423–4) an argument which can only be adopted on the assumption that the British Parliament has jurisdiction over the Chinese empire. Similarly, Lord Clarendon to Sir John Bowring, December 10th, 1856. *Naval Proceedings*, p. 14. Lane Poole's apologia (pp. 150–1) vanishes in face of the Chinese theory of the State.

the 28th Admiral Seymour was able to bombard Commissioner Yeh's *yamēn* (office), which he entered the following day with a contingent of his men. The Canton authorities, however, continued to maintain a firm attitude despite the initial success of British arms, as Sir John Bowring found on his visit to Canton on November 17th. The reply to the bombardment was a proclamation of outlawry against the British—thirty dollars being the price laid on their heads—and a warning to other Europeans and Americans that their safety and protection could not be guaranteed.

In the meantime, American and French opinion had tended to take a wider view of the issue and to regard active intervention as inevitable, since diplomacy seemed out of the question. An American contingent had supported the assault of October 29th; but its action had been officially disowned. On November 15th, however, Sir John Bowring approached the Representatives of the Powers, and from the French and American Consuls he received sympathetic replies[1]. The result of these negotiations and of Commissioner Yeh's request is seen in the withdrawal of the French and American flags and their troops from Canton (November 22nd). At this point, an unfortunate incident nearly embroiled the Americans in the quarrel, but an apology from Commissioner Yeh closed the matter. Later correspondence, however, showed how strained were the relations between the Chinese and American authorities.

An appeal by Sir John Bowring to the Chinese Government through the Commissioners of Foochow and Nanking produced not only an emphatic *non possumus* on their part, but also two imperial Edicts—one testifying to Yeh's competence to deal with the matter (December 27th), the other commanding the Commissioners to attend to their own provinces, lest the British should advance to the north (January 15th, 1857)[2].

Meanwhile, Sir John Bowring's despatches had produced a political crisis in England; but, on Palmerston's return to power with an adequate majority, it became possible to send Lord Elgin to China with full powers to deal with the situation. Lord Clarendon was able, too, to ensure French diplomatic and military support in consequence of the execution (or murder) of Père Chapdelaine, and Baron Gros, the French Plenipotentiary, was instructed to cooperate with Lord Elgin[3].

[1] Morse, *op. cit.* pp. 431–2.
[2] *Ibid.* I. 437.
[3] *Ibid.* pp. 482 ff.

At first, the attitude of both was inclined to be respectful to the Chinese Imperial authorities, and the first despatch of Lord Elgin to Commissioner Yeh is couched in strictly moderate terms. He was disgusted with the *Arrow* incident; and, in all probability, Clarendon's influence was exerted in the same direction, for, although he supported the action of Ambassadors and Consuls, he regarded none too favourably a high-handed disregard of native prejudice and sentiment[1].

Owing to the delay occasioned by the Mutiny, and the arrival of Baron Gros, diplomatic relations were suspended and the hostilities round Canton continued. Until a sufficient number of troops could be supplied, it was impossible to proceed with vigour, and in face of local opinion on the subject, a diplomatic reverse could only be remedied by energetic operations against Canton. Both Ambassadors therefore left arrangements, for the present, in the hands of their countries' accredited agents—Sir John Bowring and M. de Bourboulon. But, on the arrival of reinforcements, they took over charge of the negotiations (December 10th) and immediately exchanged notes with Commissioner Yeh (December 12th).

The terms of Lord Elgin's letter dwelt on the general observation of the Treaties of 1842, with the sad exception of Canton, where the Treaty nations were still refused the right of admittance. Great Britain was not alone in her grievance, for the Emperor of the French, too, had similar cause for complaint. Two demands were made—the admission of British subjects to the city of Canton and compensation for losses sustained by British merchants in the recent outbreak of hostilities. Ten days were allowed, within which either compliance would ensure the lifting of the blockade, or an unfavourable answer would entail the prosecution with renewed vigour of the hostilities already commenced.

Yeh's answer, dated December 14th, 1857, was a clear and fair summary of the Chinese case. The question of admission into Canton, he said, had been allowed to drop in 1850, presumably with the Queen's approval; it was therefore unfair to raise it again at that point. The misunderstanding of 1856 was due to the unreasonable action of Parkes in obstructing the arrest of Chinese criminals. He pointed out, too, the damage done to the Chinese merchants of Canton by Parkes' precipitate action[2]. The letter is a fair and straight-

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1857–8, No. 2322. Lord Elgin to Commissioner Yeh, December 12th, 1857. Walrond, *op. cit.* p. 209.

[2] *Parl. Papers*, Commissioner Yeh to Lord Elgin, December 14th, 1857, p. 3.

forward account and a full answer to Lord Elgin's, whose reply of December 24th is a simple reiteration of the demands of his previous letter. Yeh's reply, on the 25th, urges a meeting for discussion and he clears himself of "refusal to accede to terms of accommodation," requesting a more careful perusal of his first letter[1]. This Elgin left unanswered, and, on the 28th, after a preliminary bombardment, an Anglo-French force attacked Canton, which was reduced by January 4th, 1858, Commissioner Yeh being captured. He was succeeded by Pik Wei, Governor of Kwang Tung, and his deposition was confirmed by an imperial Edict dated January 28th, 1858[2]. The fall of Yeh, however, only marked the end of the first stage of the struggle. Canton was disarmed and controlled by the Allies. The next stage was to obtain acceptance of terms at Peking, for, as Count Putiatin, the Russian Ambassador, had written, "nothing could be done with the Chinese Government unless pressure were brought to bear upon Pekin itself[3]."

The initial success of the French and British forces encouraged the American and Russian Governments to abandon their policy of strict neutrality for one of diplomatic support to the Allies to enforce the formalities of Western diplomacy on the Chinese empire[4]. The first step taken was the despatch of gunboats "for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear at some point near the Capital." The diplomatic centre thus moved from Canton to Shanghai. Before leaving Canton, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros despatched Notes to the Senior Secretary of State at Peking, requesting the presence of Chinese Plenipotentiaries at Shanghai before the end of March, to negotiate a treaty for the establishment of better relations between China and their respective countries. The basis for negotiations was arranged under three main heads: (1) the residence of envoys at Peking; (2) freedom of trade in the interior; (3) remedy of grievances —*e.g.* tolls, dues, the persecution of Christians.

These Notes were of the nature of an ultimatum, and were supported by Notes from the American and Russian Ambassadors. They were delivered to the Governor of Kiang-Su at Soochow, and formalities were duly observed, the Governor returning in person the visit of the Secretaries (Mr L. Oliphant and M. de Contades) who then returned to Shanghai. Replies were received on March 25th[5]

[1] *Parl. Papers*, Commissioner Yeh to Lord Elgin, December 14th, 1857, pp. 5 ff.
[2] Morse, *op. cit.* I. 501–3, 505.
[3] L. Oliphant, *Narrative of the Earl Elgin's Mission*, I. 173.
[4] *Ibid.* I. 176–7.
[5] Morse, *op. cit.* I. 506–9. Oliphant, *op. cit.* I. 247 ff.

from the Governor of Kiang-Su and the Viceroy of Nanking, to the effect that the matter could not be forwarded, since Ministers of State were forbidden by law to have any dealings with foreigners; Commissioner Yeh had been deposed and Hwang Tsung-han had succeeded him. The Ambassadors must return to Canton and settle the matter there. The whole issue lay in the unwillingness of the Chinese Government to treat what to them was merely a provincial matter as what, in the eyes of the West, was an imperial affair. From the Chinese point of view, they had no alternative; but the decision of the issue in a Western sense was the main object of Elgin's Mission. The Notes were returned with covering letters from Lord Elgin, quoting Article XI of the Treaty of Nanking[1]. On April 19th, Lord Elgin left Shanghai for the Peiho and on the 20th the four Ambassadors were at Taku. Their immediate objective was Tientsin, their ultimate object, if necessary, Peking. On the 24th, Notes were despatched demanding Chinese Plenipotentiaries within six days either at Tientsin or at Peking. Two days later, replies were received from the provincial Government of Chi-Li, but were returned. The wording was corrected, and they were returned to the Allies on the 30th. In the meantime, Count Putiatin had been in personal touch with the provincial authorities and urged some abatement in the Allies' insistence on Envoys with full powers, on the ground that the proximity of Peking to Tientsin rendered reference to headquarters possible; thus, on May 6th, a further six days were granted within which the Viceroy of Chi-Li could obtain powers similar to those enjoyed by the Chinese Envoys of 1842. On May 10th, he replied that he could obtain no further powers. Isolated action by Mr Reed, the American Ambassador, had met with no success, nor did further correspondence; and, on May 17th, the Allies received the information "that the Emperor refuses to admit foreign envoys at Peking[2]."

After the capture of the forts of Taku on the 20th and the necessary reconnaissance of the Peiho as far as Tientsin, the Ambassadors entered that city on May 30th. On the previous day, however, an Imperial Edict had appointed two Plenipotentiaries, Kwei Liang and Hwashana, both of sufficient standing, to treat with the Allies. They arrived on June 2nd, and negotiations were opened two days later, the main work being left to secretaries and interpreters. Kiying, who, fifteen years earlier, had negotiated several Treaties and Agreements with Western Powers, appeared with full authority to assist in the negotia-

[1] Morse, *op. cit.* I. 510 ff. [2] *Ibid.* pp. 513–7.

tions and power to affix, in conjunction with the other two Plenipotentiaries, the requisite official seals. Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, however, refused to treat with him on account of papers (which had been found in Yeh's *yamēn*), by which Kiying's real attitude to the British had been revealed. Their ostensible reason was that he was "interloping." On June 8th, he left Tientsin for Peking, where he was sentenced to death.

On June 11th the Preliminaries were signed, after some hesitation on the part of the Chinese, who complained of the bullying tactics and rudeness of the interpreter, Mr H. M. Lay. Their protest reached Lord Elgin through the Russian and American Ambassadors, who were promptly snubbed for a breach of diplomatic etiquette[1]. On June 24th, however, an understanding was at last reached; but at the last moment the Chinese Plenipotentiaries made one more attempt to withstand the clauses insisting on a resident Envoy at Peking and the right to trade in the interior. At the final conference on June 26th, Mr F. W. A. Bruce, Secretary to the Embassy, silenced the opposition by warning the Chinese "that any further attempt to reopen discussion would be considered a breach of good faith... and that no treaty would be signed elsewhere than at Peking[2]."

The Treaty of Tientsin was signed, and ratifications were to be exchanged within one year. The main issue had been solved. China had been forced to recognise Western methods of diplomacy and to receive an Ambassador at the imperial Court. By way of softening the blow, however, Elgin used his personal influence to secure a concession from the strict letter of the Treaty. The British Ambassador should not normally reside in Peking, provided that he "be properly received when the ratifications are exchanged next year." Certain subsidiary matters were left to future discussion; but the Treaty marked the end, not merely of a War, the policy of which had been censured with great bitterness, but also of a struggle of two and a half centuries waged by Western nations to obtain for their Ambassadors what they considered to be their proper position at an Eastern Court[3].

[1] Morse, *op. cit.* I. 521 ff. Oliphant, *op. cit.* I. 366–7, 410–7.

[2] *Parl. Papers*, 1859 (2571 Sess. 2), pp. 329–39.

[3] Cf. the difficulties of Sir Thomas Roe at the Mughal Court (1615–18). Lord Elgin concluded the Treaty of Yedo (1858) with Japan, on similar lines to that of the Treaty of Tientsin. Another ten years, however, were to elapse before it became really effective. See *Treaties and Conventions between Japan and Other Powers* (Tokio, 1884), p. 147; Sir R. K. Douglas, *Europe and the Far East*, pp. 155 ff, 205 ff.

CHAPTER X

THE FRANCO-ITALIAN WAR, SYRIA AND POLAND, 1859–1863

I. THE FRANCO-ITALIAN WAR, 1859

THE Orsini affair, which brought Great Britain and France to the verge of war[1], opened one of the most trying periods in the history of our Foreign Policy during the nineteenth century. Despite the fair words given to Cavour at Paris in 1856, the Powers had failed to do anything for Italy. Austria, blamed even by Prussia and Russia, had indeed tardily attempted to conciliate her Italian provinces; but the mere breaking-off of diplomatic relations by France and Great Britain in October, 1856, failed to move King Ferdinand II to show mercy to his political prisoners, and Napoleon's suggestion to Francis Joseph in 1857, that they should make joint representations to Pope Pius IX, urging him to grant reforms which might enable them to withdraw their troops from the States of the Church, had no other effect than to deepen the distrust already felt for the French Emperor at Rome. And the end of it all was that the state of Italy was as bad as ever.

The truth is that, in this matter, the sentiments and the interests of the Great Powers were at variance. On the one hand, Prussia and Russia were willing enough to see Austria weakened by the loss of her Italian provinces; but they were not willing to take up arms against her on behalf of a Liberalism with which they had as little real sympathy as she. On the other hand, France and Great Britain, ready as they were to further the cause of Liberalism, were not ready to further that of nationalism; and in Italy the two causes were now one. For Austria, by the harshness of her rule, had opened an impassable gulf between herself and Italy, and the Italian Princes, by reverting to absolutism and alliance with Austria, had forced Liberals of all shades of opinion to understand, not only that without union Italy could never be free, but also that neither union nor freedom could be achieved save through Sardinia, the one national and Liberal State left in Italy. Thus, in 1857, there had come into being a National Society, with branches in every province, of which the one aim was

[1] See above, c. IX.

"the union of Italy, one and indivisible, under Victor Emmanuel as King." This change in the object of Italian aspirations could not but give pause to France and Great Britain. Apart from the fact that these were the very Powers which, next to Austria, were most likely to suffer from Italian nationalism—the one through its possession of Corsica, the other through that of Malta, both essentially Italian yet indispensable to their foreign rulers as naval Powers—neither of them could look with favour on the rise of a new State certain to destroy that balance of power in the Mediterranean which it was the main purpose of the good understanding between them to maintain. Therefore, friendly though all parties in this country were to the cause of Italian freedom, Great Britain was unwilling to weaken Austria, her traditional ally against France and now her ally against Russia also, by furthering a union of Italy which could only embarrass herself, unless she was driven to support it by the fear of seeing French influence predominant in the peninsula. For her part, France, although she had for over three centuries been trying to drive the Habsburgs out of Italy, had no intention of uniting that country unless it might be under her own supremacy; and interest, not less than religious sentiment, had made her the traditional protector of the Temporal Power which had ever been the chief obstacle to Italian unity. Thus, Napoleon III, despite his own willingness, both as a Bonaparte and as an old Carbonaro, to help the Italians to tear up the Treaties of 1815, was most unwilling to help Cavour in uniting all Italy under the House of Savoy.

Orsini's bombs changed the whole situation; for they convinced the Emperor that his life was really in danger from his old associates, unless he "did something for Italy." From that moment, his course was clear. Opposition in France to a pro-Italian policy was silenced by the publication of Orsini's letters; and, so soon as friendly relations with Great Britain had been reestablished, Cavour was invited to Plombières to arrange the terms of an alliance with Sardinia against Austria; while Prince Napoleon was sent to Warsaw to negotiate an agreement with Russia, which should at least give France a free hand against Austria in Italy. As for Great Britain, Napoleon was convinced that, so long as no interest of her own was involved, British public opinion would never allow a War in defence of Austria and absolutism; but, lest suspicion of his disinterestedness should imperil the good understanding on which he knew well enough that his position really depended, he invited Palmerston and Clarendon to Compiègne, and

there opened to them his mind on the state of Italy, sending home Palmerston, at least, resolved to give him his constant support through the Press as well as in Parliament. Then, on December 10th, he signed the Treaty arranged at Plombières, which made over to Sardinia Lombardy, Venetia, Romagna, Parma and Modena, but stipulated that Tuscany and Umbria should form an independent kingdom of Etruria under—it was understood—his cousin Prince Napoleon, who was to marry the King of Sardinia's daughter; while Rome and the Comarca were to remain under Papal rule, and Naples (where he expected a Muratist rising to follow the downfall of Austria) was to be left to herself, while the four States thus constituted were to form an Italian Confederation under the presidency of the Pope, and, in compensation, Savoy to be ceded to France. All that remained was to continue the rearming of the French Artillery, and to await the revolution which the National Society was to stir up in central Italy in the spring, so as to furnish the Allies with a fair pretext for declaring war against Austria

Secret as the Emperor kept his plans, enough was known or suspected to arouse the alarm of the Powers. So far as Great Britain was concerned, indeed, Malmesbury had long been aware of the danger. Knowing as he did the restless ambition of Napoleon and his fixed intention to obtain a revision of the Treaties of 1815, knowing, too, his very real sympathy with the nationalism as well as with the Liberalism of the Italians, he grasped at once the significance of the publication of Orsini's letter calling on the Emperor of the French to deliver Italy from the Austrians; and the ease with which he settled the quarrel with France only deepened his alarm by convincing him that Napoleon entertained some design to which this country's goodwill was essential. Now, while he and his colleagues were ready to do all in their power to obtain for the Italians the Liberal institutions which they sincerely believed to comprise all that most of them really desired, they were not ready to allow the Treaties of 1815, on which the Peace of Europe rested, to be torn up, in order to gratify the ambition of Sardinia and France. From the first, therefore, Malmesbury set himself to thwart Cavour's plans for provoking war—directly, as when he induced the King of Naples to release the *Cagliari*, a Sardinian ship which had been captured when on her way to land a party of Carbonari in Calabria[1]; and indirectly[2], as

[1] Malmesbury, *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*, II. 105–13, 116. Cf. *ante*, pp. 281–2.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 132, 138–9.

when he urged the same ruler to release Poerio and other political prisoners.

It was during the negotiations for this purpose that Malmesbury became finally convinced that Napoleon had no wish to lessen the distress of Italy, because he saw in it a pretext for war with Austria. As the ally of both France and Austria, Great Britain must by such a War be placed in a position of peculiar difficulty; and, determined as the British Government were to take no part in an Italian War, common prudence urged them to do all in their power to avert a conflict which might, only too easily, become a European War. Thus, on December 7th, Malmesbury wrote a private letter to Lord Cowley, which was to be shown to the French Emperor, urging that he should join Austria in pressing on the Pope reforms long overdue, and promising not only moral support, but even material aid, if required, for establishing an improved administration of the Roman State[1]. A few days later, when the Austrian Ambassador sought an interview with him, in order to communicate a despatch that had been sent to Paris, in which his Government made the tone of the French Press an excuse for declaring that Austria stood by the Treaties of 1815 and would consent to no exchange, no cession, and no negotiation, in the case of any part of her Italian dominions, Malmesbury took the opportunity of urging the same advice on Austria, while at the same time warning her that, in the event of war between her and France, Great Britain would not interfere[2]. At the same time, Sir James Hudson was pointing out to Sardinia that Great Britain would see with displeasure a disturbance of the Peace of Europe; that she would respect existing Treaties, and would require the other Signatory Powers to respect them likewise, while holding herself free to act in such a way as she deemed best with respect to that Power which should be the first to go to war without just cause; and that, while she would not permit undue pressure on Sardinia from without, she might fairly expect this kingdom to give no cause of offence to its neighbours[3].

It is just possible that, although Napoleon had already signed the Treaty with Sardinia, Malmesbury might have averted war, if the pretence of maintaining friendly relations with Austria had been continued, as had been intended, until the spring. But, on New Year's Day, 1859, the Emperor startled Europe by saying to the

[1] *Letters of Queen Victoria*, III. 390.
[2] *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*, II. 146.
[3] *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy*, No. 4.

Austrian Ambassador that, although the relations between the two empires were not all that he could wish, his personal feelings towards the Emperor of Austria remained unchanged. This ominous speech was probably called forth by the news that, a few days before, Austria had, in contravention of the Peace of 1856, offered the Turkish Governor of the fortress of Belgrade the aid of Austrian troops against the Serbs of the city, who had risen in revolt (December 23rd) against the pro-Austrian Prince Alexander and had recalled Milosh[1]. It was, however, universally regarded as the signal for war in Italy, and the calming effect of the disclaimer wrung from the Emperor by a panic on the Bourse was more than discounted by the announcement that Prince Napoleon was about to marry a Sardinian princess, and by Victor Emmanuel's declaration at the opening of the Sardinian Parliament (January 10th) that, though he respected treaties, he could not be insensible to the cry of suffering that reached him from so many parts of Italy.

In the crisis thus provoked, all eyes turned to Great Britain, as the ally of both France and Austria. Her course was already determined: namely, to do all in her power to preserve the general Peace, and, if she failed, to remain neutral as long as she could. Malmesbury, therefore, lost no time in renewing his efforts to remove all reasonable pretext for war by persuading France and Austria to act in concert for the reform of abuses in the States of Central Italy; and, on January 10th, he instructed Cowley to tender to the Emperor officially the advice given privately a month earlier, adding that Her Majesty's Government would be ready to give their best consideration to any territorial changes in Central Italy that would contribute to the peace of the peninsula[2]. A letter to the same effect was sent to Vienna, together with a warning that, in the event of war between France and Austria in Italy, Great Britain would remain a neutral spectator, and that she would in no case aid Austria against her Italian subjects, though public opinion would probably not take active part against Austria, unless she either became an aggressor, or gave France or Sardinia a fair excuse for beginning a war[3]. The advice thus given was at the same time communicated to Prussia and Russia as co-Signatories with Great Britain of the Treaties of 1815, and to Sardinia, who was once more warned against either attacking Austria or stirring up revolt in the States of her neighbours[4].

[1] F.O. Berlin 473, Nos. 5, 14.
[2] *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy*, No. 5.
[3] *Ibid.* No. 8.
[4] *Ibid.* No. 7.

If Malmesbury ever expected his advice to be taken—which is doubtful—he was quickly undeceived. France disclaimed all intention of provoking war, but referred to her failure, two years ago, to reach an understanding with Austria concerning the bases of reforms to be proposed to the Pope, as leaving no hope of present success. Sardinia welcomed the interest of the Powers in the condition of Italy, but could not look hopefully on any steps for ameliorating that of the Roman States, since any reforms, to be effectual, must involve the separation of the Spiritual and the Temporal Power. Austria repudiated any thought of aggression; if Great Britain wished to prevent war, she must address herself to France and Piedmont. As for the proposal that Austria and France should arrive at some agreement on Italian affairs, she could not, similar proposals having already come to nothing, take the initiative in resuming them; but, apart from this, no understanding between herself and France was possible. Russia firmly declined to give advice to those who had not asked for it, and reserved to herself entire liberty of action in the event of war. Prussia alone, who had her own reasons for uneasiness at the turn of events, welcomed Malmesbury's proposal, and undertook to do her best to induce Austria to act with moderation and to refrain from interfering beyond her own frontier.

These replies only deepened the British Government's anxiety to avert war. That France and Sardinia were bent on it, though not yet ready for a declaration, was clear; it was not less clear that Austria was not likely to waive any of her rights. She, at least, was ready for war, and had already strengthened her army in Lombardy (January 5th); and she could hardly be expected to refrain from pressing all her claims, when nearly every German State had proclaimed her cause its own, and when even Prussia had let it be known that, although she would not help Austria against the revolt of her subjects, even should Sardinia put herself at their head, she would regard the intervention of France as a *casus belli* and would cover Germany[1]. Nor was there much doubt that Russia stood behind France, looking to a European war, in which she need not take part, for a chance of retrieving her losses in the Near East[2]. Already, she had a sufficient pretext in the election of Couza as Hospodar of both Moldavia (January 5th) and Wallachia (January 23rd), in defiance of the Powers; if, in consequence, either Turkish or Austrian troops invaded the Principalities, she would assuredly

[1] F.O. Berlin 473, No. 35.
[2] *Ibid.* No. 48. F.O. Russia 531, No. 46; F.O. Vienna 565, No. 62.

not content herself with a mere verbal protest[1], and a new War would begin in the East from which Great Britain could not stand aloof. Almost certainly, the outbreak of war in Italy would range Europe into two camps, Austria, supported by the whole Germanic Confederation, confronting France, Sardinia and Russia.

It was to avert this danger that the British Government, despite its late rebuff, decided to renew its efforts to bring France and Austria into agreement on the affairs of Italy. Thus, while Lord Derby took advantage of the opening of Parliament (February 3rd) to declare publicly that Great Britain would uphold all the Treaties of 1815 and, in the event of war, would preserve perfect neutrality, Sardinia was again sharply warned against provoking the outbreak of hostilities, and Lord Cowley was instructed (February 13th) to offer to the French Government his services as a mediator and to ascertain its views on the following four points. These were (1) the evacuation of the Papal States by both Austrian and French troops, (2) the amelioration of the law and government of those States, (3) a guarantee on the part of Austria not to attack Sardinian territory, and (4) the abrogation or modification of the Treaties concluded in 1847 by Austria with the duchies of Parma and Modena, allowing her to interfere for the restoration of order there. This offer was accepted; and, the Austrian Government having consented to receive him, Cowley set out for Vienna on February 20th on an unofficial Mission. His task was made easier by the Pope suddenly asking France and Austria to withdraw their troops from his States, since he was about to form a police force of his own (February 22nd); and, with less difficulty than had been expected, Austria was induced to agree to join in urging the reform of the Papal administration, and to substitute for the Treaties of 1847 either the recognition of the neutrality of Sardinia by the Powers—or at least by Austria and France—or a League of the Italian States for mutual security. By this time, however, both Austria and Sardinia had armed, and Cowley left Vienna (March 10th), in much doubt whether Austria would, after all, enter into negotiations, since she believed that the Sardinian Army was only the advance-guard of France, who was only seeking to gain time, and since, besides being in any case reluctant to grant concessions, she was anxious to profit by the attitude of Germany[2]. Whether he was right or not was never to be known; for, on arriving at Paris, he was met with a proposal that the

[1] F.O. Russia 531, No. 63.
[2] *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy*, No. 106.

Italian Question should be submitted to a Congress of the Five Powers.

Believing that the proposal originated with the Emperor Napoleon [1], the British Government agreed to it, though naturally resenting the cavalier treatment accorded to Cowley's Mission; and they could not well draw back when the proposal was officially made, not by France, but by Russia. They were the less inclined to do so, because they doubted Russia's motive. They were aware that she had promised France an army on the Austrian frontier and had actively encouraged Sardinia, in the belief that Russia herself need take no part in an Italian War; and she might now be willing to propose a Congress because Germany had taken alarm, so that, if war broke out now, she could not remain neutral, while, if Great Britain brought about peace between her Allies, she would herself be isolated[2]. But she was persistently rumoured to have a secret treaty with France, and to be only seeking to gain time for her Ally. The fear of such a combination made the British Government more anxious than ever to avert war. Accordingly, Malmesbury not only accepted Russia's proposal, on condition that discussion was confined to the Four Points of Cowley's Mission, but urged the same course on the other Powers.

But the Derby Ministry was now tottering to its fall, and none of the Powers would move an inch until it was certain whether it could hold on or not; since, if Palmerston and Russell, the avowed friends of the French Alliance and of Italian freedom, returned to power, Great Britain might be expected to range herself openly on the side of France and Sardinia. Thus, while it became the interest of Napoleon and Cavour to throw every kind of delay in the way of settlement by negotiation, it became Austria's interest either to make terms which would leave her mistress of the situation, whether the Congress met or not, or to precipitate war before France was ready and while a British Government pledged to strict neutrality was still in office. Therefore, in agreeing to a Congress, Austria stipulated that (1) there should be no territorial changes, (2) Sardinia should disarm beforehand, and (3) all the Italian States concerned—and these only—should be admitted[3]. To the first demand Malmesbury was ready enough to subscribe; but he would not allow Sardinia to be excluded from the Congress while the satellites of Austria were included, and he insisted that the Congress should be confined to

[1] Vitzthum, *St Petersburg and London*, I. 331.
[2] F.O. Paris 1292, No. 316.
[3] F.O. Vienna 567, No. 193.

the Five Powers, the Italian States, including Sardinia, being admitted for consultation only. Neither would he hear of Sardinia being asked to disarm, unless she were given adequate security against attack by Austria[1]. His first suggestion—that France should call upon Sardinia to disarm under a five years' guarantee by herself and Great Britain against attack by Austria—having been rejected by all concerned, he hereupon suggested that Austria and Sardinia should withdraw their armies ten leagues from the Ticino; but he finally accepted, instead, Austria's proposal for a general disarmament.

It was at this crisis that the Derby Ministry was defeated on its Reform Bill (March 31st). Cavour, who had left Paris (March 30th), whither he had been summoned by the Emperor, vowing that he would have war in spite of the Congress[2], now declared that Sardinia would neither attend the Congress nor disarm at anyone's bidding[3]; while Austria became more insistent that Sardinia must disarm before the Congress met, unless Great Britain and Prussia would sign a defensive treaty with her, or at least guarantee her against attack by France[4]. On Malmesbury's refusal to take either step[5], the war party became supreme at Vienna, and it was decided (April 12th) to address to Sardinia a direct summons to disarm, unless a general disarmament were accepted by all parties within the next few days[6].

The only chance of peace now left was that France, who had after long delay agreed in principle to a general disarmament, might persuade Sardinia to anticipate Austria's summons by following her example. Once more, therefore, Malmesbury, keenly as he felt that, in his own phrase, Great Britain could not "go on running from one to the other, like an old aunt trying to make up family squabbles[7]," addressed himself to the Powers and submitted (April 18th) a proposal that there should be a preliminary, general, effective, and simultaneous disarmament, to be carried out by a Military Commission separate from the Congress, and that Representatives of the Italian States should be invited, after the Congress had assembled, to sit with those of the Five Great Powers, as they had at Laibach in 1821. This appeal was accompanied by a warning that the present was the last

[1] *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy*, Nos. 118, 125, 127, 130, 140, 144, 155.
[2] F.O. Paris 1292, No. 354.
[3] *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy*, No. 220.
[4] F.O. Vienna 568, No. 229 (enclosure); Nos. 239, 249, 261.
[5] *Ibid.* 562, No. 225.
[6] *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy*, No. 315.
[7] *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*, II. 169.

effort which Her Majesty's Government would make for peace[1]. Since Germany was now arming, and since Lord Derby's decision to dissolve Parliament, instead of resigning, kept Palmerston still out of office, Napoleon at last gave way; and, on April 19th, Cavour telegraphed that, at the invitation of France as well as of Great Britain, Sardinia would disarm. But it was too late. That very night, Austria sent to Turin, not the invitation to join in a general disarmament for which Malmesbury had pleaded[2], but a peremptory summons to disarm and to send a reply within three days, as the alternative of war.

The British Government, hereupon, at once addressed a strong protest to Austria, who, they declared, had by this step, whatever consequences might ensue from it, forfeited all claim on the support or sympathy of Great Britain. At the same time, they pointed out that the only means of averting the calamities with which Europe was threatened was for Austria to refer her differences with other Powers to the friendly mediation of an impartial and disinterested ally[3]. This proposal to renew the mediation begun by Lord Cowley was accepted as between Austria and France, but not as between Austria and Sardinia, against whom Austria duly declared war on April 29th; and the offer was in consequence withdrawn.

It was now impossible to prevent France from entering into the War, which she did on May 3rd; but there was still hope that it might after all be confined to Italy, if Germany could be restrained from coming to Austria's aid. Fortunately, Austria had by her own act deprived herself of the right to call upon the Confederation to aid her; and Prussia, whose desire to profit by Austria's difficulties had hitherto made her the one constant supporter of Malmesbury's policy, now used all her influence to prevent the Diet from making common cause with Austria, save on terms that would leave her rival supreme in the Confederation. Therefore, until Austria had come to such a pass as to be ready to buy Germany's aid on Prussia's terms, Malmesbury had only to use all the influence he could command at the smaller German Courts to prevent them from acting without Prussia, insisting that the crossing of the Ticino by the French would not constitute for the Confederation such a *casus foederis* as would justify it in crossing the Rhine, and reiterating Great Britain's determination to remain neutral[4].

[1] *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy*, No. 343.
[2] F.O. Vienna 562, No. 249.
[3] *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy*, No. 366.
[4] F.O. Frankfort 185, No. 26, May 11th, 1859.

Unfortunately for their Government, the belief was general that British influence was being used to a quite different end. From the outset, Napoleon had been convinced that Malmesbury had leagued Germany against him; and the belief, baseless though it was, was sedulously fostered in this country by the Opposition Press. It was known that the sympathy of the Court was with Austria, while that of the country was, as Lord Derby knew, neither with France nor with Austria, but with Italy; and the belief that the neutrality professed by the Government covered wishes, and even designs, in favour of Austria which must be fatal to Italy's hopes, did them much harm in the elections. Of this Palmerston took advantage, and, when Parliament met, an amendment to the Address, expressing a want of confidence in the Ministry and its foreign policy, was moved and carried by thirteen votes (June 11th); whereupon Lord Derby resigned, and Palmerston became Prime-Minister, with Lord John Russell as his Foreign Secretary.

Could they have had their way, most of the Cabinet would have followed the foreign policy of the late Ministry, as revealed in the Bluebook on the Affairs of Italy, which was published too late to save them: namely, that of remaining strictly neutral between France and Austria and maintaining the *status quo* in Italy. But the direction of Foreign Affairs was taken out of their hands by Palmerston and Russell, supported by Gladstone—all three of them strongly attached to the cause of Italian liberty. Palmerston had, indeed, no mind to depart from a policy of neutrality—such a proceeding was forbidden by the general approval bestowed upon the Bluebook; but the quality of British neutrality changed with his own regard for the Alliance with France, and with Russell's advocacy of "Italy for the Italians."

The new Ministry came into office at a critical moment. On June 4th, the Austrians lost Lombardy at Magenta; on June 24th, their effort to regain it was defeated at Solferino. Russell so confidently expected that the allied armies would now cross the Mincio and drive the Austrians out of Venetia, that, when Prussia, thinking the time for her intervention to have now arrived, expressed a wish (July 1st) to concert with H.M. Government the means of "putting an end to the effusion of blood" and suggested a mediation in common with Great Britain and Russia, he refused to intervene, on the ground that his Government could not take part in a mediation based on the *status quo ante bellum* of Austria in Italy[1]. It was, therefore, with

[1] F.O. Berlin 472, No. 18.

dismay that he received from the French Emperor (July 4th) a request that he should propose an armistice, and suggest terms of peace which would add Lombardy and the Duchies to Sardinia, make Venetia independent under an Archduke, and form the States of Italy into a Confederation under the presidency of the Pope. The "triumvirate" were disposed to agree, fearing a Franco-Russian alliance, if the War went on and Prussia joined Austria; but the Cabinet insisted on standing aloof from the settlement as from the War[1]. Napoleon, therefore, acted for himself, and, having concluded an Armistice on July 6th, signed on the 12th, at Villafranca, a Preliminary Treaty of Peace, by which an Italian Confederation under the presidency of the Pope was to be created; Lombardy, except the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera, was to be ceded to the Emperor of the French, who should present it to the King of Sardinia; while Venetia, remaining subject to the Emperor of Austria, was to form part of the Confederation; the Grand-duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena were to be restored, on condition of their granting a general amnesty; and the Holy Father was to be requested to introduce in his States some indispensable reforms.

In thus abruptly concluding peace, Napoleon was certainly justified by the military situation. The Allies, with the hardest part of their task before them, had lost heavily; Sardinia could not, and France would not, make good these losses; while the crossing of the Mincio would bring all Germany into the field against them. But the Emperor's decision was also influenced by a well-grounded fear that he could no longer control the national movement in Italy in the interest of either France or the Pope. Even before the outbreak of war, the Revolution in central Italy had begun, and, the rulers of Tuscany, Modena and Parma having fled, Provisional Governments had been set up in the Duchies and the Romagna, which with one accord proclaimed Victor Emmanuel King of Italy (June 12th). It was no part of Napoleon's plan to unite all northern and central Italy under the King of Sardinia, and he had forced the latter to decline the offer and accept, instead, a dictatorship for the duration of the War.

In this action he had been supported by Russell, who, while admitting (June 28th) the expediency of uniting under one direction the efforts of the populations at war with Austria, stipulated that every step henceforth taken should be regarded as provisional, until such time as

[1] Vitzthum, *op. cit.* I. 365–8; *Letters of Queen Victoria*, III. 450; Malmesbury, *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*, II. 200.

the will of the people, the fortune of war, and, finally, a European treaty should settle the territorial arrangements and rights of sovereignty in northern and central Italy. It was, in fact, at first no more part of Russell's policy to bring about a permanent union of Italy than it was of Napoleon's; and, if he afterwards became one of the chief makers of the kingdom of Italy, it was only because in no other way could he free Italy, and keep her free, from foreign control. The change began with Villafranca. Palmerston and Russell had relied on Napoleon's repeated declaration that the Austrians must be driven beyond the Alps, and that the settlement of Italy must be the work of a European congress. Now, the congress, if it met at all,—which was doubtful, since the Emperor of Austria declined to submit the terms of peace to any such assembly—would meet merely to ratify a treaty that falsified the Emperor's promises, destroyed the Treaties of 1815, and settled nothing in Italy. For the Treaty in question not only left Austria in possession of Venetia, but constituted her, through the influence she must possess in an Italian Confederation in which she would be supported by the restored rulers of Tuscany and Modena, as well as by the Pope and by the King of the Two Sicilies, virtually mistress of Italy. Russell, therefore, straightway refused (July 16th) to enter a congress at all, until he should have been reassured on a number of points, of which the most important was, whether French or Austrian troops were to restore the Grand-duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena against the will of their former subjects.

In refusing to enter a congress merely to ratify the Treaty of Villafranca, Russell had the support of the country, which was at one with the Court in holding that, as Great Britain had taken no part in the War, she must decline all responsibility for the Peace. But, when he went on to distinguish between the Treaty as putting an end to the War, and as forming a basis for the reorganisation of Italy, insisting that in the latter aspect it must be subject to the consideration of the Powers in congress[1], and when he would have begun to negotiate with Napoleon for what was in effect a revision of the Treaty, he found himself almost alone in the Cabinet. Bent on effecting at all costs a settlement more in accord with the wishes of the Italians, he now set about making the execution of the Treaty impossible. To this end, therefore, he privately urged that a representative assembly should be convoked in Tuscany, in order that

[1] *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy from the Signature of the Preliminaries of Villafranca to the Postponement of the Congress*, No. 10.

the wishes of the people in regard to their autonomy might be "regularly and freely expressed[1]"; and publicly not only claimed for the people of Italy the same right of choosing their own Sovereign as Great Britain had exercised in 1688, but warned Paris and Vienna (August 16th) that Great Britain would feel it her duty to protest against the restoration of the Dukes by foreign forces. The hint was taken and, by the end of August, National Assemblies had been summoned in the Duchies and in the Romagna, which unanimously voted for annexation to a Constitutional kingdom under Victor Emmanuel.

Palmerston and Russell wished the Cabinet to approve this step officially; but the Cabinet refused to give advice where they would not give active assistance[2]. Nevertheless, Russell, with Palmerston's sanction, proceeded unofficially to encourage the Italian central provinces to draw closer the bonds between themselves and Sardinia, and to urge Napoleon to abandon the idea of an Italian Confederation while accepting the annexation of the Duchies to Sardinia as the best solution of the difficulties in central Italy. The Emperor, however, though he undertook not to allow them to be coerced into taking back their former rulers, since this would profit Austria alone, would not allow them to unite themselves to Sardinia, and forced Victor Emmanuel once more to refuse the offered kingship. He perceived, indeed, that he could not prevent the annexation of Parma to Sardinia; but he knew that, as the fear of foreign intervention declined, the desire for autonomy was reviving in Tuscany, and he still hoped to prevent the formation of too strong a kingdom of Italy by preserving Tuscany, augmented by Modena, as a separate State and saving the Romagna for the Pope, at least in name. He, therefore, refused to admit the right of the National Assemblies to represent anything but a violent and unscrupulous minority, and induced Austria, not only to leave the future of the Duchies undetermined, but also to agree that, so soon as peace was signed, the neutral Powers, the Pope and the Kings of Sardinia and Naples should be invited to meet in Congress for the pacification of central Italy.

So soon as the Treaty of Peace had been signed at Zurich (November 10th), the invitation to the Congress was duly issued and accepted; and it was arranged that the meeting should take place at Paris in January. But, on December 22nd, there had appeared

[1] *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy from the Signature of the Preliminaries of Villafranca to the Postponement of the Congress*, No. 9.

[2] *Life of Earl Granville*, I. 356–8; *Letters of Queen Victoria*, III. 461 ff.

a pamphlet, entitled *Le Pape et le Congrès*, which urged that in his own interest the Pope's temporal rule should be confined to Rome. Inasmuch as this pamphlet was generally attributed to Napoleon himself, Austria at once asked the French Government for an assurance that the proposals advocated in it would not be brought forward at the Congress; and, failing to obtain this assurance, she withdrew from the Congress, which was in consequence indefinitely postponed.

For a moment, war seemed to be again in sight; and, but for the opposition of their colleagues, Palmerston and Russell would have accepted, not only Napoleon's offer of a commercial treaty, but his proposal (January 5th) of an offensive and defensive treaty against Austria, with a joint guarantee of the independence of central Italy[1]. As a compromise, Russell made a counter-proposal that France and Austria should agree not to interfere in the future by force in the internal affairs of Italy, unless called upon to do so by the unanimous consent of the Five Great Powers, and that central Italy should be left free to determine its own fate through newly elected Assemblies. This was the turning-point. The Emperor could not but accept these proposals, nor Austria fail to reject them; but, when the latter added to her refusal to enter into a formal agreement not to interfere in Italian affairs a Declaration that she intended no such interference, it was clear that the end was coming very near.

Austria's withdrawal left Great Britain and France face to face in Italy. By this time, British influence was paramount at Turin and Florence, and it was being used to create a kingdom of Italy, which would form a second Prussia for France. To prevent this, Napoleon, in agreeing that the central provinces should determine their own fate, stipulated that they should do so by a plebiscite, instead of through elected Assemblies; for he believed that the influence of the priests and landlords over the peasants would secure a majority against annexation, at least in Tuscany. At the last moment, he even proposed to solve the Italian Question by annexing Parma and Modena to Sardinia, forming the Legations into a lay Vicariate under Victor Emmanuel, and constituting Tuscany a separate principality. This very solution had already been proposed by Russell (November 26th); but now he would have none of it. Thus, on March 1st, the populations of central Italy were invited to express by plebiscite their wishes on the alternatives of union with the Constitutional kingdom of Victor

[1] Malmesbury, *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*, II. 213; Ashley, E. *Life of Palmerston*, II. 174 ff.

Emmanuel, or the formation of a separate kingdom. By overwhelming majorities, they voted for annexation to Sardinia.

Beyond doubt, Russell had now come to act consciously in the interest of Great Britain as well as of Italy. For some time, Palmerston had been deeply distrustful of the designs of the Emperor Napoleon, in view of which he was already planning to strengthen our naval defences and encouraging the Volunteer movement; and it was with dismay that he learnt, in January, that Napoleon was bargaining with Cavour for the cession of Savoy and Nice to France as the price of the withdrawal of his opposition to the annexation of Tuscany and the Emilia to Sardinia. From time to time, rumours of such a cession had reached the British Government; but, after Villafranca, the French Government declared that the idea had been abandoned. Nevertheless, when it became clear that Sardinia must be augmented by the Duchies as well as Lombardy, Napoleon, holding, with reason, that central Italy was more than an equivalent for Venetia, renewed his demand that Savoy and Nice should be assigned to France in compensation for the formation of a kingdom of more than ten million souls on her frontier.

The demand aroused strong indignation in this country; and Russell not only protested vigorously against it, but sought the support of the Powers for a Declaration, that Chablis and Faucigny, neutralised by the Treaties of 1815, should be added to Switzerland. From its very nature his protest was vain. No interests were affected by the cession save those of Sardinia and Switzerland; and the former would not, the latter could not, resist the will of the Emperor. As for principles, Austria had logic on her side when she declared that she saw no difference between the cession of Tuscany to Sardinia and that of Savoy to France: the one was as much a flouting of the Treaties of 1815 as the other. Nor, in face of his own insistence that the Tuscans should be left free to decide their own fate, could Russell justly deny the same right to the Savoyards and Nizzards. Thus, the Treaty signed at Turin on March 24th having made the cession dependent on the consent both of the Sardinian Parliament and of the populations concerned, nothing remained for him but to submit, when, the Treaty having been duly ratified by the Parliament that met at Turin on April 2nd, Savoy and Nice by plebiscite voted for annexation to France.

In opposing the cession of Savoy and Nice to France, Russell had thought only of British interests. These were not, indeed,

directly affected; but the Foreign Secretary avowedly regarded the transaction as merely the forerunner of other acts of aggression which might alter the Balance of Power in Europe to the disadvantage of Great Britain. Hence his sudden display of regard for treaties and treaty rights. At the time, he chiefly feared that Victor Emmanuel might buy with the cession of Genoa or the island of Sardinia, perhaps of both, the Emperor's help in attacking Venetia; but, only a few days after the Treaty of Turin had been signed, danger appeared from a new quarter. Bad as was the state of central Italy under the Pope, it was not worse than that of the south under the Bourbons, and the British Government had long feared a revolution there which might place a Murat or a Bonaparte on the throne of the Two Sicilies. Therefore, ever since the death of King Ferdinand II (May, 1859) enabled them to renew diplomatic relations[1], they had been pressing the young King Francis II to reform the administration as the only means of preventing an insurrection and the overthrow of his dynasty. Their advice had been disregarded; and, on April 4th, the expected revolt broke out in Sicily. A month later, Garibaldi sailed from Genoa with his "Thousand," and, by the end of July, had made himself master of the island in the name of "Italy and Victor Emmanuel." If Napoleon III now demanded the cession of Genoa and the island of Sardinia as the price of his consent to the annexation of Naples and Sicily to a kingdom of Italy, Great Britain might before long have to defend her possessions of Malta, Corfu and Gibraltar[2].

That Naples and Sicily were as Italian as Lombardy or Tuscany, was of no consequence. Palmerston and Russell, devoted as they were to the cause of Italian liberty, had, as has been seen, never favoured that of Italian unity. The differences bred of historical circumstance, which must make Sardinian rule almost as foreign to the Neapolitans as Austrian rule had been to the Lombards, to say nothing of the interposition of the Papal States between them, seemed to the British Ministers to render the annexation of doubtful advantage to either population; while, beyond any doubt at all, it would be to the advantage of British interests that southern Italy should remain a separate monarchy rather than form part of a United Italy[3]. Therefore, within a fortnight of Garibaldi's landing in Sicily, Russell is found

[1] The Minister selected was Lord John Russell's brother-in-law, Henry Elliot.

[2] *Letters of Queen Victoria*, III. 524; Russell to the Queen, November 3rd, 1860.

[3] So late as the end of July the Cabinet still held this view. *Further Correspondence relating to the Affairs of Italy*, Part VII. No. 47: Russell to Hudson, July 25th, 1860.

asking Cavour (May 22nd), first, to declare that neither Austria nor the kingdom of the Two Sicilies would be attacked; secondly, to bind the Sardinian Government not to yield any territory to France beyond that ceded by the Treaty of Turin[1].

Cavour, who was determined to annex southern Italy and was even then winning Sir James Hudson to the cause of Italian Unity by representing this as the only way of checking the Murat party and the designs of France, returned an evasive answer, which in no way lessened Russell's fears. Therefore, while doing all in his power to stop the revolution by urging the King of the Two Sicilies to grant a Constitution which would give the Sicilians a voice in their own government, he sought to engage the Emperor in an agreement that, if the endeavour then in progress to "conciliate" the pretensions of Naples and Sardinia in Sicily should fail, France and Great Britain would leave the people of southern Italy to settle their own internal affairs, and would use all their influence at Turin to prevent an attack on Venetia, which would be resisted by the whole strength of Germany as well as of Austria[2].

Napoleon was quite as unwilling as was the British Government to see Naples and Sicily added to the kingdom of Italy. But he had already in vain urged Sardinia to refrain from aiding the revolution, and now saw the only means of checking it in the employment of the British and French squadrons at Naples to prevent Garibaldi from crossing to the mainland, and to impose a truce which should give the King of Naples time for establishing Constitutional government and for concluding an alliance with Sardinia. To this, as a departure from the now sacred principle of Non-intervention, Russell would not agree[3]. Accordingly, Napoleon, who was now absorbed in the Syrian Question, and had made up his mind not to fight in Italy again, unless in defence of the Pope, declined (August 22nd) to assume any responsibility for the use that Sardinia and Italy might make of the liberty he had done so much to win for them.

This communication deepened Russell's anxiety, lest Sardinia, by attacking Venetia, should undo all his work for Italy and start a European War. He, therefore, at once sent to Turin (August 31st) a despatch, insisting that the King of Sardinia had no excuse for violating the Treaty of Zurich which secured Venetia to Austria;

[1] *Further Correspondence relating to the Affairs of Italy*, Part VII. No. 15.
[2] *Ibid.* No. 45, Russell to Cowley, July 23rd, 1860.
[3] *Ibid.* No. 50, Russell to Cowley, July 26th, 1860. Cf. No. 66, Russell to Cowley, September 7th, 1860.

he had been free to sign it or not as he pleased, but, having done so, he was not at liberty to break it when he would[1]. It was, however, in vain that he enjoined on Sardinia the faithful observance of treaties; Cavour was now quite certain that, whatever he did, Russell would support him through fear of France. Therefore, when Garibaldi, who had crossed the Strait of Messina on August 20th and entered Naples unopposed on September 7th, announced his intention of marching on Rome at once—a step which must force the Emperor to intervene—Cavour had no hesitation in anticipating him by marching a Sardinian army into Umbria, hard on the heels of a messenger sent to bid Pope Pius dismiss the foreign mercenaries—mostly Austrian and Irish—whom he was enlisting to take the place of the French troops about to be withdrawn.

None of the Powers could be indifferent to such a breach of international right, and their reply to the Memorandum (September 12th) in which the Sardinian Government sought to justify its action by appealing to the rights of nations, was to withdraw their Ministers from Turin. Great Britain alone left it unanswered, until the annexation of Umbria and the Marches, Naples and Sicily to Sardinia had become certain. Then, and then only, Russell sent to Sir James Hudson (October 27th) a strongly-worded despatch[2], in which he cited the Revolution of 1688 as justifying the King of Sardinia in assisting the people of Naples and the Roman States to throw off their Governments as the Prince of Orange had then assisted the English[3]; and declared that "H.M. Government, seeing no sufficient grounds for the severe censures passed by Austria, France, Prussia and Russia on the acts of the King of Sardinia, would turn their eyes rather to the gratifying prospect of a people building up the edifice of their liberties and consolidating the work of their independence amid the sympathies and good wishes of Europe."

The comment, "*Ce n'est pas de la diplomatie; c'est de la polissonnerie*," may be said to sum up the general Continental view of this despatch. Cavour might well shout for joy when it was read to him, for it realised the Italy of his dreams. But, in reversing without warning the policy hitherto pursued by the British Government,

[1] *Further Correspondence relating to the Affairs of Italy*, Part VII. No. 63; cf. No. 66.
[2] *Ibid.* No. 136.
[3] So far back as April 30th, Russell had, in writing to the Queen, used this argument to justify the King of Sardinia in aiding an insurrection against the King of the Two Sicilies; but he then admitted that to act thus for the sake of making new acquisitions would be criminal. *Letters of Queen Victoria*, III. 505–6.

and in justifying Sardinia's action by the assertion that, in the name of liberty, one ruler may lawfully assist a people in rebellion against another and annex that ruler's land to his own, Russell was establishing a precedent fatal to the maintenance of treaties, which had hitherto been the guiding principle of European policy, and is at all times the surest safeguard of Peace. The explanation, of course, lies in the fact that the British Ministers at Turin and Naples, themselves late converts to the policy of a United Italy, had at last convinced the Foreign Secretary that it was the only means of saving Naples and Sicily from red revolution and anarchy, and of checking the French designs on southern Italy, and that it was, therefore, the best solution both for the people of Italy and from the point of view of the Balance of Power in Europe. But the perception of this fact only contributed to convince Continental statesmen that Great Britain was consistent only in self-interest; and some at least of the failures attending our foreign policy in the course of the next ten years may be traced to the impression created on the Continent by this despatch.

At home, it was generally applauded; but it excited the indignation of the Cabinet, to whom it had not been shown. Austria, Prussia and Russia had been holding a Conference at Warsaw (October 20th) and it was no secret that an attack on Venetia—neither more nor less justifiable than that on Umbria—would bring the Austrian and Prussian armies into Italy. In that event, France would be in honour bound to come to the help of Sardinia, and the dreaded European War would begin. Russell would have faced even this danger; but he was overruled and not allowed to send to the Powers a despatch (dated November 3rd) expressing a hope that Rome and Venetia, owing to their Italian nationality, would soon share in the freedom and good government of the rest of Italy, and declaring that, if any other Power should attempt forcible interference, H.M. Government would hold themselves free to act in such a manner as the rights of nations, the independence of Italy, and the interest of Europe might seem to them to require[1]. Nor was he allowed to take official notice of the Decrees annexing Naples, Sicily, Umbria and the Marches, not to Sardinia but to "the Italian State." Instead, Cavour was informed (January 21st) that the votes taken in those provinces appeared to H.M. Government to have little validity, as being nothing more than a formality following upon acts of popular insurrection, or successful invasion, or upon Treaties, and did not in themselves imply an inde-

[1] *Letters of Queen Victoria*, III. 523.

pendent exercise of the will of the nation in whose name they were given; and that recognition of the new State must wait upon its establishment as such by the deliberate act of the elected Representatives of the several States[1].

Russell himself seems by this time to have come to doubt the wisdom of the argument, if not of the purpose, of his famous despatch; for to this later mission he added a reminder of the duty of observing treaties and a warning that "after the troubles of the last few years, Europe has a right to expect that the Italian Kingdom shall not be a new source of dissensions and alarm." It cannot, therefore, have been without uneasiness that he read Cavour's despatch (March 16th) announcing the formal sanction by the National Parliament of the votes of the people, which created one kingdom of Italy from the Alps to Etna. For in it, Cavour, dealing at length with the Venetian Question, maintained that Austria, by excluding Venetia from the Liberal policy lately adopted in all the other provinces of her empire, and by protesting against the union of central Italy with Sardinia, had sensibly modified the position established between herself and Victor Emmanuel at Zurich.

Rome was another matter; and, during the spring of 1861, Russell busied himself in trying to arrange a *modus vivendi* which would remove the French troops from Italy. His last suggestion was that the Pope's sovereignty should be restricted to Rome and its immediate neighbourhood for the present Pope's lifetime, and that the King of Italy and the Emperor of the French should agree not to recognise the temporal power of any future Pope[2]. But the despatch was never sent; for, on June 6th, Cavour died, and with him passed away all danger of attacks on Venetia and Rome, and of their consequent European complications. They were, however, to be added to the kingdom of Italy within ten years, though not with the help of either Great Britain or France. Hudson was right when he wrote, "The interests of Italy turn, naturally, towards Germany rather than France"—he might, perhaps, have added "or Great Britain"—"provided Germany will allow her."

In estimating the policy pursued by Palmerston and Russell during the two years that saw the making of Italy, there will be a general agreement as to the rightness of the policy that made Italy one State; though some may doubt the wisdom of treating so lightly as Russell did the differences between north and south—differences which made

[1] *Further Correspondence relating to the Affairs of Italy*, Part IX. No. 1.
[2] *Letters of Queen Victoria*, III. 563 n.

Cavour himself exclaim, "We have united Italy; we have now to unite the Italians." It is not, however, clear that this policy, as pursued by them, was altogether the best for the interests of Great Britain. British statesmen, zealous as they have always been to free the Mediterranean Peninsulas from foreign control, have never been anxious to see any one of them united under one ruler, and Palmerston and Russell would have been justified if they had adhered to their early policy of a divided, though free, Italy. Fear of the French Emperor's designs induced them to abandon it so far as to acquiesce in the piecemeal annexations of the States of central and southern Italy to Sardinia; but they never frankly faced the consequences of the situation thus created. In particular, they never understood that, while Rome and Venice remained unredeemed, the new kingdom of Italy would ally itself with whatever Power would help it to gain them. Great Britain might have been that Power; but, fearful of France and Austria, Palmerston and Russell steadily discountenanced attacks on Rome and Venice, and the chance they threw away was seized by Bismarck. Italy became the ally, neither of France nor of Great Britain, but of Prussia.

The truth appears to be that, after Villafranca, British Foreign Policy was inspired almost wholly by a fear and distrust of France, which was in some ways the most important legacy of the Franco-Italian War. Again and again, during the years to come, it determined the course of our Foreign Policy, and always with unhappy results to others, if not to ourselves. It was during the troubles which fixed the eyes of Europe on Syria in 1860 that this first became manifest.

II. THE SYRIAN TROUBLES AND MISSION, 1860–1861

From time immemorial the coastal plain of Syria has been a highway for invading armies; but, a few miles inland, there rises parallel to the shore a twin range of mountains, known as the Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon, or together as the Mountain, which has ever been a refuge for the native populations from the conquerors of the plains below. For many centuries the northern portion has been inhabited by the Maronites, a group of Christian tribes deriving their name, it is said, from a fifth century monk, John Maron, under whose leadership they had adhered to the Latin Church, when the rest of the land had been won to the Greek. The southern portion became the home of the Druses, a people whose religion was derived from the ancient paganism of the land, with an admixture of Moslem beliefs.

The Turkish conquest of Syria hardly affected the men of the

Mountain, who continued to live—blood-feuds apart—quietly enough under their feudal chiefs, until the European Powers in 1840 forced the Pasha of Egypt to evacuate Syria. Unfortunately, the Sultan of the day, Abdul-Medjid, adopted the policy of centralising the administration and extending it into places where Turkish administration was still unknown. Thus, the land was soon overrun by lowbred, ignorant Turks, ruling over small towns or rural districts and farming the taxes. The consequent confusion and misgovernment led the Powers to intervene; and, at their instance, the Sultan in 1842 divided the Mountain into two provinces, each under a *Kaïmakam*, Maronite in the north, Druse in the south, but both subject to the Turkish Pasha of Syria. The Turkish administration, always corrupt, was even worse in Syria than elsewhere in the Ottoman empire. For the governorship and other high offices, being always sold to the highest bidder, changed hands with a frequency which naturally resulted "in the province being cursed with a succession of incapable proconsuls, chosen without any regard for their qualifications, ruthless in their oppressions, corrupt administrators of justice, and utterly indifferent to the interests of the people[1]."

The disorder inevitable in such circumstances was aggravated by the Turkish practice of encouraging local feuds and animosities as the only way of maintaining the supremacy of the ruling race over subject peoples. In this case, religious differences made the task exceptionally easy; and, ere long, the traditional hostility between the Maronites and the Druses broke out in fresh disorders. The trouble was aggravated by the rivalries of the European Powers, France, Russia and Great Britain each seeking to establish control over Syria in the name of religion. France, as the protector of Latin Christianity in the East, had for centuries had dealings with the Maronites, who by a Charter of St Louis had been made part of the French nation; and, during the last fifty years, Jesuit and Lazarite missions had greatly extended her influence in Syria. Russia had not fallen behind, and, besides extending her protection to the Greeks of the coast as members of the Orthodox Church, had encouraged the emigration of Jews from Russia to Jerusalem and Safed. But her influence was confined to the plains; and it was to Great Britain that the Druses turned, debarred as they were by their schism with their Moslem neighbours from seeking help from them against their Christian enemies. For her part, Great Britain, uneasy at the growth of French influence in the Levant, had readily extended her patronage to the Druses,

[1] Sir A. C. Lyall, *Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava*, I. 103.

and not a few Protestant missions had been established in the Lebanon.

The trouble brewing was brought to a head by an Edict, issued by the Sultan in 1856 under pressure from France and Great Britain, his Allies in the late War, confirming measures that placed Christians and Moslems on a footing of equality throughout the Ottoman empire. This roused the bitter resentment of the Moslems, especially of the Arabs, always more fanatical than the Turks; and the Consuls in Syria soon became apprehensive of disturbances more serious than any yet known. As might have been expected, they began in the Lebanon, where, contrary to the spirit, if not to the letter, of the engagement of 1842, a Druse, nominally a Christian, had been made Kaïmakam over the Maronites, and an orthodox Moslem Kaïmakam over the Druses. A few outrages, in which, now Maronites, now Druses, were killed or wounded, inflamed the passions of both sects, and, on May 29th, 1860, the Druses fell upon the Maronites, slew the men and boys, carried off the women and girls, and laid waste the whole land.

Once started, the outbreak spread quickly on either side of the Mountain, as the Moslems joined the Druses. But the Consuls-General of the Powers at Beyrout exerted themselves to stop it, and through Cyril Graham, an Oriental traveller who knew the Lebanon well, a Treaty of Peace between the Druses and the Maronites was signed on July 10th. Unhappily, on the preceding day the Moslems at Damascus had risen against the Christians there, and, in a three days' massacre, in which they were aided by the Turkish troops, had laid the whole of the Christian quarter in ashes. Where the movement would end no man might guess.

The news of the Lebanon massacre reached Europe on June 7th by way of Constantinople; but little attention was given to it till M. Thouvenel approached Lord Cowley, on July 5th, with a proposal that a Commission of the Five Powers should be sent to make enquiries on the spot, and suggested that the Sultan might be allowed to borrow the troops of the Viceroy of Egypt for the reestablishment of order. Cowley saw in the proposal only an attempt by the Emperor to make political capital out of the disturbances in Syria, and coldly objected that the Maronites had been the first to attack and had brought their fate on themselves. But the French Minister persisted, and, on the following day, laid his proposal of a Commission before the Powers, adding a suggestion that troops should be sent to support them, but without producing effect beyond the despatch of a few British and French warships to Beyrout.

The news of the massacre at Damascus changed the whole situation. The matter at once became serious and urgent; for, if the massacres spread to the coast-towns, France and Russia would intervene without waiting for the other Powers. This happened to be the moment when fear of French designs on southern Italy was converting Palmerston and Russell to the policy of a United Italy; and it was thus with reluctance that Palmerston signed (August 3rd) a Convention not only appointing a Joint Commission, but authorising the landing of French troops at Beyrout. He, however, consented to this, inasmuch as the Sultan had just announced that he was sending to Syria an Extraordinary Commissioner, Fuad Pasha, armed with the fullest powers for dispensing justice in his master's name; and it was hoped that, by the time the Commission reached Syria, there would be little left for them to do but to approve the Pasha's acts.

For his part, Fuad Pasha expected that, if he could point to a few scores of Moslems hanged or shot, and a few hundreds imprisoned or banished, the mutual distrust of the Powers would enable him to save the highly-placed Turkish officials whose incompetence or connivance was responsible for the worst that had happened. In this he was not altogether mistaken. The Commission did indeed record a unanimous conclusion that the Turkish officials in Syria were equally responsible for the massacres with the Druse chiefs who carried them out; but it was the chiefs they were asked to punish, and, so soon as they took up the question, the differences between the Commissioners became manifest. The Turks were quite willing that the Druses, who after all were schismatic, should become the scapegoats for the Lebanon massacres; and France was ready to support Fuad in this matter, though without prejudice to the case against the officials. But Great Britain was very unwilling to see her protégés singled out in this way, and her Commissioner, Lord Dufferin, pressed for clemency, urging that a distinction should be drawn between a vendetta and a deliberate massacre, and arguing, not only that the Christians had been to blame at first, but, also, that the responsibility for the chronic anarchy which made these things possible lay with the Turkish officials. He, therefore, demanded the punishment of them rather than of the Druses. In the end, he had his way, so far as the officials were concerned; but there remains ground for the French contention that he would have taken another line with regard to the Druses, had not the Maronites been the faithful protégés of France.

Punishment for the massacres having been meted out, there remained the question of preventing their renewal. Here, again, the

Commissioners were sharply divided by national jealousies. France, supported by Prussia and Russia, was anxious that the whole of the Lebanon should be placed under a Maronite, who should hold office for life and be revocable only with the consent of the Powers. Lord Dufferin at once opposed this, in the interest both of the Druses and of Great Britain, who had no mind to see French influence established in the Lebanon, as Russian had been in Servia. Instead, he urged that the whole of Syria should be placed under the rule of a Pasha appointed for a term of years by the Sultan, in consultation with the Great Powers. Later events have shown that this policy was the right one; but it too closely resembled that which had made Mehemet Ali hereditary Pasha of Egypt to commend itself to the Sultan. France, of course, opposed it, seeing in it a device to create in Syria, under British protection, a principality for Fuad Pasha. Even the British Government, which at first approved the scheme, afterwards rejected it as infringing the integrity of the Ottoman empire. In the end, it was agreed to place the Lebanon under a Christian Governor nominated by and directly subordinate to the Porte, a stranger to the province and appointed for three years, subject to removal only for misconduct. At the same time, mixed tribunals were constituted; and administrative councils, nominated by the several communities, were established.

Long before this settlement was reached, the British Government had become anxious to end the French occupation of Syria. The Conference which authorised it had limited its duration to six months; but Russell could hardly await that term. Alarmed by the strengthening of the French garrison at Rome and by the order given (October 30th) to the French Admiral at Naples to prevent the Sardinian fleet from bombarding Gaeta, where King Francis II had taken refuge, he saw in the prolonged occupation of Syria by French troops a present menace to British interests in the Mediterranean and a future precedent for proceedings in the Balkans. Thus, on January 10th, 1861, Cowley, under his instructions, demanded the recall of the French expedition. Thouvenel pointed out that humanity and honour forbade evacuation before a responsible Government had been established. But in vain. Russell saw in the delays by which the Turks sought to prolong the negotiations until the French troops had to leave, nothing but the intrigues of France, bent on the conquest of Syria and Egypt. Very reluctantly, therefore, he allowed himself to be overruled by the other Powers, who prolonged the occupation till June—just long enough, as it happened, to secure the appointment (June 9th) of

Daoud Pasha, a Catholic Armenian, as Governor of the Lebanon, which under his rule soon became the best-governed province in Syria, if not in the empire.

For this conclusion to the Syrian troubles, though credit must be given to Lord Dufferin's tact and judgment in a difficult situation, scant approbation can be claimed for the British Government. It must, indeed, be admitted that our Foreign Policy has seldom shown itself less circumspect than in this episode. It may be that the French Emperor was glad enough to win back the good opinion of his Catholic subjects, forfeited by his dealings with the Temporal power, by taking up the cause of the Catholics of the Lebanon; but it was pure humanity which caused him to send to Syria troops that might at any moment be needed in Italy. That he was right in interposing cannot be questioned; nor could any interposition have availed, if it had not been backed by armed force. Undoubtedly, in this matter Russell was less than just towards the Emperor and France. For his own part, he, no less certainly, laid himself open to a charge of having subordinated all other considerations to British interests; and it is interesting to reflect that Gladstone was a leading member of a Ministry which, for the sake of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman empire, would have risked the renewal of a massacre of Christians without parallel in modern times before the "Bulgarian Atrocities," rather than prolong the French occupation of Syria. And the end of it all was to establish in the Levant more firmly than ever the influence of France, who alone had intervened with effect on behalf of those who looked to her for help.

III. THE POLISH INSURRECTION, 1863

Still more regrettable was the course into which fear and distrust of France led Palmerston and Russell during the Polish Insurrection of 1863. The success of the Italian Revolution made it inevitable that a cry of anguish should go up from every oppressed nationality in Europe; and daily, insurrections were looked for in Hungary, in Poland, and in Turkey. The Hungarian rising never took place at all, and that in Turkey came to nothing; but the Polish duly broke out in 1863, and went near to justifying the fears with which it had been foreseen by every responsible statesman in Europe.

In many ways, the state of parties in Poland closely resembled that of 1848 in Italy. There was a "White," or Moderate party, composed of nobles and gentry who bitterly resented the extinction of their country's independence and their own exclusion from its

administration, and whose aim was the restoration of the autonomous Constitution of 1815. Then there was a "Red" or Revolutionary party, composed of middle-class lawyers, doctors, students and clergy, who drew their inspiration from Lelewel, and through him from Mazzini (with whom he had so much in common), and whose aims were to a great extent subversive of social as well as political order. Finally, there was a group of practical patriots, whose aim was to secure for Poland a minimum of local autonomy, and who were ready to work with Russia for obtaining it. The Moderate party found a rallying-point in the Agricultural Society, formed in 1855 by their leader, Count Zamoiski, for the improvement of the condition of the peasants; the activities of the Revolutionary party were directed by a "National Central Committee," which took its orders from the exiles in Paris; and the two had little in common beyond an unreasoning hatred of Russia and all things Russian, which made them regard as traitors those Poles who, like Marquis Wielopolski, were willing to take what measure of autonomy Russia would concede and make the best of it. Moreover, while Wielopolski and his followers perceived that the old historic Poland could never be restored, since Danzig had become German and could not be retransformed into a Polish town, while without the command of a seaport an independent Poland could not exist; the other parties would be content with nothing less than the Poland of 1772, including Lithuania and the Ukraine. So far, the resemblance between the Poland of 1860 and the Italy of 1848 is very close; but there was one all-important difference: Poland had no Sardinia. Thus, the Polish revolutionary parties had to look abroad for help—the Whites to the Catholics of Europe, and especially of France, the traditional defender of Polish liberty and of Catholicism; the Reds to the parties which in different countries were working for a European Revolution.

Demonstrations of popular feeling began in Warsaw in 1860, and the Tsar had to choose between concession and repression. Alexander II's own tendencies were Liberal, and any policy save a Liberal one would prevent the alliance with France for which Gortchakoff was then working. Accordingly, in 1861, a Council of State and Elective Provincial Assemblies were granted, and Wielopolski was named Minister of Education and Public Worship. Unfortunately, Zamoiski's attitude led Wielopolski to ask for and obtain authorisation to suppress the Agricultural Society, and riots broke out in Warsaw which were sharply dealt with. Nevertheless, in 1862, the Tsar's brother, the Grand-duke Constantine, was appointed Viceroy,

with Wielopolski as Vice-president of the Council and Director of Civil Administration. The Poles, however, might have said of Russia as Cavour said of Austria, "We do not want her to amend her ways; we want her to go." Not only was Wielopolski's life attempted twice within two months; Constantine had only just arrived at Warsaw when he was shot at as he was leaving the theatre. Still, the Government adhered to its Liberal policy; and, on August 29th, 1862, the Viceroy issued a proclamation promising reforms: the creation of a Council of State, the organisation of public instruction and of religious worship, the emancipation of the Jews, the establishment of municipal and district councils, and a general reform of the administrative system. Had the Whites responded in any way to the overtures thus made, Poland might soon have become practically autonomous. But they made their offer of support to Wielopolski subject to the reestablishment of the Constitution of 1815; and Zamoiski, summoned to an interview with Constantine, presented demands for changes in the administration in consequence of which he was ordered to Petrograd to account for his conduct—and kept there.

By this time, the National Central Committee was more powerful than the Government, and Wielopolski decided (November 6th, 1862) to break it to pieces by calling up recruits for the army from the towns only, thereby gratifying the peasants, who as yet belonged to neither of the revolutionary parties. The plans of the National Central Committee for an insurrection to begin on February 19th, 1863, the anniversary of the Emancipation of the Serfs, were almost complete; but Wielopolski upset them by ordering that the selected recruits would be taken from their beds on the night of January 14th. On the 21st, the Polish Insurrection began. The rising took place at an inopportune moment for Gortchakoff, who was planning an insurrection in the Ottoman empire to begin in the spring, when Bulgaria, Herzegovina and Bosnia were to rise, aided by Montenegro, and either Prince Nicholas of Leuchtenberg or Prince Napoleon, with the aid of Russian volunteers, was to supersede Couza as King of Roumania[1]. He was, therefore, intent on dividing the forces of revolution by conciliating the Whites with further concessions and treating the Insurrection as a Socialist revolt instead of a Nationalist rising, so that the insurgents, deprived of all help from abroad and at home, would be easily crushed, while the Alliance with France, essential to his Balkan plans, would not be imperilled. Had he prevailed, Europe would, in 1863, have had to deal with a Balkan instead of a Polish crisis, and the whole course of

[1] F.O. Russia 626, No. 92; Napier to Russell, February 20th, 1863.

European history would have been changed. But he reckoned without Bismarck, who was now directing the policy of Prussia and anxiously looking for an opportunity to prevent the Franco-Russian Alliance which was his constant preoccupation. To Prussia and Austria the aspirations of the Polish revolutionaries were as dangerous as they were to Russia, since the Poland of 1772 could not be restored without depriving, the one of Posen, the other of Galicia and Cracow. But an autonomous Russian Poland would be hardly less dangerous; indeed, if it won France to an alliance with Russia, it would be much more so, since, while Austria was defending Venetia against the King of Italy, and Prussia was holding the Rhine against the French Emperor, the Tsar might overrun Posen and Galicia and recreate the Poland of 1772 to his own advantage. No sooner, therefore, had the news of the Polish rising reached Berlin, than Bismarck persuaded the King, besides sending a message to Petrograd assuring the Tsar that Prussia would not only prevent help being sent from Posen to the rebels, to authorise Russian troops to cross Posen in pursuit of them (February 10th). This turned the scale against Gortchakoff, and a war of extermination began, which rallied the nobles of the White party to the aid of the Red insurgents, and, furthermore, extending the rebellion into the country districts, made any further understanding with France impossible.

In France, public opinion had at once declared itself for the rebels; but the Emperor was very reluctant to sacrifice the understanding with Russia which had been his mainstay during the last few years, and, but for the Prussian Military Convention with Russia[1], which might at any moment become an Alliance, he would probably have left things to take their course. The Convention, however, forced him to take up the Polish Question; he, therefore, approached Great Britain with a proposal for a combined remonstrance to Berlin. Great Britain declined, because of the connexion between the British and the Prussian Courts, and proposed, instead, joint action at Petrograd. This time France declined; and there matters rested for the moment.

In Great Britain public opinion was quite as strong for the Poles as it was in France; but no member of the Government took the same interest in the cause of Polish liberty as Palmerston, Russell and Gladstone had taken in that of Italian independence, and Russell, at least, saw in the insurgents only "the savage disciples of Mazzini," on whose behalf there was no need to sacrifice our friendly relations with Prussia and Austria. But the spread of the revolt, and fear lest

[1] F.O. Russia 625, No. 118; Napier to Russell, March 3rd, 1863, reporting an interview of the Russian Ambassador with Napoleon III on February 25th.

the pressure put on the French Emperor by the Liberals through Prince Napoleon and by the Clericals through the Empress, should after all force Napoleon III, however unwillingly, to intervene at Warsaw, induced Russell on March 2nd to address to Petrograd a very remarkable despatch. It set forth that Great Britain, as a party to the Treaty of 1815, and as a Power deeply interested in the tranquillity of Europe, deemed herself entitled to express her opinion on the events then taking place in Poland, and in the most friendly spirit towards Russia. Accordingly, with a sincere desire to promote the interest of all the parties concerned, the despatch suggested that the Emperor should end the struggle by proclaiming a general amnesty, and place Poland in possession of all the political and civil privileges granted by Alexander I in execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of 1815. To this futile missive, dictated by fear of France, Gortchakoff replied by simply observing that, under the Constitution of 1861, the institutions of Poland were both national and representative; while, for the rest, he referred the British Government to the correspondence that had taken place in 1831. The despatch did unbounded harm, both by encouraging the Poles to hope for foreign aid in a hopeless struggle and by enabling Bismarck to keep France, who might have aided the Poles, in play, while he was improving Prussian relations with Russia. It even went far to bring about the very result it was intended to prevent. For, as Lord Napier pointed out to Alexander II (March 14th), Protestant Great Britain had nothing to gain from the establishment, in the rear of Protestant Germany, of a great Catholic and military monarchy with strong French sympathies; and while she desired the freedom and welfare of the Poles, her religious and material interests drew her to Russia rather than to Poland[1]. Palmerston's motive—for it was he, Russell tells us, who dictated our policy and drafted most of our despatches in this business[2]—was to persuade the Tsar to thwart the ambition of France by ending the Insurrection on terms which would leave her no *locus standi*. But the effect was to give more influence to Prince Napoleon, who, as Bismarck informed Gortchakoff, was trying to bring about a coalition between the Moderates and the rebels in Poland, so as to mitigate, in favour of the latter the existing impression as to their revolutionary and socialist character.

The Emperor Napoleon's first idea was to urge the Tsar to establish Poland as an independent State under Prince Nicholas of

[1] F.O. Russia 628, No. 153.
[2] Earl Russell, *Speeches and Despatches*, II. 231.

Leuchtenberg[1], and, when that project failed, to form an alliance with Austria against Russia for restoring the unity of Poland under an Archduke, in exchange for the cession of Venetia. But Austria, who, although she would not tie her hands by joining the Prusso-Russian Convention, was working with Bismarck for the isolation of the Polish Insurrection, refused, alleging that she wished to preserve her neutrality, to conciliate parties, and, so far as she could, to prevent war[2]. Whereupon, Napoleon fell back on his favourite device of a Congress. The British and Austrian Governments at once agreed, each being anxious only to prevent France from acting alone. On April 17th, identic Notes were presented at Petrograd, the Austrian citing the unfortunate influence exercised on her own provinces by the disturbances in Poland; the French pointing out that the recurrent outbreaks there must spring from some inveterate evil, which ought to be removed for the sake of the Peace of Europe; and the British simply repeating, at greater length, the argument of the despatch of March 2nd, and calling on the Tsar to grant Poland the Constitution stipulated for in the Treaty of 1815.

As might have been expected, Russia's answer to all three Notes was, in substance, that the Tsar had already offered (March 31st) an amnesty to all but a few and promised to maintain the institutions already granted—beyond which he would not go. The reply to London further insisted that the reconquest of Poland in 1830 cancelled Russia's obligations under the Treaty, suggested that the British Government could hardly assert that the Constitution of 1815 was the only panacea for Poland's woes, and pointed out that the Powers which attached importance to the restoration of peace in Poland should turn their attention to the party of Cosmopolitan Revolution, whose work the Polish Insurrection was[3].

Lord Napier reinforced Gortchakoff's arguments (April 6th) by pointing out[4] the objections to reconstructing ancient Poland, the ally of France and the tool of the Jesuits; and adding that an amnesty could not include the exiles, while a Constitution could not be granted to Poland unless one were also given to Finland, the Baltic Provinces, etc., and the Russian empire federated. He urged that, if Great Britain could not induce the Powers to bring the Polish Question before a Congress, her demands should be restricted to the following: (1) A limited amnesty to be granted after the suppression

[1] F.O. Russia 630, No. 265; Napier to Russell, April 24th, 1863.
[2] *Ibid.* 629, No. 191. Cf. No. 197.
[3] *Further Correspondence respecting the Insurrection in Poland*, 1863, Part II No. 1.
[4] *Ibid.*

of the Revolt; (2) the order for an arbitrary military levy to be withdrawn; and (3) an undertaking to be given that the national institutions promised in 1861 would be continued and developed, and that Poland would be admitted to an equal share of any representative rights hereafter granted to any parts of the empire.

Gortchakoff's reply to the Note of April 17th suggests that, had Palmerston and Russell followed this very sound advice, their proposals would have been accepted, enabling them to withdraw with some credit from a situation that was fast becoming impossible. Unfortunately, the tales of atrocities committed by the Russian troops—most of them true—that were reaching Paris and London, had rendered Russell not less indignant with Russia than he was distrustful of France—and the opportunity was lost, never to return. For the continued resistance of the Poles and the attitude of the Powers, which caused the Tsar to draw closer to Prussia, likewise roused the patriotic resentment of the Russians, who began to flock into the army as for a Holy War.

The Insurrection, in fact, was spreading into Lithuania and the border-provinces of Volhynia, Podolia and Ukraine, where it quickly assumed the character of a War at once national, religious, and agrarian, between Catholic Polish landowners and burghers, and Orthodox Russian peasants. Thus, at the end of April, Napier had to warn his Government[1] that no more could be done for Poland without rousing all Russia; for, where the Poles, the traditional enemies of Russian nationality and religion, were concerned, all distinctions of interest and sentiment would cease.

Palmerston and Russell, however, were now launched on their course; and Napoleon, whose resources were fully taxed by the Mexican Expedition, easily induced them to fall in with the idea of a Congress and so keep the Polish Question alive till his hands should be free again, by asserting the only two alternatives to be a conference and a rupture with Russia. In their anxiety to prevent the one, they began to urge the other. It was in vain that Napier bluntly told them (May 13th): "The Revolt is spreading in the hope of foreign intervention. If the English Government do not mean to fight, let them say so, and stop the loss of life and the suffering attendant on a rising which, unaided, cannot succeed[2]." He further pointed out[3] (May 31st) that, however desirable a cessation of hostilities might be, it was not possible to negotiate it, since no one knew where the Polish National Government was. And he asked whether, even if it were possible, France and Great Britain had enough influence with the revolutionary leaders

[1] F.O. Russia 630, No. 271. [2] F.O. Russia 631, No. 335. [3] *Ibid.* No. 351.

to bring them to terms, and whether they could put forward any terms at all for the border-provinces which were not covered by the Treaty of Vienna. They still held on their course, even when they learnt[1] that Gortchakoff would make Russia's entrance into a Congress subject to its treating all questions of international interest and not that of Poland only—in other words, that he would try to buy the freedom of the Black Sea with concessions to Poland. They persuaded France and Austria to join them in presenting (June 27th) identical Notes urging the adoption of Six Points as the bases of negotiation—including a complete amnesty, national representation as in 1815, liberty of conscience and the use of Polish as the official language—accompanied by a cessation of hostilities, and the assembling of a conference of the eight Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna.

Gortchakoff's reply, communicated July 18th, is best summarised in Napier's words:

> The armistice was rejected—that we had foreseen; the conferences were declined—that we had apprehended; but the six points had not been distinctly adopted, and, what was altogether unexpected and most to be deplored, the intervention of France and England was set aside and propositions were made to enter upon a separate discussion on Polish affairs with Austria and Prussia as conterminous Powers peculiarly interested, without any apparent provision even for the subsequent participation of the other Powers signataries of the Treaty of Vienna[2].

The claim that the settlement of Poland in 1815 was the separate act of the Powers directly interested, and that its inclusion in the general Treaty did not invest the other Powers with a right to intervene on behalf of the Poles, ought not, in itself, to have caused any surprise, inasmuch as it had been previously made at Petrograd in October, 1862, in connexion with an article in the *Journal des Débats* which discussed the bearing of the Treaty of Vienna on the establishment of the Polish Government[3]. The startling feature of this claim was the good understanding between Russia, Prussia and Austria to which its presentation on the present occasion pointed. The most determined champions of Poland had now to recognise that there could be no war against these three Powers in alliance; and, though negotiations dragged on for some months longer and rumours of war still filled the air, it was generally recognised by the end of October, 1863, that the Polish affair was virtually extinct. The Poles, indeed, were still in arms, and Napoleon III would fain have done something for them,

[1] F.O. Russia 631, No. 333.
[2] *Further Correspondence respecting the Insurrection in Poland*, 1863, Part v. No. 1.
[3] F.O. Russia 608, No. 511; Napier to Russell, October 3rd, 1862.

while covering the failure of his policy, by dealing with the Treaty of 1815 as no longer in force, and summoning a Congress to consider the European situation as a whole; but Russell rejected the suggestion in a despatch almost discourteously abrupt. This was the Emperor's last effort; and, abandoned by all, the Poles at last gave in (February, 1864) and passed under the hard yoke of servitude.

Little more need be said as to the "diplomacy" of Palmerston and Russell during this crisis, which ended so differently from the Italian of but three years earlier. It was, indeed, apart from the Polish Insurrection itself, largely of their own making. Left to himself, Napoleon would never have imperilled for the sake of the Poles the *entente* with Russia on which his policy with respect to Turkey was founded, especially when, by taking up arms on their behalf, he would have furnished Bismarck with the means of drawing Russia closer to Prussia. The fact that Palmerston and Russell did not perceive this, though Malmesbury perceived it, is the measure of their insight. Then, having decided to intervene lest the Emperor should do so alone, they never paused to consider whether their doctrinaire proposals were likely to be accepted by either the Tsar or the insurgents, but pressed these proposals on the Tsar in a manner inviting their rejection, and persisted in this course, despite the clearest warning of the harm they were doing to those whose cause they professed to have at heart. But more than this. Consciously or not, they helped to prevent the formation of the Franco-Russian Alliance which alone could have held Bismarck in check, and to call into life, instead, the Prusso-Russian Alliance, destined to be a controlling factor in European diplomacy for over thirty years. And, throughout these transactions, they treated the French Emperor with a suspicion and, at the end, with a lack of courtesy which went far to impair what remained of good feeling between Great Britain and France. Yet, in censuring the policy, we can hardly blame its agents. Neither Palmerston, self-confident, high-handed and intolerant of opposition, nor Russell, a sincere friend of humanity and a genuine patriot, but dogmatic, and impatient of criticism, was very well qualified to deal successfully with the Polish crisis; but the fundamental fact is that they alike no longer understood the age in which they found themselves or could cope with its strongest statesmanship.

CHAPTER XI

COMMERCIAL RELATIONS, 1828–1865

I. *ZOLLVEREIN* NEGOTIATIONS, 1828–1865

THE Prussian Tariff of 1818, upon which the *Zollverein* was eventually built, was received enthusiastically at the time by British fiscal reformers and by a large part of the British exporting interest. As bestowed on the most rational Tariff of its day, this admiration was deserved. Food and materials were taxed lightly or not at all, and manufactures paid very reasonable specific duties[1]. But heavy revenue duties were laid on alcoholic liquors and "colonial wares," and heavy transit duties, also with an eye to revenue, on most goods merely passing over Prussian territory for consumption elsewhere. These heavy duties were, naturally, not acceptable to the British exporting interest, which was anxious to see its reexport trade in colonial produce undiminished, and to retain routes to the main trade centres of Germany free of the Prussian transit dues. As almost all German foreign trade, during the early nineteenth century, flowed through the Hanse Towns and through the great fair-holding towns of Frankfort-on-the-Main and Leipzig, this implied—when translated into terms of commercial policy—a desire to prevent the extension of the Prussian system to the Free Cities of the Empire, who as trading communities kept all customs duties at a minimum, and to preserve a route to Leipzig over which Prussia had no control. There was an equally natural desire that a group of agricultural States in northern and north-western Germany—Hanover, the Mecklenburgs and some others—whose customs system was more favourable than that of Prussia to the import of British manufactures, should not change that system. These are the postulates of the purely commercial policy pursued by Great Britain towards the *Zollverein*—itself, after all, a commercial entity—during the years of its gestation and those in which it covered only a part of Germany.

For some years after the introduction of the reformed Prussian Tariff, its destiny was not perceived even by Prussian statesmen[2];

[1] I.e. duties on the yard, gallon, pound, etc., as opposed to *ad valorem* duties. The point is of importance in the history of the commercial relations between Great Britain and the *Zollverein*. See below, p. 470.

[2] Treitschke, *Deutsche Geschichte*, II. 619.

but by 1828 the possibilities of the future were becoming clear. Germany was dividing itself into leagues and counter-leagues, in whose contests the British Residents at the various German Courts were showing an active interest, though that taken by British Foreign Secretaries remained rather languid. The accession of Hesse-Darmstadt to the Prussian system by the Treaty of February 14th, 1828, marks the beginning of these contests. Prussia, at that time, was sounding the King of Saxony, the Thuringian Grand-dukes and other Princes, and the Elector of Hesse. Should she succeed in winning them, wrote the British Chargé d'affaires at Frankfort anxiously on March 24th of that year, "our commerce with the interior of Germany..., will be almost entirely destroyed." He was glad to be able to report, however, that the Royal Saxon Court was striving to form a free trade Central Union, "with a view to keeping open the communication with the middle and south parts of Germany[1]." Meanwhile, Bavaria and Württemberg were drawing together into a Union of the South. All through the summer, negotiations went on, with the active participation of the British Minister accredited to the Diet at Frankfort, Henry Unwin Addington[2]. He endorsed what his subordinate had written as to the importance of keeping open the Leipzig route, and added that "besides their *lawful* commercial advantages such a state of things will afford immense facilities for carrying on the contraband trade in the dominions of Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg and Darmstadt, and may not improbably have the effect of ultimately detaching more than one of these States from the restrictive system[3]." In September, the new Union, whose chief members were the Saxonies, Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, Brunswick, Frankfort and the Hanse Towns, came into existence by the Treaty of Cassel. Addington was present and, in writing to his chief, expressed the hope that he had not gone too far in letting the Elector of Hesse know "that Great Britain did not view with an indifferent eye the proceedings of the Association[4]." The expressions indicate the measure of active interest shown in Whitehall.

Its facilities for smuggling did not give life to the Central League. Prussia, her aims now clear before her, attacked it with every weapon in her armoury. She negotiated across it with the League of the

[1] Milbanke to Lord Dudley, March 24th, 1828.

[2] Addington arrived in May. Besides the F.O. documents here quoted, reference may be made to the slightly warped account of Addington's work in Treitschke, *op. cit.*, v. 627 sqq.

[3] Addington to Lord Dudley, May 27th, 1825.

[4] To Aberdeen, September 13th, 1828.

South. She bribed petty Thuringian States to desert it by undertaking to build a great road through their difficult territories southward into Bavaria. She won over Hesse-Cassel, and detached Saxony, who coveted the Prussian markets for her rising manufactures. By 1831, the League was dead; and in 1833 Bavaria, Württemberg and all the Saxon States were arranging to enter the *Zollverein*. In 1832, Great Britain had tried to keep Frankfort out of it by signing with her a Commercial Treaty which contained a ten years' mutual guarantee of most favoured nation treatment. "The Treaty," wrote our agent at Frankfort a few years later, "was contracted [by her] to obtain support against Prussia and encourage other States to take the same course[1]." But, during 1833–4, all Frankfort's neighbours went over to Prussia, and the Prussian customhouses came "within a few hundred yards of the gates of the town on every side[2]." In 1835, the Berlin Government told the representative of the Free City that it "considered him in the light of an agent...come...to fight a battle for British interests[3]"; at the end of the year that city, now helpless, begged and received Great Britain's leave to abandon its promise to her of most favoured nation treatment[4]; and in 1836 it entered the *Zollverein* on good terms.

From this time forward, direct British intervention in *Zollverein* affairs became rare; but there was generally a British agent, with a watching brief, at the periodical *Zollverein* Tariff Conferences, ready to encourage quietly any party whose policy favoured British commercial interests. In 1836, John Macgregor, an unofficial servant of the Board of Trade, was exploring the ground at the first of these Conferences in Munich[5]. He had to consider among other things the chances of an Anglo-*Zollverein* treaty; but, being told very clearly by the Prussian Representative, that this meant a negotiation at Berlin and "a reduction of [the British] corn duties to a fixed figure[6]," he proceeded no further. He had already ascertained, by a visit to the Leipzig Easter fair, that the *Zollverein* Tariff had nearly killed the sale of British cottons for local consumption, but that there had been heavy sales for transport into Poland—by Jewish smugglers—and into Turkey, Greece and Persia. The sale of British woollens at

[1] Thos. Cartwright to Palmerston, June 4th, 1835.
[2] Cartwright to Palmerston, June 9th, 1835.
[3] Cartwright to Palmerston, May 13th, 1835.
[4] The revised Treaty is dated December 29th, 1835.
[5] Details and references in *The English Historical Review*, July, 1910, p. 490.
[6] Macgregor to Board of Trade, July 9th, 1836.

Leipzig had never been good, because of the well-developed Saxon woollen industry. On hardware and cutlery the duties were not high enough to check sales. His conclusion was, that all Great Britain really needed was a reduction of the cotton and woollen duties[1]. Next year, again in Munich though not at a *Zollverein* Tariff Conference, Macgregor was encouraged by Bavarian statesmen to agitate the matter once more. He was led to believe that Bavaria, Saxony and "several other states" would assist him "in regard to a Commercial Treaty with England and a reduction of the high duties" in the *Zollverein* Tariff, and was assured that Bavaria and other "smaller sovereignties" were, "not without reason, alarmed" at "the influence which Prussia was exercising all over Germany[2]." But the British Tariff being, in spite of Huskisson's reforms, still far more restrictive than that of the *Zollverein*, any attempt to modify the policy of the *Zollverein* laid Great Britain open to an easy retort. Hence, no overt attempt was made. Had the Whig Government of the 'thirties been as much interested in fiscal as it was in municipal or in poor law reform, the result might have been different, and a treaty might conceivably have been arranged before the *Zollverein* Tariff began, as it did later, to assume a more definitely protective character. As things were, however, the British corn, timber and linen duties proved an absolute bar to effective negotiation.

Yet Macgregor's activities in 1836–8 actually produced a Treaty which marks an important stage in the relations between Great Britain and the *Zollverein*: the Anglo-Austrian Commercial Treaty of July 3rd, 1838. Macgregor's political superior, Sir F. Lamb, Ambassador at Vienna, hoped that the Treaty, which was intended to develop the traffic on the Danube, might "give to Bavaria and Württemberg a community of interests with Austria and counterbalance the ascendancy which Prussia had acquired over them[3]"; but those mainly responsible for the Treaty at the Board of Trade took a more strictly commercial view—and Palmerston appears to have taken no particular view of any kind.

In form, the Treaty was merely an expansion of the Anglo-Austrian Treaty of 1829, the last of that series of Reciprocity Treaties which is connected with Huskisson's name, though Huskisson was

[1] To the Board of Trade, April 29th, 1836, Letters of Board of Trade Series. Saxony, on entering the *Zollverein*, had bargained with Prussia for low transit duties on goods handled at the Leipzig fairs.

[2] Macgregor to Palmerston, July 12th, 1837. F.O.

[3] Lamb to Palmerston, December 29th, 1837.

not in office at the time of its signature. It began by guaranteeing reciprocity of dues on shipping throughout the whole of both empires. Great Britain, also, promised to give most favoured nation treatment to Austrian goods "exported through the Northern outlet of the Elbe and the Eastern outlet of the Danube" (Art. II)—a new type of clause in such treaties, since it applied to exports through territory not actually Austrian. It was not in conflict with the letter of the last revision of the British Navigation Law (3 & 4 William IV, c. 54); but its harmony with the spirit was doubtful. A later clause (Art. IV) broke even the letter of the law, by authorising Austrian vessels to fill up with cargo at Turkish Danubian ports, and so carry the produce of a third country into England, as though it were Austrian produce. Art. V again violated the law, by sanctioning the shipment of African and Asiatic produce to England from Austrian ports—in practice, Levant produce from Trieste. In return for these useful concessions, Austria substituted for her prohibitions of various English manufactures[1]—cottons, woollens, "fire engines," and many others—duties on them, and in other cases she reduced her duties. This was not done by treaty, but by a separate customs edict.

Macgregor, a utilitarian free-trader like his partner J. D. Hume, the Secretary of the Board of Trade, was not indisposed to a breach in the old navigation system; but his political chief at home had some difficulty in regularising his action. The Article dealing with Levant produce was regularised by a clause, "smuggled," as a Parliamentary critic put it, into a customs Bill on the third reading in 1839. The Danubian clause was not made legal until 1840, when, by 3 & 4 Victoria, c. 95, Her Majesty was empowered "to declare by order in council that ports which are the most natural and convenient shipping ports of States within whose dominions they are not situated may, in certain cases," be treated as the national ports of those States for all purposes of British navigation regulations. In discussions of the matter, stress was laid upon the revolutionary effects of steam navigation upon the river trade of the Continent and the consequent need for a revised policy.

For ten years from the signature of the Austrian Treaty diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the *Zollverein* turned almost solely on navigation questions; but, through these negotiations, there

[1] "It need hardly be said that the prohibitions had never been effective. There was an immense smuggling trade in English wares up the Elbe from Leipzig, to mention only one line of fraud." *The English Historical Review*, July, 1910, p. 494.

can clearly be traced the desire of Great Britain to prevent the extension of the *Zollverein* to those northern and north-western States of Germany which were still outside it. This desire was the more natural because, in the 'forties, while British tariffs were moving downwards, *Zollverein* Tariffs on manufactures were either moving upwards or becoming more burdensome to the British trader by remaining at the old "specific" levels, while invention and the factory system were cheapening the yard of cotton goods or the ton of iron rails.

Prussia lost no time in claiming for the *Zollverein* the advantages of the modified British policy. Baron Bülow had opened the matter in London, before the Bill of 1840 was under discussion in the House. When the Bill appeared, he pressed it forward. Palmerston was busy with greater international questions during the summer, and Henry Labouchere, President of the Board of Trade, was much out of town. Consequently, Bülow dealt chiefly with John Macgregor, who had recently succeeded J. D. Hume at the Board. Prussia wished to have all the North Sea rivers, from the Elbe to the Scheldt inclusive, scheduled as "natural and convenient" outlets for *Zollverein* trade. Macgregor agreed to insert the Scheldt into his draft convention, accepting, though with hesitation[1], Bülow's argument that the Scheldt was a branch of the Rhine, joined to it by a natural waterway[2]. This contention was subsequently ruled out by both Labouchere and Palmerston. Before the end of the year, the Foreign Secretary knew of the project for a Franco-Belgian Customs Union, which came to light in 1841[3]. If Antwerp was a natural port for Prussia, it was still more so for France, out of whose territory the Scheldt flows: and, if it was natural for France, this was an argument in favour of the plan which was being considered by the King of the Belgians. Palmerston was not the man to give away a point in such a game, though at an early stage in the negotiations he had expressed the opinion that there was "no legal objection to including the Scheldt[4]." He and Bülow signed the Convention, excluding the Scheldt, on March 2nd, 1841.

Great Britain agreed to treat *Zollverein* ships and their cargoes, coming from any port between the Elbe and the Meuse, as though they came from ports in *Zollverein* territory. British ships, from whatever

[1] He noted his doubts on the margin in pencil.

[2] There are two Memoranda on the subject from Bülow in the F.O. Papers (Prussia), one of August, 1840, a second of February, 1841.

[3] He discussed the scheme in his despatches to Lord William Russell at Berlin, during the latter part of 1840.

[4] A Note for the Board of Trade, August 20th, 1840, initialled P.

ports they came, might enter *Zollverein* ports on the same terms as *Zollverein* ships. Prussia retained rights of trading with British Colonies, guaranteed to her under Huskisson's Reciprocity Treaty of 1824; and any States which might in future join the *Zollverein* were to enjoy the benefits now stipulated.

The Convention at once moved the non-*Zollverein* States to seek equal privileges. Concessions were made to the Hanse Towns in a Treaty, dated August 3rd, 1841, whereby their powerful shipping was to be at least as well treated as that of the *Zollverein*—which, in fact, possessed very few ships. In Hanover, Oldenburg and the Mecklenburgs, the negotiations with Great Britain led to trials of strength between parties for and against the *Zollverein*. The latter could always put pressure on Great Britain by threats of joining the former. So successful were the Mecklenburgers in insisting on "that favour which by the accession to the *Zollverein* could without doubt be obtained[1]" that, by a Treaty of May 1st, 1844, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, which has no more sea-coast than Bohemia, found that its "natural outlets," as recognised in London, extended from the Meuse to the Oder. Three months later (Treaty of July 22nd, 1844) the "natural outlets" of Hanover were even more widely defined: they extended from the Meuse to the Niemen. She was also promised reciprocity in all matters affecting shipping, with most favoured nation treatment in all customs matters. As a result of the three Treaties, the Hanseates were jealous of the privileges granted to the Mecklenburgers, and the Mecklenburgers of those granted to the Hanoverians.

The British Navigation Law was revised for the last time in the year of the Irish Potato Famine (8 & 9 Victoria, c. 88)[2]. To the end, it was more restrictive than the corresponding laws of any German State. In the early 'forties, partly as a result of Frederick List's "national economic" propaganda, there was much talk in Germany of a league among her maritime States which should force concessions from Great Britain by concerted pressure[3]. Prussia took the occasion of the great Corn Law debates, in the spring of 1846, to come forward as the champion of Germany. In April, Bunsen handed to Lord Aberdeen, in the name of the *Zollverein*, a Memorandum on the renewal of the Convention of 1841, which was really

[1] Baron Lützow to Colonel Hodges, Consul-General at Hamburg, September 30th, 1843. Hodges to Viscount Canning, October 10th, 1843.

[2] There was no debate on this final "Act for the encouragement of British shipping and of navigation."

[3] See Treitschke, *op. cit.*, v. 484 sqq.

a reasoned attack on the Navigation Law and on the recent British Treaties with north-German States. "The Treaties recently concluded ... exclude the supposition that a strict maintenance of the Navigation Act is intended.... A great principle of that Act has been given up in order to conclude them, and, be it observed, this has been done to the direct injury of Prussian shipping[1]." Prussia could not, the Memorandum stated, promise to renew the Convention on the old terms. She was being constantly urged to enact a navigation law on British lines; but she preferred to begin by friendly methods. In view of recent events, Bunsen expressed confidence in Great Britain's readiness to "mitigate her Navigation Laws, or grant exception from those laws in favour of the *Zollverein*."

Aberdeen referred the Memorandum to his colleagues at the Board of Trade, Dalhousie and Gladstone. Dalhousie pointed out that for years Great Britain had been lowering duties on *Zollverein* wares, whereas, from the German side, "every year brought either heavier imposts or the threat of them." Gladstone was more emphatic. Prussia, he said, like most other States, pursued an anti-commercial policy, "and only differed from them in that this course of proceedings had been accompanied with constant vapouring about the principles of freedom of trade." He expressed his personal doubts of the value of the Navigation Laws, but also a strong wish that his country should deal with them "as Prussia said she meant to deal with her customs duties," that is to say, as and how she herself thought fit. Aberdeen's reply to Bunsen's Memorandum was made verbally and is not on record in the British archives[2]. No immediate action was taken on either side.

Within a year (January, 1847) the Navigation Law had been suspended by the Whig Cabinet, to ease the importation of food. In May, Prussia announced her intention of not renewing the Convention of 1841, but offered provisional renewal, provided all Baltic ports were recognised as natural outlets for *Zollverein* trade. Palmerston replied that he would concede the ports on the Mecklenburg list, but no other. He would not, for example, allow Riga. He suggested that Prussia should show her zeal for free trade and reciprocity by imitating

[1] Mecklenburg, for instance, might treat Prussian Baltic ports as her "natural outlets" for trade with England; Prussia did not enjoy a similar privilege in connexion with Mecklenburg ports.

[2] Judging from the reference in Treitschke, *op. cit.*, v. 485–6, there is in the Prussian archives some record of Gladstone's share in the matter.

Great Britain's recent wholesale reduction of tariffs[1]. In accepting the offer, some months later, Bunsen reiterated what he had often said before, that certain sections of our Navigation Law were "deeply felt" as "an infraction of German honour": it was, he said, the "universal conviction" in Germany that, unless Great Britain repealed the Law, the *Zollverein* must imitate it[2].

The necessity never arose. On June 26th, 1849, after prolonged Parliamentary enquiries and discussions, Labouchere's Bill, which practically put an end to the Navigation Law, received the royal assent. How far the action of the *Zollverein* had contributed to bring about repeal cannot, of course, be estimated. Other Powers, more formidable on the seas, notably the United States, had also put pressure on Great Britain. But, certainly, the attitude of foreign Powers taken collectively was of great importance. Peel once said that it was second only to the attitude of the Colonies among the considerations which led him to favour a thorough revision of the Navigation system[3].

From 1849 to 1852, the *Zollverein* passed through its most critical period. Austria under Schwarzenberg was working either for its dissolution or for her own entry into it as the conscious rival of Prussia. Prussia, therefore, was more than ever anxious to include in it those north-western States whose exclusion was a maxim of British policy. All through the 'forties she had been trying to secure them. Brunswick, which in 1834 had joined Hanover and Oldenburg in a *Steuerverein*, had gone over to the Prussian league in 1841. The intermixture of her territory with that of Hanover made this step very inconvenient to the Hanoverian Government. Offers to the latter from Prussia were frequent; but the King of Hanover thought that his royal dignity would be impaired by a sacrifice of fiscal independence, and continued to hold out for impossibly high terms. The Prussian Representatives at the Hanoverian Court complained of his reluctance to discuss the subject or allow anyone else to discuss it[4]. In 1843, the British Representative could "perceive no symptoms of an increasing disposition upon the part of this Government to join the great commercial league"; although it was, "indeed, the fashion to say that 'the Union must

[1] Palmerston to Bunsen, June 14th, 1847.
[2] Bunsen to Palmerston, January 24th, 1848.
[3] In a speech of June 9th, 1848. *Hansard*, XCIX. 646.
[4] Mr Bligh (British Representative at Hanover) to Lord Aberdeen, December 12th, 1843.

take place sooner or later[1].'" Early in the next year, he was instructed to "take every proper opportunity of encouraging the opinion that it will be more advantageous and more honourable for Hanover to maintain an independent position[2]." He replied that this was what he had always done[3]. The terms of the Anglo-Hanoverian Navigation Treaty, arranged in the summer at London, were intended to strengthen the Hanoverian spirit of independence.

After 1848, the situation changed. The Hanoverian Government needed money for domestic reforms; there was a chronic and irritating tariff war with Brunswick; industrialism was beginning to develop in a country hitherto agricultural, and the new railways were admitting an increasing flood of British manufactures[4]. A party in favour of a modest tariff protection began to grow up. These circumstances gave Prussia an opportunity which the events of 1850 determined her to seize. In that year, the *Zollverein* Conference met at Cassel. It was "indeed of unusual importance," as the British Representative wrote in his *Reminiscences*[5]:

> Prussia, in order to gratify the south-German Governments, had proposed against the opinion of her own statesmen increased duties on... foreign manufactures; whilst Austria...desired that the intended new duties should not take effect, but that the south-German States should continue discontented with Prussia...and the foreign Powers, viz. Great Britain, Belgium, and Switzerland...were assisting Austria in her efforts to nullify the business of the conference....I soon found that I had more allies than I at first anticipated.

The proposals were in fact rejected by the single vote of Brunswick, given, as the British Representative believed, in collusion with Prussia, who had no real wish to gratify the southern States, since they "were becoming every day more Austrian." This account is an interesting picture of a *Zollverein* gathering.

Since the risk of the south falling away to Austria and high protectionism was now great, Prussia, a predominantly agricultural and a food-exporting country, with a low tariff bias, was determined to secure Hanover and Oldenburg. Their admission would ensure a continuous north-German *Zollverein* territory; their weight, if they were admitted, would go into the low tariff scale, and their political importance was of the highest. She offered Hanover a reduction in the

[1] Bligh to Aberdeen, January 5th and March 30th, 1843.
[2] Aberdeen to Bligh, February 26th, 1844.
[3] Bligh to Aberdeen, March 14th, 1844.
[4] See Droysen, *Die Begründung des deutschen Reiches* (ed. 1905), II. 113 sqq.
[5] J. Ward, *Experiences of a Diplomatist*, pp. 98–9.

duties on colonial wares and alcohol, the right to import British railway-metal free of duty, and a handsome share in the takings of the joint concern. The offer was too good to refuse. By a Secret Treaty, signed on September 7th, 1851, Hanover and Oldenburg agreed to enter the *Zollverein* on January 1st, 1854—the date as from which all the Treaties constituting the League required renewal[1].

In the decisive *Zollverein* negotiations of 1852–3 Great Britain took no part[2]. Her policy was now quite exclusively commercial. Her Agents did what they could to block schemes for high tariffs; they were not instructed to interfere with the building up of a *Zollverein* as such. In fact, the Prussian policy in 1852 was rather favourable to British interests. Prussia was working to keep Austria out of the League, and one of her best tools for that purpose was a low *Zollverein* Tariff, which the Austrian manufacturing interest, accustomed to high Tariffs and prohibitions, would dislike. Therefore, at the Berlin *Zollverein* Conference of April, 1852, the British Agent was only a spectator[3]. Schwarzenberg's death (April 5th, 1852) eased Prussia's task, though she met with endless difficulties on the part of her associates, old and new. At last, she carried all her points, though the formal renewal of the *Zollverein* Treaties for 1854 was not completed until April 8th, 1853. The League, now including all Germany except German Austria, Mecklenburg, Holstein and the Hanse Towns, was renewed on the basis of a moderate Tariff, and the Austrian empire, being finally excluded from it, had to rest satisfied with a Treaty of Commerce and a promise that the question of her entry into the League should be reconsidered after six years.

This *Zollverein* Tariff of the fifties, kept low for reasons of policy, was in accord with the drift of contemporary European economic thought. As the years passed, Prussian Ministers were more and more influenced by Free Trade as a doctrine. Rulers of a State which was still, on the balance, an exporter of food and now profited by the opened British market; themselves mainly belonging to an agrarian gentry with no liking for industrialism—they had always proved refractory material for that national economic propaganda with which many of their associates from the south-German States sympathised. List was dead; and there was hardly an economist in Europe

[1] Droysen, *op. cit.*, II. 115.

[2] The negotiations are only mentioned once in the F.O. drafts for 1852, and then only in reference to something that Lord Cowley had been saying about them in Paris.

[3] Ward, *op. cit.*, pp. 121 sqq.

whose writings failed to suggest to them that, in this matter, inclination and principle were in accord. The electric telegraph was linking up the nations: telegraph forms began to appear among the diplomatic files; the victorious British Free Traders preached economic brotherhood; the linked nations negotiated with one another for the first time about such things as copyright law, in a way which suggested a real meaning in the phrase "the European family of peoples." In 1860 the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty was concluded, and Gladstone was hewing such wide gaps in the residuary British Tariff that it could no longer be regarded as even a small continuous obstacle to trade[1].

Prussia had now but little to gain by commercial negotiation with the United Kingdom. Ever since Bunsen's *démarche* of 1848 the arrangements guaranteed by the Anglo-Prussian Treaty of 1841 had been maintained provisionally, subject to six months' notice from either side[2]. Great Britain was not likely to give such notice. Her Navigation Acts had gone, and the Tariff reductions of 1860 had not been confined to France; they were a gift to the world. For Prussia, therefore, any bargaining with Great Britain was unnecessary. With France, who had made her concessions to Great Britain only, the case was different. So, before the year 1860 was out, Prussia began negotiations with France in her own name and in that of the *Zollverein*. Any tariff reductions which such a negotiation might eventually secure for German goods would be extended by France automatically to British goods, under the most favoured nation clause of the Treaty of 1860. But the Cabinet of London felt no absolute certainty that *Zollverein* concessions to France would be similarly extended, since there was no general most favoured nation clause applicable to tariffs in the Treaty of 1841[3]. It was hoped, however, that, in view of the British policy of the open door, Prussia might consent to the extension and pledge herself by an amended treaty containing a most favoured nation clause.

Lord Augustus Loftus, our Ambassador at Berlin, was instructed to sound the Prussian Government early in 1861. He was assured that any concessions made to France would in due course be extended to Great Britain[4]. Later in that year, Mr Ward, Chargé d'affaires

[1] See Section II of this Chapter.

[2] Lord John Russell to Lord Augustus Loftus (at Berlin), February 13th, 1861.

[3] There was only a clause guaranteeing most favoured nation treatment for sugar and rice imported from Great Britain.

[4] Instructions in the despatch of February 13th, referred to above. This first Prussian assurance is referred to in a letter from the Board of Trade to the Foreign Office of July 7th, 1861.

to the Hanse Towns, was appointed his technical adviser, the Board of Trade being anxious, not merely to obtain the concessions made to France, but, if possible, to secure "that the claims of British Commerce...received due consideration in the tariff changes which the Prussian Government was engaged in arranging[1]." Apparently, Mr Ward's representations carried some weight with the Prussian Ministry of Commerce[2]; but the draft treaty prepared by the Board of Trade was put on one side at Berlin. The French negotiation was moving slowly: Prussia, as usual, had difficulty in carrying the south-German States with her: she would not sign anything with Great Britain until she had made certain of France: but Lord Augustus Loftus was again assured that, "on the very day" on which the French business was settled, she would "sign a convention of the nature now proposed[3]," that is, a convention guaranteeing to Great Britain most favoured nation treatment.

The Franco-Prussian negotiation was finished early in 1862; but this did not amount to a treaty. Prussia's colleagues in the *Zollverein* had yet to approve; and, in these years of political tension in Germany, economics were but the tool of politics. At times, the Cabinet of London grew impatient; but, being assured by an expert Agent, in the spring of 1862, that there was no cause for anxiety, first, because the new Tariff would not "essentially change" the commercial relations between Great Britain and Germany, and, secondly, because differential duties were never allowed by the *Zollverein* except to Austria[4], it proceeded to watch developments with more calm.

Austria tried to block the Treaty; Hanover attempted to set a high price on her adhesion to it; there was much trouble with the south, and, in the end, Bavaria and Württemberg refused to sign it. Thus, although the Prussian Parliament accepted it, in August, 1862[5], Bernstorff explained to Loftus that it could not come into force until the existing *Zollverein* Treaties had been renewed, assuring him at the same time that "Prussia would never consent to the renewal of the *Zollverein* except on the basis of the Treaty with France[6]." By the

[1] Board of Trade to Foreign Office, July 7th.
[2] Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 182.
[3] Loftus to Russell, August 24th, 1861. See also a Memorandum of Baron von Sydow to Loftus of September 24th.
[4] Louis Malet, of the Board of Trade, to the Foreign Office, from Berlin, March 8th, 1862.
[5] Loftus to Russell, May 17th, May 31st, July 26th, August 2nd, August 16th.
[6] Loftus to Russell, August 2nd, 1862. The Treaties were timed to run out on January 1st, 1866, and would require renewal in 1865, at the latest.

end of 1862, no progress had been made towards breaking down the opposition of the southern States, behind which Hanover and Grand-ducal Hesse were marking time. Their motives were almost entirely political: "they will make their adhesion to the French Treaty dependent on the terms which may be granted to Austria," Loftus reported in November[1].

One small step towards a freer intercourse between Germany and Great Britain was taken during these years of abortive negotiation—a Treaty with Hanover, signed on June 22nd, 1861, by which the so-called Stade Tolls on cargoes ascending the Elbe were abolished. These Tolls constituted a hoary impediment to traffic, with a pedigree which German publicists traced to A.D. 1038[2]. So far back as 1841, Great Britain had sent a Commissioner to treat with the Hanoverians; but no agreement was reached, and the matter slept[3]. In 1861 the initiative came from Hamburg, which—lying up stream from Stade—was of all places the one most interested in the free navigation of the Elbe. Dr Rücker, the Hanseatic Minister in London, raised the question, which was settled after a complex negotiation between Hanover, of the one part, and fifteen States, led by Great Britain and the Hanse Towns, of the other part. Hanover abandoned her rights for ever, in return for a sum down of 2,857,338⅔ German *thalers*, of which Great Britain and Hamburg each paid 1,033,333⅓, and the remaining thirteen States the balance[4].

Negotiations in Germany touching the Prusso-French Treaty and the renewal of the *Zollverein* seemed interminable, and they became active in 1864. In June of that year, Sir A. Malet, British Minister at Frankfort, after referring to "the desperate struggle of the protectionists against the growing prevalence of free-trade doctrines," informed Earl Russell "with much confidence, that the efforts of this effete doctrine were about to encounter a complete defeat by the miscarriage of the attempt to break up the German Customs Union, and to defeat the liberal tendencies of the Franco-Prussian Treaty." "*The Augsburg General Gazette*," he added, "had published a series of violent attacks against Prussian commercial liberality, contrasting the views of the Bismarck Cabinet in this respect with the absolutism

[1] To Russell, November 25th.

[2] See a Memorandum from Bülow to the Foreign Office of August, 1840. F.O. Prussia.

[3] Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 24. Mr Ward was the Commissioner. In 1861 he assisted in the negotiation at Hanover, p. 179.

[4] The text is in *Accounts and State Papers*, LXV. (1861), 559. The thirteen included nearly all the European Powers and Brazil.

of its political administration[1]." A few days later, Electoral Hesse, because of its position a keystone State in the *Zollverein* fabric, agreed to renew the Union unconditionally and swallow the French Treaty[2]. The other recalcitrants all fell into line; and by the end of the year it was known that the Treaty would begin to operate on July 1st following[3].

Therefore, in January, 1865, Russell sent a draft Anglo-Prussian Commercial Treaty of a most undiplomatic simplicity to Lord Napier at Berlin. Napier had asked for it. Great Britain, he had reported, would, in any case, obtain nearly all that she wanted, since most of the concessions made to France had been inserted in the *Zollverein* General Tariff; but, since "a basis of right," was preferable to "a basis of benevolence," he suggested a brief Treaty[4]. By its first clause, Prussia should undertake to extend the provisions of the French Treaty to the United Kingdom; by the second, she should guarantee most favoured nation treatment in all matters of commerce and navigation; by the third and last, she should agree to treat British subjects as though they were her own "in regard to trade marks and designs[5]." Bismarck, after reading the draft, said that, "for his part, he would be happy to sign . . . in half an hour—but he owed it to his colleagues . . . to consult them[6]." Also, there were his *Zollverein* colleagues, whom, as he said when handing in a counter-draft three weeks later, "it was his duty, and not always an easy one, to consult and satisfy[7]." This process led to complications, and the Treaty, which started with three Articles, ended with nine, less explicit, but on the whole sufficient for the ends in view. There ought to have been ten; but Hanover refused to accept an Article, representing half of the original British Article II, which guaranteed most favoured nation treatment in all matters of navigation as distinct from commerce. This Article was dropped and turned into a minute Navigation Treaty with Prussia alone[8]—though Oldenburg acceded to it—finally signed by Napier and Bismarck on August 16th.

The main Treaty had been signed on May 30th, by Napier and

[1] Malet to Earl Russell, June 25th, 1864. F.O. Germany.
[2] Malet to Russell, July 2nd.
[3] Malet to Russell, December 19th.
[4] Napier to Russell, January 13th.
[5] Russell to Napier, January 18th. Ward had been sounding the ground at Berlin in the previous September. Ward, *op. cit.*, pp. 208–9.
[6] Napier to Russell, January 21st.
[7] Napier to Russell, February 11th.
[8] Russell's despatches of April and May to Napier, especially May 22nd, and May 20th, and Napier's telegram to Russell of May 16th.

Ward, for Great Britain, Bismarck, von Pommer-Esche, Phillipsborn and Delbrück for the King of Prussia, "representing the sovereign States and territories united to the Prussian system of Customs[1]." The Contracting Parties agreed (Arts. I–III) to treat one another's subjects, import trade, and export trade on the most favoured nation footing. They agreed (Art. IV) to levy no transit duties on one another's goods—an echo from earlier discussions. Any trade favours or privileges granted by either party to a third country were to be extended at once to the other; no prohibitions of imports or exports were to be made by either party with special reference to trade with the other; the export of coal was never to be prohibited, nor export duties on coal levied (Art. V)[2]. The trade marks clause of the original British draft became Article VI. Articles VIII and IX were formal; but Article VII dealt with principles which were to become critical. By it the whole Treaty was extended to the British Colonies and possessions, and it was agreed that in these no duties were to be laid on goods coming from the *Zollverein* higher than the duties on similar goods coming from the United Kingdom[3].

When the Ministers of the King of Prussia signed the Treaty on behalf of the "sovereign States and territories" united to his, the *Zollverein* had only a short span of life before it; but the Treaty remained the groundwork of Anglo-German commercial relations for over thirty years.

II. THE FRENCH COMMERCIAL TREATY OF 1860

The beneficial working of Pitt's Commercial Treaty (1786) was interrupted by the long wars that began in 1792. Napoleon showed no disposition to renew it after the Peace of Amiens, and before peace came again, the outlook of France had changed. Industries growing up under the Empire had brought into being a small group of iron-masters and textile manufacturers who exerted a great and increasing influence in the narrow circles of politics under the Restored Monarchy. The progressive elevation of the Tariff made it clear that France was following a policy of Prohibition and Protection, behind which both the agricultural and the manufacturing industries would be securely sheltered from foreign competition. The

[1] *Accounts and State Papers*, LVII. (1865), p. 951.

[2] This coal reservation, it is curious to note, was put in at the request of Württemberg. Napier to Russell, May 23rd.

[3] The Article was drafted by the Prussian negotiators. Russell took it lightly, saying he had no objection in principle. To Napier, March 10th.

progress of French industry during the reign of Louis-Philippe rendered high Protection less necessary; but, though a few duties were lowered and Commercial Treaties were negotiated with Sardinia and Belgium, French policy remained substantially unchanged. Some conversations, indeed, passed between Great Britain and France; but the time was unfavourable for a commercial treaty, the sentiment of the Chamber was strongly Protectionist, political difficulties arose, and the idea was dropped. The establishment of the Second Empire made a vital change in the existing conditions. Power passed from the Chambers to the Emperor, who had leanings towards freer trade, and the *entente* with Great Britain became an Alliance, which Napoleon genuinely desired to preserve and consolidate.

From the British point of view it had been, as Palmerston said in a debate on the Cobden Treaty (February 24th, 1860), "the object of many successive Governments" to extend our commercial intercourse with France. Peel had hoped to do so. In 1842 (May 10th), he explained to Parliament that he did not propose the reduction of certain duties which might be used later as instruments of negotiation[1]. The times had not favoured his hopes; nor were his successors more fortunate. In 1858, though our annual export of manufactured goods amounted to about £130,000,000, we sent but £688,000 to France[2]. The prohibitions imposed by France excluded our yarns and textile fabrics, the finer sorts of earthenware, glassware, hardware, cutlery and broadcloth, and high duties prevented the import of many other classes of goods. By successive steps, since 1842, Great Britain had been freeing her own trade, and it was principally the policy of France which restricted within narrow limits the commercial exchanges between two nations so near in situation, and mutually complementary in their resources and productions.

"The commercial relations of England with France," said Gladstone (February 10th, 1860), "have always borne a political character"; and political circumstances in 1859 were to favour the rapprochement of which the Cobden Treaty was the fruit. The idea was in the air, and what had long been economically desirable became suddenly politically possible. The state of Great Britain's finances and the needs of Napoleon's policy ripened the opportunity, and the men promptly appeared who could seize it. Napoleon III himself was both a necessity for and an obstacle to the arrangement of a treaty. His

[1] See also Peel's speech in the debate on Commercial Treaties, April 25th, 1843.
[2] Cashmere shawls made up nearly one-third of this amount.

autocratic power and his personal leanings made the Treaty possible; his baffling personality and the obscurity of his aims engendered a suspicion which nearly frustrated it.

The Treaty was not initiated, like that of 1786, along the ordinary diplomatic channels. The conception derived its original impulse from the enthusiasm of unofficial persons on both sides of the Channel[1]. In a debate on financial policy (July 21st, 1859) Bright made a powerful but unheeded appeal to the Government to make an offer to France. The speech was read by M. Chevalier, an enthusiastic Free Trader, who thereupon wrote to Cobden, and, later, finding that Cobden was intending to spend a part of the winter in Paris, suggested that he might then see the Emperor and discuss the project of a Treaty. In September, 1859, Cobden paid a visit to Gladstone at Hawarden and "in a garden stroll" unfolded to him the idea. He had expected sympathy and caution; but he found enthusiasm. Gladstone saw at once the wide fiscal and political bearings of the proposal—the pacification of excited suspicions and warlike feelings, and the passing of large measures of fiscal reform in both countries. Neither he nor Cobden stumbled over the pedantic consideration that, in such circumstances, a commercial treaty would be inconsistent with the doctrines of Free Trade. The two statesmen were so thoroughly at one in their outlook on finance and politics that Cobden, who had not hoped to do more at Paris than make enquiries, was able to proceed thither with a definite scheme. On his way through London he saw Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, and "spoke frankly to both of them as to the state of our relations with France." Palmerston's mind was more occupied with Napoleon's Italian policy and Great Britain's state of defence than with finance and trade; but he desired good relations with France and respected Cobden[2], and made no objection to the proposed Mission.

It was natural that Gladstone should have been stirred by Cobden's proposition. Quite apart from the temperamental difference between him and the Prime-Minister, and their different ways of promoting the honour and prosperity of Great Britain, it should be noted that

[1] See for the negotiation of the Treaty (Lord) Morley, *Life of Cobden*, chs. xxix, xxxi, xxxii, and Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, Bk v., chs. ii, iii, on which the following account is based.

[2] Palmerston had offered Cobden the Board of Trade in his Administration of 1859. "I would of course rather have gone on as before with my old friends. I offer you the seat because you have a right to it." Morley, *Life of Cobden*, p. 695.

the next year was certain to be one of great interest in British financial history. Terminable annuities to the amount of £2,146,000 were falling in, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would thus have some elbow-room for a new stroke of fiscal policy. To Gladstone finance offered a chief instrument of economic and social progress; and he was resolved that this large sum should not vanish in "the great gulf of expenditure," but that an opportunity should be seized for the permanent benefit of trade and the masses of the population. He "contemplated including the conditions of the French Treaty in a new and sweeping revision of the Tariff[1]." The moment was one of inspiration. He had behind him the example and the foresight of his great predecessors. He might achieve what Peel had hoped to accomplish, and what Pitt would have effected but for the Revolution.

Cobden arrived in Paris on October 18th. From the Minister of Commerce, M. Rouher, he received a sympathetic hearing; but he was given to understand that all depended on the Emperor. A few days later he had his first audience with Napoleon at St Cloud. "After a few remarks...the Emperor...expressed his regret that, notwithstanding he had for ten years given every possible proof of his desire to preserve the friendship of the British people, the press had at last defeated his purpose, and now the relations of the two countries seemed to be worse than ever....He asked what he could do more than he had already done[2]...." This gave Cobden the desired opening, and with all his power of persuasion and inspired conviction he urged Napoleon to "a bold measure of commercial reform," than which nothing would more effectually convince the British people of his pacific intentions. The Emperor discussed the matter straightforwardly and freely, pointed out his difficulties—the Protectionist sentiment of the country and the Chambers, together with his own pledge not to lower the Tariff before 1861—and asked for advice on practical points. To every enquiry and every difficulty Cobden was ready with an answer. The new duties need not come into force until 1861—the moral effect would be the same. "In France the great primary want was cheap iron...and I should begin by abolishing the duty on iron and coal." The Emperor was manifestly impressed, and Cobden pursued his advantage in long discussions with the French Ministers. He found them timid and distrustful of one another, but

[1] Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, I. 489.
[2] Morley, *Life of Cobden*, p. 708.

convinced that "something must be done" to improve relations with Great Britain. Most certainly, the situation was difficult, if not alarming. The sudden and secret manner in which the Italian War was begun had disquieted public opinion in this country. The annexation of Savoy and Nice increased the excitement. It was feared that Napoleon contemplated repeating the career of his uncle. The name of Napoleon, as Cobden told the Emperor, "which had such a charm in the cottages of France, had still a sound which carried a traditional alarm into our houses." The state of British defence was causing the Government grave anxiety. We seemed to be losing the unchallenged naval supremacy that had been ours since 1815. There were dangers that the Italian Question might produce a general war and fears that Napoleon designed a sudden descent on our unprotected shores. In November, the Secretary for War circulated a sensational Memorandum[1] to the Cabinet. Moreover, Palmerston, who had long been an apologist for Napoleon, had changed his views[2]. The information that reached him of French military expenditure seemed to justify suspicion and to necessitate corresponding measures of defence. The Cabinet was divided: Gladstone traversed the statements of Sidney Herbert and asked for facts. While matters were at this pass, Persigny, the French Ambassador, crossed to France and warned Napoleon of the dangerous state of British feeling. This appears to have been the conclusive argument; and, in December, Napoleon, more anxious for British friendship than for commercial reform, decided for the Treaty, though the "habit of deviating and stumbling by the way," which his cousin, Prince Napoleon, attributed to him, was still to cause Cobden serious anxiety.

At this point, the matter was taken up officially, and the business which had hitherto been transacted in a series of personal letters between Gladstone and Cobden came formally before the Cabinet. Gladstone seems at first to have feared some difficulty; but, though Palmerston was "rather neutral," Budget and Treaty were accepted, Lord Cowley and Cobden were appointed Plenipotentiaries, and on January 23rd, 1860, the Treaty was signed at the French Foreign Office. By its terms Great Britain undertook to abolish almost every duty on manufactured goods and to reduce the duties on French wines

[1] Detailing "some of the indications of coming mischief, and of warlike intentions on the part of the French Government." See Lord Stanmore, *Memoir of Sidney Herbert*, II. ch. vi.

[2] See letter to Lord John Russell, November 4th, 1859, in Ashley, E., *Palmerston*, II. 187 (edition 1876).

and brandies, and from April 1st, 1861, to fix the duties on wine according to its alcoholic strength, while France undertook to reduce the duties on a long list of articles of British production and manufacture, including all the principal articles, to not more than 30 per cent. *ad valorem*[1], and from October 1st, 1864, to not more than 25 per cent. It was further arranged that the *ad valorem* duties established within the limits fixed should be converted into specific duties by a Supplementary Convention. Both countries agreed not to tax or prohibit the export of coal and to confer on the other most favoured nation treatment. The Treaty was to last for ten years and then to continue in force from year to year, subject to a year's notice by either contracting party[2].

The Treaty had the kind of reception that might have been expected in the two countries. In the industrial centres of Great Britain it made an excellent impression, and in general was regarded as evidence of friendly intentions; but Napoleon's popularity suffered with the French Protectionists, who considered that their interests had been too lightly sacrificed. In the British Parliament, it was criticised both by Protectionists and Free Traders; but there was little doubt of its ready acceptance. Disraeli found in it "something of the idiosyncracy of the negotiator" and the Government were accused of following "a double policy." "The Treaty implied confidence in peace, while the estimates implied a strong expectation of war[3]." The charge was true. The Government hoped for peace and feared war, and their policy reflected their state of mind. On the critical division there was a majority of 116 for the Treaty.

It now remained to negotiate the Supplementary Conventions in which the specific duties were to be fixed, and, since the value of the Treaty from the British point of view depended on their being reduced as far below the high agreed maximum of 30 per cent. as possible, Cobden offered to go as Chief Commissioner for the more detailed negotiations, feeling "no concern whatever about the loss of dignity." From April to November he was engaged on this difficult and laborious task, harassed all the time by the sense that Anglo-French

[1] The new French Tariffs were to come into force by the following dates: for coal and coke from July 1st, 1860; for bar and pig iron and steel from October 1st, 1860; for tools and machinery not later than December 31st, 1860; for yarns and manufactures in flax and hemp from June 1st, 1861; for all other articles from October 1st, 1861.

[2] For the Treaty and Supplementary Conventions cf. *Parliamentary Papers* 1859–60 (see Bibliography).

[3] Morley, *Life of Cobden*, p. 753.

relations were growing steadily worse[1]. He feared that the warlike policy of the Government would "discredit by anticipation the political value of the Treaty"; and, in July, he wrote at length to Palmerston and urged him to postpone military expenditures until the Treaty was ready, pointing out his own difficulty in negotiating a Treaty while the Government committed itself to "a permanent attitude of hostility and distrust." Palmerston, who had, not long before, written to the Queen that "it would be better to lose Mr Gladstone than to run the risk of losing Portsmouth or Plymouth[2]," was not likely to be moved by Cobden's appeal, and on July 23rd introduced into Parliament, in a speech bluntly directed against France, his proposals for fortifying our naval arsenals. There was no doubt that the Prime-Minister had the support of public opinion; but Cobden felt that he had been very badly used, since Palmerston's conduct "threw ridicule and mockery on my whole proceedings," and he compared Palmerston's treatment of him very unfavourably with Pitt's treatment of Eden in similar circumstances[3]. In spite of other difficulties and delays, galling to his whole-hearted enthusiasm, the first Supplementary Convention, fixing the duty on metals, was signed on October 12th, and the second, fixing the remaining duties, on November 16th. Herewith ended Cobden's labours. "I never had so tough a task," he wrote. It was indeed a remarkable achievement to have carried out so great a work of peace in an atmosphere charged with the menace of war.

The Treaty thus negotiated was certainly one of the landmarks in the fiscal history of Europe in the nineteenth century. By it Great Britain made an end of Protection for herself and lowered her revenue duties, while France began a new policy, which she continued in the next few years by negotiating Commercial Treaties with other countries. Each new Treaty recognised the principle of the most favoured nation, so that every concession became a general and not a particular one, and contributed to a widening of European commercial intercourse. Twenty years later, when the future renewal of the Treaty was hanging in the balance, Gladstone, to whom, next to Cobden, its negotiation was due, thus summed up its influence:

[1] See Cobden, "Three Panics," in *Political Writings* (1868), II. 381.

[2] Stanmore, *Memoir of Sidney Herbert*, II. 286.

[3] Morley, *Life of Cobden*, p. 795. But Palmerston was not unappreciative of Cobden's laborious services. See letter to Queen Victoria, November 22nd, 1860 in *Letters of Queen Victoria*, III. 413.

It is quite true that that Treaty did not produce the whole of the benefits that some too sanguine anticipations may possibly have expected from it.... But it did something. It enormously increased the trade between this country and France. It effectually checked and traversed in the year 1860 tendencies of a very different kind towards needless alarms and panics, and tendencies towards convulsions and confusions in Europe....It produced no inconsiderable effect for a number of years upon the legislation of various European countries, which tended less decisively than we could have hoped, but still intelligibly and beneficially, in the direction of freedom of trade[1].

[1] Gladstone at Leeds, October 8th, 1881, quoted in Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, II. 616.

CHAPTER XII

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING THE CIVIL WAR, 1860–1865

FOR many years there had been no period in Anglo-American relations so uneventful as that which followed the settlement of the Crampton incident in 1856 and lasted down to the close of Buchanan's presidency. Lord Napier was appointed to succeed Mr Crampton only after the post of British Minister in Washington had been left vacant for some months. No event of signal importance marked his tenure of the appointment; but it was evident that the political struggle in the United States was becoming very dangerous. On Napier's retirement in 1858, Lord Malmesbury's choice fell upon the recently appointed British Minister at Florence, who had shown himself possessed of very considerable tact and diplomatic skill. The new Minister, who succeeded his father as Lord Lyons in the very month of his appointment, took up his new duties on April 12th, 1859, with the presentation of his letters of credence to President Buchanan and Secretary Cass. The only outstanding question between the two Powers concerned the possession of the Island of San Juan and the delimitation of the frontier in the Straits of Juan de Fuca, which had been left ambiguous in the Oregon Agreement. This question pressed for decision because of the abrupt military seizure of the disputed island by the officer commanding the United States troops in the Washington Territory; but the difficulty was averted by arranging for a joint occupation, and, after unsuccessful negotiation for a settlement, Lyons proposed a reference to arbitration. This was accepted by the United States; and, on December 10th, 1860, the King of Prussia was by both Parties accepted as arbitrator.

The perennially underlying troubles in Anglo-American relations concerning Maritime Law and the maintenance of Neutral Rights were once more brought to the fore by the outbreak of war between France and Austria. Lord Lyons's attention was drawn to the refusal of the United States to accept the Declaration of Paris of 1856, and he was confidentially asked what attitude would be observed by America, if Great Britain should unfortunately become involved in the War, and what steps were being taken by the United States to protect their

commerce from interference by the belligerents. He replied that, in all probability, the best way for Great Britain to avert the danger of becoming embroiled with the United States would be

> to avoid interfering in matters in which we are not sufficiently interested to make it worth while to raise serious questions: and, above all, in matters directly affecting British interests and British rights to be clear and distinct in our language, and firm and decided in our conduct, to convince them that, when we are in the right and in earnest, we are more unyielding, not less so, than formerly—in short, to avoid as much as possible raising questions with them, but not to give way upon those we raise[1].

Before many months had elapsed, he had to bring the line of conduct thus laid down into operation in connexion with far more important matters than the remote Franco-Austrian conflict, and the passage is of interest as to some extent explaining the ideas underlying that cool and admirably judicious restraint, thanks to which Lord Lyons came to exercise a more and more preponderating influence, not merely in the carrying-out, but also in the direction of British policy in regard to the United States.

President Buchanan had privately proclaimed his ambition to leave the score entirely clear between the United States and Great Britain when he laid down his office; and his Annual Message to Congress of December, 1859, was more friendly in tone than had been the case in most previous Messages. But the rapidly rising passions over the questions of Slavery and State rights in both sections of the country were far too powerful for his ineffectual control, and Lord Lyons had repeatedly to warn the British Cabinet of the dangers of the situation and of the view held by politicians of influence on both sides, that a remedy for the troubles that were tearing the nation asunder could most easily be found in foreign war, and most probably in a war directed against Great Britain. An excuse might readily be found in the joint action which Great Britain, France and Spain were contemplating in order to protect the interests of their nationals against Mexican anarchy, or in the difficulties arising out of the "Lynch Law" proceedings that were of such frequent occurrence in the South against all persons suspected of Abolitionist sentiments, and especially against British subjects. In the North, anti-British feeling was not so prominent, and when, early in 1860, Lord Lyons was asked his opinion as to the advisability of accepting President

[1] Lord Lyons to Lord Malmesbury, May 30th, 1859. Lord Newton's *Life of Lord Lyons*, I. 17.

Buchanan's invitation to the Prince of Wales to visit the United States, he expressed himself in its favour. The details of the tour were arranged by him, and when it took place in the autumn of 1860, he attended throughout in his official capacity. The Prince was welcomed with great popular enthusiasm everywhere in those of the Northern States which he had time to visit, and the tour, though it, of course, led to no political result, undoubtedly did much to bring out the underlying unity of feeling between the English-speaking peoples.

As the Presidential campaign of 1860 wore on and it became more and more certain that the Democrats were destined to defeat, there were open threats of Secession among the serious and responsible leaders of the South, if Abraham Lincoln, the "free-soil" nominee from the North-west, should be elected. Projects in this sense had long been in contemplation, and the British Consuls in the South had from time to time reported efforts on the part of the Southern extremists to trade on England's supposed dislike of the Yankees in order to secure her approval and help[1]. Lord Lyons was particularly careful to warn the Consuls to preserve an entirely non-committal attitude towards such overtures, and the Consular correspondence bears testimony to their deference to his Instructions. In the speeches of Northern leaders throughout the campaign there was little reference to foreign affairs; but William Henry Seward occasionally indulged his usual propensity to play upon anti-British sentiment and protested loudly against European, and especially British, interference in American affairs. The campaign resulted, as was foreseen, in Lincoln's election on November 6th. The threatened schism was at once precipitated, and on December 20th a freely chosen Convention of the people of South Carolina unanimously declared their connexion with the Union dissolved, a lead that was soon followed by other cotton-growing States. Lord Lyons could offer little guidance to the Home Government as to what was likely to happen. It has been repeatedly asserted that the reports of the foreign Ministers in Washington in 1860 were coloured in favour of the South, owing to their social connexions; but this was certainly not the case with Lyons, for he took up a noticeably impartial attitude and reported the progress of the Secession movement with scrupulous accuracy. Like Seward, he was in the beginning optimistic as to the existence of a conservative element in the Slave States that would avert any

[1] Bunch, British Consul at Charleston, to Lyons, February 2nd, 1860, and other letters. *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.* XLVIII. 199–202.

break-up of the Union; but he believed that, if Secession were really accomplished, it must result in final separation. The views of so capable an observer on the spot naturally had great weight with the British Cabinet, and their attitude may be described as that of hoping against hope for a peaceful solution of the troubles. Ministers were not alone in feeling that, if Secession were insisted on, it would be impossible for the North to coerce the Southern States into remaining within the Union. Similar views were shared even by such pronounced friends of the North as Cobden, who, in his desire for the preservation of peace went further. Writing to Senator Sumner in February, 1861, while matters were still in the balance, he said: "Were I a citizen of a free state in your Union, I should hold up both hands for peaceful and prompt separation. My earnest prayer is that you may avoid civil war, from which no advantage to any party can accrue. Let your voice be raised for peaceful separation[1]."

The first official step taken in consequence of South Carolina's Secession had reference to the payment of customs dues by British ships at Charleston, from which port the Federal officials had been extruded. No guidance in the matter could be obtained from President Buchanan, and Lord Lyons had therefore to direct the Consuls to pay the duties "under protest," when they were demanded in the name of the State of South Carolina. In January, 1861, the Consuls were directed to remain at their posts, but to take no action in compliance with any demands made upon them for any formal act of recognition of Secession. Though it still appeared not unlikely that a way of compromise might be found, prudence dictated that preparations should be made for what might happen, and careful enquiries were instituted by the Foreign Office through the British Consuls in the South as to those who would direct the policy of the new Confederacy of Seceded States that was brought into being at Montgomery, Alabama, on February 8th, 1861. Similar information was sent home by Lyons concerning the better known personalities in the North and their views. As to the President-elect it was impossible to ascertain much, but his new Secretary of State, William H. Seward, whose appointment was generally known about the middle of January, was in Lord Lyons's view likely to be a very dangerous Foreign Minister. British statesmen did not fail to remember his extraordinary *volte-face* on the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and how, having been foremost in

[1] Cobden to Sumner, February 23rd, 1861. Quoted by J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, 1860–62, p. 343 n.

maintaining the justice of the British contention in 1853, he had been the loudest in attacking it in 1856. He held the firm conviction that Great Britain would never go to war with the United States, to whatever extent her rights or interests were attacked, and he was obsessed with the view that he could avert domestic dangers by embarking in a foreign quarrel[1]. Again and again, Seward maintained in his long conversations with the British Minister that the struggle had nothing to do with freedom or slavery, but was simply concerned with Constitutional difficulties concerning State-rights and turned on the question of union or disunion. Undoubtedly, he and those who joined or followed him in his incessant flow of speech and writing had a great deal to do with confusing well-instructed public opinion in England and seriously weakened the sympathy felt there with the anti-Slavery party and the North.

During the first three months of 1861, before Lincoln and Seward came into office, Lyons had to play a particularly difficult part. On the one side he was approached with many suggestions for action by Northern partisans: notably by Edward Everett of Boston, who had been Minister to Great Britain and who urged that England, France and Russia should at once jointly offer their mediation between North and South. To any such interference Lyons and the British Cabinet in agreement with him were rigidly opposed, and he was also antagonistic to the plan of Mercier, the French Minister in Washington, who was a strong sympathiser with the Southern cause and wished to have discretionary powers of recognition placed jointly in his and Lyons's hands. President Buchanan, after much hesitation, addressed a Circular on February 28th, 1861, to the United States Ministers abroad, instructing them to take steps for opposing Confederate attempts to secure recognition. When Dallas, the American Minister in London, communicated this Circular to Lord John Russell, he was formally assured that the British Government would be very reluctant to take any step which might encourage or sanction the separation; but that it was impossible to give a permanent pledge as to their action in unknown future circumstances. When Seward reiterated and amplified the Instructions of his predecessor immediately on assuming office, the Foreign Secretary repeated his former reply. This was published without delay, and unfortunately, and without just cause, it was held in America to be intended in an unfriendly spirit and to imply that Great Britain was ready to grant

[1] Lyons to Russell, January 7th, 1861. *Life of Lord Lyons*, I. 30.

Confederate recognition in the near future. Any such intention was entirely absent from the designs of the British Cabinet; but they were, rightly, not prepared to bind themselves as to their action regardless of whatever circumstances might occur.

The need for direct action came immediately after the inauguration of President Lincoln, in the matter of the treatment of British ships in Southern ports. Three courses were considered by Lincoln and his advisers—the proclamation of the closing of the ports and the treatment as smugglers of those who entered or left them; the collection of United States customs dues by cruisers stationed off the coast and the confiscation of ships that refused to pay; or, finally, the imposition of a strict blockade governed by the rules of international law, which necessarily involved a recognition of the Confederates as belligerents. Seward was in favour of the one or the other of the first two courses; but Lyons boldly told him by word of mouth that the actions contemplated would be nothing but gigantic paper blockades and would place foreign Powers in the dilemma of recognising the Confederacy or tamely submitting to an interruption of their lawful commerce[1]. All the foreign Ministers who heard Seward's tirades at this interview, strongly suspected that the Secretary was seeking to pick a quarrel; but they did not know how true were their suspicions, and that within a week he would be making a written proposition to the President of a plan that was calculated to force the European Powers into war. Categorical explanations of their conduct were to be demanded from Spain, France, Great Britain and Russia; and if these were refused, the United States was to declare war against them. The Memorandum in which this plan was outlined was presented to President Lincoln on April 1st, 1861[2]; but he entirely ignored its reckless suggestions, and its existence remained secret for many years. Lyons and Russell were not at fault in their judgment of the situation and in the distrust they felt both of the Secretary's intentions and of the soundness of his statesmanship.

But both Lincoln and Seward had been impressed by Lyons's arguments, and had come to the conclusion that the only safe way of closing the Southern ports was by the application of a strict blockade, because the rules governing it were positive and well-known, and would involve less difficulty of interpretation with foreign Powers

[1] Lyons to Russell, March 26th, 1861. *Life of Lord Lyons*, I. 33.

[2] "Thoughts for the President's Consideration," April 1st, 1861. (Section 2) Foreign Relations. *Lincoln's Works*, II. 29.

than any other method. It was determined, early in April, to take this step, though some of the Cabinet must have perceived that it implicitly admitted the Confederates to be belligerents. The first act of war, however, did not come from the Union Government; for on April 12th, Fort Sumter which guarded the entrance to Charleston harbour was bombarded by the Confederate batteries and its garrison of Federal troops compelled to capitulate. The President replied to this overt act of war by calling for an army of 75,000 volunteers. Simultaneously, he learned that the Confederacy was taking steps to grant letters-of-marque to privateers, and, on April 19th, he issued a proclamation of blockade, directed against the ports of the insurgent States in pursuance of the Law of Nations, and stating that a competent force would be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of all vessels[1]. Lord Lyons had been warning the Foreign Office for some weeks of the naval activity in Northern ports which seemed to portend a blockade; but the news of the proclamation did not reach England until May 2nd, two days after that from Fort Sumter. The actual terms of the proclamation were received on May 5th, though it was not officially presented by the American Minister until May 11th. The actual dates are important, because the charge was afterwards made, and pressed with much vigour by Seward, that the British Government was unfriendly to the Union cause in precipitately recognising the Confederates as belligerents. The accusation was unworthy and could only have been proffered by censors unfamiliar with the usages of maritime war. When the blockade had once been proclaimed, no other course lay open to foreign Powers but to recognise its existence by the proper formal action or to disregard it—an act that would imply support of the blockaded States. On May 6th, Lord John Russell in the House of Commons intimated that Great Britain would take steps to enforce on her subjects respect for the blockade, as it was her duty to do, and, on May 9th, Sir George Cornewall Lewis formally announced the issue of a proclamation of British neutrality in the struggle and the enforcement of the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act. The Proclamation was signed by the Queen on May 13th, and on the same day Charles Francis Adams, the new American Minister, arrived in Liverpool, bringing with him most explicit and detailed Instructions from Secretary Seward as to the conduct of his Mission. He was extremely

[1] For text of this Proclamation see M. Bernard, *The Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War*.

chagrined to find that the formal steps for the recognition of Confederate belligerency had already been taken, and endeavoured to secure their reversal. He failed to see the essential necessity of the British Proclamation as a recognition of the blockade proclaimed by the American authorities, and, somewhat perversely, took it to mean a gratuitous and premature recognition of the Confederacy—the same view that was insisted on by Seward to the American public. The matter was one not of sentiment, but of hard practical importance, for in many of the Southern parts there were large amounts of British property. British ships more than any others frequented those ports, and many were at sea on their way thither. It was therefore essential that the Government should instruct its naval officers in American waters as to the course they should pursue in relation to the proclaimed blockade and should do this without delay, since it would take twenty days, at least, for their Instructions to reach them. Precedents were strictly adhered to, and the British Proclamation was closely modelled on that issued in 1859, on the outbreak of war between Austria and France and Sardinia[1]. British ships at once avoided the ports of the Confederacy, and the supply of foreign goods to the South from the early weeks of June, 1861, was largely cut off, save by means of blockade-runners, which knowingly risked capture and confiscation.

Jefferson Davis had, before the actual outbreak of war, appointed Commissioners to proceed to Europe in order to secure the recognition of the new Confederacy as a Sovereign Power. Messrs Yancey, Rost and Mann arrived in England almost simultaneously with the news of the fall of Fort Sumter, and applied for an interview with Lord John Russell. The Foreign Secretary sent for the American Minister and informed him of this application, and that Great Britain and France had agreed upon a common course of action. They would not recognise the Commissioners or receive them as Envoys; but it was thought advisable to see them "unofficially" as private persons and hear what they had to say. Lyons had advised that they should not be too directly rebuffed, in view of Seward's suspected desire to pick a quarrel, but Russell's reception of the Commissioners was very cool. He listened to what they said almost without remark, but on their dismissal left them in no doubt that Great Britain would

[1] For an authoritative summing up of the evidence which concludes in favour of the propriety of the British action, see J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, 1860–62, pp. 420–1. Bernard comes to the same conclusion.

not concede the recognition they desired. But the news of this unofficial interview angered Seward exceedingly, and in this temper he wrote a violent despatch to Adams for communication to Russell, which threatened war in unmistakable terms, if any intercourse, official or unofficial, were held by the British Government with the "so-called Commissioners, the domestic enemies of the United States[1]." Seward planned that Adams should hand the despatch to the Foreign Secretary and at once break off diplomatic relations; but Lincoln knew that this would be fatal and ordered the Minister to regard the despatch as strictly confidential, thus rendering it harmless. Its tenour was discovered by Lord Lyons at the end of June, 1861, and by him communicated to Lord John Russell and the Cabinet.

No persons responsible for the government of a widely extended empire could afford to neglect precautions for defence, in the face of the provocative attitude which Lyons had in almost every important despatch to report as maintained by the Secretary of State. Canada was the part of the empire most vulnerable to attack from the United States, and, in the first place, it was determined to put her into a position of defence to repel such attack. On May 23rd, the Prime-Minister circulated a confidential Memorandum to his colleagues, expressing his view that, without parade, additional troops should be sent to Canada, to serve as a stiffening of local levies; this was agreed to and the reinforcements left in June. The state of public opinion in the North at this time was so irritable that almost any step seeming even remotely to bear upon the civil strife in the Union was regarded as deliberate unfriendliness, and the news of the sailing of these British troops caused extreme offence. The Cabinet, in its desire to avert the consequences of Seward's recklessness, not only concerned themselves with the means of defence but took secret measures which were really more efficacious. The personal ties between British statesmen and many of the leaders of American opinion were very close, and correspondence between them was constant. Lord Lyons advised that use should be made of such channels in order to point out privately to men of commanding influence in the Republican party the unnecessary dangers to Anglo-American amity that were being invited. Among others, the Duke of Argyll, Lord Privy Seal, wrote to Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Committee on

[1] Lincoln softened down the most furious expressions in the despatch before allowing it to be sent; but, even so, the despatch caused extreme offence in England when published a few months later by Seward without the President's knowledge. See *U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1861, p. 80.

Foreign Relations who had considerable influence with the President, and John Lothrop Motley (the historian), after interviews with representative Englishmen, also wrote private letters direct. But Lincoln was already convinced by his own shrewd common sense that the recklessness of his Secretary of State was dangerous and must be curbed, and in his Fourth of July Message he publicly declared that "the sovereignty and rights of the United States are now everywhere practically respected by foreign Powers, and a general sympathy with the country is manifested throughout the world." The danger was over by the end of June, and Russell summed up the policy which the British Government had pursued:

> Her Majesty's Government has felt that it was its duty to use every possible means to avoid taking any part in the lamentable contest now raging in the American States. Nothing but the imperative duty of protecting British interests, in case they should be attacked, justifies the Government in at all interfering. We have not been involved in any way in that contest by any act or giving any advice, and, for God's sake, let us, if possible, keep out of it[1].

But, as Argyll wrote,

> I believe there is no desire stronger here than that of maintaining friendly relations with America, but there are points on which our people are very sensitive. If they saw themselves touched on these points in honour or interest, the irritation would be extreme and could not be controlled[2].

The high-handed proceedings of American officials might raise such a point of honour at any moment. Seward himself behaved with entire disregard of propriety in his enquiries at Toronto concerning the *Peerless*, a steamer suspected of being a Confederate privateer, but which had in reality been purchased for the United States as a blockade ship. He was compelled by Lyons to apologise without the matter becoming fully public; but the case fairly illustrated the attitude he would take up in more serious matters. He wished to reopen the question of the adhesion of the United States to the Declaration of Paris of 1856, but refused to conduct the negotiations in Washington and insisted on their transference to London and Paris. Russell felt that this was a device to involve the European Powers in action against Confederate privateers indirectly, and Great Britain and France issued written Declarations stating that they would not enter into any engagements concerning the Declaration of Paris,

[1] Russell to Edward Everett, July 12th, 1861. *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.* XLV. 77.
[2] Argyll to Sumner, June 4th, 1861. Quoted by Rhodes, *op. cit.* III. 425.

bearing directly or indirectly on the struggle then proceeding[1]. At the same time, unofficial communications on the subject were opened by Great Britain and France with the Confederate Government through Bunch, the British Consul at Charleston. He incautiously went further than he had any right to go, and, after the Confederate Congress had passed resolutions adhering to all the Articles of the Declaration of Paris with the exception of the First (for the abolition of privateering), he sent an account of his negotiations through the Federal lines to Lord Lyons. His messenger broke the provisions of his safe-conduct by carrying with him a large number of private letters, and, when he was arrested and these were confiscated, the whole of the secret negotiations were revealed to Seward. He seized upon the incautious words of the Consul as indicating that formal diplomatic relations had been entered into with the Confederacy by the British and French Governments, and he used the incident to divert the public mind as far as possible from the serious defeat which the Union forces had suffered at the battle of Bull Run (or Manassas) on July 21st. In the conduct of his negotiations with the two sides with regard to the Declaration of Paris, Russell has been accused of evasion and of acting with an ulterior and concealed end—the disruption of the United States. Such seems to have been the suspicion of the American Minister in London and of the American public[2] at the time; but the considered opinion of subsequent investigators is quite adverse to the conclusion. Adhering strictly to his policy of neutrality in the American conflict, Russell was compelled to have recourse at times to what in the eyes of Adams seemed to be disingenuous evasions; but this cautious handling was inevitable in order to avoid committing the British Government in the way designed by Seward. Lord Lyons quietly warned his chief of what was going on; but neither France nor England could ever have been so imprudent as to tie their hands unwittingly[3], and, writing some years later, Adams confessed that his suspicions of Russell's ulterior purposes were unjust and that, on the whole, he was actuated rather by a balance of good-will rather than of hostility to the United States.

The news of the battle of Bull Run arrived in London early in

[1] Bernard, *op. cit.* p. 179. For a full discussion and documents relating to these negotiations see C. F. Adams's paper in *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.* XLVI. 23–84.

[2] See C. F. Adams's *Life of Charles Francis Adams* (1900), ch. xii.

[3] For a full discussion of these negotiations and the documents relating to them see C. F. Adams's paper in *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.* XLVI. 23–84. For Charles Francis Adams's view in 1872 see *Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington*, IV. 162.

August, and on the 14th the Confederate Commissioners addressed a long letter to Earl Russell praying for recognition as a Sovereign Power and pointing to their victory as a proof of strength. But the British Cabinet's policy had been firmly decided upon; they had no intention of departing from the straightforward position they had taken up, and on August 24th, Russell replied positively, in terms incapable of being misunderstood, that Her Britannic Majesty declined to acknowledge the independence of the Confederate States. When Seward withdrew the *exequatur* of the British Consul at Charleston (Bunch) for his share in the privateering negotiations—but ostensibly on personal grounds—Russell acquiesced, but stated that his actions ought not to be regarded as in any sense implying a recognition of the Confederacy. Her Majesty's Government had not recognised, and was not prepared to recognise, the "so-called Confederate States" as a separate independent Power[1]. Nothing could be clearer, and Seward had distinctly gained a point in securing so open and definite a disclaimer.

The noisy bellicosity of the Press on either side of the Atlantic was regarded by many observers as far more decisively indicative of the real condition of opinion than it was in reality. It had little influence on the action of the United States Government and practically none on that of the British Cabinet, which in the main steered a steady and cautious course that commended itself to the mass of thinking British people. Everyone longed for an early termination of the struggle and a cessation of the interference with trade which it caused; but very few had any idea that Great Britain by her action could bring that end any nearer, and public opinion was utterly confused as to what would be its nature when it arrived. The great majority of the House of Commons was contented to leave the conduct of affairs in the hands of the Government, and whenever throughout the War opinion was really tested, the general attitude was always found to be the same. There was a small, but extremely active, group of members who sympathised strongly with the South and did all they could to urge the Government to immediate recognition of the Confederacy, regardless of consequences. The most prominent members of this group were W. H. Gregory and W. S. Lindsay, but their influence was small; and, whenever they succeeded in bringing forward a motion in the House, they invariably found the overwhelming sentiment against them. At the opposite

[1] *U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1861, pp. 156–7.

pole was the much larger and more influential group of members who were in strong sympathy with the North and were in close and constant contact with the American Minister and the leaders of the Radical party in the United States. The most active members of this group were W. E. Forster, Richard Cobden and John Bright. They persistently claimed that, in spite of what was said, the North was above all things fighting for the abolition of Slavery. Their advocacy was listened to with interest and attention both by the House and by the country, and it had much influence with certain members of the Cabinet. Unfortunately, Bright was too much inclined to apply the issues of the American conflict in the way of furthering the victory of his Radical ideas in British politics, and this, though carried out with entire sincerity, aroused the antagonism of many who would otherwise have been more sympathetic towards his views about America. The great majority of the members of the House of Commons and of their constituents, as always, thought most of the struggle as it affected British interests and themselves. The crude violence of many Northern advocates of Abolition and the necessarily arbitrary nature of some of President Lincoln's measures tended to confirm them in the traditional British attitude of rather supercilious criticism of things American.

The men who, above all others, stood for this great middle party were the Prime-Minister, Lord Palmerston, and the Foreign Secretary, now Earl Russell. Though they knew infinitely more of what was in progress than the back bench member or the man in the street, they thought very much on the same lines as these and they were deeply perplexed by the oft reiterated refusal of the official leaders of the North to admit that their fight was being waged against Slavery. Seward had insisted upon this point emphatically to the American Representatives abroad in their formal Instructions and wrote: "The territories will remain in all respects the same, whether the revolution shall succeed or shall fail. The condition of slavery in the several states will remain just the same, whether it succeed or fail." General Frémont's proclamation of August 30th, 1861, against slavery in Missouri had, by the President's orders, to be rescinded and its author dismissed, for reasons of policy that were imperative, but could not be explained to the public; and it was almost impossible for even the best-informed Englishmen to fail to attach some credit to the persistent slanders of the Southern apologists against the motives of the North.

Russell's tendency to confusion of questions and situations was

revealed to the public by his speech at Newcastle-on-Tyne on October 11th, 1861. He placed side by side the problems involved in the American War and in Italy's struggle for freedom and her aspirations for Rome. He found it impossible to deal with Foreign Affairs in water-tight compartments and felt that principles that must be applied in a European controversy should also guide our policy in the Western hemisphere. This led to his use of phrases that caused deep offence in the United States. "We now see two parties contending together, not upon the question of slavery,...but contending, as so many States of the Old World have contended, the one for empire and the other for power." He painted the possible endings to the struggle in the darkest colours and went on to ask, "If by means such as these the reunion of the States should be brought about, is it not the duty of Christianity to see whether this conflict cannot be avoided?[1]" The Foreign Secretary's indecision was largely caused by French influence, which was being directed towards joint intervention. On his return to London, after his Newcastle speech, Russell wrote confidentially to Palmerston to sound him as to the possibility or advisability of action either in Italy or America. But the Prime-Minister had no hesitations; he was certain that Great Britain could not mix herself up with the acknowledgment of Slavery and of the principle that a slave escaping to a free-soil State should be followed, claimed or recovered, like a horse or an ox[2]. He, therefore, rejected any idea of action and wrote: "The only thing to do seems to be to lie on our oars and to give no pretext to the Washingtonians to quarrel with us, while, on the other hand, we maintain our rights and those of our fellow-countrymen[3]."

Unfortunately, such a cause of quarrel arose within a very few weeks. After Bull Run a period of stagnation settled down upon the rival armies when neither seemed capable of decisive action. The minds of the Southerners therefore turned to securing European allies by the aid of the potent influence of "King Cotton," and the North looked for relief to the activities of its Navy in maintaining the blockade. Jefferson Davis determined to send two of the most experienced diplomatists in the Confederacy, James M. Mason of Virginia and John Slidell of Louisiana, to take up the task in which his earlier Commissioners had failed. Having evaded the blockade at

[1] Earl Russell at Newcastle-on-Tyne, October 14th, 1861. Reported in *The Times* of October 15th.

[2] Palmerston to Ellice, May 5th, 1861. Ashley, E., *Life of Palmerston*, II. 209.

[3] October 18th, 1861. *Ibid.* II. 218.

Charleston, Mason and Slidell reached British territory in the Bahamas, but failing to find passage thence they went to Havana and there booked passages on the British mail-steamer *Trent* for Southampton without any concealment, intending to transfer themselves to the trans-Oceanic steamer at the Danish port of St Thomas. Capt. Charles Wilkes, of the United States Navy, in the *San Jacinto* sloop, having served two years on the West African Station, on his way home via the West Indies, heard that Confederate privateers were infesting the Florida Channel. Arriving there in order to take action against them, he learned Mason and Slidell's intention to sail by the *Trent* and determined, admittedly without orders, to intercept that vessel and seize the Commissioners. On November 8th, he carried his intention into effect, by shots across the bows of the *Trent* which forced her to stop, though she was showing British colours, and bore off the Envoys and their two Secretaries as prisoners. With them, he arrived at Fortress Monroe a week later (November 15th); but the news of his exploit did not reach England for another fortnight (November 27th). This eventful interval of three weeks was marked by an almost unprecedented outburst of rejoicing throughout the North and extravagant estimations of the triumph over Great Britain such as had rarely been seen. Lord Lyons was placed in a position of extreme difficulty. The utterances of unofficial persons, however eminent, might be neglected; but when the Secretary of the Navy publicly informed Wilkes that his action had the emphatic approval of his superiors and when the House of Representatives on December 2nd unanimously passed a resolution of thanks, little was wanting to show that the attack on Britain's Maritime Rights had behind it the full weight of the United States.

In these circumstances, Lyons determined that his best course was to maintain an attitude of complete reserve, and he wrote both officially and privately to Earl Russell to say that he should take no action until he received full Instructions. In Washington he refused to say a word either officially or unofficially and explicitly imposed a similar course on all British officials in the States. He feared that this might seem to imply Britain's complete insensibility to insults[1]; but he was undoubtedly right in allowing the excitement to spend itself, for shrewd American observers soon began to see that the incident threatened the embroilment of the United States not only with Great Britain but with all the neutral nations.

[1] Lyons to Russell, November 22nd, 1861. Newton's *Life of Lord Lyons*, I. 56.

The news of the seizure reached England on November 27th and was almost immediately followed by accounts of the outburst of congratulation in the United States. A few days before, the Cabinet had been considering what course should be taken if an American warship that had put into Southampton Water were to arrest the mail steamer from the West Indies in the Channel and, as was supposed to be her intention, seize the expected Envoys. The opinions of the law officers were taken and found to be in favour of the legality of such a course according to British precedents in the Napoleonic Wars. Palmerston on November 11th wrote to Delane, editor of *The Times*, informing him of these opinions and stating that the Cabinet had determined not to interfere with the exercise of her rights by the American vessel beyond the three-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction[1]. On the following day, he asked the American Minister to call upon him and told him that, while the Government would not interfere with the exercise of any American rights to seize the Confederate Envoys, if this was contemplated, the seizure was really not worth while; for the arrival of additional Confederate Commissioners would scarcely make a difference in the action of the British Government, after it had once made up its mind[2]. A more patent hint that Mason and Slidell's Mission was doomed to failure could hardly have been given; but Adams failed to see its importance and did not properly report the interview to Seward.

As the story of Wilkes's action became public, the greatest indignation at his deliberate insult to the British flag was expressed on all sides. Men of every party were unanimous in its condemnation and the majority looked upon it as confirming the suspicions long entertained by them that the United States had determined to force Great Britain into war, in order to seize Canada. The Cabinet held long meetings on November 29th and 30th to determine on its course, if Wilkes's action had been designed by Seward to flout the British flag and was officially supported, in which case the danger of war would be very near, or had been unauthorised and would be disavowed. The general tenour of the Secretary's policy had been quite recently revealed by the publication of his despatches, and General Scott, lately in command of the Federal army, was said to have stated in Paris that he had been present at the Cabinet meeting where the seizure of the Envoys had

[1] Palmerston to Delane, November 11th, 1861. *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.* XLV. 54–5.
[2] Diary of Charles Francis Adams, November 12th, 1861. *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.* XLV. 53–4.

been decided on, and that Lower Canada was to be offered to France in return for her aid in a war against England[1]. The Duke of Newcastle, who as Colonial Secretary was responsible for the defence of Canada, retained vivid memories of Seward's exposition of his anti-British policy to him when in the United States in 1860. He, therefore, pressed for the immediate despatch of reinforcements and secured the approval of the Cabinet so as to guard against the worst.

There were historical reasons to support the view that the seizure of the Commissioners must have been the unauthorised act of Captain Wilkes; for, though it might perhaps be supported by a strained construction of the most extreme British Maritime Claims as maintained fifty years earlier, yet it was undoubtedly inconsistent with the doctrines governing Neutrality for which the United States had gone to war in 1812 and which had often been reiterated by that Power on subsequent occasions. This view commended itself to the Cabinet as the more likely one, and at its long meetings on November 29th and 30th two despatches were decided on; one of these being for presentation to Secretary Seward and designed so as to afford him the easiest opportunity to withdraw if he wished to do so, the second a secret Instruction to Lord Lyons to govern his action in either event. When they were finally passed by the Ministers, the drafts were sent down to Windsor for the Queen's approval, and she discussed them fully with the Prince Consort. Though he was very ill and hardly able to work, the Prince gave the night to thinking the matter over. Early next morning, he submitted to the Queen the last Memorandum he ever wrote, in which, while approving the general course proposed by the Cabinet, he suggested an amplification of the somewhat meagre and brusque terms of the public despatch. He urged the addition of clauses stating the unwillingness of Great Britain to believe that the United States wished wantonly to put an insult upon her and expressing the expectation that redress would be spontaneously offered. These alterations were readily accepted by the Cabinet, and the main despatch was amended so as to follow the lines of the Memorandum very closely[2]. The French Government was informed of what was being done, and almost simultaneously with the sending of the British despatches, M. Mercier, the French Minister in Washington, was instructed to support Lord Lyons's representations.

[1] Palmerston to Queen Victoria, November 29th, 1861. *Letters of Queen Victoria*, II. 468.

[2] The Memorandum is given in facsimile in Sir T. Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, V. 432.

Somewhat later the Austrian, Prussian and Russian Governments also lent their support[1].

In his secret Instructions Lord Lyons was directed to offer Seward seven days for consideration of his reply, and in a private letter Lord Russell told him to inform the Secretary verbally of the purport of the main despatch before presenting it, thus allowing the President and his Cabinet further time for consideration before the term of the indicated delay began to run. This made it possible for moderating counsels to take effect; but, even before the despatches arrived in Washington on December 18th public excitement had rapidly evaporated, and saner views of the situation precipitated by Captain Wilkes had begun to prevail. Lord Lyons performed his duty with the utmost tact and courtesy, but he took the opportunity to let Seward know that England was in deadly earnest in demanding the surrender of the prisoners; and, looking back on the affair at a later date, he expressed the opinion that this intimation had a great deal to do with its final result. Seward, at last, came to see that the relations of the United States with England were not safe playthings to be used for the amusement of the American people[2], and, on Christmas Day and the day following, he managed to convince the President and the Cabinet that it was right to comply with the British demand[3]. His despatch conveying this decision, ingeniously but justly, claimed the surrender of the prisoners as a vindication of principles that were professedly American; and in both countries his claims to statesmanship undoubtedly gained with thinking people. Lord Lyons pointed out in private letters that the Secretary had now constituted himself the most anxious guardian of good relations with Great Britain, and that it behoved British Ministers to smooth his path as much as possible. Lord Russell acquiesced, and official relations improved. For his admirable conduct of the affair Lord Lyons received the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, with a warm letter of commendation from Lord Russell. He was naturally pleased with this approval and the honour conferred on him; but he modestly maintained that his principal merit had lain in resisting the temptation "to do something, which always besets one when one is anxious about a matter." In his view, it was the British military preparations in Canada that turned the scale in favour of peace[4].

[1] For their despatches see Bernard, *op. cit.* pp. 193–200.
[2] Lyons to Russell, December 23rd, 1861. *Life of Lord Lyons*, I. 69.
[3] Seward to Lyons, December 26th, 1861. Bancroft's *Life of Seward*, II. 241–2.
[4] *Life of Lord Lyons*, I. 77.

The absorption of all the energies of the United States in the War for the time being neutralised American influence in the lands to the south and left the field clear for the unchecked ambitions of those Powers who had never willingly accepted the doctrine laid down by President Monroe. Spain took the lead by reasserting her sovereignty over the republic of Santo Domingo in May, 1861, and sent an army to enforce the annexation, in spite of Seward's warning that the United States would regard it as an unfriendly act[1]. During the four years of the Civil War, the royal forces persisted in their attempt to conquer the republic, and they were only withdrawn when the United States was again in a position to speak with unimpaired authority. The most serious disregard of the Monroe Doctrine took place in Mexico. Anarchy had progressed so far in that unhappy country that in 1859 President Buchanan had seriously considered armed intervention by the United States to secure reparation for the outrages committed on American citizens, and had discussed the matter with Great Britain, France and Spain, whose nationals had also suffered numberless injuries. British policy was consistently averse from the use of armed force for the collection of debts to private bondholders[2]; but the robbery of legation premises and the repudiation of agreements concluded by the national Government for the payment of claims seemed to warrant some drastic action. In September, 1861, the Foreign Office learned that Spain had determined to take possession of the Mexican port of Vera Cruz to enforce the claims of her subjects, and it was confidently asserted that Queen Isabella's Government were preparing to assist in the reestablishment of a monarchy acting under her protection in Mexico and in concert with a strong party in that country. Russell was strongly opposed to any such project of European interference in the domestic quarrels of an American republic, especially as he had reason to believe that France was furthering the Spanish plans and was secretly proposing joint action on a grandiose scale, in defiance of the well-known policy of Great Britain and the United States.

To avert the danger of undesired intervention Russell took advantage of the news of fresh outrages in Mexico to force on the negotiation of a Convention providing for joint and strictly limited action for

[1] *State Papers*, LII. 1221 and 1351–6.

[2] The principle on which the British Government ought to take national action to enforce the payment of debts was discussed by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (A. H. Layard) in the debate on Mexican Affairs of July 15th, 1862. *Hansard*, CLXVIII. 363–74.

the enforcement of Mexico's legal obligations. Great Britain, France and Spain mutually bound themselves to go no further, and to abstain from interference with Mexico's right to choose freely her own form of government[1]. The assistance and adhesion of the United States were to be invited in any military measures that were undertaken; but an identical invitation by the three Powers was declined by Seward, and Great Britain was left to restrain by herself the ambitions of the other partners in this Tri-partite Agreement. Spain took precipitate action in sending a considerable military force to Vera Cruz without warning to Great Britain; and Russell was much concerned to learn in January, 1862, that Napoleon III proposed to follow suit, and that in flagrant disregard of the recently made agreement the Throne of Mexico had been offered to the Archduke Maximilian of Austria, with a promise of ample French support. The Austrian Government was officially informed of Great Britain's disapproval of any such plan and of the provisions of the Tri-partite Convention against interference in Mexico. But it was all of no avail. Napoleon III was determined to take action. The French troops who had landed in Mexican territory marched up into the interior, and Great Britain thereupon withdrew the small force of marines which she had employed at Vera Cruz, and left the Emperor to pursue his suicidal Mexican policy alone. By the exercise of considerable diplomatic pressure at Madrid, the withdrawal of the Spanish forces was also secured, after the conclusion of an agreement with the Mexican Government for the settlement of the claims that had been in dispute. Throughout the whole affair, the Government of the United States was kept informed by Lord Russell of what steps were being taken, and no doubt seems to have been entertained by Seward of the friendliness and correctness of British policy[2].

The arrival in England of the Confederate Envoys after their release attracted little attention, and they found it quite impossible to enter into official relations with the Foreign Office. Slidell went off to Paris, to take what advantage he could of the Emperor's notorious readiness for intrigue, while Mason was left in London. Lord Russell saw him privately in February, 1862, in order to hear what he had to say, but gave him clearly to understand that Great Britain had no intention whatever of changing her policy of neutrality. Mason fed

[1] Convention of London, October 31st, 1861. *Parl. Papers* (1862), LXIV. 103–6.

[2] Lord Russell's vindication of his policy in the House of Lords, June 19th, 1862, will be found in *Hansard*, CLXVII. 720–4.

the English advocates of the cause of the South with what evidence he thought might further his designs; but the ease with which such friends of the North as W. E. Forster were able to demonstrate the real effectiveness of the blockade of the Southern ports, when its validity was attacked in the House of Commons, was a severe disappointment to the Southern Envoy and his friends[1]. Three days later, the consistently neutral policy of the Government was explained by Lord Russell in the House of Lords, and he claimed amid general assent that it had the support of the nation at large. American topics continually appeared at question time in either House; but it was not till four months later that supporters of the South again ventured to bring forward a specific motion in favour of recognition. Adams was more hopeful for a time that friendly relations between Britain and the United States were safe; but, in June, 1862, he was seriously disquieted and deeply offended by the receipt of an incautious private letter from Lord Palmerston in condemnation of the notorious proclamation of General Butler after the capture of New Orleans by the Federal forces. Adams knew of the incessant intrigues that Slidell was carrying on in Paris and feared that the Prime-Minister's hurried note of indignation meant that he had, at last, determined to join France in intervention on behalf of the Confederacy. His troubles about the Confederate cruisers were then coming to their height and his fears were altogether natural[2]. But, though Butler's proclamation was severely condemned in the debates in both Houses, Palmerston's letter in no way indicated a line of policy; and Lord Russell, in the most explicit and formal way denied any project of joint mediation. The Prime-Minister, in the debate on W. S. Lindsay's motion in favour of the Confederacy on July 18th, satisfied the general temper of the House when he deprecated the many offensive things that had been said on both sides by the champions of South and North. He claimed that the country was satisfied with the steady course of neutrality pursued by the Government, and emphasised the expedience of leaving matters of such immense importance in the hands of the responsible Ministers[3]. Until the close of the session on August 17th

[1] W. H. Gregory's motion was rejected without a division, March 7th, 1862. *Hansard*, CLXV. 1225 etc. See also V. Mason's *Life of James Murray Mason* and "Diary of Benj. Moran" in *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.* XLVII.

[2] For Palmerston's letter of June 11th, 1862, and a misinterpretation of it see C. F. Adams's *Life of Charles Francis Adams*, pp. 249–50. The same writer puts the incident in its proper proportions in *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.* XLVII.

[3] July 18th, 1862. *Hansard*, CLXVIII. 570 and 573.

the consistency of the Government's policy was fully preserved, and it is fairly represented by their public utterances; but the crisis was rapidly approaching; and, unfortunately, in the recess there ensued a period of wavering and a lack of clear policy on the part of Ministers that did a great deal of harm.

While the summer of 1862 was filled with disappointment for Confederate efforts in England, Slidell's intrigues in France showed many signs of prospering. In April Mercier, the French Minister at Washington, who had always favoured the South, applied to Seward for a safe-conduct to visit Richmond, the Confederate capital, and suggested to Lord Lyons that he should accompany him, in order to form his own estimate of the resources of the South. Lyons steadily refused and attempted to dissuade Mercier from his plan, but to no avail; for, when the French Minister returned, he was more convinced than ever that the Union could never be restored, and that it would be well for the European Powers jointly to intervene. His report strengthened the resolve of the Emperor to carry further the plans on which he had embarked. Napoleon did not choose to approach the British Cabinet through the regular channel of our Ambassador, Lord Cowley, but in April informed Mr W. S. Lindsay, at a private interview, that he was prepared to send a formidable fleet if England would aid him to break the blockade. A few days later he told Slidell, also in a private interview, that he expected that his Mexican policy would bring him into collision with the United States, and that, as England had behaved so badly, he might be inclined to act in favour of the Confederacy without her[1]. Lindsay tried to convey this intelligence to the Government so that it might begin concerting plans with the Emperor; but he was severely rebuffed. The Prime-Minister took no notice of him, and Lord Russell, in refusing to receive his communication, informed him that negotiations with foreign Powers could only be conducted through the regular diplomatic channels. Napoleon was apparently serious in his projects; and, in July, Slidell with the sanction of President Jefferson Davis attempted to induce him to take action by the offer of support in Mexico and the delivery of cotton to the value of a hundred million francs. The Emperor insisted that all these negotiations should be concealed from the British Government and Mason alone was kept fully informed of what was in progress. But both Palmerston and Russell knew something

[1] Slidell's Memorandum of Lindsay's interview, April 11th, 1862. *Life of Mason*, p. 269. Slidell to Mason, April 20th, 1862. *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.* XLVII. 379.

of the tricky game the Emperor was playing, and even Adams had his suspicions and was dreading that the public utterances of Ministers against intervention were mere pretence.

The sudden wavering of Palmerston and Russell from their line of policy during the recess is almost inexplicable save by their fear of the designs of France and a desire to keep step with her. This phase of its history marks the real crisis of the Civil War in the sphere of international affairs, and its beginning was brought about by military events. The high hopes of Northern victory which had filled the early summer of 1862 had been exploded by the utter failure of McClellan's campaign in the Peninsula. He was superseded by General Halleck and his army withdrawn to its original positions covering Washington. There the Federal forces were severely defeated by the Confederates on August 29th and 30th at the second battle of Bull Run. The news of his defeat reached England a fortnight later and was published in the Sunday papers of September 14th witn forecasts of the immediately impending fall of Washington. The dominant clause in Palmerston and Russell's speeches about intervention or mediation had always been, "The time has not yet come." On the very day on which the news of Bull Run arrived, the Prime-Minister wrote to the Foreign Secretary, who was then in attendance on the Queen at Gotha:

> [The Federals have had] a very complete smashing, and it seems not altogether unlikely that still greater disasters await them, and that even Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the Confederates. *If this should happen*, would it not be time for us to consider whether in such a state of things England and France might not address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation[1]?

The question was tentative, suggesting that, if Washington were captured, the right moment would have come; but Russell's reply slurred over the condition and pointed to immediate action.

> Whether the Federal army is destroyed or not, it is clear that it is driven back to Washington, and has made no progress in subduing the insurgent States. Such being the case, *I agree with you that the time is come* for offering mediation to the United States Government with a view to the recognition of the independence of the Confederates.... We ought if we agree on such a step to propose it first to France, and then, on the part of England and France, to Russia and other powers as a measure decided upon by us[2].

[1] Palmerston to Russell, September 14th, 1862. Walpole's *Life of Russell*, II. 349.
[2] Russell to Palmerston, Gotha, September 17th, 1862. *Ibid.* II. 349.

This was going too fast for Palmerston, and in his reply he emphasised the need of waiting to see the result of the new battle before Washington which was understood to be imminent. The news of what was under discussion was circulated to members of the Cabinet who apparently had heard little of France's eagerness to press on intervention. Only Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, attempted to influence the judgment of the Prime-Minister and on September 25th urged the immediate abandonment of a waiting policy in view of the suffering in Lancashire[1]. The British Ambassador in Paris was instructed to sound the French Government privately; but, on the very day on which Palmerston received Gladstone's plea for immediate action, he learned the news of the Federal victory at Antietam and the repulse of the Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania. Three or four days later, a long and carefully reasoned argument arrived from Lord Granville, the Minister in attendance at Gotha, who strongly urged the continuance of our waiting policy[2]. It is uncertain whether in expressing this view he spoke only for himself or after discussing matters with the Queen. She was in very poor health at the time and had to be spared as much business as possible; but it seems unlikely that in a crucial matter of foreign policy which Her Majesty and the Prince Consort had always regarded as coming peculiarly within the royal sphere, her opinion should not have been sought. In all probability, therefore, Lord Granville's letter embodied the result of his conversation with the Queen, and therefore could not but have great weight with Lord Palmerston. The capture of Washington, too, had not been achieved and the contingency contemplated by him had, therefore, not arisen.

Russell, who, as Clarendon remarked, always loved to do something when to do nothing was prudent[3], could not be content to wait, and set to work on the preparation of an elaborate Memorandum for the Cabinet urging early action and the offer of joint mediation with France. Lyons, who was on leave in England for a few weeks,

[1] The story of the crisis was worked out on a basis of partial information by C. F. Adams in *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.* (1904), XVIII. 147–54. He returned to it after access to very much fuller material, and in *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.* (1913–4), XLVII. 372–424, greatly modified his conclusions and those he had expressed in his Oxford lectures of 1913. In the light of what was happening at this time it is interesting to note that on July 11th, 1862, Cobden wrote to Sumner: "It is during the recess that all the mischief is generally done in our foreign relations."

[2] Granville to Russell, Gotha, September 27th, 1862. Fitzmaurice's *Life of Earl Granville*, I. 442–4.

[3] Clarendon to Sir George Cornewall Lewis, October 24th, 1862. Maxwell's *Life of Clarendon*, II. 265.

advised extreme caution; but, on October 7th, Gladstone in a public speech at Newcastle threw caution to the winds and made a declaration that at first sight appeared decisive. "Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South," he said, "have made a nation. We may anticipate with certainty the success of the Southern States so far as their separation from the North is concerned." The speech was received with consternation as portending immediate intervention, and it produced a sensation in the mercantile and manufacturing community that was not far removed from panic. But the Prime-Minister at once informed his colleagues that the Chancellor had spoken entirely without authorisation and the Foreign Secretary, upon whose preserves he had trenched, wrote sharply to rebuke him saying that the Cabinet as a whole was not prepared to grant recognition[1]. This was undoubtedly the case, and certain Ministers were not long in indicating that, if the dangerous change of policy were decided on, it would be without their assent. The Secretary for War, Sir George Cornewall Lewis, took the lead, though he was not specially marked out as a sympathiser with the Union. It has been suggested that he acted on Palmerston's prompting; but in all probability this was not the case[2]. In a public speech at Hereford on October 14th, Lewis severely condemned any departure from Great Britain's neutral attitude, and he circulated to the members of the Cabinet a carefully argued Memorandum in reply to Russell's Circular recommending recognition.

Palmerston, who, above all things, wished to maintain the unity of his Cabinet in view of the difficulties of the European situation at the time, had arranged for a Cabinet meeting on October 23rd; but he was impressed by the public reception of Gladstone's and Lewis's speeches and by the opinion of Lord Derby, the leader of the Opposition, whom he had sounded through Lord Clarendon[3]. After consultation with Disraeli the Conservative leader pointed out that the recognition of the South could be of no benefit to Great Britain, unless she were prepared to undertake hostilities against the North and break the blockade by force. He would in no way pledge himself to support such a course. Lord Russell was obstinate; but even he was shaken, and when Adams asked for an interview to make enquiries about Gladstone's Newcastle speech, he fixed the appointment

[1] Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, II. 80.

[2] C. F. Adams examines the arguments and evidence in detail in *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.* XLVII. 407.

[3] Palmerston to Clarendon, October 20th, 1862. *Life of Clarendon*, II. 267.

for the afternoon of the decisive Cabinet. But the decision was already inevitable, the Prime-Minister did not come up from the country to meet the assembled Ministers, and only an informal consultation could take place[1]. Only Russell and Gladstone advocated a change of policy; Lewis in the contrary sense received the support of Grey and Newcastle and was strongly backed by the Northern sympathisers, Argyll, Villiers and Milner-Gibson. No room for doubt was left; and, when later in the day Adams asked categorically if he were to understand that Britain's policy was to remain unchanged, the Foreign Secretary answered with an explicit assent and stated that the Government were determined to leave the struggle to settle itself[2]. Gladstone alone remained unconvinced and circulated to his fellow Ministers a rejoinder to Lewis's Memorandum.

The Emperor kept his promise to Slidell to take action for intervention, and on October 30th he ordered the French Ambassadors in London and Petrograd to make proposals for the joint tender of their good offices to the belligerents by the three Powers. The proposal came before the full Cabinet on November 10th, and Russell then stated that Russia had already declined to be a party. He advised that the Emperor's proposal should be accepted, for he believed that if Great Britain refused, Russia would reconsider her decision and join forces with France in order to effect a rupture of the *entente*. Palmerston gave this advice a perfunctory support, but only Gladstone could be found to speak strongly in its favour. Every other Minister was firmly adverse to acceptance, and finally the Prime-Minister closed the discussion by arranging for the despatch to France of a definite refusal[3]. The crisis had been at last safely weathered and henceforward Great Britain's neutrality was assured[4]. Napoleon, knowing that he could not obtain the cooperation of Great Britain, determined to proceed alone and proposed his good offices to the belligerents in January, 1863; but he was politely rebuffed by

[1] Walpole, in his *Life of Russell*, II. 352, calls the meeting of October 23rd a Cabinet; but Clarendon's letters show that this was not the case.

[2] Russell was under no illusions as to the course the North would take if intervention were forced. Adams had received confidential instructions from Seward to break off diplomatic relations and he let their tenour be known to W. E. Forster for communication to the Foreign Secretary through Milner-Gibson.

[3] Lewis gave a report to Clarendon of what had happened in the Cabinet, and it was thus known to the Opposition leaders. Lewis to Clarendon, November 11th, 1862. *Life of Clarendon*, II. 268.

[4] A motion in favour of recognition was brought forward in the House of Lords by Lord Campbell on March 23rd, 1863; but it secured no support, and Lord Russell spoke strongly against it.

Seward with impressive finality. His despatch left no further opening of which the Emperor could make use for his designs and in March, 1863, both Houses of Congress passed resolutions stating that any further attempt at foreign interference in the direction of mediation would be regarded by the United States as an unfriendly act.

It was one of the bitterest complaints of those who were fighting for the Union that Englishmen were blind to the greater issues of the struggle and did not perceive that the downfall of Slavery was at stake. This failure was chiefly attributable to the complexity of American Constitutional conditions; but, when Lincoln and Seward could free themselves from their difficulties in securing the border States for the Union, the fog was gradually dispelled, and the great moral issues of the conflict stood forth clearly from the puzzling half-truths that had hidden them from view. Seward proposed to Lyons on March 22nd, 1862, that a new Treaty for the suppression of Slave-trading should be negotiated, and his overtures were at once accepted. The negotiations were conducted at Washington and met with no difficulty. The Treaty provided for joint action by specially commissioned officers of both countries and for mixed Courts at Sierra Leone, the Cape of Good Hope and New York. It was signed on April 7th, 1862, and ratified unanimously by the Senate without delay[1]. The publication of the Treaty provided Seward with the opportunity he desired of showing to foreign countries that the Federals were sincere in the anti-Slavery views. The next step forward in the conversion of British opinion was the publication of President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of September, 1862. Seward circulated this with explanatory comments to the American Ministers abroad. His utterances in the past had been too inconsistent for his practical appeal for sympathy to meet with much result at first; but all doubts were set at rest by the Proclamation of January 1st, 1863, declaring that all slaves in the States in rebellion were henceforward free. The news created extraordinary interest in England and a rapid growth of sympathy with the Union cause. Direct and organised attempts to encourage this growth were made with the approval and help of Seward and Adams. The Confederates complained bitterly of Governmental complacency towards this agitation and of the action of Cabinet Ministers, such as the Duke of Argyll and Mr Milner-

[1] *U.S. Treaties and Conventions*, pp. 454–66. *State Papers*, LII. 50–64. Correspondence concerning the negotiations. *State Papers*, LIII. 1424–38.

Gibson, in fostering it; they loudly proclaimed that such actions were unneutral, but they could obtain no satisfaction; the tide of enthusiasm steadily rose and great meetings were held in all parts of the country to wish success to the Northern arms in their crusade against Slavery. The debates on the Address in both Houses of Parliament at the opening of the session of 1863 contained many references to the American struggle and gave occasion for utterances from responsible leaders more friendly to the cause of the Union than any heard from them since the outbreak of the War. Lord Palmerston made no reference to American affairs; but Russell spoke at some length in support of his refusal to join France in any attempt at mediation. He expressed no regret for the way in which the policies of the two Powers had drifted apart, but he pointedly took occasion to express his cordial wishes for the preservation of the unity of the United States[1].

The main stream was flowing strongly towards friendly relations, when its progress was stopped by the outbreak of difficulties of the most untoward sort that were caused by the activities of Confederate agents in England. The recurrent practical difficulties of the War period fall under three heads—the first, concerning the treatment of British subjects in the States under Federal control, the second, matters connected with the blockade and the third, troubles arising out of the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819. All three involved a great deal of work and anxiety for Lyons and the Foreign Office; but only the third gave rise to questions of firstrate international importance, and can find consideration here.

The blockade of the Confederate ports by Northern cruisers which was at first very incomplete, became rapidly effective and its pressure upon the Confederation grew so great as to cause an enormous rise in the price of all imported commodities. On the other hand, the need of Europe for the cotton that was shut up in Southern ports was acute enough to render it highly profitable for any ship that could elude the blockade and escape with a cargo. Ship-owners willing to take the risk began to organise blockade-running in a systematic way, and since their enterprises were largely carried on from British ports, they led to incessant discussions between the two Governments. Adams protested against the inefficacy of the laws of Great Britain for applying any adequate policy of prevention of the fitting out of blockade-runners; but Russell maintained that

[1] February 5th, 1863. *Hansard*, CLXIX. 42–3.

it was not the duty of a neutral Government to enforce, or assist in enforcing, either by its laws or by executive action a blockade instituted by another Power. The preparation of warlike enterprises on neutral soil was a different thing; but the only penalty risked by an unarmed blockade-runner was capture and condemnation by a prize Court[1]. This answer was certainly in accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law, and Adams had to accept it. In replying to his protests and in their general action in regard to the blockade the policy of the Government was to adhere to certain broad principles which had been established or acknowledged by British jurists. On these Britain had acted when she was herself at war, and in them the United States had generally acquiesced. The case of every vessel affected by the blockade ought, in the opinion of the British Government, to be determined by its own time, place and circumstances and decided by the proper Prize Court[2]. In adherence to these principles the majority of the instances of maritime difficulties were settled; but they were difficult of application in the most dangerous cases of all.

In 1819 on the motion of Canning Parliament had passed a Foreign Enlistment Act[3] prohibiting the equipment of ships of war in British ports for a foreign Power engaged in a war in which Great Britain was neutral. The Act was drawn up to deal with the circumstances arising from the War of Liberation in Spanish America, and a similar measure was about the same time passed in the United States. The Acts had been undoubtedly evaded in both countries at the time of the troubles in Texas, and suggestions were made for increasing their stringency; but nothing was done, and they remained as the sole safeguard against the preparation of warlike enterprises on neutral soil. In the late summer of 1861, the Confederate Government sent Capt. James Bulloch to England to arrange secretly for the purchase or building of several fast steamers to be employed against American commerce; and by October he had succeeded in placing contracts on the Mersey for two such vessels. His intrigues were suspected at the American Legation; but Adams could obtain no definite information, and when he first protested to Russell against certain vessels supposed to be fitting out as warships, each proved to be an unarmed blockade-runner and his protests were of

[1] Russell to Adams, May 6th and 10th, 1862.

[2] These principles were laid down, as governing his advice, by the Solicitor-General, Sir Roundell Palmer (afterwards Lord Selborne). *Memorials*, II. 403.

[3] 59 Geo. III, c. 69.

no avail. Bulloch's precautions for disguising the real purpose of the first vessel for which he contracted were successful in preventing her arrest when the Government made enquiries, and in March, 1862, she sailed, as the *Oreto*, ostensibly for the Mediterranean. Four months later she made her appearance in the Bahamas, but attempts to arrest her there as contravening the Foreign Enlistment Act were unsuccessful. She ran the blockade into the Confederate port of Mobile and, having been fully armed, was renamed the *Florida*. She again ran the blockade and succeeded in doing great damage to American shipping before she was destroyed by the Federal forces in Bahia harbour in October, 1864.

The second vessel was at first known as *Number* 290 and was launched in May, 1862[1]. Adams had long suspected her purpose and, at the end of June, his agents had collected sufficient evidence for an appeal to Russell for her detention until it could be proved that her purpose was not inimical to the United States. The Foreign Office made enquiries through the Customs officials at Liverpool; but the local authorities there were obstinately insistent on technicalities and reported that there was no direct evidence of an intention of contravening the Foreign Enlistment Act. Russell, therefore, declined to take immediate action and did so in a rigid official way which the Americans found particularly offensive and which they regarded as a sign that the Government was sympathetic towards the Confederate designs. However, Adams at last succeeded in obtaining unmistakable evidence and, having secured the authoritative legal opinion of eminent Admiralty counsel that this proved *Number* 290 to be intended for the Confederates, he, on July 21st, forwarded the whole of the papers to Lord Russell with a request for immediate action. Orders were sent to the Customs officials in Liverpool to prevent the vessel's sailing, but once more they found excuses for delay, while Bulloch pressed forward his preparations with speed. In London, the Foreign Office forwarded the new papers concerning the case to the Law Officers on Wednesday, July 23rd; but, owing to a series of minor accidents[2], they did not reach the hands of the Attorney-General until late in the afternoon of Monday, July 28th. The decisive opinion that the vessel ought to be seized

[1] At her launching she received the name *Enrica* and became the *Alabama* after her escape.

[2] Certain of these accidents were attributable to the ignorance of the Foreign Office of the lapse into insanity of the Senior Law Officer, then the Queen's Advocate, to whom the papers were first sent.

without loss of time was given next morning, but the mischief was already done. The *Enrica*, or as she soon came to be called, the *Alabama*, had left the Mersey that morning (July 29th) on what was ostensibly a trial trip, but was really the beginning of a cruise of depredation against American commerce that in two years practically drove the flag of the United States from the high sea. A further chapter of small accidents prevented her stoppage off the Welsh coast before she left British waters. A United States warship ordered by Adams to intercept her in the Channel failed to do so, and ultimately the *Alabama* got clear away to the Azores, there to receive her arms and equipment from a British vessel that had been loaded in the Thames under Captain Bulloch's direction. Her crew comprised a large proportion of British sailors and, during her long and extremely destructive career, she was on several occasions received in the ports of British colonies with every courtesy, and indeed in some cases with undisguised admiration of her exploits. Round the controversies aroused by her escape and her subsequent career the difficulties of Anglo-American relations were for many years to circle.

Russell was much chagrined over the failure; but, when in October Adams began his long series of complaints concerning her depredations, the Foreign Secretary entirely disclaimed responsibility. His reply was written at a time, when, as was shown above, he was seriously contemplating intervention. Its tone was regarded by the Americans as curt and unfriendly; but he was sincerely anxious to prevent any further mishaps of the sort. He proposed to the Cabinet an immediate amendment of the Foreign Enlistment Act, but the Lord Chancellor (Lord Westbury) gave his emphatic opinion that it was unnecessary and the Ministers shrank from an attempt to force through Parliament a measure that would undoubtedly arouse fierce controversy. The Confederate sympathisers in England were elated with the news of the *Alabama's* exploits and a loan of 3,000,000*l.* launched upon the London market for the provision of further supplies was well subscribed. When Forster and Bright, having been provided with evidence by Adams, attacked the Government for negligence in enforcing the Foreign Enlistment Act and in failing to amend it, the Solicitor-General's defence rested on such narrowly legal grounds as to ignore entirely the moral responsibilities of neutrality[1]. Palmerston followed with a flippant speech that treated the protests of the American Government as insincere, and when these speeches

[1] Debate of March 27th, 1863. *Hansard*, CLXX. 33–72.

were reported across the Atlantic they did great harm, so that Anglo-American relations seemed to be drifting from bad to worse.

But Adams's incessant protests were rendering Russell profoundly uneasy, and he was determined not to be deceived again. On the very day of the Solicitor-General's unfortunate defence he privately admitted to Adams that the cases of the *Alabama* and the *Oreto* were a scandal and reproach to British laws[1], and, a few days later, he ordered the arrest of another vessel, the *Alexandra*, which was suspected of being fitted out for Bulloch. When this order was attacked in the House of Commons Sir Roundell Palmer defended it in a speech of an entirely different tone to that adopted by him a month before and when the case was brought to trial he did his best to secure the condemnation of the *Alexandra*. But Lord Westbury's opinion of the efficacy of the Foreign Enlistment Act was shown to be fallacious, Chief Baron Pollock summing up most adversely to the case for the Government and interpreting the Act as in no way designed for the protection of belligerents but solely to prevent conflicts in British waters. The case was dismissed and by the obstinacy of Pollock any appeal against his judgment was prevented so that, in spite of Russell's wishes, the *Alexandra* had to be released.

The Government had really placed itself in an impossible position by its weak reluctance to press upon Parliament an amendment of the imperfect Act, and Adams was not far from the truth when he wrote that the most extraordinary circumstance attending the history of the whole business was the timidity and vacillation of the officers of the Crown in the assumption of a necessary responsibility[2]. Strictly legal means were of no avail in the face of an unprecedented situation, and nothing but the exercise of the supreme political power could save the country from a very real danger of war. The climax came in the case of two powerful ironclad rams that were being built by Messrs Laird ostensibly to the order of a French merchant. Rumour persistently maintained that they were intended to break the blockade, but in view of the acquittal of the *Alexandra* the Law Officers advised that their condemnation could not be obtained from the Courts[3]. Russell was in the greatest perplexity as to what course to take, for Adams

[1] Russell to Lyons, March 27th, 1863. Russell's *Official Correspondence respecting the Alabama*, p. 67.

[2] Adams to Seward, September 8th, 1863.

[3] The story of the Laird rams is worked out in detail but with some anti-English bias by Brooks Adams in *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.* XLV. 243–333. J. F. Rhodes also deals with it in detail in *History of the United States*, IV. 377–94. Each agrees that the seizure of the rams was vital for the maintenance of the blockade.

told him with unmistakable frankness that the United States would regard the release of the rams as virtually tantamount to the participation of Great Britain in the War[1]. Every enquiry that was made during the month of August tended to prove that the ostensible ownership of the vessels was nothing but a legal fiction, but the Foreign Secretary could not bring himself to decide what action to take.

In a menacing despatch which Adams luckily kept secret Seward threatened to pursue the commerce destroyers into British ports regardless of consequences, and he ostentatiously went on with preparations for the issue of letters-of-marque to privateers whose sole object for attack must be British shipping. It has been frequently asserted that Russell at last yielded to these threats what he would not concede to right, but a comparison of the dates of a very tangled correspondence reveals that such was not the case. On September 1st the Foreign Secretary wrote from his Scottish seat definitely declining to take action against the rams; but, before he had received this refusal, Adams on September 3rd wrote a threatening despatch couched in terms that were clearly anticipatory of a declaration of war. When at last on September 5th Russell's refusal reached him he replied that he was awaiting instructions and implied that these would mean the severance of relations. Had the refusal been persisted in, there is no doubt that war would have resulted, for the great Federal victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg had given to Lincoln and Seward complete confidence in the nearly approaching success of the Union armies.

But while Adams in London was beginning his preparations for a diplomatic rupture, Russell in Scotland was taking second thoughts entirely on his own account and not in retreat before the American threats of which he was ignorant. Material is lacking for an explanation of his sudden change of attitude between September 1st and 2nd, but on the 3rd Layard, the Foreign Under-Secretary, wrote to the Treasury stating that he had been directed by Lord Russell to request that orders should be at once given for the detention of the rams. On the same day Russell himself wrote to the Prime-Minister stating that he had given these orders and two days later (September 5th) Adams was informed that the desired action had been taken. From his own despatches we can learn what a terrible wrench it had been for Russell thus to use the prerogative of the Crown outside the bounds of strict legality; but, having once decided that public policy

[1] Adams to Russell, July 11th, 1863.

demanded the action, he displayed no lack of vigour in carrying it through. Into the further details of the affair it is unnecessary to enter. Having been detained for some time under the charge of a naval force, the rams were purchased for the British Government and the builders compensated. The most acute danger of the Civil War to Anglo-American peace had been at last averted. Though the last two years of the War were filled with diplomatic difficulty, they gave rise to no question that came within the sphere of policy. Only the bitter controversies aroused by the events of its earlier years remained, and they had to await a settlement until long after the War was over.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION, 1852–1866

I. RECAPITULATORY: BEFORE THE TREATY OF LONDON

LORD PALMERSTON'S celebrated gibe, after (if one may say so without uncharitableness) serving its purpose, has at all events had its day. In his circular despatch of December 28th, 1863, at the time when the Schleswig-Holstein Question had, by the death of King Frederick VII of Denmark, suddenly come to the forefront in European politics, and after, under most competent guidance, Lord Russell had, in his turn, familiarised himself with some of that Question's most important features, he declared that "nothing is more embarrassing or more intricate than it, if examined in detail." But he was convinced that "a broader and more general view of the Question would perhaps lead to a more just appreciation of facts, and possibly furnish a clue by which we might escape from the dark labyrinth into open daylight." In the present Chapter, any attempt would be out of place either to summarise what may be called the antecedents of the Schleswig-Holstein Question, which could not be coherently treated without a careful survey of them from, say, the twelfth century onwards, or even to enlarge upon the account already given in the present work of the revolutionary movement and of the subsequent reaction in the Duchies (by which collective name we may here venture to call Schleswig and Holstein, with Lauenburg when occasion arises[1]). Nor do we propose to furnish a general summary of the political history of Schleswig-Holstein within the period extending from the Treaty of London of 1852 and the negotiations leading up to it, to the Gastein Convention and its collapse, after which what had been a dominant European problem sank into a subsidiary element in the conflict between the two Great German Powers—till, in our own day, it formed an all but insignificant item in the dealings of the Allies and their Associates with vanquished

[1] The "Danish duchies" and the "Elbe duchies" are, though in different ways, misleading terms.

Germany. Our more restricted theme is the share taken by British Foreign Policy in what may, with perhaps sufficient accuracy, be called the penultimate phase of the Question—a far easier, but by no means more inviting, task. For the story of that share is one of interference, very diversely received and ultimately ignored, on the part of a diplomacy showing "little real interchange of thought between the English Government and Foreign Powers[1]" and of a statesmanship of good intentions: a story, in a word, of failure[2].

From the point of view we have indicated, it will be desirable to recall very briefly some of the chief phases in the earlier history of British Foreign Policy towards Denmark and the duchies. Before the eighteenth century, our Foreign Policy had found little or no occasion for concerning itself with the fortunes of Schleswig and Holstein (Lauenburg, till the Peace of Amiens, remained a possession of the House of Hanover). Affinities of race had ceased to be regarded as the dominant element in the struggle between Danes and Germans which, nevertheless, lay at the root of a large proportion of the dynastic vicissitudes of more than six centuries, and which, after reaching its crisis in the nineteenth century, has ended in a partition of probable stability. When, in the earlier part of the eighteenth century, the Great Northern War ended with the breakdown of the ascendancy of Sweden, against whom, and against whose ally the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, the owner of half Schleswig, Denmark had carried on a perennial contest, neither of the two Scandinavian Powers any longer ruled the Baltic, and Great Britain, under the influence of Hanoverian interests, was found ready to take part in holding the balance between them. Thus, by the Treaty of Stockholm (1720), in which Great Britain and France acted as mediators, and by which Denmark restored to Sweden part of Pomerania, Denmark obtained from the two mediatory Powers a guarantee of the "Ducal" or, strictly speaking, younger Gottorp portion of Schleswig, on which Denmark had now laid hands, and which, already in 1715, King George I had guaranteed to King Frederick IV and his descendants. Much play was made, down to a late date in the discussions on the

[1] The phrase is Lord Beaconsfield's, applied by him to the whole of this period of our diplomacy in a letter to Lord Salisbury, November 10th, 1876. See Lady G. Cecil's *Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury* (1921), II. 95.

[2] As to the authorities on the history of the Schleswig-Holstein Question before, and more especially after, 1848, see *Bibliography*. For an attempt to summarise the course of the Schleswig-Holstein Question up to 1852, see vol. II. ch. ii, of the present writer's *History of Germany*, 1815–1890 (Cambridge Historical Series, 1917); and cf. *ante*, pp. 322–4.

Schleswig-Holstein Question, with the guarantees of 1720[1]. It is clear, however, from the words actually used in them, that, in any case, they extended only to the "Ducal" portion of Schleswig, and not to that duchy at large; and it is equally clear that they could have no application to any changes in the order of Succession, as determined by the laws of that duchy itself, or prejudice the rights of any claimants on the occasion of a vacancy in its sovereignty[2]. The Treaty of Copenhagen, in 1727, was, admittedly, only a general undertaking to maintain the King of Denmark in peaceable possession of the "Ducal" portion of Schleswig. Finally, the Treaty between Denmark and Russia by which, in 1773, the Grand-duke Paul, on coming of age, confirmed the cession to Denmark in 1767 of the rights of the Russian, or elder, branch of the Gottorp line, of which he was the Head, to the Ducal-Gottorp portions of Schleswig and Holstein, involved no waiving of the eventual reversionary claims of the Russian line, among the *agnati* of the King of Denmark, to the whole of both duchies[3].

Denmark and the Duchies alike enjoyed a golden age of peace, with freedom from outside intervention in their affairs, while the foreign policy of the united monarchy was in the master-hands of Count Andreas Peter von Bernstorff, one of the most farsighted statesmen of his age (1773–80 and 1784–97). But, before his days

[1] The Danish Minister Hall referred to them at Copenhagen in 1863 in his conversations with Lord Wodehouse, who, however, very sensibly observed that it seemed useless to refer to a transaction carried on in quite different circumstances (see his despatch to Lord Russell of December 21st); and de Bille solemnly appealed to them as still in full vigour in his despatch to the same of February 11th, 1864. The arguments against acting upon these guarantees were well summed up by Drouyn de Lhuys, in a statement communicated by Lord Cowley on February 13th.

[2] The argument based on the statement that the Prelates and Knights of Schleswig did homage in September, 1721, *secundum tenorem legis regiae* falls to the ground, unless the *lex regia* referred to be assumed to be that of 1665, which had never acquired a legal force by being published in the Duchies.

[3] It has seemed well to mention in this place the agreements in question, and to estimate their political value, inasmuch as, at the critical period when the Western Powers were faced by the design of incorporating Schleswig as a whole with the kingdom of Denmark, it was attempted to induce them as "guarantors" to give it their support. The historical meaning of these antecedents is therefore of enduring importance—all the more so that the late Lord Salisbury in a note to his essay on "The Danish Duchies," which first appeared in January, 1864 (reprinted in his *Essays: Foreign Policy*, 1905), stated that the British guarantee (July, 1720) applied to the Danish possession of the whole of Slesvig and was concluded in the strongest terms "against all and everyone who may attempt to disturb it directly or indirectly." Much earlier, in his treatise *On the Relations of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to the Crown of Denmark* (1848), the late Sir Travers Twiss, though he subsequently (p. 177) cites the precise text of the guarantees of 1720, had quoted (p. 126, note) Art. IV of the British Convention as guaranteeing peaceable enjoyment by Denmark of the duchy of Schleswig. In C. F. Allen's standard *History*

drew to a close, heavy clouds had been gathering round the endeavour, consistently pursued by him, of preserving Danish neutrality, especially as the maritime policy of Great Britain, and perhaps the great Minister's personal tendencies, rendered him unwilling to throw in Denmark's lot with the adversaries of France. Under Bernstorff's son and successor, Count Christian Günther, the tension with Great Britain increased; and, in 1801, the Danish Government having unconditionally joined in the Armed Neutrality, the well-known collision with Great Britain followed, but ended, in the same year, with the restoration of peace. It was not broken again for six years; since there was no reason for Great Britain to trouble herself about the ill-advised attempt, after the dissolution of the Germanic Empire in 1806, to unite Holstein permanently with the kingdom of Denmark (by the Royal Patent of September of that year). But in 1807 began a series of events which, while jeopardising the future of the entire monarchy, and involving it in a seven years' war with Great Britain, brought the Duchies to the brink of national ruin. King Frederick VI, however, continued to cling to the fortunes of Napoleonic France, at first in the sanguine hope of becoming the Sovereign of a Scandinavian Union, and then with the sheer fidelity of despair. Not till January 14th, 1814, the day of the Dano-Swedish Peace of Kiel, was peace, also, concluded between Great Britain and Denmark, who now joined the Coalition against Napoleon[1]. The Duchies had suffered severely from the long struggle, after the close of which a "liberating" Russian army remained in Holstein till 1815.

Neither resentments nor regrets refuse to die out in politics, if left to themselves—and still less was the remembrance of the long conflict with Denmark likely to affect the attitude of British statesmanship towards the submerged, but not extinct, question of the relations

of Denmark (French translation, II. 138) (1878), France and Great Britain are said to have guaranteed to Denmark, the *mère patrie*, the possession of Slesvig in perpetuity. The work of Sir Travers Twiss cited above criticises at great length, and beyond doubt with much learning and acumen, the view taken by Bunsen in his celebrated *Memoir to Lord Palmerston* (published in 1846 with J. von Gruner's *Essay on the Succession to the Danish Monarchy*), which, while in the main unanswerable, seems to go too far in asserting (p. 56) that the guarantees of 1720 "clearly lost their object in 1773, when those claims of the House of Gottorp were removed against which the guarantees had been demanded and given."

[1] In this Peace, while Great Britain restored the Danish possessions occupied by her in the course of the War (though not the captured fleet), she ceded in return the island of Heligoland, hitherto forming part of the duchy of Schleswig and included in the guarantee of 1720. This last statement is made on the authority of R. Schleiden, *Jugenderinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners* (Wiesbaden, 1866) a notable work of a very distinguished and high-minded author, whose account of the Duchies in the earlier part of the nineteenth century is full of interest.

between the Danish kingdom and the Duchies. The latter had, in trying times, continued loyal to their Danish connexion; and in the Peace of 1815, it was the Danish Government itself that had brought about a closer relation between Holstein and Germany. The entrance of Denmark, on behalf of Holstein, into the Germanic Confederation, was intended to strengthen the security of the Danish tenure of that duchy by means of the mutual guarantee of their federal possessions binding the members of the Confederation; although it must be allowed that the Vienna Final Act of 1820, together with certain Organic Laws, so enlarged the range of intervention by the Federal Diet in the internal affairs of the several Federal States, as to be unfavourable to the maintenance of an autonomous conduct of its affairs by the Holstein Government[1].

In reconstituted Europe, demands for the separation of both Duchies from Denmark, and their union with some German State (such as Prussia or Oldenburg) remained quite isolated,—and, though in the University of Kiel and elsewhere, the beginnings of a controversy on the historic rights of the duchies were taking literary shape, they can hardly be said to have as yet commanded the attention of foreign Governments. Yet it was an open secret that, apart from the principle of nationality, whose paramount claims were still very imperfectly recognised in European politics, the solid argument of Constitutional rights, which neither Schleswig nor Holstein had ever renounced or forfeited, and, above all, the chartered condition of indivisibility as between the two Duchies, which had taken deep root in the life of both[2], were certain to come into conflict with the assertion of the corporate unity regarded at Copenhagen as indispensable to the safety of the entire monarchy. The reign of Frederick VI, however, came to an end in 1839, without incidents in the dispute more decisive than the protests of the Schleswig-Holstein knightage (*Ritterschaft*), the appeal of the Holstein section of that body to the Frankfort Diet (1818) and its rejection at the instance of Austria and Prussia (1823), followed by the institution of Provincial States for each of the two Duchies (and other chief parts of the monarchy), which could thus at least make known their views as to the renewed promise of a common Constitution. King Frederick VI's personal popularity and their innate loyalty had held out

[1] Cf. C. A. Gosch, *Denmark and Germany since* 1815 (1862), pp. 3–4.

[2] The quibble as to the meaning of *ungedeelt* may be safely left unnoticed, though it commended itself to Lord Salisbury (*u.s.* p. 76, note).

with his Schleswig-Holstein subjects at large, and there had been no serious internal agitation in the Duchies, in spite of the trials (not wholly unconnected with the British Corn-laws) undergone by their agricultural interests. Under the new King-Duke, Christian VIII, who had begun his reign at a comparatively advanced age and without the prospect of any successor of his own line after his only son, the question of the Succession, which, presenting as it did the possibility of a separation between the component parts of the present monarchy, inevitably came to the front in both Danish and German political life; and with it the nationalities question could not but assume proportions to which it had hitherto failed to attain. In July, 1846, the "Open Letter" of King Christian definitely adopted the views which Parliament and public had come to hold at Copenhagen, and announced to the world that the union between the kingdom of Denmark, Schleswig, and part of Holstein was permanent and indisputable. There followed protests from the Holstein States (feebly responded to by the Frankfort Diet), the Duke of Augustenburg, the Grand-duke of Oldenburg and others; but the year 1847 passed very quietly, so far as open action was concerned, and the British Government was, not unnaturally, content, as to the Succession Question, to await events[1]. In January, 1848, Frederick VII, the last Danish King of the elder—or royal—line of the descendants of Christian II, mounted the throne; and, two months later, the Revolution had broken out at both Copenhagen and Rendsburg. The dissolution of the historic union between Schleswig and Holstein and the incorporation of Schleswig in the kingdom of Denmark, announced by the "March" Ministry at Copenhagen, were the immediate cause of the rising of the Duchies and the setting-up of a Provisional Government at Kiel, which led to the outbreak of the War carried on by the Schleswig-Holsteiners with the support of Prussian and other Federal troops, until the abandonment of the duchies by Prussia and the Confederation in the Peace of Berlin (July 2nd, 1850).

The course of these events marks the first intervention of British Policy in the Schleswig-Holstein Question. The Memorandum on Foreign Affairs and on the general line of policy which seemed to be incumbent on this country, drawn up by Lord John Russell as

[1] A Memorial on the Succession, explanatory of the history and state of the entire question, was transmitted to Lord Palmerston by Mr John Ward, then H.M. Consul-General at Leipzig. Lord Palmerston accompanied his acknowledgment of it by the remark that he had forwarded it to the Prince Consort, by whom he believed it would be duly appreciated. The conclusions reached in it are stated in Mr Ward's *Experiences of a Diplomatist* (1872), pp. 66–8.

Prime-Minister in October, 1848, indicates that no part of his "system" had been less closely considered by him than that which concerned Denmark and the duchies. While Great Britain's "obvious policy" was "to dissuade from all violent invasions of territory...she did not, as advised by some, interfere to prevent the Prussian invasion of Schleswig; but she advised an armistice and terms of agreement to Denmark and Germany[1]." But the policy carried out by Palmerston as Foreign Secretary at this time was neither purely pacific nor consistently directed to the matter-of-fact solution of the quarrel by the partition of Schleswig, which was, so early as 1848, suggested by him[2]. British as well as Russian policy—Russian as the inspiring, British as the directly active, influence—contributed to render King Frederick William IV of Prussia, never strong in resolve, unwilling to push on the invasion; so that when, after the expiration of the Malmö Truce, the War had been renewed, and before the Danes had gained the memorable victory of Fridericia (July 6th, 1849), peace negotiations (prepared at Petrograd and London) had opened at Berlin. In these negotiations Great Britain took part as Mediating Power; but the moving force was obviously the determination of Russia to maintain the "integrity" of the Danish monarchy and, in conformity with the policy afterwards carried out at Warsaw and Olmütz, to frustrate the aspirations for a united Germany. There can be little doubt that Palmerston, never cordially inclined towards the German Powers, was at this time anxious to conciliate the goodwill of Russia which, together with that of France, his recent policy in Greece had of late severely tried[3]. Hence, the London Protocol (brought forward immediately after the Peace of Berlin between Denmark and Prussia as representing the Germanic Confederation), to which reference will be made immediately, and by which Great Britain and Russia, with France and subsequently Austria, joined with Denmark and Sweden in accepting in principle the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish monarchy, while charging the King of Denmark with the preparation of a new Order of Succession designed to compass this end[4].

The seal was set upon the abandonment of the Duchies by the

[1] Cf. Spencer Walpole's *Life of Lord John Russell*, II. 43–4.
[2] *Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier*, I. 385. [3] Cf. *infra*, chap. XIV.
[4] Cf. Morier, *u.s.* I. 363 sqq., who refers to *Aus meinem Leben* (Memoirs of Duke Ernest of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha). The situation at the time of this "Protocol" is very well described in the essay "Schleswig-Holstein seit Mitte 1849," in *Die Gegenwart* (VI. 1851).

German Great Powers in the Peace of Berlin (facilitated by the previous appointment of an Administrative Commission in which a British official[1] as *répresentant de la Puissance Médiatrice* had been appointed as arbitrator between his Prussian and Danish colleagues) by the punctation of Olmütz (November 29th, 1850). On July 5th, 1850, the Earl of Westmorland, then at Berlin, is found congratulating Lord Palmerston on the termination "under his auspices," and with the aid of the good offices of Russia, of the "prolonged and arduous peace negotiations." But, though the evacuation of Schleswig was completed in the course of 1851, and the authority of the King-Duke was reestablished in Holstein, he and his wisest advisers were not blind to the necessity of a reorganisation of the Danish monarchy as a whole, if a recurrence of the shock undergone by it was to be averted, and the approval to be secured, both of the Duchies, not yet absolutely irreconcilable, and also, through the Austrian and Prussian Governments representing its interests, of the Germanic Confederation. The sagacious and conciliatory statesmanship of C. A. Bluhme, who, after becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1851, in January of the following year formed a Ministry of his own, essayed to bring about such a reorganisation on what may be called moderate "whole-State" (*Helestat*) as distinct from Eider-Danish lines[2]. The negotiations which ensued proceeded on the twofold understanding that, while the King of Denmark should undertake to abstain from any step towards the incorporation of Schleswig, no union beyond that already in existence in respect to certain non-political institutions should be countenanced between that duchy and Holstein, but that, on the other hand, the King of Denmark should definitely promise to secure and protect an equal treatment of the German inhabitants of Schleswig with that enjoyed by his Danish subjects there. To the agreements—or engagements—contracted on these lines, King Frederick VII gave definite expression as such, in his Proclamation dated January 28th, 1852, and they were subsequently (on June 3rd of the same year) confirmed by the Diet[3]. As to the binding nature of these engagements

[1] This was Colonel Hodges, at that time British Chargé d'affaires at Hamburg, who had been British political agent in Serbia and in Egypt, and who had no German sympathies—hence Bunsen's "*perhorresco* Hodges." In June, 1851, he was sent by the Foreign Office to investigate the condition of things in Schleswig; but his Report was not made public.

[2] Those desirous of following the internal changes in Danish politics in the period from 1848 to the beginning of 1852 may be referred to the essay "Das Königreich Dänemark," in *Die Gegenwart*, VIII. 1853.

[3] For a list, with dates, of the most important documents containing the much-vext "engagements" in question, see *The Home and Foreign Review* (1864), pp. 50–1.

no reasonable doubt can be entertained, notwithstanding the Danish attempts to call it into question; and no such doubt was at any time expressed by the British Government. Austria and Prussia had made themselves responsible for the execution of these agreements to the duchies as well as to the Germanic Confederation; although the subsequent assertion of the two German Great Powers that it was on the faith of the Danish promises that they became parties to the Treaty of London of 1852 may not be documentarily demonstrable. In any case, no supposed settlement of the kind has ever been clothed in a less satisfactory form, and among the many diplomatic shortcomings in the history of the Schleswig-Holstein Question this may be regarded as one of the most notable.

The side of the Question which, naturally enough, had from the first commanded the attention of the British Foreign Secretary was that of the Succession. On February 19th, 1850[1], Lord Palmerston, with his usual directness and force, urged his views on Sir H. W. Williams Wynn, our active Minister at Copenhagen, in a passage worth quoting at length, inasmuch as it conveys the essence of our anything but complicated (or circumspect) policy in the matter, both before and after the Treaty of London:

I have to instruct you to press strongly on the Danish Government the great importance of settling without delay the question as to the Succession to the Crown of Denmark, which is the key to the whole of the questions pending between Denmark and Germany. For, as long as there is a likelihood that, in consequence of the difference which exists between the law of Succession in Denmark and the law of Succession in Holstein, Holstein will, after the termination of the present reign in Denmark, be separated from the Danish Crown, and become a purely German duchy, so long will the Germans strive to the utmost to attach as firmly as possible to Holstein as large as possible a portion of the duchy of

A full Memorandum on these undertakings as to which Hall afterwards sought to repudiate the view taken by the great German Powers was drawn up by Count Bernstorff, just before he was superseded by Bismarck in the conduct of Prussian foreign affairs. See *State Papers*, LXXIV., under the date of November 14th, 1862. It is worth pointing out that Count Rechberg explicitly stated to Count Apponyi, on February 18th, 1864 (communicated by him to Russell, February 24th), that in 1851–2, "in exchange for promises given by Denmark not to incorporate Schleswig with the kingdom, Austria and Prussia gave up the maintenance of the intimate union formerly subsisting between Holstein and Schleswig." He then claimed that the outbreak of war had invalidated the whole understanding. See *Parliamentary Papers*, LXV. (1864).

[1] The despatches to which reference is made in the text with dates belonging to the period from February 19th, 1850, to August 5th, 1853, are, unless otherwise specified, to be found in *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Denmark*, 1850–3, in *State Papers*, LXV. (1864).

Schleswig, in order that such portion of Schleswig may, on the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy, follow the fortunes of Holstein, and become essentially German; and, as long as there shall be foreseen a likelihood of such a result, so long will the Danish [*sic*, Eider-Danish?] party at Copenhagen not only strive to make the separation between Schleswig and Holstein as complete and final as possible, even to the injury of the material interests of the two duchies; but so long will they also endeavour to escape from the plain meaning of the basis adopted by the preliminary treaty for the final settlement of these matters, and try to connect Schleswig and Denmark as intimately as possible. But,

he continues, foreseeing the sort of solution approved by the London Protocol of July, 1850, but not the special difficulties of the choice sanctioned by the Treaty of 1852,

if once the continuance of the political union between the two duchies were secured by a settlement of the Crown of Denmark [on a Prince] who would equally succeed to Holstein and Schleswig, these motives for such conflicting endeavours would cease, and the contending parties would be more likely to concur in some equitable arrangement.

The way out of the difficulty here clearly pointed out lay, not less clearly, in at all events an attempt to reconcile the conflicting interests of the kingdom and the Duchies. But on this head, or on the expediency of an immediate understanding with Prussia, as the German Power most nearly interested, Palmerston did not trouble himself greatly, falling in at once with the suggestion that King Frederick VII should make overtures on the subject to the Hereditary Prince of Oldenburg, though, already at this point, Nesselrode had stated that the King would prefer Prince Christian of Glücksburg. The Duke of Augustenburg's protest (May) against his name being excluded from consideration in the prospective arrangements, Lord Palmerston answered by a simple acknowledgment. The Prussian Government, though not from the first treated by the Danish Government with the same confidence as was the *Puissance Médiatrice*, agreed, indeed, in a Secret Article of the Berlin Treaty of Peace to "take part" in negotiations, the initiation of which was to be left to the King of Denmark, for regulating the Order of Succession in the Danish monarchy. But, on the actual eve of the meeting at the Foreign Office in London for signing the Protocol approved by the Representatives of Great Britain, France, Russia, Sweden and Denmark, which "recognised the wisdom of the initiative of the King of Denmark to regulate eventually the Order of Succession in his House, in order to facilitate the arrangements by which the integrity of the Danish

monarchy should remain intact," Prussia's refusal to sign was notified to Palmerston by Bunsen. He complained of the exclusion of Prussia from the previous negotiations, and stated that the proposed Protocol, while violating the rights of the Germanic Confederation in Holstein, ignored the claims of a German princely House concerned in the Succession. More fundamentally, the Prussian Foreign Minister, on the day before the second meeting of the Conference (August 2nd) at which the Austrian Representative appended his signature, but from which the Prussian was absent, informed the British Chargé d'affaires at Berlin that before signing, "it would be necessary for Prussia to arrive at a decision on the preliminary question, whether it would be more for the advantage of Germany that the integrity of Denmark should be maintained, or whether, on the extinction of the present male line, the Danish dominions should be divided into two parts, the one Danish, the other German[1]." The Austrian assent was in so far ambiguous, that, according to information sent to Palmerston from Vienna on August 6th, Prince Schwarzenberg claimed consideration for Austria's responsibility both as a European Power and as a member of the Germanic Confederation, though he avowed that "we desire, in fact, the same thing as the other Powers taking part in the Conference." At its meeting on August 23rd, the Austrian Representative expressly reserved the rights of the Germanic Confederation, and, a week later (August 31st), Schleinitz instructed Count Perponcher to lay before Palmerston the frank declaration that Prussia regarded as "at best dubious" the novel expression "the *integrity* of the Danish monarchy," and that the first object of the contemplated negotiations, to which political expediency, even if it should prevent the preservation of this integrity, would have to be subordinated, must lie in ascertaining what is "the disputed documental law." Although Olmütz was to put an end to the fears, by which Queen Victoria was at the time distracted, of Prussian resistance to the Protocol policy and a possible Russian armed intervention against the continued resistance of the Duchies, and although Palmerston had left her query as to what course he would in that case pursue, without a positive answer[2], peace had

[1] Schleinitz, who at this time seems not to have been disinclined to favour the Augustenburg pretensions, was careful to argue that the action of Prussia in the interests of Germany could not be prejudiced by the Secret Article in the Berlin Treaty of Peace. As to this Secret Article, by which Sir A. H. Layard afterwards asserted that Prussia had from the first bound herself, see Count Usedom's letter to Baron G. von Bunsen mentioned below.

[2] Cf. Sir T. Martin, *Life of the Prince Consort*, II. 309–10.

been with his aid preserved, the point was now, whether and how further efforts of diplomatic statesmanship could render it permanent.

In the negotiations of the following fortnight Austria is found exhibiting the same diffidence as to taking a view of her own on the Succession problem. Without any interest of her own in the state of the Duchies, beyond unwillingness to allow Prussia to stand forth any longer as their chief champion, she, as an essentially conservative Power could not be otherwise than favourably disposed to what Nesselrode (September 7th, 1850) described as the essentially conservative policy of the Peace and the Protocol. Prussia's, now more shifting, but already carefully calculated course was rendered more difficult by the inconsistencies in her Sovereign's attitude towards the claims of the Duke of Augustenburg. Russia, while at first declining to put forward any preference of her own, favoured a further conference of the Powers that had signed the Protocol of August 2nd, over the heads as it were of the supporters of the Augustenburg or other claims; and, by June 5th, 1851, Nesselrode signed at Warsaw a Protocol of Arrangement with Denmark, agreeing to the designation at such a Conference by King Frederick VII of Prince Christian of Glücksburg and his Consort as his heirs presumptive. Indeed, in order to facilitate the success of this arrangement, the Russian Government undertook such further renunciations as might be necessary on the part of the Tsar in the name of himself and his line (the elder branch of the House of Gottorp), while reserving the rights of the younger branches, and of the elder in the event of the extinction of the House of Glücksburg[1]. On behalf of Great Britain, Lord Palmerston, so late as March 8th, 1851, declined to take any active part in the discussion of the Succession in Denmark and the Duchies, and even, on May 24th, described it as one which ought to be settled by internal arrangement. But it was not long before he arrived at the conclusion desired by Denmark. On July 24th of the same year, he informed Sir Edmund Lyons (then at Stockholm) that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the choice of Prince Christian of Glücksburg, or of his eldest son, would be a good one. On September 8th, Count Reventlow, on behalf of the Danish Crown, laid before

[1] This compact was, on May 1st following, stated by Baron Brunnow to have been concluded in London between himself and de Bille. See the State Paper on *Danish Succession* presented in return to an Address to the House of Commons dated February 18th, 1856, in *Parliamentary Papers*, LXI. (1856).

Lord Palmerston an elaborate (though by no means closely argued) survey of the present position of the Succession Question, declaring it indispensable that the Succession to the entire monarchy should fall to a Prince possessed at the same time of unquestionable rights and safeguarded against doubtful pretensions to any part or parts of it. From this point of view, reference was made to the gracious action of the Emperor of Russia, while the pretensions of the Augustenburg line were ruled out at once. It was described as unnecessary to reiterate the groundlessness of the appeal to the *lex regia* of 1665, while Schleswig, always an integral part of Denmark, had since been acknowledged to be so by new proffers of fealty and homage, and guarantees of the Great Powers. What was now required was that the Powers who signed the Protocols on August 2nd and 23rd, should, together with Prussia, authorise their Representatives in London to secure by an act of European reorganisation a further pledge of stability for the arrangement naming Prince Christian of Glücksburg, with his Consort and their male descendants, heirs to the Danish monarchy. This invitation was accompanied by a private letter from King Frederick VII to Queen Victoria, appealing to Her Majesty's friendship in a matter which covered the highest and most precious interests of his Crown.

Palmerston, while apparently reserving a reply to the Danish Memorandum, was, as has been seen, by this time predisposed to adopt its policy as his own. On September 25th, he instructed Lord Bloomfield at Berlin to inform Manteuffel (President of the Council) that the Succession in the Danish monarchy could not be regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a purely German question, since it involved European interests and might lead to European conflicts. "It is for the general interests of Europe that Denmark, Schleswig and Holstein should remain united under the same sovereign, and it was for many reasons manifestly impossible that they can be so united under a member of the House of Augustenburg." To the Augustenburg claims, concerning which nothing further need be said here (except that even the King of Prussia had asked Duke Christian August, who with his brother had identified himself with the rising of 1848, to "compromise" matters with the Danish royal family at large), and to the extraordinary national current in their favour, Palmerston was wide awake. While, therefore, declaring that Her Majesty's Government felt incompetent to pronounce an opinion as to their legal foundation, he pressed the elimination of them by granting the

Duke compensation for his sequestered estates[1]. Of ulterior designs by Prussia as to the acquisition of the Duchies for herself—Bismarck was not as yet in a position calling for the utterance of such thoughts—Palmerston cannot have had more than a vague suspicion, or he could hardly, in the same despatch of September 25th, 1851, have loftily assumed that the Prussian Government was "too enlightened and high-minded to wish to pursue what must be acknowledged to be a doubtful scheme of separate advantage for Prussia at the expense of Europe," by declining to join in the scheme of the Protocol. The language held by Bismarck as to the Holstein Question, to Lord Cowley on a visit to Frankfort on September 30th, was, the latter said, all that Palmerston could desire, for the Prussian Envoy held it to be more for the interest of Prussia to uphold the Danish monarchy as it was than to see Holstein separated from it and annexed to Germany; that Denmark, as at present constituted, was sufficiently strong to inspire respect without having resources to make her possession of the key of the Baltic a source of fear; that, were Holstein taken from her, she would become so weak that she must become an easy prey either to Russia or to England.

At all events, Manteuffel now conveyed to the Danish Minister at Berlin, in most cordial terms, the formal assent of the Prussian Government to the principle of the integrity of the Danish monarchy, and to the King's choice of Prince Christian of Glücksburg as his successor; and there now seemed every prospect of the policy which Palmerston had almost from the first supported being adopted by a European Concert.

It was at this time (December, 1851) that the conduct of the Foreign Affairs of Great Britain passed temporarily into the hands of Earl Granville, from whom no change in his predecessor's line of action was to be looked for. In his courteous and most friendly official reply to Count Reventlow's Memorandum noted above, the new Foreign Secretary exhibited a caution which at first filled Nesselrode with dismay, and which was to be fully justified by subsequent events. But he did not persist in this attitude[2], and, on

[1] Partly, perhaps, by way of meeting the sympathies of Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort, he was glad to hear of this transaction being entrusted to M. de Bismarck, the Prussian Envoy at Frankfort, by whom it was in the end successfully accomplished. It is worth while noting, to Lord Malmesbury's credit, that he as Foreign Secretary steadfastly refused to have anything to do with the negotiations in question. (See Lord Stanley's despatch of August 31st, 1852.)

[2] Her Majesty's Government, he told Sir H. Wynn on January 29th, 1852, had uniformly declined to take part in the arrangements as to the Succession in the Danish monarchy, and had limited their obligation to the promise of recognising

January 28th, 1852, King Frederick VII issued the Proclamation referred to above, which announced the important changes agreed upon in the negotiations with the two German Great Powers, together with a Constitution in contemplation for the monarchy at large. An expression of satisfaction from Nesselrode at the clearing of the horizon followed; and when (February 27th, 1852) the Earl of Malmesbury took over the seals of the Foreign Office, the chief remaining difficulty in the Schleswig-Holstein Question seemed to be the still unfinished bargainings with the Duke of Augustenburg, which the British Government was supposed to be influencing in his favour, but with which it was in reality anxious to have as little as possible to do[1]. But what was actually intended to be the first step in the settlement of the Succession Question was near at hand. The wish of the British Government to take no directing part in laying down the conditions of the contemplated Treaty was shown by Malmesbury's ready assent (March 26th) to the Danish proposal that

such arrangements when they should have been completed to the satisfaction of the Parties concerned. But—and it was to this reserve in the reply that exception was taken at Copenhagen—they could not but consider that arrangements affecting the Succession to German as well as to Danish territories would require the assent of the Germanic Confederation before third parties could regard it as settled. Lord Granville, at the same time, repeated his predecessor's advice to bring about the renunciation of the Duke of Augustenburg by a liberal compensation, and thus to anticipate any objections on that score to the choice of Christian of Glücksburg, in a European sanction of which, if accomplished, Great Britain would have great satisfaction in joining. Bluhme having, somewhat superfluously, protested against the change which the adoption of this advice would effect in the position of the Duke of Augustenburg as showing the British Government's view of his claims, Sir H. Wynn (on January 17th) "tried to pacify him" by arguing that the consent of Austria and Prussia, as holding the mandate of the Confederation in their negotiations with Denmark—which mandate was not resigned by them to the Diet till about the beginning of April following—would be considered by Her Majesty's Government to imply the consent of that Body. And, with the aid of the deprecatory language of Manteuffel (a statesman unsurpassed in the quality of knowing how to wait), he soon relieved the fears of the Danish Cabinet. While, he wrote to Sir H. Wynn on January 28th, Her Majesty's Government "have a right to expect every precaution to be taken to prevent the revival of the [Succession] question by persons considering themselves entitled to express an opinion, [their] expectations would be satisfied if Austria and Prussia, as holding the Diet's mandate, considered the arrangement to be definitely concluded, and would in such case be prepared to join Her Majesty's Allies in giving to that arrangement" a European sanction. Bluhme was now, to all intents and purposes, satisfied; the *Rigsdag* acquiesced and was speedily prorogued, and the Government could take action.

[1] Nor, though much goodwill was felt towards him and his family at the British Court as well as at those of Coburg and Berlin, is there any reason for supposing that the delay in the settlement of the claims, which was a very troublesome business and even, as Lord Bloomfield wrote on March 11th, 1852, suggested the necessity for a special Protocol on the subject, was due to the interest taken in the matter by Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort. On the contrary, the Prince gave the Duke very good advice. (Cf. Sir T. Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, II. 311.)

the draft "Protocol" or Convention (both terms are on this occasion employed) should be first approved at Berlin before being signed in London; but on the same day it was sent to Malmesbury by de Bille. As to the concurrence of France there was no doubt; and, at Vienna, Schwarzenberg was chiefly anxious to have the matter settled. When, towards the close of the negotiations, Manteuffel expressed the desire to consult him as to laying the draft Treaty before the Diet, the British Ambassador, Lord Bloomfield, as he reported home on April 1st, told the Prussian President of the Council that "it would be time enough to communicate with the Diet when the affair was completed." Thus, the Danish Government pressed on their project, and Nesselrode (in a despatch written on April 3rd for communication to Malmesbury) expedited its passage by describing the draft as satisfactorily corresponding to the legitimate wishes of the Copenhagen Ministry, and specially commending its careful avoidance (as in the Protocols of August, 1850) of the word "guarantee," which would imply "binding engagements of which the object is not clearly defined." From the same point of view, he suggested that the clause making provision for the event of the extinction of the male line of Prince Christian's and his consort's descendants should be so worded as to limit it to an engagement to consider the ulterior proposals made by the King of Denmark in that event. This change, which was ultimately adopted, though of Russian origin, certainly relieved the British Government, which was to identify itself with the maintenance of the Treaty, from a possible future responsibility of importance. On the other hand, Bloomfield reported on April 22nd, Nesselrode objected strongly to any reference in the Treaty to the Germanic Confederation, to whose "meddling in any European question" he objected as "an unwarrantable pretension."

On April 28th, 1852, on which day Bloomfield could inform his chief that a telegraphic message had reached Berlin announcing (though prematurely) the acceptance by the Duke of Augustenburg of the Danish offer of compensation and its conditions, a Conference of Ambassadors was held at the Foreign Office in London, before which was laid the Danish project of the Treaty. The Austrian Chargé d'affaires had received no power to sign; but held himself authorised to intimate the acceptance of it by his Government. The Prussian Ambassador, on the other hand—Bunsen—who was also without Instructions, announced that he must wait. Malmesbury, well aware of Bunsen's determined adverseness to the draft, but

encouraged by information just received by himself from Berlin, represented to the Ambassador the importance of his signature, and that a longer delay would necessitate the signing of the Treaty without him. The draft was, hereupon, initialled by those present at the Conference, but was afterwards returned to Malmesbury by Bunsen as not implying his concurrence with it. The following days were full of profound trouble for the high-minded Prussian statesman, whose attitude towards the Draft had hitherto been one of unfaltering resistance on the broadest patriotic grounds; but, in the end, he gave way as an act of duty, of which neither friends nor opponents doubted the conscientiousness, towards a Sovereign whose express command his sense of loyalty—and, it may be added, his personal devotion—forbade his disobeying. On May 8th, there was, accordingly, signed between the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Great Powers and Sweden on the one part and the Danish on the other, the Treaty of London—in some of its consequences beyond all doubt one of the most unfortunate of the achievements of European diplomacy[1].

The Danish Government was fervent in its expressions of gratitude for the support given by Great Britain on this critical occasion; and, since the Russian Plenipotentiary at the Conference, Baron Brunnow, whose services during the progress of the Treaty had been as signal as those of Bluhme in its initiation, was authorised to repeat the renunciation in the Warsaw Protocol (not of course omitting its reservations), while the Augustenburg claims were regarded as out of the way, the document was judged satisfactory by the Powers who had accorded it their sanction. As a matter of fact, few treaties have ever been subjected to an amount of criticism so hostile in its tone and almost bewildering in the variety of its objections, that it is the reverse of surprising to find the veteran Stockmar, already in 1854, declaring his conviction that this compact would fall to pieces of itself[2].

Passing by what may be fairly described as formal shortcomings which the British Government never showed itself prepared to consider[3], we come to those points as to which fault was found with the

[1] For the text of this Treaty, with a brief historical commentary, see ch. vi of Oakes and Mowat's *Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century*. As to Bunsen's signature, the fullest and clearest account which it is impossible to read without something more than interest in the crisis of the public life of an illustrious man will be found in Count Usedom's letter to his son, Baron G. von Bunsen, dated August 23rd, 1864, and reprinted in the *Memoir of Baron Bunsen*, by his widow, II. 280–4 (1868).

[2] Morier, *u.s.* I. 366.

[3] Von der Pfordten, the Bavarian Envoy at Frankfort, and the mouthpiece of the secondary States upholding the Augustenburg claims in the Diet, and those associated with him, made a point of mentioning the Treaty of London as the

Treaty in direct reference to the significance of its contents. The Diet of the Germanic Confederation had not been consulted as to the application of the declared order of Succession to the German duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg, although Art. VII had stipulated that its rights and obligations with regard to them should remain unaffected by it[1]. Nor had the consent of the Schleswig or the Holstein States been asked to the contemplated Succession in these Duchies—though it has been contended (by the eminent German historian who has summarised these transactions) that the Succession Law for the Danish monarchy promulgated on July 3rd, 1853, which had no reference to the rights of the States of the Duchies, was not, during the lifetime of King Frederick VII, held by them to require their assent[2]. Finally, the Duke of Augustenburg had not signed away—and did not sign away, when on December 30th of this year (1852), the bargain about his compensation for his estates was actually completed—the claims of his sons and their descendants after them, to *the Schleswig-Holstein Succession*. These claims were precious to the Schleswig-Holsteiners, who regarded them as part and parcel of their historic rights. They were of value to the German Princes of the secondary and petty States, who saw in them the symbols of the principle of legitimacy, and they had, already in 1848–9, figured in the forefront of the German national movement on behalf of the duchies. National approval had, indeed, not yet come to be recognised as an indispensable element in international agreements. But public opinion in Europe—central as well as western—had made and was making large strides in that direction. Moreover, Austria and Prussia had, under the mandate of the Germanic Confederation, secured promises from Denmark to which King Frederick VII had given

"Protocol" (Prince Christian being popularly designated as the "Protocol Prince"); so that Earl Russell felt bound to enjoin upon Sir A. Malet and others the avoidance of "that nickname" (December 14th, 1863; *Parliamentary Papers*, LXIV. (1864)). While, however, the non-ratification of the Treaty, except as between the several Signatory Powers and Denmark, was not formally pressed as a plea against its possessing a mutual binding force upon the Signatory Powers in general—a view expressly disputed by Russell (to Bloomfield, July 10th, 1864; *Parliamentary Papers*, LXIV.)—Bismarck had in the Chamber denied to the Treaty the character of one between the Great Powers *inter se* (Buchanan to Russell, December 5th, 1863). Of a guarantee to Denmark there had been no question.

[1] According to the Bavarian Minister, Baron Schrenck, it had, on second consideration, been agreed not to submit the Treaty to the Diet as a Body, but to ask the several States of the Confederation separately for their adhesion to it. (See Lord A. Loftus to Russell, November 23rd, 1863; *Parliamentary Papers*, LXIV.)

[2] Sybel, *Die Begründung des deutschen Reiches* (popular edition), III. 61; cf. *ibid.* p. 233, where Bismarck's transitory adoption of this objection is described as one of his few inconsistencies in the treatment of the whole question.

publicity in his Proclamation of January 28th, 1852, and which, though they had thus not been given under the Treaty, could no more be dissociated from it than could the Order of Succession proclaimed by him on July 31st, 1852. As it stood, the Treaty, after, in its preamble, stating its object to be "the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish monarchy, as connected with the general interests of the Balance of Power in Europe," merely settled the Succession in the whole of the present dominions of the King of Denmark upon Prince Christian of Glücksburg and his Consort and their male issue, adding that in case of the extinction of this line the Signatory Powers would take into consideration, under the above-mentioned reservation, any further proposition addressed to them by the King of Denmark. Before, on July 31st, 1853, the King of Denmark's Proclamation of the new Order of Succession went forth, a number of accessions to the Treaty had been signified. Russia, which had from the first identified itself with the accomplished settlement, had taken a direct part in these invitations, and at first encountered difficulty in a closely connected quarter—the Grand-duke of Oldenburg. The Germanic Confederation had, after some hesitation on the part of Russia, not been included in the list, the British Government (as Malmesbury wrote on October 21st) being of opinion that the middle course of a simple notification would meet this case[1]. The British Foreign Secretary took advantage of the occasion to repeat to the Danish Envoy (de Bille) that under no circumstances would Her Majesty's Government consent to reopen Conferences on any matter connected with the Treaty; and (on November 1st) Bluhme gave words to the unqualified satisfaction of the Danish Cabinet at this announcement. For political feeling was running high at Copenhagen; and the conduct of the King and his Ministers was sharply criticised. A few days later, they expressed a hope that British support would not be wanting to them, even if, after all, they should find themselves compelled to invite the accession of the Germanic Confederation to the Treaty. Hereupon, Lord Malmesbury felt himself compelled to go a step further on its behalf, by loftily pointing out to King Frederick VII (through Sir H. Wynn) that, whatever might be thought

[1] The list of accessions will be found in a separate paper presented to Parliament in 1864 (*Parliamentary Papers*, LXV.). They include several German, together with several Italian States, Belgium and Portugal. Bavaria and some smaller States refused; Oldenburg and Saxony accepted with reservations; Beust, while signing for Saxony, characteristically substituted "*assentiment*" for "*adhésion*" (cf. Murray to Russell, November 30th, 1863).

of its terms by an important section of His Majesty's subjects—i.e. the Eider-Danes, on whose pro-Scandinavian aspirations it had put a damper—he was bound to Great Britain and the other Signatory Powers to carry it into execution, and that from this obligation Her Majesty's Government had no intention of releasing him. Bluhme accepted the intimation with a "*Je m'en servirai*" (December 23rd), and, inasmuch as, on December 30th, the Augustenburg renunciation at last reached Copenhagen, Lord Malmesbury's first tenure of the Foreign Office came to an end without any change on the part of the British Government towards the affairs of Denmark and the Duchies.

II. FROM THE LONDON TREATY OF 1852 TO THE WAR OF 1864

Before the year 1852 was quite out, the seals of the Foreign Secretaryship came into the hands of Lord John Russell (December 28th). He had, with his usual courage, assumed the control of a Department of which he had no special knowledge, and the direction of British diplomacy—an art or science in whose methods, as he once confessed[1], he was himself inexperienced. But the rapidity of his mental processes, and his high-minded readiness to meet the fullest responsibilities of any public position in which he found himself, gave promise that the problems occupying British Foreign Policy while under his guidance would be met alike with intelligence and with independence of judgment. As to his treatment of the Schleswig-Holstein Question, however, these qualities hardly had time to become apparent during his first tenure of the Foreign Secretaryship, which in February, 1853, passed into the hands of the Earl of Clarendon, who held it for five years. The constant pressure of Nesselrode was hardly needed to induce the British Government to refrain from inviting the accession of the Germanic Confederation to the Treaty of London, which the Bavarian Government demanded as a previous condition of its own accession; and, on January 18th, 1853, Lord John administered (through Sir J. Milbanke) to Bavaria, as the leading secondary State in Germany, one of those admonitions which ran so easily from his pen but left an enduring sting behind them. Clarendon, though he at once (May 20th) professed his sympathy with the patriotism of Denmark, and his freedom from fear that she would preferentially trust to Russian advice, contributed none of his own to the Constitutional discussions at Copenhagen, which led to the promulgation of a common Constitution for the monarchy in July, 1854, and to

[1] See Spencer Walpole's *Life of Lord John Russell*, II. 262.

the substitution for it of another in October, 1855, when the newly-formed *Rigsraad* scornfully rejected the proposal that it should be referred for revision to the States of the Duchies. The tension which in these years existed between the two German Great Powers, accounts for their relative disregard of the interests of the Duchies, though the dissatisfaction of the Schleswig-Holsteiners with the proffered "great boon" (to use Lord Salisbury's expression), was shared by national and democratic sympathisers in Germany at large. Meanwhile, practical grievances continued to accumulate and to lend substance to the complaints of political hopes deferred. These grievances were the inevitable consequence of the administration of the Duchies as dependencies of the Danish Crown, instead of as parts of the monarchy with rights and traditions of their own. They concerned, therefore, not only the general question of the relations between the common expenditure of the monarchy and that appertaining to the several parts of it—the Budget Question—but also the various branches of the financial and other administration in the duchies, the management and revenues of the domain-lands and the customs, and the coinage and postal system. And in Schleswig, whose inhabitants were suffering under the same grievances as the Holsteiners, the German-born or German-speaking half of the duchy had, in addition, to submit to the master-grievance (as it may fitly be called) of the oppression of their language in School and Church, the Danisation, in other words, against which their Government had promised the German Great Powers, as mandatories of the Confederation, to protect them.

The British Government, in these years of accumulating grievances on the part of the Duchies, and growing bitterness among all who sympathised with their cause, had reason enough for abstaining from anything like hasty interference. Within the earlier of the eleven years of tribulation undergone by the Duchies after the Treaty of London falls the struggle of the Western Powers with Russia and their failure to obtain in it material support from Austria, or from Prussia even moral or diplomatic countenance; and, subsequently, the approach of the Franco-Italian conflict with the former Power aroused much animosity to her, too, in the friends of the *Risorgimento*. To this was added, in some English minds, an apprehension of Germany's—or Prussia's—aspirations in the direction of Baltic supremacy, and, in many, a growing assumption that this country was bound in honour to carry through the rôle of protectress of "little Denmark." Palmer-

ston's leanings in the Question partly were influenced by, partly themselves stimulated, these tendencies of British public opinion. But, for a considerable time, the Foreign Office continued to maintain a watchful attitude. It was not in Clarendon's way to intrude himself into the internal affairs of other Powers; but, when he took a political problem into consideration, he was wont to enter into it fully, and to provide himself with sufficient materials for arriving at a well-considered judgment. In 1857 he sent a specially qualified official[1] to report on the political condition of the Duchies, and, though the Government persistently refused to publish the Report till nearly seven years later, when the crisis in the affairs of the Duchies had been reached, the Foreign Office, at least, was well aware of the conditions of the Question and of the suggestions presenting themselves for its solution; Lord Clarendon, whose present tenure of office came to an end in February, 1858, thus had it in his power to balance facts and arguments with those abundantly supplied by our diplomatic agents from Copenhagen and Frankfort.

It was not till after Lord Malmesbury's second appointment to the Foreign Secretaryship, that the relations between Denmark and Germany again reached a more acute stage of difficulty[2]. Though, as

[1] Mr John Ward, whose opportunities of observation were soon afterwards increased by his appointment as H.M. Representative at Hamburg. Mr Ward's Report, dated May 28th, 1857, was presented, together with that of Vice-Consul Rainal's, dated February 15th, 1861, to the House of Commons in pursuance of an Address dated March 28th, 1864, moved by Sir Harry Verney, the steadfast upholder of the claims of the Duchies. From the earlier of these Reports the remedies proposed in it were omitted; but it speedily fell into the hands of critical readers (including Bishop Monrad) at Copenhagen, where it created some alarm. (See Manteuffel's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 1901, III. 225–6; and cf. Ward's *Experiences of a Diplomatist*, p. 150.)

[2] In April, 1857, the Scheele Ministry at Copenhagen had to make way for that of K. C. Hall, the leader of the Eider-Dane party, a politician of both capacity and daring and supple as well as pertinacious. Austria and Prussia, which had hitherto alike shown themselves indisposed to allow matters to be pushed into an actual conflict, and desirous of continuing to act together, now (February, 1858) approved the passing by the Frankfort Diet of a resolution refusing to recognise the Common Constitution of the Danish monarchy dated October, 1855, and calling upon the Danish Government to fulfil the engagements into which it had entered with them as Mandatory Powers in 1851–2. On the refusal of the Danes, the Diet had, by the advice of Prussia (July) threatened Federal Execution in Holstein and Lauenburg; whereupon the Danish Government had resolved to give way so far as to abrogate the application of the Common Constitution to these two duchies —but not that to Schleswig, and to summon the Holstein States to a discussion of the whole subject (November, 1858). But neither this compromise nor a counter-project of the States having proved acceptable, the Danish Government (September, 1859) proposed, as the only way out of the difficulty, a provisional arrangement (*provisorium*) slightly improving the financial position of the Holstein States, and leaving the adjustment of the Common Budget to be settled by a conference

yet, Federal Execution was not carried out in Holstein and the *provisorium* established there by the Danish Government had tided over the financial dispute, the Schleswig grievances continued to accumulate. Lord Malmesbury (October 20th, 1858) clung to the view that, since the questions at issue between Denmark and the Diet were "purely German," he had no claim to interfere, except in a friendly way, with "proceedings purely local" and discouraged the idea (which he attributed to Count Manderström) of referring "the Holstein Question" to a European Conference (October 26th). But, as to Schleswig, while counselling the Danish Government to exercise "strict justice and conciliation" (January 12th, 1859), he declared that duchy to be under "the full and complete exercise of sovereignty by the King of Denmark," while "any attempt to acknowledge a union between Schleswig and Holstein would lead to complications which it would be most desirable to avoid" (February 16th, 1859)[1].

The situation, unmodified by such contributions to the discussion of it, was more likely to be influenced by the appointment on June 18th, 1859, of Lord John Russell to the Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, which he held till he became Prime-Minister, for the second time, in October, 1865. The period was one in which British Foreign Policy was to attest, through both the head of the Government, and the Minister directly responsible for the control of our Foreign Affairs, the broad and deep national sympathy with the cause of freedom and national self-government which pervaded the British nation, though neither to the liberation of Italy nor to unhappy Poland's abortive struggle could it afford more than "moral support." The case of Schleswig-Holstein demanded careful investigation of its previous history and a freedom from prepossession, such as had hitherto, however naturally, coloured the popular view in favour of the weaker side. Lord John Russell, greatly to his credit, was one of the few British politicians of his time—and one of the few Ministers in the Government to which he belonged—who applied himself, with his usual courage, if not with exceptional thoroughness, to a study of

between them and the *Rigsraad* (the representative Council of the monarchy). This failed to satisfy the requirements of the Diet; but when (July, 1860) a Common Budget for the monarchy was imposed on Holstein without the approval of the States, the Diet, though it had resolved to carry out the Execution, should such a step be taken, under the influence of the Great German Powers still paused, and the *provisorium* continued. But, manifestly, it could not be expected to endure.

[1] For Lord Malmesbury's despatches of the years 1858 and 1859 see *Correspondence respecting the State of Affairs in the Duchies of Holstein, Lauenburg and Schleswig* 1858, presented to Parliament in 1864, *Parliamentary Papers*, LXV. (1864).

the matter in hand; and, when he had convinced himself of the justice of his revised opinion, he showed no hesitation in urging its adoption by the parties to the conflict[1]. On the other hand, his failure to apprehend in their entirety the conditions of the greater German problem which in this period came to have a decisive influence on the progress of the Schleswig-Holstein Question, or to discern the relations of Austria and Prussia to one another, and to the Germanic Confederation to which they alike belonged, prevented the success of his efforts in the present connexion even more distinctly than his lack of any close acquaintance with the internal details of Transalbingian annals.

For some time after the taking over of the Foreign Office by Lord John Russell, its action in regard to the dispute was confined to what may be called general advice; and, in the matter of Schleswig in particular, no advance was made. Our indefatigable Minister at Copenhagen, Mr (afterwards Sir Augustus) Paget, whose sympathies were (notwithstanding his German marriage) unmistakably on the Danish side, reported, on March 27th, 1860, that the situation in Schleswig was as hopeless as ever. He pointed out, in the same despatch, that some of the Schleswig grievances were undeniable, but that no attempt on the part of the Danish Government to redress them would be successful, so long as a restoration of the cherished political union between the two Duchies—the very essence of Schleswig-Holsteinism—were not *bonâ fide* accepted by the Danish Government. Hall showed no disposition to yield to a demand so contradictory to the spirit of Eider-Danism; and, inasmuch as, on March 14th, Sir A. Malet had reported from Frankfort that the Diet seemed prepared to delay the Execution, till informed as to the views of the non-German Great Powers, Lord John found himself in doubt as to what specific advice to offer at Copenhagen. On April 11th, he suggested that, if, on the Danish side, a fair proposal was made as to the fulfilment of the engagements of 1851–2, the British Government might succeed in inducing the Germanic Confederation to pursue a moderate course, and instructed Paget to express his hope that Denmark "would go almost any length in the way of conciliation." More specific recommendations he avoided, and, meanwhile, the situation became more critical. In May the

[1] The references, accompanied by dates (extending from February 16th, 1860, to March 11th, 1861) in the pages which follow, are, if not indicated as made to other sources, to *Parliamentary Papers*, LXV. (1864).

Berlin Chamber of Deputies, with quite unwonted unanimity, urged upon the King's Government the support of the duchies in their struggle for their violated rights (of which the reunion of the Duchies was treated as part and parcel); and Rechberg, at Vienna, announced the intention of Austria to join Prussia in demanding the fulfilment of the Danish engagements of 1851–2. For, as yet, the relations between the two German Great Powers (whose common anxieties were still largely directed to the west) were friendly, and their cooperation as to the Danish trouble continued. The Danish Government protested to Lord John, through de Bille (July 23rd, 1860) that it did not hold itself to have contracted any international obligations as to the administration of Schleswig, and, so late as September 26th, Hall persisted in the same view, though not denying the binding force of the King's spontaneous declaration in the Royal Patent of January, 1852. Lord John's "mediation" (not yet technically to be called by that name) up to this point stood on very uncertain foundation; and his advice, on August 2nd, to let the British Government propose to the Germanic Confederation, on behalf of Denmark, a settlement of the Constitutional (financial) dispute with Holstein on reasonable terms, and, as to Schleswig "the modification or repeal of any laws in existence there as to the nationalities which were in conflict with the Royal Patent of 1852" proved, therefore, of proportionately little value. For the actual concessions to which Hall hereupon agreed, and which Lord John then communicated to the Prussian Government, had no chance of acceptance at Berlin or Frankfort; and, manifestly, no settlement was possible, so long as the objects ultimately in view were held to be, on the one side, the incorporation of Schleswig in the kingdom of Denmark, and, on the other, the separation of the duchy from the Danish monarchy at large. Prussia, therefore, fell back on the claim of the unfulfilled engagements of 1851–2, while the Germanic Diet made preparations for further action.

On December 6th of the same year, Lord John addressed a despatch to the British Secretary of Legation at Berlin (Mr W. Lowther), which he, two days afterwards, also sent to Copenhagen, but which proved equally fruitless. As to the Constitutional difficulties in Holstein, the writer duly expressed himself in favour of the claim of the Holstein States to a voice in the appropriation of the common expenses of the monarchy. As to the actual grievances and ulterior fears of the Schleswigers, while declaring it to be the wish of the British Government to avoid any step likely to weaken Denmark,

and pointing out that Schleswig was a "Danish Duchy," he made no decided pronouncement concerning Austria's and Prussia's right to interfere in the affairs of that duchy by virtue of the Danish engagements of 1851–2. The King of Denmark's reply to the Austrian despatch of December 6th, 1851, and his declaration of January 29th following, seemed to warrant the interpretation given to his action by Austria (and Prussia). This despatch (if its substance be correctly "interpreted") is as unsatisfactory as a half-consent could be; and its effect was not improved by the supplementary assertion that neither in form nor in substance were the German Great Powers entitled to interfere in the details of administration in the German duchy of Schleswig, or the Germanic Confederation to challenge the sovereign rights of the King of Denmark by seeking to regulate the management of churches and schools there[1]. Although the British good offices so far proved abortive, notwithstanding that the Prussian Government had seemed to encourage it by partial approval (see Gruner's despatch to Count Bernstorff of December 29th, 1860), Lord John had the satisfaction of learning that his general views on the Danish Question had the approval of the French Government, though the information as to them conveyed by M. de Thouvenel would not appear to have been very precise.

The question of the threatened Federal Execution in Holstein now greatly occupied the British Foreign Office[2]. It cannot be said to have been precipitated by the Frankfort Diet, although urged by von der Pfordten and the Envoys of the other secondary States (with the exception of Hanover, where the standstill policy of Count Platen was encouraged by the ceaseless efforts of Mr (afterwards Sir Henry) Howard, one of the busiest of our diplomatists). But the Danish Government persistently refused all substantial concessions, and Paget could not hope for anything further (January 17th, 1861). Indeed, while Hall was at last thinking of seeking a guarantee for Denmark from the Great Powers, in case of her being subjected to further encroachments after making the full concessions demanded on the German side, Baron Blixen-Flinecke was calling into life at Copenhagen a club for resisting any foreign interference in the affairs

[1] Of course, Schleinitz (see Lowther's despatch of December 15th, 1860) deprecated the supposition that any such claims had been advanced.

[2] A chronological summary of the chief diplomatic transactions in the Dano-German dispute from January, 1861, to January, 1863, will be found in Lord John Russell's full Memorandum contained in his despatch to Paget of January 21st, 1863, *State Papers*, LXXIV.

of the kingdom of Denmark (Paget, January 18th, 1861). Yet while, both here and in Germany, public feeling rose higher and higher, both France and Russia continued to regard the threatened Federal Execution in Holstein as an internal German matter, though the carrying-out of it was to be deprecated[1]; and nothing could have exceeded the self-confidence of Hall's assertion of Denmark's right to manage her own affairs in the despatch (of January 19th, 1861), in which he assented to Lord John's perfect appreciation of the situation.

Lord John Russell, as the opening sentence of Morier's letter to him, begun on January 26th, shows[2], seems about this time to have

[1] Indeed, at Petrograd, where very friendly relations were at the time maintained with Berlin, Gortchakoff frankly told Bismarck that the Execution was an immediate menace to the preservation of peace, and the Prussian Ambassador had to agree that, as to Schleswig, any action by which Denmark might be compelled to fulfil her engagements could be international only. (See *Politische Berichte des F. Bismarck aus Petersburg und Paris* 1859–62, ed. by L. Raschdau, II. 10–11.)

It may be worth pointing out that Bismarck's Reports—with which it is interesting to compare for more intimate expressions of his opinions, though reticence was not his weakness at any time, his *Briefwechsel mit dem Minister von Schleinitz* (1905—cover nearly the whole of the period from 1859–62, and elucidate, better perhaps than our own Blue-books, the position taken up by Great Britain and the other non-German Great Powers to the relations between Denmark and the Duchies in those years. Towards the close of the series, we are specially interested in noticing Bismarck's personal impressions as to Palmerston's and Russell's attitude towards a Question which to him, undesirous though he long continued of pushing it to the forefront in either German or European politics, was of the greatest significance for the development of both. In the first week of July, 1862, he called upon the two Ministers in London, when he discussed with them—besides the general condition of things in Prussia, where the military service quarrel was still aflame—the Danish difficulty, and was in some measure surprised by the defective insight under which they seemed to him to labour on both these heads. As to the Danish Question, the two British statesmen alike expressed themselves in an Eider-Danish sense, nor was there, evidently, any prospect of a change soon taking place in their views. Indeed, Russell, shortly afterwards, intimated to Bismarck that there was no necessity for any concession by Denmark beyond the grant to Holstein of independence on the lines of a personal union like that of Luxemburg with Holland, and it had to be pointed out to him that the most difficult part of the dispute was the political incorporation of Schleswig with the Danish kingdom and the satisfaction of the Germans in the duchy. When Bismarck observed that he could see no practical solution of this part of the problem but the partition of Schleswig, Russell replied that Denmark would never listen to such a proposal, and that Austria disapproved of it; while Bismarck's—rather "casual"—suggestion that the German part of Schleswig might be integrally united with Holstein without being included in the Germanic Confederation seems to have been lost on his interlocutor. As for Palmerston, Bismarck seems to have thought him too imperfectly acquainted with the facts under discussion to make it easy to pursue it far with him. But it is noteworthy that, when observing in both Ministers "a suspicion that Prussia entertained designs of acquiring possession of both duchies," Bismarck most distinctly contradicted it, insisting that, if the action of Prussia were due to any such intention, she would not be at pains to bring about a state of things which might render the inhabitants of the Duchies contented to remain under their present rulers.

[2] See *Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier*, I. Morier had in the previous May remonstrated with G. S. (afterwards Sir G. S.) Dasent, Assistant Editor of

come to contemplate a more definite line of intervention in the whole quarrel, which should endeavour by amicable representations, if possible, still to avert Execution in Holstein, while offering direct "English mediation" in respect of Schleswig. By way of clearing the ground on the former issue, he appears to have wished, by means of a Circular (January 22nd, 1861) to the British Representatives at the chief German Courts to inform himself—rather late in the day—as to what would be the precise objects of the Federal Execution in Holstein, should the Danish Government not yield to the demands of the Germanic Confederation. The enquiry elicited a variety of answers[1]; but Count Rechberg quite explicitly told Mr Fane that the object would be to occupy Holstein with Federal troops, under a Commissary appointed by the Diet, until "Denmark should agree to make the administrative changes in regard to the duchy which were deemed equitable by the Germanic Confederation." The real difficulty of the situation, as already indicated, lay in the fact that, while logically, the Holstein and the Schleswig troubles called for separate treatment in both form and matter, neither the patriotic population of the Duchies, nor their supporters at the Diet and in Germany at large would consent to separate the interests of Schleswig from those of Holstein; while the Danish Government at the same time refused to abandon a policy "tending to the incorporation" of the former duchy with the kingdom of Denmark. Lord John, however, in reply to an enquiry from Lord Cowley (February 23rd, 1861), while approving of the plan that the Holstein States (quite recently summoned to an extraordinary session) should have the right of voting part of the expenditure proposed in the Common Budget, said nothing about Schleswig, except that both the honour and interest of Denmark required the equitable treatment by her of that duchy, though the King "could not without danger treat with Germany respecting the terms to be given" to it. Intervention on behalf of "principles" so vague could hardly prove effective; and neither the French nor the Russian Government showed any disposition to interfere with the Execution in Holstein, while the Danish Government declined to

The Times, on the view taken by that journal in the disputes between Denmark and the duchies (see *ibid.* pp. 371 sqq.). His still more notable letter to Lord John himself (printed *ibid.* pp. 374 sqq.) was begun on January 26th and ended on March 3rd. It was written in remembrance of conversations held in the autumn of 1860 at Coburg, where Lord John had, when in attendance on the Queen, met Morier and had been invited by him to talk German politics "*à cœur ouvert.*"

[1] The British Minister at Dresden, Mr Murray, was referred by Baron Beust, for elucidation of his reply, to Meyer's *Corpus Juris Confederationis Germanicae.*

follow the collective advice of Great Britain, France and Russia (see Paget's despatch of March 3rd, 1861), and submit to the Holstein States the Holstein share of the Common Budget for 1861. The financial dispute with the Danish Government—the chief motive cause of the Execution—thus remained unsolved, while the concomitant demand for a restoration of the former union between Holstein and Schleswig was, as a matter of course, left unsatisfied.

On March 30th, 1861[1], accordingly, Lord John took a further step in the direction of plain-speaking, reminding the Danish Government through Paget, that, in the opinion of the British, French and Russian Governments, the assent of the Holstein States to the annual Common Budget of the monarchy ought to be explicitly asked, and adding that nothing short of the frank acceptance of this advice could bring the dispute to a peaceful issue. Hall, hereupon (see Paget's despatch of April 1st), proposed to submit to the States their share of the Common Budget; when their decision on it would be accepted by the King, *save in the event of an unsurmountable obstacle presenting itself*; and then fell back on the assertion that the 1861 Budget had already been virtually submitted to them. This was, however, denied by the States[2].

As the course of the above transactions indicates, the pacific efforts of the British Foreign Secretary had, from the spring of 1861 onwards, found support at Petrograd, where the arrival of Lord Napier as British Ambassador at once attracted the notice of the most keen-sighted amongst his diplomatic colleagues[3]. This support favoured the method, at this time followed by the British Minister, of seeking as complete as possible an understanding between the three non-German Great Powers before communicating it to the Copenhagen Government and thence, if accepted, transmitting the joint recommendations to Berlin, Vienna and Frankfort.

The sincere anxiety of Lord John Russell for peace cannot for a moment be called into question; but his temperament was sanguine and his conclusions were at times all too rapid; so that he opened his now deliberate attempt at mediation by expressing his conviction,

[1] The dated references in the text concerning the period from March 18th, 1861, to January, 1863, onwards are, unless otherwise noted, to *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Holstein, Lauenburg and Schleswig*, presented to Parliament in 1863, in *State Papers*, LXXIV. Morier's letter, it will be noticed, must have reached Lord John early in March.

[2] As to the alleged "virtual" submission by way of the arrangement forming part of the *provisorium*, see Morier's Memorandum enclosed in Lord Augustus Loftus's despatch to Russell of April 13th, 1861. [3] Cf. Bismarck's *Berichte*, II. 51.

first, that there was no sufficient ground for a Federal Execution, and further, that, if the demands of the German Confederation were well founded, they yet admitted of an amicable settlement. The scheme which he now submitted, through Lord Cowley, for the preliminary approval of the French Government, was, so far as Schleswig was concerned, simple to a fault. It suggested, among other things, that the proper functions of the Schleswig States were to provide for the expenses of church and school, and to pass laws ensuring the equal welfare of the nationalities in the duchy. When these conditions and the terms of the representation of Schleswig in the *Rigsraad* and in its own States had been laid down and approved by the King of Denmark, the friendly Powers, Great Britain, France and Russia, with Sweden, should guarantee the possession of the duchy to the Danish Crown. This last notion momentarily possessed him, notwithstanding Schleinitz's assurance to Lord Augustus Loftus (April 19th, 1861) that his chief was wholly mistaken in supposing that Germany, or Prussia, coveted the duchy. Ten days later, he declared to Paget that, after all, as to Denmark and Holstein, there seemed no solution but a personal union; while, as to Schleswig, the Powers ought to provide a security for Denmark's hold on it, as the connexion between the kingdom and Holstein was relatively loose. As usual, there was a difference of opinion between the friendly Powers with regard to the significance of the suggested new guarantee in its relation to earlier engagements; and, in the end (May 29th), Lord John proffered a simple statement that the Signatory Powers of the Treaty of 1852 "continue to recognise as permanent the principle of the integrity of the Danish monarchy in accordance with that Treaty"—a confirmation which hardly added to its strength. Thus, though a compromise was reached for the present year as to the Budget and Holstein, in return (it was hoped) for willingness on the part of Prussia to postpone the Execution there (Paget to Russell, June 20th), the Schleswig problem remained open; and as to this, although their mandate on behalf of the Confederation had expired, Austria, under Rechberg's guidance, and Prussia were more clearly agreed than ever to adhere jointly to the engagements under which Denmark had, in 1851–2, placed itself to them, and through them to the Germanic Confederation. Earl Russell[1] expressed his satisfaction (December 11th) at what seemed a simplification of the quarrel, not perceiving the impossibility of passing by Schleswig in the negotiations;

[1] He had accepted a peerage in July, 1861.

and Paget, who perceived this, had to content himself with the hope that the Danish Government would spontaneously put an end to the Schleswig grievances.

By the beginning of the new year (1862), it had become necessary for British policy, if it aimed at effecting a settlement between Denmark and Germany, to induce Denmark to include the Schleswig side of the Question in the final negotiations. Mediation on any other basis was futile. Count Bernstorff, for the time at the head of the Berlin Foreign Office—where he was very effectively preparing the way for Bismarck—told Lord Augustus Loftus (see his despatch to Russell of January 25th, 1862), that any illusion on the subject was useless. The question of Holstein could not be settled apart from that of Schleswig, or while Schleswig remained under the control of the *Rigsraad* as at present constituted; the question of Schleswig was therefore not an international one, inasmuch as the binding engagements involving its equality of rights and independence might be insisted on by the Germanic Diet. If, however, the King of Denmark had actually violated his engagements to the Confederation (or to Austria and Prussia acting on its behalf), a *casus belli* might arise between Denmark and the Confederation as international Powers, when the mediation of other Powers would be the only applicable remedy. Whatever view may be taken of the logic of this twofold contention, it is not a little strange that in this very conversation with the British Ambassador, Bernstorff should have designated a partition of Schleswig according to nationalities as perhaps the only way of bringing about a satisfactory solution of the problem. Lord Russell's reply to this notable despatch passed by this suggestion, except that, on March 14th, he mentioned it to Hall (through Paget) as an alternative to which Denmark might find herself compelled to submit, if she did not fulfil her engagements[1]. On the general question, it harked back to the necessity of enquiring whether the kingdom of Denmark had actually incorporated Schleswig, while making a special point of the impossibility of restoring the former union (or *connexité*, as it was called by the Danes) between the two Duchies. Lord Russell seems on this occasion, as perhaps on others, to have more readily seen his way into a difficulty than out of it; and

[1] Rechberg, according to Bloomfield (see his despatch to Russell of March 13th, 1862) was much surprised by it; but Bloomfield thought that Austria might accept it if Prussia did, in order to prevent war. Hall (see Paget's despatch to Russell of April 9th) bluntly rejected the proposal in any form. Some time afterwards (see Lord A. Loftus, July 19th), Bernstorff withdrew the suggested "compromise."

a renewed suggestion by him (March 26th) to Thouvenel of making joint representations with Russia at Copenhagen in favour of the fulfilment of the Danish engagements was put aside by the French Minister as a useless repetition of advice already declined. Gortchakoff's experience having suggested "some objections" to the proposal, the further prosecution of it was postponed, and the quarrel continued to run its course. In an elaborate despatch (August 22nd, 1862)—followed by an Austrian Memorandum of similar purport—Bernstorff summed up to Balan (Prussian Minister at Copenhagen) the demands made in common by the two great German Powers upon Denmark. An independent and equally privileged position as to their separate affairs must be granted to the several parts of the monarchy, none of which were to be incorporated in, or made subservient to, another; and on this requirement, involving the settlement of the Budget question and the treatment of Schleswig on the same principles, Austria and Prussia insisted on behalf of Germany, as in accordance with the agreements of 1851-2 on which the entire dispute turned.

Our Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna were both on holiday, and from the former capital Mr Lowther could only report (September 20th, 1862) how M. Quaade, the Danish Minister at Paris, had, when passing through Berlin, told him that the Danish Government would certainly not agree to the above-mentioned demands, and that he looked upon the present state of things as highly critical. Lord Russell was himself in attendance on the Queen at Coburg, where Morier was acting as his Secretary, and where was drafted the celebrated despatch[1] from Russell (dated September 24th, 1862), an important document in the history of British policy, though it may not possess the momentous significance of the same statesman's Italian despatch of October 27th, 1860. It stated that,

[1] The despatch was addressed to Mr Fane at Vienna, and identical copies were sent to Mr Lowther at Berlin and Mr Paget at Copenhagen. It is reprinted by Morier in *Memoirs*, 1. 385 ff., where he gives an account of the origin of its proposals. There can be no doubt that he correctly describes himself as, morally, their author. We may, also, accept, though with less certainty, his statement that he persuaded Bernstorff, who had at first been inclined to reject the scheme, to accept it, inasmuch as Denmark would certainly refuse it and Prussia would thus obtain *gratis* the credit of showing herself fair. His own purpose, Morier says, was to give Great Britain the chance, if Lord Russell's mediation were refused, of withdrawing from the Treaty of London and from the eventual obligation of going to war for the succession of Prince Christian. This, he adds, Russell perceived; but "the rest of the Cabinet pooh-poohed it"—with the result that, in the end, we abandoned Denmark in spite of the Treaty.

finding that the negotiations between Germany and Denmark as to the obligations of the latter Power had merely embittered the contention between them, Her Majesty's Government had resolved to furnish their Ambassadors at Vienna and Berlin, and their Minister at Copenhagen, with Instructions designed to promote the long-desired settlement. The imposition of taxes or enactment of laws in Holstein and Lauenburg without the consent of the representative bodies of those duchies, and the validity for them, without such consent, of the Common Constitution of 1855 had alike been definitively disallowed. It remained to arrive at a decision as to two further points—the future treatment of Schleswig by the Danish Government, and the future conditions under which both Schleswig and Holstein would be included in the Common Constitution of the Danish monarchy. The despatch declared that, for the present, complete autonomy should be granted to Schleswig, and that, in particular, since the nationality grievances in Schleswig were patent, the best way would be to allow the States of that duchy to arrive at a decision concerning them. As for the future Common Constitution, since it would manifestly be absurd to require the assent of four representative bodies to all (including financial) legislation, a less unwieldy but more complicated distribution of expenditure was recommended[1].

Bernstorff (see Lowther's despatch of September 27th) who at this time seems certainly to have been working for peace, though unwilling to engage his Government to premature action, accorded a favourable first reception to the British manifesto as a whole, pointing out, however, that it would be useless for either the Prussian or the British Government to display their goodwill to these proposals, unless the Danish could be induced to accept them on their approval by the Germanic Confederation. Thouvenel, hereupon, consented, while reserving his own views, to recommend the acceptance of Russell's proposals at Copenhagen; while Gortchakoff believed that they would be supported by the Russian Government and that some practical result might follow. Austria was, on the whole, favourable, and, by October 11th (see the despatch of Lord Augustus Loftus of that date), Bernstorff (who was about to give up the direction of Prussian Foreign Affairs to Bismarck) felt able to express himself in the same sense. But the Danish Government remained unwilling to pledge itself to a settlement implying, in a word, the abandonment of the Eider-Danish policy to which they were pledged, and Hall (see Paget's despatch of October 14th) professed himself staggered

[1] The four bodies were to agree on a normal Budget for ten years, while they were to vote extraordinary expenditure annually and leave its distribution to be settled by a Council composed two-thirds of Danes, and one-third of Germans. To this suggestion, crude as it was, Bernstorff took immediate objection.

by Russell's action. He had not, he said, expected that from the British Foreign Minister would emanate a plan which, if pressed, must (by the abolition of the existing Common Constitution) lead to absolutism and by the embodiment of the Prussian views as to Schleswig to a dismemberment of the monarchy. As to Holstein, the Danish Government would yield to the demands of the Confederation; but, as to Schleswig, he would (to put it briefly) not renounce the present Danish position. The maintenance of the Common Constitution, he declared to de Bille (October 15th), was a matter of life and death to Denmark, and from this conviction the Danish Government was resolved not to budge. On October 27th, before a final reply from Copenhagen reached Russell, upon whom Count Manderström had pressed the desirability of waiting for the counter-project which Hall stated he was preparing, the Prussian reply was sent, through Bernstorff, from Bismarck (he had been placed *pro tem.* on September 23rd at the head of the Ministry, of which he was appointed President, with the conduct of Foreign Affairs, on October 8th); and with this a despatch from Rechberg to Count Wimpffen (October 29th) virtually concurred.

Bismarck observed that the question was, properly speaking, one for settlement without foreign interference between Denmark and Germany, as resting upon treaty stipulations between them; but that, inasmuch as the present state of the question might lead to serious results, it being impossible for Germany to give way as to what affected her whole political position, a proposal from a friendly Power such as Great Britain called for the fullest consideration, should it be unreservedly accepted by Denmark. Of the two main points in the British despatch, the provision to Schleswig of security against incorporation and of protection to the German nationality was beyond cavil; as to the financial relations of the duchies to the monarchy, Lord Russell's suggestions might prove a point of departure (*Anknüpfungspunkt*) for satisfactory arrangement[1].

But the Danish Government before whom the proposals had now been finally laid and for whose "counter-project" he was—naturally enough—unwilling to wait, was not to be moved to send any response, although (on November 6th) they had intimated to the Austrian and Prussian Governments that they were prepared to allow the Holstein States concurrent authority as to common expenditure with the *Rigsraad*, but that they could not regard the administration of Schleswig as open to investigation by the Germanic Confederation.

[1] Bernstorff's elaborate Memorandum on the engagements of 1851–2—his last act as Foreign Minister—was communicated to Russell on November 14th, 1862; a rather earlier retrospect had been addressed by Hall to Quaade on November 6th.

Their reply to a British transmission of Schleswig grievances was described by Russell as insufficient and illusory (November 20th, 1862)[1]. Thus, on the same date, he declared his opinion that, unless the present state of things were to be allowed to continue till it ended in an explosion, *or* a Common Constitution were to be adopted giving more weight to the German element than it could derive from mere numbers, *or* the expedient of a partition of Schleswig were fallen back upon—it only remained to adopt his proposals. A policy so replete with alternatives, and so devoid of decision, was hardly to be called a policy at all; though the adoption of his own way was stated by Russell to be approved by Russia and held worthy of consideration by France. For, though Gortchakoff was sympathetic, he showed no desire to relieve the British Government of part of her mediating task, and the attitude of France was uncertain. Meanwhile, Prussia, seconded by Austria, was—it would not be appropriate to say, losing patience, but preparing for a final pressure upon their adversary.

At Copenhagen, the feeling of combative determination was running high, and on January 10th, 1863, an explicit answer by the Danish Government to his proposals was at last communicated to him. It professed its readiness to grant to Holstein the rights demanded for its States by the Diet, but with the reservations necessary for preventing the duchy from becoming the arbiter of the destinies of the monarchy; while, as for Schleswig, it meant union outside the action of the Germanic Confederation, its Constitutional relations with the kingdom as to common affairs being maintained. On January 24th, a royal message announced to the Holstein States that, on the present occasion, drafts of laws concerning the common affairs of the monarchy would be laid before them; but, in their Address on February 18th, while referring to the advice of a British statesman "whose wishes for the welfare of the Danish monarchy could not be doubted" they expressed the conviction that "a return to a real and lasting peace could only be effected by the reunion of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein[2]."

[1] Bismarck's ominous *igni et ferro* menace was uttered at a sitting of the Budget Commission at Berlin on September 30th, a week after he had been made Minister.

[2] In a very remarkable Memorandum (communicated by Mr Howard from Hanover on February 26th, 1863) Baron Charles von Scheel-Plessen, President of the Holstein States and a statesman of exceptional sagacity (he was opposed to the Augustenburg claims and ultimately became the first Chief-president of the Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein), approved Lord Russell's proposals as extending the engagements of 1851–2, the chief deficiency in which was that they neither established a close union between Schleswig and Holstein nor made for a federative relation of both Duchies with the kingdom, such as would perhaps protect the integrity of the whole monarchy better than any other arrangement.

It would have been well if British Foreign Policy could, before the eleventh hour had passed, have availed itself of such counsel as was still at hand, and if Lord Russell had recognised wherein his well-meant and well-received proposals, though they went too far for the Danish Government, fell short of the demands as to Schleswig which, as Prussia and Austria were coming to perceive, must, sooner or later, be satisfied—the federal relations which must be permanently established for Holstein, being so established for the sister duchy also. As it was, the proposals, belated as they were and only feebly supported by the two German Great Powers, while only in part—and that not the crucial part—accepted by Denmark, virtually broke down; and the Memorandum of January 21st, 1863, with which Lord Russell furnished Mr Paget and our representatives at Paris, Vienna and Berlin, and which in the following month he laid before Parliament, though it forms an interesting account of transactions extending over more than two years, tells a tale barren of results.

On March 7th, the Holstein States, whose address the King of Denmark had refused to receive, voted a Memorial to the Frankfort Diet, expressing a hope that it would succeed in taking the proper steps for securing the privileges and interests of the duchy. This was (as Mr R. Lytton[1] wrote from Copenhagen on March 11th) equivalent to an invitation to the Germanic Confederation to institute an Execution in Holstein against the King-Duke. The real question now was no longer, whether, before resolving, formally and finally, to carry out the measure first threatened by it so far back as 1858, the Diet would even now attempt to induce the Danish Government to yield at least so far as was suggested in Lord Russell's proposals of September, 1852. In any case, the Danish Government resolutely pursued the line of policy on which it had determined[2]; sending forth, on March 30th, a Royal Proclamation excluding Holstein from the *Rigsraad* and avoiding all reference to Schleswig, as to which the Common Constitution of 1855 was, therefore, maintained, and with it, in defiance of the engagements of 1851–2, the incorporation of Schleswig with the Danish kingdom.

In other words, Scheel-Plessen, whose desire was still to preserve the tie between Denmark and the Duchies, perceived that the requisite solution lay in inducing Denmark to adhere to the engagements of 1851–2, but to go further and accept Lord Russell's proposals, and, as to Schleswig (and its union with Holstein) even exceed them. As to Scheel-Plessen and his views in 1861, cf. Ward, *Experiences of a Diplomatist*, pp. 178–9.

[1] Afterwards first Earl of Lytton.

[2] In what follows, the dated references are from the middle of March, 1863, onwards, unless otherwise noted, to *Parliamentary Papers*, LXIV., *Denmark and Germany*, Nos. 2 and 3, presented to Parliament, 1864.

Eider-Danism was thus writ large on the banner of the Danish Government[1], which would hardly have ventured on so provocative a manifesto, had it not been for the fact that the Constitutional conflict was then at its height at Berlin, where, in the great debate of April 17th, Bismarck flung upon his adversary Twesten the declaration that, if the Prussian Government thought it necessary to wage war, it would do so with or without the approbation of the Chamber. Russell's (April 22nd) and Thouvenel's warnings were in season; for in Holstein separation from Denmark and repudiation of the London "Protocol" was being openly called for; in public meetings at Hamburg and, under the auspices of the *Nationalverein*, at Lübeck, a settlement by force of arms was virtually demanded; and at Frankfort, where Austria and Prussia were urging the Diet to offer Denmark a final six weeks for compliance, Bavaria and Oldenburg were demanding a repudiation of the London Treaty, as a compact never sanctioned by the Confederation.

Lord Russell, who rightly perceived a satisfactory settlement of the Schleswig Question to be indispensable, seems, instead of seeking to influence Bluhme and the Moderate party at Copenhagen in this direction, to have been so much alarmed by the attacks upon the Treaty of London (to which he had pinned his faith) that he insisted upon the affairs of Schleswig being an international concern and not one for the decision of the Diet (to Bloomfield and Malet, May 27th). But, for the present, notwithstanding the polite reception given to the idea by Bismarck, he did not press further the settlement of the Schleswig side of the question by a Conference or Congress; and the next noteworthy stage reached in the matter was a Report.

This Report presented to the Diet on June 18th by its Committees[2] analysed the whole course of the dispute since the Diet's first notice of Execution of July, 1858, including Lord Russell's despatch of September, 1862, rejected by the Danish Government, and culminating in the Proclamation of March 30th, 1863, which it described as consummating the incorporation of Schleswig. Hereupon, the Report recommended the Diet, though it might simply have gone back to the Peace of 1850, to adhere to the unfulfilled agreements of 1851–2 as the basis of any future transaction, distinguishing between the rights of Holstein as federal, and those of Schleswig in so far as they did not refer to institutions common to both duchies, as international in character.

[1] Attention should perhaps be directed to the reported intention of an ulterior conciliatory policy on the part of the Danish Government, mentioned by Consul-General Crowe, a well-informed Agent, in his despatch of April 12th.

[2] It was drawn up by the Bavarian von der Pfordten, a genuinely "professorial" statesman, though not *intransigeant* like some others of that class.

This important Report, which was communicated to Lord Russell from Frankfort on June 19th by Mr Corbett (who added that the President of the Diet, Freiherr von Kübeck) referred to Lord Russell as having by a despatch dated ten days earlier materially helped to bring about the distinction drawn between Holstein and Schleswig interests, was adopted by the Diet on July 9th. The Danish Government was to be informed by the Prussian that a six weeks' delay was allowed to it for the withdrawal of the Proclamation of March 30th and the acceptance of the demands of the Confederation, before further action was taken—*i.e.* before the Execution was actually set on foot. In the Assembly of the Schleswig States, convened as if for a discussion of the future of the duchy, the German majority seceded; and the deadlock was complete.

British public opinion on the quarrel, now that its issue was becoming simpler, seemed to the Head of Her Majesty's Government to warrant the plain speaking which he loved. On July 23rd, Lord Palmerston made a speech in the House of Commons which seemed to signify something more than a "gesture" (as the phrase is) in the relations of Great Britain to the Schleswig-Holstein Question[1]; for he stated his conviction that, if any violent attempt were made to overthrow the rights and interfere with the independence of Denmark, "those who made the attempt would find in the result, that it was not Denmark alone with which they would have to contend." Lord Russell, when, on July 31st, he communicated to Lord Bloomfield at Vienna a Swedish avowal of alarmed sympathy with Denmark, might well write that "these matters are becoming serious"; though he overshot the mark in suggesting that "if Germany persists in confounding Schleswig with Holstein, other Powers of Europe may confound Holstein with Schleswig, and deny the right of Germany to interfere with the one any more than she has with the other, except as a European Power." Rechberg, in reply (see Lord Bloomfield, August 6th), pointed out that the interests of the two Duchies could not be separated, although he still explicitly denied that any question had arisen as to the Succession or the London Treaty; while Bismarck's subordinate (Philipsborn, see Lowther, August 29th) though apprehending that the Frankfort Diet could no longer be prevented from taking action, opined that there was no reason why the entrance of German troops into Holstein should be regarded by Denmark as a

[1] Disraeli referred to this often-quoted speech in the Vote of Censure debate of July 1864. (*Hansard*, n.s., for 1864, p. 91.)

hostile invasion. On the contrary, the Danish Government (see Paget, August 27th) now maintained that, since it proposed to accord political autonomy to Holstein, an Execution there could only proceed as an international measure. The controversy was becoming one of sophistries; and Russell, recognising (to Lowther, August 31st) the uselessness of any communications to the Danish Government on the subject of his proposals, was reduced to warning the Austrian and Prussian Governments (as controlling the action of the Diet) that, if they invaded Holstein in order to compel the Danish Government to fulfil engagements concerning Schleswig, they were raising a European question on which any European Government was entitled to pronounce a judgment. This view he carried further in a later despatch (to Mr Grey at Paris, September 16th[1]), when he asked for the opinion of the French Government as to a proffer of the good offices of the Western to the German Great Powers and the Confederation, or at least an admonition against any act at variance with the maintenance of Danish independence, in accordance with the Treaty of 1852.

But the mutual relations of the European Great Powers in the autumn of 1863 were not in favour of such a cooperation on the part of France. Austria and Prussia, whose rivalry for the lead in German affairs had very openly declared itself on the occasion of the Frankfort *Fürstentag* (August, 1863) were alike anxious to court the goodwill of the secondary States and the nation at large by a forward policy in the Schleswig-Holstein Question. Moreover, after the recent rebuff experienced by the Western Powers from Russia in another European question—the Polish—Drouyn de Lhuys (see Grey, September 18th) was convinced that the Emperor would refuse to join in the proposed remonstrance to Germany, unless Great Britain and France were prepared, this time, to go further than the mere presentation of a Note followed by the return of an evasive reply.

Earl Russell was thus brought face to face with the considerations which, as the event proved, finally determined the result of British policy in the matter of the Dano-German quarrel. In the course of September, the Committees of the Diet in Frankfort agreed on a motion for imposing on Denmark a final term of three weeks, on the expiration of which without a satisfactory reply Hanover and Saxony were to carry out the Execution by nominating Commissioners and supporting

[1] In this despatch, anxious to see clearly even so late in the day, he expressed a wish that he might be precisely informed what rights were claimed for the German Schleswigers, and in what way these had been violated by Denmark.

them with a force of 6000 men, Austrian and Prussian troops furnishing reserves sufficient to overcome any resistance to the transfer of the control of the duchy[1]. The Danish Government showed no sign of any desire to arrest the progress of events: indeed, their announcement, on September 28th, of a new Constitution for the kingdom and Schleswig meant adherence to the policy of the Proclamation of March 30th. Russell, while declaring to Lord Bloomfield and Sir A. Buchanan (September 30th), that the question of a Common Constitution could never be the subject of a Federal Execution, wandered further into the mists of both future and past, by expressing a hope that Austria's and Prussia's participation in the Execution would not be regarded as an act of war against Denmark, and thus cause their efforts in the interests of Schleswig to clash with the primary engagements of those Powers under the London Treaty of 1852. And, on the same date, he took refuge in his favourite expedient of "enquiry" by recommending the German Great Powers, instead of associating themselves with the Federal Execution, to demand from the Danish Government an elucidation of the terms of the Proclamation of March 30th; while once more proffering the good offices of Her Majesty's Government for terminating the dispute.

On October 1st, the Diet formally resolved to adopt the motion of its Committees as a resolution of its own, Baden (which would have preferred the repudiation of the London Treaty and the actual union of Schleswig and Holstein) voting in the minority with Holstein and Luxemburg. There was, however, no wish on the part of Prussia (or Austria) to precipitate action; indeed, on October 8th, Bismarck told Buchanan that, if Her Majesty's Government were to inform the Diet that Denmark had accepted their mediation and to invite the Diet to do the same, the Execution might, he thought, still be prevented[2].

[1] So late as September 25th, we find Russell, in a despatch of characteristic ingenuousness, informing Count Wachtmeister that Her Majesty's Government, setting as they did the highest value on the independence and integrity of the Danish monarchy, were ready to proffer their good offices to the two parties to the dispute, either in conjunction with the French Government or not. Her Majesty's Government were not prepared to assert that Denmark was altogether in the right, or that Germany had not some grounds of complaint as to the treatment of the German inhabitants of Schleswig. But these differences should be the subject of negotiation either in Conferences or otherwise, and should not be allowed to end in war. At the same time, Her Majesty's Government were ready to remind Austria and Prussia of their obligations under the Treaty of London.

[2] Buchanan to Russell, F.O. Prussia, 158. At this date begins, in frequent sequence to January 6th, 1864, an important series of telegrams and letters from Sir A. Buchanan at Berlin to Lord Russell, preserved at the Foreign Office (*Prussia*,

The Danish Government, hereupon (as Russell informed the President of the Frankfort Diet through Malet on October 14th), offered to allow the Proclamation of March 30th to remain provisional only, if the Diet agreed to suspend the Execution; but even this offer was illusory, in view of the new Constitution announced on September 28th for the kingdom and Schleswig. And the concession (as Hall explicitly stated to Paget in a long interview on October 14th), was, in any case, to be conditional on the proposed negotiations being strictly limited to the legislative and financial position of Holstein. Paget taking this as a refusal to withdraw the obnoxious Proclamation, Hall observed that there was one other condition on which this might be done, viz. that Great Britain and France should formally promise Denmark to support her against any further demands of Germany. Paget suggested that it would be more to the point for the Danish Government to refuse to negotiate with Germany as to the non-federal parts of the monarchy without the cooperation of all the Signatories of London; and the interview came to an end with a promise by Hall that, if the Proclamation were not withdrawn by the Danish Government it should be regarded as provisional only, till Germany and Denmark had come to an agreement on the Holstein part of the question. This provisional limitation Bismarck (October 17th) was certain the Diet would not accept; and he blandly informed Buchanan that, though the engagements of 1851–2 were accepted by Denmark as the basis of negotiations, they might be kept distinct from the Federal demands in Holstein, yet that, if war were to ensue, the stipulations of the London Treaty would in no way prevent Prussia from taking part in it. Russell's formulation to Paget (on the same date) of the opinion of Her Majesty's Government on the situation was, therefore, futile, the more so that the President of

546–8 and 553), copies of which I owe to the kindness of Professor Holland Rose. Sir Andrew Buchanan, certainly one of the ablest of our diplomatic Agents in this period, vigilantly noted the communications, then, as a rule, both conciliatory and versatile, of Bismarck, whom he was well capable, when it seemed desirable, of meeting in argument. In the course of preparing this volume, I have, as mentioned in the Preface, been favoured by the loan of some private correspondence of Sir Andrew Buchanan's of the years 1863–4, including a long series of letters from Lord Bloomfield, a diplomatist of a very pleasant type, but less initiative of view. They are valuable as showing Rechberg's change into an acceptance of Bismarck's views, while they freely complain of the writer's uneasiness at the "lecturing" propensities of his Chief, and the growing practice of publishing early Blue-books. As to Lord Russell, Lord Bloomfield tells Sir Andrew, on October 7th, 1863, that the Foreign Secretary "gave himself a great deal of trouble to get up the Danish Question, and deserved better of the Cabinet of Copenhagen; but they and the wiseheads at Frankfort were equally unreasonable."

the Diet (see Malet, October 23rd), while he recognised the excellence of Russell's motives, stated that the Diet must decline any intervention with its action concerning the treatment of Holstein. This was the rebuff direct, and its effect might have seemed to be enhanced by the attitude of the French Government, whose advice to Denmark (as Cowley informed Russell on October 27th) had been altogether pacific, Drouyn de Lhuys recommending acquiescence in the Federal Execution, should it take place. Yet, even now, the British Foreign Secretary, encouraged by a telegram from Bismarck[1], continued to press the Danish Government through Paget (October 28th) to yield the Holstein claims as to the Common Budget vote of the Duchies, while urging the Diet through Malet (October 30th) that the Signatory Powers of the London Treaty should be invited to mediate on the international side of the question.

So late as November 5th, Bismarck still advised the proffer at Frankfort of Great Britain's sole mediation, though Rechberg was less sanguine as to the assent of the majority of the Diet. Russell, who failed to perceive that it was the popular view upheld by the secondary and petty States which both Great Powers shrank from offending, scouted the notion that Austria and Prussia could not prevail in the Diet if they chose. But, though the Danish Government (see Paget's despatch of November 11th) was making ready to yield, under many reserves, on the Holstein financial question and to accept British mediation, the Frankfort Diet had resolved (as Malet reported on November 13th) to insist, as on a condition *sine qua non*, on the absolute repeal of the March Proclamation. On the same day Russell informed Buchanan, that, while the Diet had a perfect right to refuse British mediation (as this decision in fact implied), Great Britain likewise had the right of reserving any future interference, till there was a prospect of its proving salutary and sufficient. Already, a different method of reaching a settlement was under discussion; the Emperor Napoleon had, on November 5th, opened his legislature with a denunciation of the Treaties of 1815, and with an appeal to Europe, in accordance with an invitation issued by him to her Sovereigns on the same day, to decide in Congress all doubtful issues[2].

The protracted but barren interchange of advice, subterfuge and

[1] October 27th, F.O. Prussia, 548.

[2] For Bismarck's views on the French proposal of a Congress see his ciphered letter to Russell of November 15th, F.O. Prussia, 548. It considerably reduced the proposed scope of the Congress, and insisted on its acceptance of all the Powers being required.

refusal, to which some reference could not be avoided here, might have come to a fit ending with the adoption by the *Rigsraad*, on November 13th, of the new Constitution for the kingdom of Denmark and the duchy of Schleswig. On receiving the King's signature, it was to come into force on January 1st, 1864, when the provocation to combat would be complete. Mediation, Bismarck on the following day informed Buchanan, would henceforth be a mockery; and Napoleon's Congress lay in dim distance. But one more incident was to supervene. On November 15th King Frederick died, leaving to his successor the legacy of the unsigned document. Russell's advice (November 17th) that, though he could not urge King Christian IX to take a course which might prove unpalatable to his subjects, the prospect of successful mediation would be greatly improved by the suspension of the new Constitution till the international question had been settled, was hardly left time for falling flat. After delaying for a couple of days, on the ground that it behoved him as a Constitutional Sovereign to consider the situation, the new King on November 18th appended his signature. On the same date, the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg, in whose favour his father had at once renounced his rights, issued a Proclamation announcing that, as the first of the *agnati* in hereditary sequence, he had assumed the rulership of Schleswig-Holstein as Duke Frederick VIII, and started, viâ Gotha, for Berlin. It remained only for Paget to inform Russell, as he did on the 19th, that the King of Denmark, having accepted the Congress, could not now answer the question whether he would accept the (sole) mediation of Great Britain. It was well, he took the liberty of observing on his own account, that, pending the result of the Augustenburg manifesto, King Christian had at least made sure of his subjects in the home kingdom. Bismarck, at once conciliatory and dilatory, regretted the improbability of the Diet's recurring to British mediation; if it did not, the Execution would have to proceed. On the 19th, and again on the 21st, Buchanan reported that Prussia was making military preparations. In these, as Russell was warned on the 20th by Mr Ward, lay the real danger threatening the Danish monarchy; for the object now in view was ulterior to the carrying-out of the Federal Execution.

In other words, the question of the Succession and of the validity of the Treaty of London, on which the Succession and the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish monarchy depended, once more stood in the front. On November 23rd, Russell sent forth a Circular Note to the British Representatives at the German Courts,

great and small, in which he gave vent to the regret with which Her Majesty's Government had heard of the Augustenburg claims having been brought by an accredited agent of the Hereditary Prince before the Diet, whereas no course was actually open to those States which had signed or acceded to the London Treaty but to recognise King Christian IX. On the same date, he, in identical despatches to Bloomfield and Buchanan, though approving of the requirement of the withdrawal of the March Proclamation, insisted that international difficulties should be settled between the disputants and the Signatory Powers, and appealed to the Austrian and Prussian Governments to act in unison, thus affording to Germany "the best chance of averting from it the danger of democratic revolution." Meanwhile, Paget (November 21st) had repeated that the Danish Government would welcome British mediation; but that the King had already accepted the French invitation to a Congress. As to the latter proposal, the British Government, on November 25th, finally declined it, the Austrian following suit. Prussia demurred to so wide a proposal. Unless some temporary expedient could be found, by which delay at least could be secured in the operations of Germany and the German Great Powers, the British Government believed the beginning of the end to be at hand; for, on November 26th, a Council of State was held at Berlin, in which King William, though declaring himself, notwithstanding a vote to the contrary in the Chamber of Deputies, still bound by the Treaty of London as to the Succession, announced that the Federal Execution in Holstein must take place, and that Prussia must arm, in view not only of its requirements but of its possible consequences[1].

On the same day, Russell informed Bloomfield that the British Government agreed to a proposal by Gortchakoff that the Five Great Powers, with Sweden, should send to King Christian Special Envoys, to congratulate him on his accession and to inform him that, while

[1] The position (Malet reported on the 30th) was, indeed, taken up by Prussia and Austria that the Treaty of London was a supplementary part of the engagements of 1851–2.—It would be beyond the present purpose to describe the way in which the lesser German Governments, headed by Bavaria and Baden, outvied one another in urging a forward policy in accordance with the national sentiment. But attention should be directed to Lord Russell's tone in addressing such Governments as those of Saxony and Württemberg, if we are to understand the beginnings of anti-British sentiment in Germany. About this time (November 26th) he pointed out to Bloomfield that the presence of a Federal army in Holstein "might cause revolutionary movements among the excited part of the population."

As to the apprehensions of the Duke of Cambridge and Lord de Grey (then Secretary for War) in November and December, 1863, and as to the Queen's Memorandum to the former, see L. Wolf, *Life of the First Marquess of Ripon*, I. 204 ff.

their Governments adhered to their treaty obligations for maintaining the integrity of the Danish monarchy, they considered that the Danish Crown was bound to fulfil its engagements and to make the Constitutional changes requisite to that end[1].

In December, 1863, accordingly, a new negotiation began, conducted by Baron Ewers on behalf of Russia, and on that of Great Britain by Lord Wodehouse (afterwards Earl of Kimberley), a politician of Liberal views and (as his later career proved) of administrative as well as of parliamentary ability, but whose acquaintance with the Schleswig-Holstein Question was not more intimate than that of most of his contemporaries in Lords or Commons[2]. He reached Berlin on December 11th, armed with Instructions not of course taking the Austro-Prussian view of the full significance of the Danish engagements of 1851–2, but treating them as binding; while at the same time insisting on the validity of the Treaty of London.

Of course, Hall expressed great satisfaction on hearing of the Mission of Wodehouse. Thus (after the manner of Special Envoys), he started in a hopeful mood, in possession of the elementary fact that Schleswig was not part of the Germanic Confederation, but not otherwise provided with expedients for bringing about the satisfaction of the several obligations indicated in his Instructions. Before he reached Berlin on his way to Copenhagen, Bloomfield (December 30th) had informed Russell that Austria would only hold to the Treaty of London if Denmark fulfilled the "connected" engagements, and the Emperor Francis Joseph (King William following suit) had refused to receive Admiral von Irminger, the Danish officer sent to notify to him King Christian's accession. On the same date, Buchanan had transmitted Bismarck's opinion that, unless Wodehouse at once induced the Danish Government to prevent the new Dano-Schleswig Constitution from coming into force, his Mission was foredoomed to

[1] These Instructions will be found in the Blue-book (*Parliamentary Papers*, LXIV. 1864), under date December 9th, 1863. They begin by asserting that the London Treaty of 1852 is open to no sort of question, and clearly forms part of the public law of Europe. Her Majesty's Government cannot admit the correctness of the view that the Treaty must be read in connexion with certain anterior arrangements conducted by diplomatic Notes interchanged between the German Great Powers and Denmark in 1851–2; but, when those Powers urge that Denmark has not kept faith with them as to these engagements, Her Majesty's Government is prepared to consider this allegation fairly and impartially with the other non-German Powers, and, should it be proved, would seek to induce the Danish Government to carry out the engagements in question. The result to be aimed at is the fulfilment of the Treaty of 1852 and of the engagements of 1851–2; but the mode of arriving at the result cannot be laid down, though patience and impartiality will contribute to this end.

[2] General Fleury's Mission from France seems to have been mainly complimentary.

failure. On his way to Copenhagen Wodehouse had a very long interview with Bismarck at Berlin on December 12th, the results of which he reported home on the same day. After much preliminary fencing, a definite point was reached when Wodehouse, who thought that his language had "made some impression" upon his interlocutor, obtained from him a Memorandum, afterwards initialled by the Austrian Ambassador, Count Karolyi, and Sir A. Buchanan, as well as by Bismarck himself, of the actual German demands on Denmark. It purported that immediate steps must be taken to prevent the Constitution of November, 1863, from being carried into effect as to Schleswig at the New Year, and that, this having been done, Denmark should furnish Austria and Prussia with proposals as to the fulfilment of the engagements of 1851–2. With this statement, which left untouched the question of the Execution in Holstein, and the Federal demands the non-fulfilment of which had provoked it, Wodehouse, on December 14th, betook himself to Copenhagen. On the previous day[1], Buchanan at Berlin was authorised to inform Russell that, within six days after the Special Envoy's arrival at the Danish capital, the Federal Execution would commence. Although both Bismarck (whose own position was at this point of time rumoured to be doubtful[2]) and Karolyi seemed to have considered that Wodehouse might possibly still prevail upon the Danish Government to change its policy as to the Constitutional position of Schleswig, he found, on his arrival at Copenhagen on December 16th, that, while the Danish Government was prepared to let the Execution in Holstein take its course, it was equally resolved not to put an end to the Dano-Schleswig Constitution[3]. Russell's insistence to Wodehouse (December 17th and 20th), and his argument that this step and the general fulfilment of the engagements of 1851–2 would ensure the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish monarchy in accordance with the Treaty of London, were as ineffective as they were belated. The situation had, as he had reported on the previous day (16th), become an *impasse*; the Execution was now a certainty, or at least nothing would induce the German Powers to arrest it except a compliance with the whole of their demands by Denmark, which was "out of the question[4]."

[1] Buchanan to Russell, December 13th, 1863.

[2] December 15th, 1863. F.O. Prussia, 548.

[3] From this point onward see *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Holstein, Lauenburg and Schleswig*, No. 4, presented to Parliament 1864, in *Parliamentary Papers*, LXIV. (1864).

[4] Bismarck, it may be suggested, was doing his best to confuse the issue, declaring (according to Buchanan's despatches to Russell of December 21st) that the

Meanwhile, the French Government, at cross-purposes with the British, was renewing its call for a Congress, which Austria, with obvious reasons of her own, regarded as premature (Bloomfield, December 17th). On December 19th, Wodehouse called on M. Dotézac, the French Minister (who had been instructed to take no part in the Russo-British negotiations with the Danish Government, but to warn it explicitly that, if it became involved in war with Germany, France would not come to its assistance), to enquire whether he would join with Ewers and himself in insisting on the repeal of the Dano-Schleswig Constitution.

On December 21st, however, Wodehouse, supported by Ewers, and sure of Swedish support, while Fleury had intimated the assent of France, though announcing that she would not go against Denmark in a war against Germany, made a final attempt to induce Hall to consent to a change of policy and abandon the maintenance of the Dano-Schleswig Constitution. He begged the Danish Minister to understand that this by no means implied any recognition of Austria and Prussia's right to make their adherence to the Treaty of London dependent on the fulfilment by Denmark of her engagements of 1851–2; but Hall was unsatisfied that the cancelling of the Constitution, on which the German Powers insisted as indispensable, and which Great Britain and Russia pressed, would not be followed by further demands. Holstein had been duly evacuated by the Danish Government; and the repeal of the new Constitution would have no further effect, as that of the Proclamation of March 30th had had none[1]. A few days later (December 25th), Wodehouse informed Russell that Hall had resigned, rather than be a party to persuading the reconvoked *Rigsraad* to repeal the Constitution. But Bishop Monrad, who, after a few days, took his place (the highly capable Quaade soon assuming the conduct of Foreign Affairs), showed no signs of giving way, and, as reported by Wodehouse on December 30th,

engagements of the Signatories of the Treaty of London were to Denmark only; and, again, that, if Austria and Prussia should, as they had a perfect right to do, declare war against Denmark, the Treaty of London was at an end so far as they were concerned. At the same time, he was anxious that the view solemnly stated by Russell in identical despatches to Buchanan and Bloomfield (December 17th), that any departure from the Treaty of London on the part of any of the Signatories would be deemed by Her Majesty's Government extremely inconsistent with good faith, should be known to the German Governments and people, since it could not but have an important influence on the action of the Confederation. (He was at this time anxious to let it be seen that he himself was not subject to British influence.)

[1] Wodehouse to Russell, December 21st, 1863. Cf. Paget to Russell, December 22nd, 1863.

declared that, if the Danes were attacked, they would resist to the last man. On December 27th, Buchanan had regarded the advance of Austrian and Prussian troops into Schleswig as certain, if the Constitution were not at once repealed. Thus, with the advent of the New Year, the extension of military operations was a certainty. On the last day of 1863, Buchanan avowed to Russell his belief that, if German troops entered Schleswig, they would not leave it again until the southern part of the duchy at least had been united with Holstein, and the port of Kiel included in the territories of the Germanic Confederation[1].

On the same day, Russell issued a general request, preceded by a long preamble, to the British Embassies and Legations at Paris, Vienna and Berlin, Petrograd and Stockholm, as well as Frankfort, Dresden and Stuttgart, asking, in the interests of peace, that a Conference should be held between the Signatory Powers at London or Paris, to treat of the differences between Germany and Paris, the *status quo* being maintained till this Conference should have finished its labours. The invitation implied the beginning of a new stage in the efforts of the British Government for a settlement.

By January 7th, 1864, both Wodehouse and Ewers, whose cooperation with him he described as cordial throughout[2], were preparing for immediate departure from Copenhagen; and two days previously to this[3] Russell had once more, through Cowley, placed the imperative necessity for a Concert between the non-German Powers before Drouyn de Lhuys and his master. The Frankfort Diet was hesitating between the Bavarian and Saxon proposal to place the Augustenburg claimant in possession of both Holstein and Schleswig, and the Austrian and Prussian counter-suggestion that, while definitely refusing the repeal of the new Constitution, they should occupy Schleswig as a pledge for the fulfilment of the Danish engagements. Russell condemned the former demand as tantamount to the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy; the latter he desired to submit to a Conference of the Signatories of the Treaty of London, or to leave to the mediation of the non-German Signatories, or some other method of amicable arrangement. Christian IX had been but two months on the throne, and some time ought to be allowed him. The

[1] The notion mentioned by Buchanan to Russell on December 26th, of keeping Kiel for purposes of war as a Danish port, can only be described as unintelligible.

[2] Wodehouse to Russell, January 7th, 1864.

[3] Russell to Cowley, Napier and Jerningham, January 5th.

attitude of France had for some time been doubtful; but Drouyn de Lhuys was not indisposed to a Conference as such. Bismarck, however, considered that this was not to be accepted, if it should interfere with military operations that might in the meantime have been decided on. Russell hereupon, though willing (January 9th) to postpone the opening of the Conference till the repeal of the Constitution should have been accomplished—in which case the invasion of Schleswig should likewise be postponed—persisted in his efforts to bring about the meeting he desired. At no period in the history of this Question had British diplomacy been more active, and at no time had it had less effect. Malet reported to Russell (on January 8th) that his elaborate appeal of December 31st had been received with disfavour by the majority of the Diet, where the opinion prevailed that Great Britain would in no case "interfere materially," and where British counsels had accordingly no weight. Bismarck, on the other hand, while expressing himself personally in favour of a Conference, urged Her Majesty's Government to withdraw their opposition to the occupation of Schleswig, though aware of the support the Augustenburg pretensions had received in Holstein (Buchanan, January 9th). On the other hand, the Danish Government (as Russell informed Bloomfield and Buchanan on January 11th) applied to all the Signatories of the London Treaty to meet in Conference on the bases of the Treaty of London, of securities (as promised in 1851–2) for the fair treatment of the German subjects of the King of Denmark, and of a promise on his part to endeavour to induce the *Rigsraad* to repeal the November Constitution, so far as Schleswig was concerned[1]. So much Wodehouse had achieved, and the British Government[2] readily accepted this proposal. But to what did it amount, when, on the same date, Malet reported the view of the leader of the national majority at Frankfort, the Bavarian von der Pfordten, that the invalidity of the Treaty of London must be voted by the Diet, and that, for the rest, he saw no sounder basis for a permanent settlement than a partition of Schleswig? And (as Buchanan reported to Russell on January 12th) Bismarck and Karolyi were agreed that the obnoxious Constitution must be repealed and that there was time enough to do so before the German troops could actually cross the Eider.

[1] For what follows from January 12th to 31st, 1864, see *Parliamentary Papers*, LXIV. *Denmark and Germany*, No. 1 (Session 1864). Also, *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Holstein, Lauenburg, and Schleswig*, presented to Parliament 1864, in *Parliamentary Papers*, LXV. *Denmark and Germany*, Nos. 5–7 (Session February 4th to July 29th, 1864).

[2] See Russell to Cowley, January 15th, 1864.

In face of the continual menace of the immediate occupation of Schleswig, Russell's efforts for averting it by a counter-concession were beginning to be submerged in impatience. On January 14th, when telling Bloomfield of his conversation with Bernstorff, he had described it as by no means surprising that the King of Denmark should be ready to defend Schleswig and to look upon the hostile occupation of that duchy as a blow to the integrity of his dominions. But he (Russell) could not doubt that in the defence of Denmark, the King would be "assisted by Powers friendly to" his country. Bernstorff at once dwelt on the danger to Europe, should hostile relations ensue between Great Britain and Germany, and Russell could only repeat that his warnings to the same effect had passed unheeded, since but little time was now left for counsel, wisdom and moderation. The danger was not an illusion, for Bernstorff was circumspect and far from ill-disposed to Great Britain, and Russell meant to be just. His sense of the seriousness of the situation could only be heightened by the receipt of Mr Grosvenor's Report on the state of feeling in the duchy, forwarded by Buchanan on the same date (January 14th)[1]. Meanwhile, the proposal of a Conference (complicated by the side issue of the presence of a representative of the Germanic Confederation) continued to be discussed, mainly on the same lines, Russell adhering to the twofold bases of the integrity of the Danish monarchy and the fulfilment of the engagements of 1851–2; France slowly moving towards this more restricted scheme; Russia cautiously agreeing but desirous of keeping the action of Austria and Prussia separate from that of the Confederation. The Frankfort Diet having, by a majority, declined to approve the method of action proposed by the Austrian and Prussian Governments on January 14th, the two Powers had on the 16th concluded a Convention binding them to cooperate on the lines agreed upon between them, and had at once telegraphed to Copenhagen, demanding the revocation of the November Constitution within forty-eight hours. Thus, though this Convention was kept secret, and though by January 17th Russell could regard the terms proposed by him as accepted by all the Great Powers except France, he could not, even now, look forward to the avoidance of bloodshed, if Austria and Prussia crossed the Eider;

[1] Holstein, he reported, was for Augustenburg from end to end, and confident of the success of his claims; Schleswig generally so in the middle-class population of the towns. Austrian and Prussian intervention was feared more than anything else in the Duchies; British public opinion was held to be regrettably ill-informed.

and upon this they had determined unless the Dano-Schleswig Constitution were suddenly repealed[1]. Of any such repeal there was no prospect; for the pertinacity of the Danish Government under Monrad was fundamentally the same as it had been under Hall[2]. And, even if Austria and Prussia agreed to a delay, the Diet might, in response to irrepressible popular feeling, interfere on its own account, while the two Great Powers would not be able to hold themselves aloof from such a proceeding. But war would put an end to all treaties, and the preservation of peace, Conference or no Conference, seemed improbable.

Towards the end of the month, matters having made no progress and Bismarck's attitude towards the Treaty of London continuing to become more and more doubtful[3], it occurred to Russell to resort to the expedient of a Protocol to be signed in London by Representatives of the Signatory Powers, notifying the King of Denmark's intention to summon the *Rigsraad* and propose to it the repeal of the November Constitution, and Austria and Prussia's willingness to delay the occupation of Schleswig till the result of this endeavour should be known. To Drouyn de Lhuys this suggestion—in which he could see nothing objectionable, if accepted by the German Powers, but also nothing really new—only seemed at the same time to necessitate a protest against its being, if accepted, considered to involve France in ulterior measures, for which she was unprepared (Cowley, January 27th). Gortchakoff was willing to agree to the Protocol, though he saw little chance of its being signed by the German Powers. And, in fact, Bismarck declined it, on the ground that it was impossible for the Austrian and Prussian troops to remain stationary for six further weeks, without any assurance of Denmark's giving way in the end[4]. And he followed up his refusal by declaring that, though by her non-fulfilment of the obligations contracted in 1851–2 and intrinsically connected with the Treaty of 1852, as well as by directly contravening those obligations through the November Constitution, Denmark had given the German Powers the right of releasing themselves from the Treaty—they proposed to insist on the aforesaid obligations by their own action, leaving over the question of the Treaty and the principle of the integrity of the Danish monarchy to be dealt with in the future. Within a week, they would occupy

[1] Russell to Buchanan, January 17th, 1864.
[2] Paget to Russell, January 13th and 14th, 1864.
[3] Buchanan to Russell, January 23rd, 1864.
[4] Buchanan to Russell, January 29th, 1864.

Schleswig. Two days later (February 1st) "the future" was practically settled by the transit of the Austrian and Prussian troops under the supreme command of Wrangel into the duchy of Schleswig.

III. THE WAR OF 1864 AND THE LONDON CONFERENCE

The German Great Powers and Denmark were now at war. The actual conflict had, indubitably, been brought about by the obstinacy of Denmark and it would now certainly be carried on for the determination of issues beyond the Danish obligations for the enforcement of which, together with the repeal of the November Constitution, the German Great Powers professed to have undertaken it. The policy of Great Britain had failed to induce the Danish Government to give way to demands which it had recognised as unavoidable, and it now only remained to seek to avert the consequences of this failure. The necessity became more pressing when, by February 5th, the Danish army had abandoned the defence of the Dannewirke, and Jutland lay open to the German advance. The Düppel forts had still to be captured, and the island of Alsen; but the self-confidence of the Danish Government, or their trust in foreign support, was at last giving way. They had, on January 30th, accepted the British proposal of a Conference, if possible at London, of the Signatory Powers, with a representative of the Germanic Confederation; and a successful Danish resistance might conceivably affect its deliberations, should it meet before the land-war had crushed out all such attempts, while Danish action by sea failed to exercise any important counter-effect. The efforts of the British Government, with the support of Russia, to obtain an armistice, had, although not altogether discountenanced at Vienna, met with no success at Berlin. It was felt at Copenhagen that a final catastrophe might be no longer distant; and, on February 11th, de Bille addressed to Russell a formal appeal confessing that "if reduced to her own strength, Denmark must in the end be crushed"; and that it was therefore necessary, while there was yet time, that the Powers friendly to her should come to her help, among whom there was none the Danish Government addressed with greater confidence than Great Britain[1]. The appeal was not unwarranted nor its tone undignified, though the argument of Great Britain's guarantee of 1720 was a weak link in the chain[2].

[1] Drouyn de Lhuys was not slow to point this out. See Cowley to Russell, February 11th, 1864.

[2] Cf. *ante*, pp. 523–4.

Far more impressive must have been the reference to Palmerston's more recent vaunt in Parliament (July 23rd, 1863) that, in case of an attack on the integrity of the Danish monarchy, Denmark would not stand alone. Neither the author of that warning nor British public opinion could remain deaf to the Danish monition; and Russell privately submitted to Palmerston for his approval the suggestion that France and Great Britain should categorically offer their mediation to Austria and Prussia on the basis of the integrity of the Danish monarchy and the engagements of 1851–2, and that, if it were refused, Great Britain should despatch a squadron to Copenhagen, and France a *corps d'armée* to the Rhenish frontier of Prussia[1]. Palmerston, who "fully shared Russell's indignation," hesitated to engage Great Britain—unsupported as she was—to enter into a conflict with Germany on Continental soil, and to suggest to France an attack upon the Prussian Rhenish territory. As to sending a squadron into the Baltic, he observed that this could not in any case be done for several weeks; nor would it have much effect on the Germans, unless understood to be only a first step. Altogether he doubted whether either the British Cabinet or British public opinion was prepared for active interference. Nothing, therefore, came of the proposal for the moment; but Palmerston wrote to the First Lord of the Admiralty (the Duke of Somerset) to advocate the despatch of a squadron into the Baltic, when the season should permit, with a view to prevent any attack upon Copenhagen. But these utterances remained confidential only. On February 19th, Russell replied to the Danish Government, through Paget, that Her Majesty's Government would take no steps towards arresting the progress of the present unhappy contest, until after full consideration and communication with France and Russia. But this concert was, more especially with regard to France, far from being a matter of course, and fell far short of the completeness of that reached by Austria and Prussia on January 16th, which, in Bismarck's opinion[2] (February 27th) had, in all probability, prevented Great Britain from affording material assistance to Denmark. The discussions as to holding of a Conference between the Signatory Powers, with a representative of the Germanic Confederation, pressed by the British Government, and the armistice which was to accompany it, were in the last degree tedious. For, while the Austrian and Prussian Governments, trusting to the strength of their

[1] See E. Ashley's *Life of Palmerston*, II. 246 sqq. (1878), for this correspondence.
[2] Buchanan to Russell, February 27th, 1864.

position which could not change except for the better, were willing, and the Russian Government (indeed, the Tsar himself) urged the Danish Government to concur, it held back, refusing to relinquish the hope, unreasonable as it was, of direct foreign interference on behalf of Denmark, and at first pleaded for delay. In this request it was momentarily supported, without obvious reason, by the British Government[1]. On March 11th, Russell stated that Austria and Prussia were ready to agree to an armistice, either on the basis of a mutual evacuation of Jutland and Schleswig, or on that of the military *status quo*, as well as to a Conference. But inasmuch as, on the 17th, the Danish Government still insisted that the Conference must be restricted to the question of the engagements of 1851–2—a condition to which the Austrian and Prussian Governments refused to agree, in view of the changes already brought about by the War[2], Russell had consequently to fall back on the proposal that, to avoid controversy, the purpose of the Conference, unaccompanied for the present by an armistice, should be defined simply as the discovery of the means of restoring the blessings of peace to the north of Europe. The Danes (Monrad), while not abandoning the restriction of the basis insisted on by them, had argued that it was impossible to prevent the discussion of other modes of arrangement; and this appeared to reduce the difference to a matter of form[3]. Such was the slender diplomatic substructure contrived for the attempt to terminate the War, which had meanwhile continued its course. The advance of the Germans in Jutland was slow; the occupation of Alsen remained unachieved; and the Düppel forts were not captured till April 18th[4], two days before the date first fixed for the meeting of the Conference in London. It actually met, after the belated arrival of Baron Beust, the Plenipotentiary of the Germanic Confederation, on April 25th.

The London Conference, which had been brought about with so

[1] Napier to Russell, February 28th, 1864.

[2] To Bloomfield, March 20th, 1864.

[3] Russell to Paget, March 21st, 1864.

[4] By sea, the Danish position had not been so unchallenged in its predominance as to preclude the possibility of the despatch of an Austrian squadron into the Baltic. This possibility Palmerston, in a confidential interview with Count Apponyi, denounced in no measured terms, declaring that such a naval movement would be treated as an "affront and insult to England" (see his letter to Russell, May 1st, in E. Ashley's *Life of Palmerston*, II. 250). He wrote in the same sense to the First Lord of the Admiralty (the Duke of Somerset), adding that "by forbidding the Austrians to enter the Baltic during the War, we should be rendering valuable assistance to the Danes, without any great effort to ourselves" (*ibid.* p. 252). The Austrian ships, however, proceeded no further than Deal; for Rechberg was very sensitive to British opinion.

large an expenditure of effort, cannot be said to have opened with great expectations; but neither was its success altogether hopeless for the weaker side. The entire Continental portion of the Danish monarchy was under German control; but Denmark maintained her superiority at sea and continued to trust in it as the certainty grew that no Austrian fleet would be seen in the Baltic. As to the Neutral Powers, public feeling in Great Britain had never been in more general sympathy with Denmark, and the goodwill of the Court to the Augustenburg pretensions was, as Palmerston took occasion to point out, making no difference in their favour. Of the friendliness of Russia, Denmark could likewise entertain no doubt, though dynastic interests could not but suggest caution in dealing with the Treaty of London, for which Russian statesmanship was largely responsible. Sweden was purely anxious to uphold Danish interests; France, with aims of her own in view, was indisposed to take a prominent part in the present transaction. Of the belligerents, Austria had not as yet openly withdrawn from her treaty obligations to maintain the integrity of the Danish monarchy; and it was hardly known how far she had for the time subordinated her policy to that of Prussia. The Germanic Confederation was bound to uphold the interests and the choice of the duchies. The action of Prussia on the other hand, would be guided by ulterior considerations, or calculations, which could not reveal themselves at once. Elimination of the issue or issues she desired to avoid must be the course she would follow at the Conference, before her own purposes could declare themselves. As to the Plenipotentiaries sent by the several Powers to the Conference and the part taken by them in its proceedings, it may perhaps be worth adding that Russell necessarily depended much on Clarendon, who with great charm of personality combined the gift of clearness in debate, and who was at no time prepossessed in favour of the diplomacy of Bismarck. Prussia was represented by Bernstorff and von Balan, whose capacity and experience were alike uncontestable. Austria had sent to Apponyi's assistance Biegeleben, an official strongly antipathetic to Prussia; the Russian Plenipotentiary was Baron Brunnow, discretion itself, but whose friendship to Denmark had been constant and who might justly claim to have been one of the authors of the Treaty of London. Denmark was represented by three Plenipotentiaries, of whom Quaade was a statesman of notable moderation, though, like his colleague de Bille, in principle a steadfast Eider-Dane. Beust, whom the Germanic Confederation had chosen to

advocate its claim, did so with the self-confidence which deserted him in none of the vicissitudes of his versatile career[1].

The British Plenipotentiaries began proceedings by calling upon the belligerents, in the interests of humanity, to agree to a suspension of hostilities; but, since the Danes objected to a cessation of the blockade as the condition of an armistice, on which Prussia and Austria insisted, it was not till the third sitting (on May 9th) that the compromise proposed by Prussia of a short Armistice to last, with such cessation, to June 12th, was accepted. At the fourth sitting (on May 12th) the first step in the Prussian process of elimination was taken, and the root of the contention laid bare, by the Declaration of Bernstorff, couched in diplomatic language, which called into question the validity of engagements founded on the Treaty of London. The protest of British Plenipotentiaries and their request to know what was to take the Treaty's place were followed by similar expressions from Brunnow; and the Declaration of Bernstorff (on the 17th) that the only satisfactory guarantee of peace could be found in the complete political independence of the united Duchies—which left the Succession Question and the idea of a merely "personal union" between the kingdom and the Duchies open—was absolutely rejected by Denmark, and fell dead. At the sixth meeting (on May 28th), a combined Austrian and Prussian proposal, as unexpected as its predecessor had been, carried the Bismarckian series a step further. The two Powers now demanded—with what respective measure of sympathy it is unnecessary to estimate—a complete severance of the Duchies from the kingdom, and the union of Schleswig-Holstein as a single State under the sovereignty of the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg[2]. Russia inevitably objected, pronouncing the question of the Succession to the Duchies not an open one to those Powers who still regarded the Treaty of London as binding; and Denmark considered the proposal impossible. As Bismarck had foreseen, it fell to the ground.

Russell's moment, as it seemed to him, had now arrived. The agreement which he hereupon proposed, and with regard to the intrinsic reasonableness of which as a basis of peace there could, in the existing state of affairs, hardly remain a doubt, left aside all

[1] For the following see *Protocols of Conferences held in London relative to the Affairs of Denmark*, presented to Parliament 1864, in *Parliamentary Papers, Protocols, etc.*, LXV. (Session 1864).

[2] As to this move—playing for a fall—cf. Sybel, *u.s.* III. 223. It must be remembered that Napoleon had already approved annexation to Prussia.

reference to the violated engagements of 1851–2, and sought to secure the elements of a solid peace which alone could justify the disregard of a solemn treaty. Holstein, Lauenberg, and the southern part of Schleswig were to be separated from the rest of the Danish monarchy, their future destiny as Danes or Germans not being settled without their consent. (No fortresses or harbours of war were, however, to be constructed there—a clause to which the German Powers at once took exception.) The Danish compensation for the sacrifice demanded was to be a guarantee by the Great Powers of Europe of the independence of the kingdom (with, no doubt, the northern portion of Schleswig, as it might be ultimately settled). The plan, previously communicated to France and Russia, and conditionally (France much approving the plebiscite clause) was now accepted, in principle, by the German Powers. At the next sitting of the Conference (June 2nd) it was reluctantly accepted by the Danish Plenipotentiary, but also in principle only. The reservation was momentous; for, as the Danes pointed out, limits must be found for the sacrifices to be imposed on their country; and the question of the new frontier-line therefore became one of vital importance[1]. Should an equitable arrangement on this head prove impossible, Denmark must be free to fall back on the Treaty of London, on the maintenance of which by the Powers she had originally counted.

As British Policy was repeatedly to experience in dealing with the Schleswig-Holstein Question, the details were to prove a fatal stumbling block, as they are apt to do in an atmosphere of mutual ill-will. Already, the task of the Conference ran the risk of being rudely interrupted by the resumption of hostilities. The Armistice was to end on June 12th, and it was only reluctantly that the Danish Government assented to prolonging it to the 26th, while the German Powers, who had time on their side, would have preferred a truce of several months. Quaade repeatedly declared that his Government would prefer to submit once more to the decision of arms rather than to continue a hopeless dispute; and, desirous of avoiding a breakdown of his endeavour, Russell, at the sitting of June 18th, made a last attempt at conciliation. Referring to the memorable desire (*voeu*) expressed at the Congress of Paris in 1856, that Cabinets, in the event of a serious misunderstanding, should, before appealing to force, have recourse to the good offices of a friendly State, he proposed

[1] The conditional cession of Lauenburg, which formed no essential element in the dispute, may be passed by here.

that the belligerents, Austria, Prussia and Denmark, should appeal to a friendly Power to trace a frontier-line passing south neither of the line designated by the Danish nor of that preferred by the German Plenipotentiaries.

It was understood at the time that France was the Power in the minds of the British Plenipotentiaries—a notion which can only have been intended to assure the support of that Power, of late little disposed to a ready cooperation with Great Britain. But Russell's last proposal was doomed to failure. Austria and Prussia, between whom there was no real agreement as to the future of the Duchies, could concur only in offering an evasive consent; and at Copenhagen the infatuation of the ruling party was resolved on refusal, though the King, and even Hall, were for acceptance. On June 22nd—almost on the eve of the end of the Armistice—this refusal was notified to the Conference, the Danish Plenipotentiaries adhering to the line accepted by them on May 28th (Eckernförde—Friedrichstadt)[1]; while the Germans declared themselves unable to approve of an arbitration on the final decision. Prince de La Tour d'Auvergne, hereupon, intervened with a suggestion that a vote of the communes in the mixed districts should be taken as decisive; but, though the British Plenipotentiaries, rather than throw up the game, assented to this, conditionally on the acceptance of Denmark, Quaade could only take it *ad referendum*, as in conflict with his Instructions. Thus, as the sand in the glass had virtually run out, the efforts of the neutral Powers, and those of Great Britain in particular, and with it the Conference of London, were at an end, and its final sitting on June 25th was formal only. The Danes had resolved on rejecting any partition; and the German Great Powers had agreed upon securing the whole of the prize, leaving the future of the Duchies still open. So far as the non-German Powers were concerned, Bismarck's scheme of action had been successfully carried through; and British intervention by consultation and advice had reached its terminus[2]. Of

[1] The final Austro-Prussian suggestion seems to have been the line north of Flensburg to Hoyer, leaving Alsen to the Danes.

[2] To the Protocol of the last sitting (No. 12) is annexed an account agreed upon by the Plenipotentiaries of the neutral Powers, but involving no responsibility on the part of those of the belligerent Powers and of the Germanic Confederation. These reserved to themselves the right of comment or reply, and exercised it in the letter of Bernstorff and de Balan and that of Beust, printed with the Protocols presented to Parliament. As to Monrad's defence of the Danish action at the Conference "which step by step followed the advice of the neutral Powers, and especially that of the English Cabinet," see his letter to de Bille, June 28th, 1864, in *Parliamentary Papers*, LXV. (1864), *Denmark and Germany*, No. 7.

its zeal, while it had lasted, no doubt can exist, nor of its remoteness from considerations of self-interest, which had, to say the least, long fallen out of sight. Its final effort had been a Conference begun in the midst of war, with the purpose of securing the recognition of the principle of the integrity of the Danish monarchy, and ending in an unsolved dispute as to the extent to which that integrity should be impaired.

British intervention was at an end; and the War, as to the final purpose of which the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets had arrived at a formal agreement on June 24th, the day before that of the last sitting of the London Conference, ran its inevitable course. Alsen was occupied, a landing on Fünen would follow, and the Danish fleet was no longer to be depended on for the protection of Copenhagen. The debate, which occupied the British Parliament from July 4th to 9th, and which ended in the Commons with a majority of eighteen in favour of the Government's policy of peace—in the Lords they had been left in a minority of nine—extinguished the last glimmer of hope of British interference, against which a majority of the Cabinet was known to have decided. In the Lords, Clarendon declared that an amicable settlement would have been brought about, had the efforts of the Government been met in an equal spirit "not only by the parties directly interested, but also by the other parties who were equally parties to the Treaty of 1852"; while Russell, on this occasion with less ingenuousness, maintained that the Government had chosen and acted on the principle of non-intervention as in the case of Italy, and in that of the American Civil War[1]. In the Commons, Disraeli and Lord Stanley for the Opposition, alike deprecated the conclusion that they advocated war; and Palmerston, in a speech which took away the breath of all who heard it[2], rested the defence of the Government on what, during their five years' tenure of office, they had done for the national prosperity. On the same day as that on which this speech was delivered, Bluhme succeeded Monrad as President of the Council at Copenhagen; twelve

[1] On July 6th (to Paget) he thought it well to remind Monrad that, though "Her Majesty's Government were unwilling with the other neutral Powers, to urge upon the Danish the acceptance of terms which it deemed incompatible with the safety and honour of Denmark, they had never engaged themselves, *nor could they now engage themselves*, to support the Danish Crown by force of arms, or to impose upon Germany the conditions suggested in the Conference." This last clause would appear to refer to the frontier-line finally insisted upon by Denmark. See *Denmark and Germany*, No. 7 in *Parliamentary Papers*, LXV. (1864).

[2] The present writer was one of them. For the debate see *The Annual Register* for 1864, pp. 88–102.

days later a new Armistice began, and on October 30th peace was signed at Vienna with the two German Great Powers. The cession to them of the three Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg was yielded by the vanquished without much discussion; and in the Treaty, the financial arrangements of which were the results of long debate, neither the future government of Schleswig-Holstein, nor the treatment of the mixed districts in Schleswig, found any mention.

In the settlement of this Peace the British Government, it is needless to say, had no share. After the Preliminaries had been concluded, Bismarck had communicated to Russell through Bernstorff (August 5th) his hope that the British Government would not refuse to recognise the moderation and placability which Bloomfield had counselled at an interview between them at Vienna. The entire cession of the three Duchies was indispensable. The Danes themselves had declared any relation of the nature of a personal union impossible; and the retention by them of part of the duchy of Schleswig, which had formerly seemed conceivable, was manifestly out of the question now. But Austria and Prussia had not extended their original demand, and had not asked for the cession of any part of the kingdom of Denmark, though Jutland was in their hands. By way of reply (through Mr Lowther, August 20th), Russell, though he would have preferred to have observed total silence, could not but once more repeat the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that the aggression of Austria and Prussia was unjust, and deeply lament that their success in war should have enabled them to dismember the Danish monarchy, which it was the object of the Treaty of 1852 to preserve entire. Specially objectionable was the transfer of 200,000 or 300,000 loyal Danish inhabitants to a German State. For the rest, he had the satisfaction of noting that the cession by King Christian IX implied his previous right to rule over them, and hoped that they would be fairly and fully consulted in the choice of their future Sovereign, failing which Her Majesty's Government "could not feel at all secure of the prospects of lasting peace[1]."

Into the progress of the relations between the European Powers, and the Great German Powers in particular which ensued, and towards which Great Britain stood almost in the position of a witness with averted eyes, this is not the place to enter. In these relations, though the destinies of Schleswig-Holstein continued for a short

[1] *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of the Duchies*, February 7th to July 6th, 1865, in *Parliamentary Papers*, LVII. (1865).

time to occupy the forefront both before and after the Convention of Gastein (August 24th, 1865), they were only an element in the relations between Austria and Prussia, and one with which British policy had ceased to have much concern. The Gastein Convention itself greatly troubled French political designs, as seeming to promise a good understanding between the Partitioning Powers; but Great Britain had no interest in promoting dissension between them, indeed, so late as the very eve of the final rupture, Clarendon made an abortive attempt at mediation. The rupture itself was rendered certain by the Prussian demand (January 26th, 1866), left virtually unanswered, for a change in the administrative methods of Austria in Holstein; and when war ensued between the two Great Powers, it was on the definite double issue of the acquisition of the Duchies by Prussia and the reform or transformation of the Germanic Confederation. But for British Foreign Policy the Schleswig-Holstein Question had fallen out of cognisance, though the moral effect of the connexion between them could hardly be described as a thing of the past[1].

[1] It may be worth adding, in a note, that, when after the Nikolsburg negotiations, the French intervention in which had met with no countenance on the part of either Russia or Great Britain, the Peace of Prague (August 23rd, 1866) transferred all the rights of Austria in Schleswig-Holstein to the Prussian Crown, provision was made for the retrocession of the doubtful North-Schleswig districts, if so desired by the inhabitants. For the rest, Baron Charles Scheel-Plessen, the first Prussian administrative chief of the new Province, managed to induce the Schleswig-Holstein population as a whole to acquiesce in the Prague settlement, and in the judicious Act by which (on January 2nd, 1867) Duke Frederick of Augustenburg released all who were, or felt themselves to be, under engagements of allegiance to his person or successors. The stipulation as to North-Schleswig was by an understanding between Austria and Prussia (October 11th, 1874) converted into an engagement to be carried out by the latter Power at her own discretion. The Prussian Government postponed any action on the matter, notwithstanding pressure put upon it even in the National-Liberal Press, thus leaving over the question for settlement in the Treaty signed at Versailles between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (section XII, Articles 109 ff.) on June 28th, 1920. See *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, ed. by H. W. V. Temperley, vol. II. ch. iv. part I: "The Schleswig Question"; where the results of the Plebiscites taken in February and March, 1920 are added. They were not one-sided, and it may be noticed that British policy had not striven to make them such. For the rest, although according to the Treaty of Versailles no fortifications were to be allowed along the roadway between the North Sea and the Baltic, the internationalisation of the Kiel Canal was not contemplated by the Peace Conference, except with regard to trade, which the Treaty declares open in the Canal and its points of access to all nations at peace with Germany, disputes on this head being referable to the League of Nations.

CHAPTER XIV

GREECE AND THE IONIAN ISLANDS, 1832–1864

I

FREE, in the main, from uncertainties such as it exhibited in the case of Denmark and the Duchies, the policy of Great Britain in that of Greece and the Ionian Islands in this period was of a piece with her general policy in action as well as in principle, and, more distinctly than our intervention north of the Elbe, one of which self-interest in no sense besides that involved in the advancement of peace and freedom of government formed an essential element. The outbreak of the Greek Revolution had, in the words of the foremost British historian of later Hellas, been "viewed with more aversion" by the British Cabinet than by any other Christian Government[1]. But the British Government had no power of coercing the sympathies of the British people; and British love of freedom, impelled by British Philhellenism, may claim a principal share in having brought about, though within too narrow limits, the establishment of Greek Independence. The incorporation in the Greek kingdom of the Ionian Islands, effected as it was through the goodwill—and, even more distinctly, thanks to the goodsense—of the British Government, not only harmonised with the internal policy Great Britain had consistently recommended to Greece; but, so far as it went, corrected the shortcomings of our dealings with her external relations; and the result, though only of secondary importance in the progress of European affairs, redounds, unlike its Schleswig-Holstein failure, to the credit of contemporary British statesmanship.

The purpose of this chapter being to indicate the general character of British Policy towards Greece from the accession of King Otho to the Union of the Ionian Islands with the Greek kingdom, it seems necessary to point out that during the whole of this period the histories of these two communities, though never out of touch with one another, ran each its separate course, and in the interests of clearness, as well as fairness to those concerned, call for distinct treatment. From this point of view, the political relations of the

[1] See G. Finlay, *History of Greece from the conquest by the Romans to the present time* (1874) (new edition, edited by H. F. Tozer), VII. 2.

Islands to Great Britain, as under her sole Protection, should be noted in the first place. In June, 1863, when the question of the Union of the Ionian Islands with the Greek kingdom had become a matter of practical politics and the Queen had declared her willingness to assent to that step, if (as was of course known with certainty) it were desired by the Ionian Islands themselves, Earl Russell very appropriately sought to clear other minds besides his own by means of a statement to the British Ambassadors to the Four Great Powers on "the position, rights and future condition of the Islands[1]." They were not, he pointed out, "as some persons appear to suppose, a part of the possessions of the British Crown." They formed, added Earl Russell, "the Republic" of the Ionian Islands—a not quite correct description; for the Paris Treaty of November 5th, 1815, which he cites and which placed them under the Protection of the British Crown, designated them as "forming a State, under the denomination of the United States of the Ionian Isles[2]." The conclusion of this Treaty, as Earl Russell reminded his readers, had not been reached at once; for Austria had, through her Plenipotentiary, declared her willingness to charge herself with the Protection of these Islands, in view of the importance of the question of the possession of them for that of the tranquillity of Italy and the provinces formerly, like the Islands themselves, under Venetian sway. But Russia, professing to desire nothing but the happiness of their inhabitants, had endeavoured to promote their wish to remain under the Protection of Great Britain, into whose hands they had recently come; and Count Capodistrias, himself of ancient Corfiote descent, who at this time stood high in the favour of the Tsar, and was specially charged with the conduct of this transaction, favoured the same solution, as most likely to ensure to his countrymen the measure of liberty and independence to which they must limit their aspirations. In the Treaty of November 5th, 1815, between Great Britain and Austria (and Russia and Prussia), which, in order to assure to the seven Ionian Islands their

[1] See his *Despatch respecting the Union of the Ionian Islands with Greece*, presented to Parliament, 1863, in *Parliamentary Papers*, LXXIV.

[2] Cf. Finlay, *u.s.* VII. 312, note, and see S. Xenos, *East and West*, pp. 219 sqq. The Islands had in 1797 (at Campo-Formio) exchanged the Venetian for the French rule, which they had in 1798–9 easily thrown off with Russian help. In March, 1800, Russia and the Porte concluded the Treaty of Constantinople, which established the Republic of the Seven Islands, under the suzerainty of the Porte, while Russia guaranteed their territory and Constitution, and Great Britain recognised the republic (1801). By the Secret Treaty of Tilsit (1807) Alexander I handed over the Islands to Napoleon, from whom they were reconquered by Great Britain in 1809—Corfu in 1814.

"independence, liberty and happiness," placed them and their Constitution under the immediate Protection of Great Britain[1], Earl Russell accordingly signalised Article IV as declaring that the Lord High Commissioner of the Protecting Power should summon a Legislative Assembly, of which he should direct the procedure for drawing up a new Constitutional Charter for the State, which the King of Great Britain and Ireland should be requested to ratify. Great Britain obtained the right of garrisoning the Islands, of command of their military force and of jurisdiction over their ports. The Constitution, which was duly considered and approved by an Assembly called for the purpose in the course of 1816, and became law on January 1st, 1817, made at least adequate provision for the maintenance of a strong executive.

The Commissioner was to reside at Corfu, with Residents in the other Islands. The legislature, likewise seated at Corfu, consisted, with the Commissioner, of a Chamber of forty and a Senate of five members, the election of the latter being subject to his veto, while the former was chosen by a high suffrage for five years, during which it was to hold two sessions, when it would be prorogued for six months by the High Commissioner. As a matter of course, the Constitution contained nothing as to the relations of the Seven Islands with the Greek world at large, of which it formed no inconsiderable part[2]; though, in his despatch, Earl Russell notes that Article IV contained a provision that "the established language of the States is Greek"; the intention of Capodistrias to develop a Greek nationality being thus openly kept in view by Great Britain, the State entrusted with the Protectorate.

The hopes founded, or proposed to be founded, on the establishment of the British Protectorate were, however, disappointed under the sway of Sir Thomas Maitland and his successors. "King Tom" fully established his reputation as a Constitution-maker and an administrator, notwithstanding his unconciliatory ways and the untoward episode of the restoration of Parga to the Turks (1819), and his immediate successor, Sir Frederick Adam, was able with the enthusiastic aid of Lord Guildford to bring about the inauguration (1824) of the University of Corfu. But the British Protectorate, with

[1] It is given in full by Xenos, with the Constitutional Charters passed by the Legislative Assembly and ratified by the Sovereign Protector 1817, and the Sultan's *firman* recognising the Protectorate 1819.

[2] In 1863 its population was estimated at 235,000 (Finlay, *u.s.* VII. 316, note). The population of the Islands however comprised, especially at Corfu, a large non-Hellenic, including a large Jewish, element. The total number of the Greek race, at the time of the outbreak of the Insurrection, was reckoned at not much beyond two millions, of whom not much more than a million were estimated by Col. Leake to inhabit Continental Greece (*ibid.* VI. 2, note).

whose aid through the High Commissioner and the Residents in the lesser Islands much that was beneficial was effected by the establishment of public security and the advance of material prosperity, failed to secure the goodwill of the population, mainly in consequence of the want of mutual understanding; though the preference shown to Corfu over the other Islands, and perhaps also (though this was hardly noticed at the time) a neglect of the interests of the peasantry, may have contributed to the weakness of British tenure on the sympathies of the Islanders. And at the root of the growing disaffection to the existing relations, lay the enduring sense of nationality. Strengthened as this feeling could not but be by the outbreak of the Greek Revolution, any support of which from the Ionian Islands was vigilantly prevented by the Protecting Government, it was not less inevitably rebuffed by the limits fixed in 1830 for the new Greek State[1]. While Philhellenism was on the wane, the Near Eastern policy of the British Government was steadily intent upon safeguarding the interests of the Porte; and for the Ionians there remained during the earlier years of the Greek monarchy no resource but that of hoping against hope, or promoting political reforms which might bring ulterior aims within the range of possible fulfilment.

II

Meanwhile, the new kingdom of Greece had passed through its first experiences; Prince Otho of Bavaria—the son of the most ardent of royal Philhellenes—having been chosen King by the Protecting Powers (Great Britain, France and Russia), and the Quadruple Convention of May 7th, 1832, having established the bases of his government[2]. Till his coming of age on January 1st, 1835, it was to be carried on by a Regency composed of Bavarian officials, and supported by a force of 3500 German troops, pending the organisation of a sufficient Greek army. On February 6th, 1833, King Otho, escorted by a numerous fleet, and accompanied by a considerable armed force, landed in Nauplia from the British frigate *Madagascar*, under the command of Captain (afterwards Sir Edmund and finally Lord)

[1] Cf. *ante*, ch. ii. section viii.

[2] The originator of the choice seems to have been the eminent scholar and educationist Friedrich Thiersch, who had advocated it in 1829 and been sent into Greece in 1831 to prepare the ground. Though the Greeks called him "*preceptor Bavariae*," he was not asked to accompany King Otho to Greece, King Lewis having been prejudiced against him by von Heydeck, and also by the British Resident Dawkins's opinion against his further employment in Greece. He laid down views on the Government in a notable French work, *De l'état actuel de la Grèce* (1833).

Lyons, and the Regency which had landed with him entered upon its administration. It consisted of Count Armansperg, who when in office in Bavaria as Minister both of Finance and of the Interior, had been credited with Liberal tendencies but who owed his personal ascendancy as Regent mainly to his hospitality and general qualities as a man of the world. On the other hand, the services of the eminent jurist G. L. von Maurer to the organisation of judicial and other reforms in Greece were unquestionable and in part enduring[1]; but he had not bestowed sufficient consideration on the existing condition of the country, and his personal influence was hampered by his jealous irritability, so that his activity in the Regency came to an end before it had had time to unfold itself fully. The remaining Regents were K. von Abel (afterwards well known as the leader of the Ultramontane party in Bavaria) and Major-General K. W. (afterwards Freiherr) von Heydeck, who had held a command in the Greek War of Liberation and took a strong interest in military matters, but whose position was due to his being regarded as representing the personal views (as well as the artistic sympathies) of King Lewis.

The task of the Regency and of the first period of monarchical government was necessarily one of extraordinary difficulty. The numerous problems confronting it—the establishment of an administrative system at once effective and workable, resting on a sound financial basis and secured by an honest judicature, the extinction of brigandage, and the formation of a regular native army—all demanded accomplishment within the narrow territorial limits, and from the consequent restricted resources, assigned to the country by a *fiat* not its own. And, even within these limits, neither the administration of the new State by the Regency and by the Government succeeding it, nor the policy both internal and external determining its course, could be easily carried on without the goodwill of the more or less vigilant Protecting Powers. Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the Treaty, or Convention, of May 7th, 1832, which had established King Otho on the throne of Greece had guaranteed to her a loan of £2,400,000, of which by 1835 only two instalments had been paid and that the date of the payment of the third depended on the joint decision of the Three Powers, though the loan had been "specially" guaranteed by Great Britain. Hence, it depended on the

[1] They were expounded by himself in his three volumes on *The Greek People in its Public, Ecclesiastical, and Private-Law Relations before and after the War of Liberation up to July 31st*, 1834.

will of each of these Powers—in other words, upon its disposition towards the Greek Government of the time—whether it would insist upon its final claim on the Greek Treasury as superior to that of any other expenditure[1].

Thus, during the Regency and in the early period of monarchical government which ensued, when Bavarian counsels, as a matter of course, continued to have their weight with the well-disposed, but far from circumspect, young King, those responsible for or interested in the conduct of affairs and of their followers were constantly actuated by a desire to secure the support of the diplomatic representatives of the Protecting Powers. At the same time, the use in this connexion of the expression "the Russian," "the English," "the French" party (except perhaps, at times, in the first of these instances) should not be throughout accepted too literally, since it often merely means the politicians in frequent and active contact with the Legations in question.

In the course of the quarrel which very soon divided the Regency, and which, in July, 1834, led to the recall by the King of Bavaria of Maurer (whose place was taken by von Kobell, an official of no particular significance) and Abel, the British Minister, E. J. Dawkins, had been accused by them of using his influence against them and in favour of Armansperg and Russian counsels. Yet Palmerston, who consistently held fast by Armansperg, accused his adversaries of being the "dupes of Russia." Dawkins, who had held his present appointment since 1828, was an experienced public servant; but the position was by no means an easy one, and his relations with Armansperg himself seem to have become strained. When, therefore, the Regency dissensions had been settled in favour of the latter, who thus became master of the situation, Palmerston (again Foreign Secretary) was well contented to recall Dawkins, substituting for him Sir Edmund Lyons, who in April, 1835, was sent to Athens on a Special Mission to congratulate King Otho on the attainment of his majority (June) and to take over (in the following month) the Legation at Athens. Here he was *persona gratissima* both with the King and with Armans-

[1] Cf. Finlay, *u.s.* VII. 239; Eardley-Wilmot, *Life of Vice-Admiral Lord Lyons*, p. 79. See also Parish, *Diplomatic History*, etc., pp. 337 sqq. No reference is here necessary to the assertion of Parish, that the Convention of 1832 unwarrantably ignored the claims of the British bondholders of the loans of 1824 and 1825, to the payment of whose debentures the Greek (Provisional) Government had then appropriated all the resources of the country—at the very moment of giving Greece to understand that "of whatever extravagances she might be guilty, she might reckon upon more money from England" (*ibid.* p. 356).

perg, who till February, 1837, remained in absolute control of the Government[1]. A passage in the letter which, early in August, 1835, Palmerston addressed to Lyons is worth quoting as impressing upon him the necessity of insisting on the one thing (in the opinion of the British Whig Government) needful for Greece:

> Pray press on Armansperg and the King the absolute necessity of establishing some form of representative Government in Greece. The habits and genius and geographical distribution of the nation; their ancient history and recent struggle; their National Assemblies during the War of Independence; the expectations they have been encouraged to form—all these things combine to render it impossible that they can be contented to go on under an absolute monarchy. King Otho has it now in his power to give them Chambers moulded and organised according to his view of what is best. If he delays, Chambers will be extorted from him moulded and organised according to what the most violent and least enlightened of his subjects may think best[2].

Palmerston certainly had fair grounds for assuming that King Otho would play the part of a Constitutional Sovereign[3]; for his father, King Lewis of Bavaria, had not yet broken with Liberalism, and the pledge given by his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron von Gise, in July, 1832, declared that it would be one of the first cares of the Regency to summon a National Assembly to assist in preparing a Constitution for the kingdom, which had been guaranteed in a Proclamation of the Protecting Powers, published at Nauplia to announce their choice of King Otho[4]. Sir Edmund Lyons, from first to last[5], followed his chief's Instructions both in the letter and in the spirit, and found a ready listener, at all events to his representations in Armansperg, who had himself come from Bavaria with a "Liberalising" reputation. Writing to Lyons on December 1st, 1835, Palmerston says, in that mood of confidence which at once secured the implicit compliance, and gained the hearts, of his agents, "There is a grand European cabal against Greece and Count Armansperg; but

[1] *Life of Vice-Admiral Lord Lyons*, pp. 77 sqq. [2] *Ibid.* pp. 77 sqq.

[3] "I certainly," Palmerston wrote to Sir Edmund Lyons in September, 1841 (*ibid.* p. 91), "made a great mistake when I persuaded France to give way to the wishes of Russia in favour of Prince Otho; but we heard a good account of him as a boy, and we thought a Bavarian Prince would be more likely to be imbued with constitutional ideas and feelings than a prince taken from States where the form of government was more despotic."

[4] Finlay, *u.s.* VII. 115.

[5] In 1849, when his Mission came to an end, Sir Edmund Lyons would not hear of any Greek policy but that of fully and fairly carrying out the Constitution (brought about in 1843). See Mr Ward's account of an interview with him in April of that year (*Experiences*, p. 92).

you may be quite sure that I shall neither give in to it nor give way to it, and if Count Armansperg is true to his promises and stout in his purposes I will engage that England shall bring him and Greece through all difficulties[1]."

The financial side of Armansperg's administration was not the most satisfactory; but even as to this Palmerston (in 1836) supported him by asking power from Parliament to guarantee the British proportion of the third instalment of the loan promised by the Three Powers without inviting the assent of France and Russia[2]. The diplomacy of Lyons, who remained at Athens till 1849, was, as befitted a naval officer brought up in the traditions of the Senior Service, absolutely straightforward and perhaps, in the phrase of Palmerston's biographer[3], too apt to "fire off very big guns at very small affairs." Thus, after having, early in his residence (1833), begun a series of complaints and reclamations in the first of which the King had to take his part against the Court, he ended by utterly alienating the goodwill both of the King himself and of his surroundings. But Palmerston's confidence in the zealous agent of his policy remained unabated, and, on Lyons's return to England before taking up a new appointment at Berne, the Foreign Secretary expressly testified to his own and Lord Aberdeen's approbation of the services rendered by him during the whole of the fourteen years of his residence in Greece[4]. He had throughout the cordial support of Sir Richard Church, who after his services in the War of Independence had retained the office of General-in-chief of the Greek forces, to which he had been appointed in 1827.

In the summer of 1836—a year after King Otho had come of age, and before any material improvement had taken place in the disturbed and brigand-ridden condition of Greece, while political intrigue clouded the atmosphere of Athens under Armansperg's continued sway—King Otho started on a tour through his kingdom, proceeding thence on a visit to Germany. On his return, he brought back with him a consort, Princess Amalia of Oldenburg, "exceedingly proud

[1] Palmerston was at the same time quite willing to allow a reasonable time for the carrying out of his recommendations as to a Constitution. He had, he adds, argued much with Count Sebastiani in London "about the third instalment. I find from him that France wants as a condition to that the grant of a representative Constitution. I pointed out that this would be to set up a new condition... that I was convinced Count Armansperg meant to give a Constitution; but that some preparatory measures were requisite." *Life of Vice-Admiral Lord Lyons*, p. 80.

[2] Finlay, *u.s.* VII. 143. [3] E. Ashley, *Life of Palmerston*, II. 130.

[4] *Life of Vice-Admiral Lord Lyons*, p. 116.

of her connexion with the reigning family of Russia," and a new Minister suggested to him by King Lewis of Bavaria, Ignaz von Rudhart[1], a youthful Professor of Law at Würzburg, who, though progressive in his political and economical views, and formerly desirous of advancing the development of national life in Greece, was adverse to the premature grant of a Constitution, and thus soon fell out with the Reform party at Athens and with the British Minister. Lyons, who had regretted Armansperg's withdrawal from a post to which he at last felt unequal, denounced delay and urged the commitment of the control of affairs to A. Mavrocordatos and S. Tricoupis, the Constitutionalist leaders. In the end, the dissensions in which Lyons's activity against the Bavarian interest had played an important part, resulted in the resignation of Rudhart (end of 1839), and for some time two native politicians of less importance undertook the direction of Foreign Affairs and of Finance, no Prime-Minister being appointed.

In "foreign" affairs—though the designation may be deemed a misnomer—the question of the incorporation of Candia (Crete) had since the establishment of the Greek kingdom never been allowed to slumber; and in February, 1840, Lyons mentioned to Palmerston King Otho's particular wish to purchase that island with the remainder of the British loan. Palmerston replied (March) that, in the first place, neither he nor any other British Foreign Minister could ask Parliament to take upon itself the payment of the interest on the sum in question, and, secondly and most decisively, that neither would the Porte agree to the sacrifice of so important a military position, nor would Her Majesty's Government advise it. In 1830, when the limits of the Greek kingdom were about to be fixed, he had been strongly in favour of the transfer of Candia to Greece; but at that time Greece was expected to be under the rule of Leopold of Coburg, and to become possessed of a representative Constitution. At present, the kingdom was generally regarded as under the sway of the Russian faction and the Bavarian camarilla, and the Greek subjects of the Porte were practically in better case than those of the King of Greece. Finally, the British Government knew what to expect from the Sultan, while the uses to which Greece might put her changed position were uncertain, though in many cases not difficult to guess[2].

[1] See the interesting notice of Rudhart by K. Heigel in *Allg. deutsche Biographie*, XXIX.

[2] *Life of Vice-Admiral Lord Lyons*, pp. 86–89.

At the beginning of 1841, Alexander Mavrocordatos became for a second time Chief Minister; but the hopes of the Constitutional party were thwarted by King Otho's aversion from their ends; and British influence, owing partly to the numerous disputes in which Lyons's zeal exerted itself in the interests of British commerce—then more than ever preponderating in the Levant—was on the wane at Athens. Moreover, Lord Aberdeen, when he superseded Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office (1841), expressed a wish from him, that our Legation would show more moderation in its demands on the Greek Government, and if possible place itself on a better footing with the Representatives of other foreign Governments at Athens. Among these, the Austrian and Prussian had (no doubt in the Bavarian interest) with the undisguised concurrence of the Russian and the French and of course the Ottoman, demanded the recall of Lyons. Before long, while the active French diplomatist Piscatory was sent on a Special Mission of enquiry to Athens, where he afterwards became Minister and later a constant opponent of his British colleague, Lord Aberdeen directed Sir Stratford Canning, who had (at the end of 1841) been appointed Ambassador to the Porte, to visit Athens on his way and give King Otho's Government the benefit of his counsel (January, 1842). It was freely imparted and courteously received, but no change ensued and a Conference of Ambassadors held in London in 1842 on Greek affairs, chiefly financial, led to no practical results. The evils which beset the country remained unabated—brigandage was rife, justice largely a mockery, financial reform represented by expenditure on the Bavarian army, and the remedy of Constitutional self-government left in entire suspense. It was consistently urged by British, while too speedy a recourse to it was deprecated by French, advice; Russia supporting the demand for change in the interests of the Orthodox party in the Church, as opposed to the establishment of a Hellenic Patriarchate. King Otho was wholly unable to initiate strong measures himself in any direction, or to entrust responsible Ministers with promoting them; he had no confidence in the very Bavarians who still surrounded him, and among the foreign Ministers at his Court whom he had at one time favoured he had now conceived a bitter animosity against Lyons, on account of a libel upon the King imputed to members of his household and unwarrantably supposed to have become known through the British Minister.

Outbreaks had occurred and been suppressed in the earlier years

of this period in various parts of the country; that which took place on September 14th and 15th, 1843, was, by the directness of its purpose and the completeness of its results, entitled to be designated the Greek Revolution; for on the 15th, or on its morrow, Greece became a Constitutional monarchy. The Ministers of Great Britain, Russia and France, who had repaired to the royal palace took their departure thence on being assured that the King was in no present danger; and the Austrian and Prussian were with difficulty persuaded to follow suit. The King then signed the requisite documents, and the cry of *Ζήτω τὸ Σύνταγμα* which greeted his surrender announced the triumph of the rising.

The national character of the Greek Revolution of 1843 was marked by the unanimity with which all Bavarians were expelled from the Army and (with a few exceptions) from other Services of the State[1]. Andreas Metaxas, an old adherent of Capodistrias and thus, as a "Nappist," disposed to follow Russian counsels, was appointed Head of the Ministry, and held the office till early in 1844. In the National Assembly, which between November and March, 1843–4, accomplished its task of drafting the Constitution thereupon accepted by the King, an understanding was for the time maintained among its leading members, of whom Alexander Mavrocordatos was in the confidence of Lyons, and Kolettes favoured by Guizot. Russian influence was mainly exercised on behalf of the maintenance of the connexion between national and orthodox aims; British, in consistent adherence to its standing Constitutional demand; and French, in order to secure the ascendancy of the particular politician on whom the French Government had concentrated its support. The result was a Constitution based (as was to be expected in this period of European Liberalism) on modern conceptions of liberty and equality rather than on the claims of inherited or traditional interests, but forming a declaration of national self-government as well as of personal freedom which, naturally enough, seemed to open a new chapter in the history of the country and to promise well for its future as the centre of Hellenic life, though expressly excluding the *Heterochthones*, *i.e.* (with certain exceptions) Greeks not born in the kingdom from public official service. In ecclesiastical matters, a compromise was arrived at which held out to the Hellenic Church the prospect of freedom from the control of the Constantinople Patriarchate. For the rest, the

[1] This measure, as Hertzberg points out (p. 673) was the deathblow of German Philhellenism.

suffrage for the Chamber of Deputies was settled on a democratic footing; but the Second Chamber, or Senate of not less than twenty-seven members, was to be nominated by the King.

The first period of the history of Greece as a Constitutional monarchy was, however, one of disillusionment both for the country itself, and for the Powers which had so consistently urged the panacea now actually adopted. The social evils needing cure were not such as to be healed at once; brigandage continued in the shape of the shameless use of robbers (*klephtury*) for political party purposes, and formed part of the general system of corruption that had become inseparable from party contentions. And, no sooner had the National Assembly of 1843–4 come to a close, than these struggles entered into a more than ever embittered and violent phase, and led to varying relations with the Protecting Powers and their several aims which could not but deeply affect the foreign policy of Greece herself.

Thus, by the early part of 1844, the parties led respectively by Metaxas, Mavrocordatos and Kolettes had fallen back into their former state of contention, and with it into their accustomed practices and intrigues. Such a rivalry could not be permanently carried on in a divided Cabinet; and, on March 29th, 1844, Mavrocordatos was called by the King to the headship of the first Greek Constitutional Ministry. With him Spiridion Tricoupis (who had in 1825 presented in London the Address appealing to the protection of Great Britain for Greece) took office. The Ministers thought it absolutely necessary to secure a majority in the elections which ensued—if need were, without regard to Constitutional legality; and, with this result achieved, it might seem as if British influence would be established on a secure footing, especially as Lyons, the policy of his Government having been successfully asserted, now sought to abstain from excessive interference in the conduct of affairs. Great Britain and Russia were at this time in accordance as to their Turkish policy, and little interested in the progress of Greece; while the object of the policy of Russia (and of the Tsar Nicholas in particular) was to prevent cooperation between Great Britain and France. But Kolettes, seconded by the support of France and encouraged by the King's dislike of Mavrocordatos, as well as benefitting from the dissension among that Minister's adherents on the subject of Church Government[1], prevailed, and, in August, 1844, he was called upon to form a Ministry. This he could only do by entering into a Coalition, Metaxas being appointed

[1] Finlay, *u.s.* VII. 198.

Minister of Finance. The downfall of British influence seemed to be signalised by the removal of General Church from his military offices—a step which called forth a strong protest even from the unimpassioned pen of Lord Aberdeen. But Metaxas resigned in August, 1845; and, in that year, the Russian Government supported the pressure exercised by the British upon the Greeks for the payment of the annual interest due on the loan of 1832. In general, however, the friendly influence of the British Government in Greek affairs diminished again, though Lyons was abundantly encouraged by Sir Stratford de Redcliffe from Constantinople, and hopeful, as he wrote to Palmerston in July, 1845, when, congratulating him on his return to the Foreign Office, that "King Otho would lose his throne before the Greeks lost their Constitution."

The relations between the British and Greek Governments continued in the main far from cordial during the administration of Kolettes and after his death in September, 1847. The long period of peace and better ways at home enjoyed by Turkey during the ascendancy of Sir Stratford Canning in the councils of the Porte was unfavourable to Hellenic aspirations, which had begun to trouble it on the side of Thessaly, and when, after an interval of a year and a half, Canning in the spring of 1848 returned to the Constantinople Embassy and was specially commissioned by Palmerston to visit other Continental capitals on the way (not to the unmixed satisfaction of the British Embassies or Legations where he put in an appearance), his sojourn at Athens had no particular effect in reviving more satisfactory relations with Court and Government, especially as it led to an unfortunate rupture between Canning and Lyons[1]. Before the death of Kolettes his party had been joined by several politicians[2] hitherto in touch with British influence, and the Ministerial changes which ensued after his death implied neither a revival of it nor an effort at a more Constitutional order of things, but merely the elevation of popular figureheads[3]. When Lyons took his departure from Athens in 1849, he still enjoyed the confidence of his chief; but British interference in Greek affairs, and the tone in which it was

[1] According to the *Life of Vice-Admiral Lord Lyons*, p. 113, when the Ambassador and the Admiral met again at Constantinople in 1853, they at once entered into cordial cooperation.

[2] Among these was S. Tricoupis, who was rewarded by the post he no doubt most desired, the Legation at London, where he was already favourably known, and where he and his family were to become familiar figures.

[3] One of them was the veteran Admiral Kanares, whose acquaintance I made at Athens in his green old age in 1877.

conducted, had only succeeded in attaching something like popularity to King Otho for resenting it. British influence had, however, been wrongly suspected of fostering efforts of brigandage taking the form of petty insurrectionary movements, and especially the garrison revolt at Patras (in December, 1847), the perpetrators of which had departed in a British schooner with a ransom extorted from the inhabitants. And, before long, certain open disputes arose between the Greek and the British Governments, in which the tension between them found definite expression, and which attained for themselves a political celebrity out of proportion to their intrinsic importance. If the beginning of these disputes reflects discredit on the Greek Government by the defective sense of both honour and justice which it displays, neither can the bearing of the British Government in their course be acquitted of an insistance on its legal position neither reasonable nor generous, or the French intervention defended as based on an either judicious or consistent appreciation of the conditions of the quarrel.

The diplomatic management of the British claims in question was in the hands of Mr (afterwards Sir Thomas) Wyse, an accomplished scholar and educationist, who had been associated with O'Connell in the struggle for Catholic Emancipation and, after being appointed Secretary of the Board of Control in 1846, was in 1849 sent as British Minister to Greece, where he remained till his death in 1862. The first of these private claims, that of the historian George Finlay, was of long standing, and referred to a piece of land which he had purchased from a Turkish proprietor in 1830, but which King Otho had enclosed in the royal garden at Athens, the Government declaring in 1837 that the British purchaser had no claim for compensation, the land not being wanted for any purpose of public utility. The second was put forward by Dom Pacifico, a Portuguese Jew born at Gibraltar, for the looting in 1847 of his house at Athens and the devastation of his property by a mob, while the police remained inactive. The remainder of the five private claims concerned grievances of subjects of the Ionian Islands then under the Protection of Great Britain, as to illtreatment and denial of justice by the Greek authorities. To these private claims was added a sixth of a public character, for the possession of the Islands of Cervi and Sapienza, which had been in Greek hands since the expulsion of the Turks from the Morea, but had already in 1839 been claimed by Lyons as properly appertaining to the Ionian Islands. The Greek Government (under

Kanares) having declined to meet Wyse's demand for a settlement of the claims in question, as it had previously refused similar demands by Lyons, Palmerston resolved to carry out the intention which, in August, 1847, he had informed Lord Bloomfield at Petrograd that he might find himself compelled to execute[1], and to use force. On December 3rd, 1849, he notified Wyse that Sir William Parker had been instructed to stop at Athens on his way back from the Dardanelles, and that "if the Greek Government does not strike, Parker must do so," taking on board the British Legation, and then beginning by reprisals—preferably by the seizure of the King's little fleet—and proceeding to "the blockade of any or all of his ports" and such other steps as might be requisite. "Of course, Pacifico's claim must be fully satisfied"; and it should be intimated that "although we do not this time come to levy the amount due to us on the Greek loan, yet we abstain from doing so in order to give them an opportunity of doing the right thing on their own merit[2]." On January 17th, 1850, the complete satisfaction within twenty-four hours of all pending claims was accordingly demanded from the Greek Government, with the alternative stated. On the receipt of this ultimatum, the Ministry of Admiral Kriézes, with the approval of the Assembly, sent an evasive reply, and on January 19th Admiral Parker began the blockade of the Piraeus, seized the Greek man-of-war *Otho* as a "material guarantee," and proceeded to the detention of other Greek vessels (at Salamis), continuing this even after the blockade of the Piraeus had been for the time abandoned in reply to French representations. The Foreign Ministers at the Greek Court had, very naturally, agreed in advising King Otho to restrict himself to a passive resistance; but the French Minister, Thouvenel, proffered what he termed his good offices which were declined by Wyse on behalf of the British Government.

The further course of this deplorable conflict cannot be followed in detail here. The French Government, whose good offices had been in the first instance refused, pressed for explanations from the British —whether or not with the purpose of displaying the energy of the new (Presidential) regime; and though the resort to "material guarantees" was not contrary to the principles of international law, and precedents might have been found for its recent or contemporary

[1] See E. Ashley's *Life of Palmerston*, II. 133. He had then added that "we are too palpably in the right to render it possible for France to oppose us by force of arms; and we are stronger than she is in the Mediterranean."

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 135–6.

use, Palmerston was unlikely to press his defence of it too far. Moreover, the seizure of Greek public property was a proceeding open to question by the two Protecting Powers who, together with Great Britain, had a still unsatisfied claim upon the complete payment of the loan of 1832. Finally, in this year 1850, when, in view of the more important struggle for influence in progress in Eastern Europe, Great Britain had every reason for avoiding any dispute of secondary importance in that quarter, it was manifestly undesirable to prolong a controversy which might range the other two Protecting Powers decisively on the side opposed to British policy. Thus, Palmerston resolved on a moderate course, though not in the essence, but in the measure, of his demands; and on February 12th the British Government accepted the good offices of the French in the matter. Baron Gros was sent to Athens on a Special Mission—not, as it proved, to dispute the right of Great Britain to establish a blockade, but to review the terms of the settlement of the British claims already submitted to arbitration. His pronouncement, assessing the whole amount of the claims at 150,000 drachms[1], was rejected by Wyse, and the blockade, with Palmerston's approval, temporarily resumed. King Otho then gave way, and agreed to 180,000 drachms for the whole of the claims, accompanied by an apology, while the Greek Government waived any counter-claim for the detention of its ships. This was, however, resented by France, which had been arranging in London through Drouyn de Lhuys for a definitive convention under French guarantee; the French Ambassador was recalled, and in Paris the French Foreign Minister openly censured the double-faced action of the British Government. Since, on February 19th, 1850, Nesselrode had, through Brunnow, likewise sounded a note of protest[2], against the assumption by the British Government of the right to blockade Greek ports without the assent of the other Protecting Powers, the situation was becoming hazardous[3], and the director of British Foreign Policy could not feel assured of the requisite Parliamentary support at home. On June 18th, a vote of censure was carried by a

[1] Under £6000.

[2] It has been suggested that Russia was induced not to press her objections by Palmerston's acquiescence in the Russian policy as to the Danish Succession and the integrity of the Danish monarchy which brought about the London Protocol of 1852. See Hertzberg, IV. 691; and cf. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, in *Preuss. Jahrbücher, u.s.* p. 386, where Palmerston is stated to have never denied this imputation.

[3] According to Malmesbury, *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*, I. 361, feeling on the other side of the Channel was so strong that "the French talked of going to war with us."

majority of thirty-seven in the House of Lords, and Palmerston now announced to the French Government that the Government was prepared to abide by the arrangement signed in London on April 19th with Drouyn de Lhuys and thus to satisfy the self-consciousness of France as having brought about the settlement[1].

This, in fact, no longer presented any material difficulty, and the episode might be regarded as virtually closed. When, accordingly, on June 29th, Palmerston faced the House of Commons (where it had been arranged that Mr Roebuck should propose a vote of confidence in the foreign policy of the Government), though he was aware of a want of unanimity regarding his earlier action in his own Cabinet and of the disapproval of it by the Court[1], he not only could meet the House in a spirit of high confidence, but achieved, as all students of our Parliamentary history know, the greatest parliamentary triumph of his life. Though his *apologia* was long and elaborate, the gist of his appeal was addressed to the patriotic pride of his fellow-countrymen, and proved absolutely irresistible[2].

III

In the years 1848 and 1849, the feeling in the Ionian Islands against the British Protectorate and the desire for Union with the Greek kingdom had led to risings at Cephalonia and elsewhere, which were at first met by certain concessions, and which Sir Henry Ward, on his arrival at Corfu as successor to Lord Seaton, would it was hoped bring to an end by the amnesty proclaimed by him there August 1st, 1849. But at the end of the month, an agrarian outbreak of a more serious character followed in Cephalonia, and had to be

[1] As for the private claims, their settlement, as detailed by Finlay (*u.s.* VII. 314, note) showed no disposition on the part of the British Government (or, with regard to a section of Dom Pacifico's, on the part of an Anglo-French Commission to which they were referred) to bear hard on the Greek Treasury. The futile pretensions to Cervi and Sapienza were dropped.

[2] Lord John Russell's support in the whole affair was given to Palmerston under great difficulties, caused in the first instance by the objection taken by the Queen to the absence from Palmerston's omission in the critical despatch to Wyse and Parker of the grant to them of the discretionary powers which Russell and the Cabinet had approved, and increased by the Foreign Secretary's leaving the Prime-Minister to vindicate the action which had led to the recall of Drouyn de Lhuys. As a matter of fact, Lord John, as he had written when the quarrel began, did not think the complaint "worth the interference of the British Lion." (See S. Walpole, *Life of Lord John Russell*, II. 53.) But, though Palmerston had jeopardised his position with both Queen and Cabinet, his will had prevailed; while, at the last, he had been supported by his chief and his colleagues, and the enthusiasm of the House of Commons and of the country had identified them with his action as a manifestation of the guiding principles of British Foreign Policy.

severely repressed by the Lord High Commissioner on the spot[1]. Although Sir Henry Ward, an administrator of much ability, kept good order in the Islands during the remainder of his tenure of office, the "Constitution" of November, 1849, by a democratic extension of the franchise tended to augment the activity of the General Assembly, to put an end to the ascendancy of the old Venetian families and to intensify the desire of the inhabitants to administer themselves, and to be rid of an alien, however beneficent, Protectorate[2]. In December, 1850, Palmerston is found[3] answering a letter from the High Commissioner, "enclosing a copy of the resolution of the Ionian Assembly for Union with Greece," in an altogether unyielding mood, to the effect that it would serve the Ionians right to take them at their word; but that it would be a great act of folly to give up Corfu, a very important position for Mediterranean interests, and to allow it to fall into the hands of Russia or France. A year later (November, 1851)[4], he writes that he would not object to an arrangement by which Corfu should be annexed to the British Empire and the other islands added to Greece, but that, as it was not very likely Austria and Russia would agree to the former, or perhaps Russia to the latter suggestion, "all this was a speculation in the clouds."

The Anglo-Greek embroglio of 1849–50 could not have acted as a sedative to Greek aspirations in this direction; but greater issues would soon have to be decided which might affect the future of Greece with those of the near Eastern world at large, while bringing about a new phase in her relations to the Great Powers of Europe. To the Greeks of the kingdom, which owed its existence and the guarantee of its continuance to the three Protecting Powers, the Eastern Question, as to which those Powers were already at issue and must before long find themselves in open conflict, presented itself in the form of a national expansion—in other words, in that of the erection of a Greater Greece on the ruins of the Ottoman empire in Europe. In the struggle which was preparing itself for the overthrow or preservation of that empire, Greek goodwill could not incline to its British or its French defender; from the former they had been

[1] It was the severities then used with which Prince Schwarzenberg taunted Lord Aberdeen in the course of the controversy caused by Gladstone's letters on Neapolitan affairs.

[2] For a general description of the system of government obtaining in the Islands in the period preceding the close of the British Protectorate, see Ansted, *The Ionian Islands in the year* 1863, ch. xvi.

[3] E. Ashley, *Life of Palmerston*, II. 184–5.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 186.

effectively alienated, against the latter Orthodox prejudices were stirred in the Holy Sepulchre discussions, in contrast to sympathies with Russian claims. Greek statesmanship, if it deserved the name, merely followed the popular impulse. The Emperor Nicholas, as he had told Sir Hamilton Seymour, had no intention of bringing about the creation of a new Byzantine empire, or of contributing to the aggrandisement of the Hellenic kingdom; but of his actual aims King Otho and his advisers were ignorant, and to the cautions of Austria and Prussia they paid no attention. Thus, in the period immediately preceding the Crimean War, Greece was more or less openly preparing to take part, in her own obvious interest, in the approaching conflict; and from the time (July, 1853) onward when a Russian army crossed the Pruth, Western diplomacy at Athens could no longer prevent a Greek participation in the War. Naturally, the movement began in the southernmost provinces of the Ottoman empire, and early in 1854 Epirus and Thessaly seemed to be witnessing the opening of another War of Liberation. In February, the Greek Minister of War, S. Soutzos, who enjoyed the confidence of the Court and had been in command of the regular forces on the frontier, allowed them to join the armed bands that had crossed it, and though the King, his Government and the Greek Minister in London (Tricoupis), shrank from no prevarication on the subject, neither Wyse nor the British Government were deceived, and open war prevailed. Beyond doubt, the numbers of Greeks who took part in it were grossly exaggerated, especially by the *Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung*, eager to encourage Bavarian and Greek hopes; but, though the Turkish Government had only a very small protecting force with which to resist the invasion, its progress was too disorderly to prove effective, and came to an actual close even before the Allies interfered. The first interference—by Great Britain—was well warranted enough in form, but not of a nature to compel deference while the crisis was still prolonged—being in fact a threat to enforce the engagement of the Treaty of 1832 binding Greece to expend her annual receipts on the interest of the loan[1]; and it fell through as a matter of course. But the time for such remedies had passed. While the Porte had ordered all Greek subjects to quit its territory and a stampede followed, in which many Hellenes contrived to become Ionians, piracy was rife in the Aegean and attacked even British vessels. In May, French

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, LXXII, *Greece and Turkey* (1854). The date of the warning is April 22nd, 1854.

and British troops were landed at the Piraeus, and the Greek Government was formally compelled to break off the Russian Alliance and desist from further attempts to disturb the tranquillity of the southern provinces of Turkey. The occupation lasted till February, 1857, beyond the termination of the War and the sittings of the Paris Congress, where the Plenipotentiaries of the Western Powers had declared the continuation of hostilities necessary till Greece could furnish adequate guarantees for the maintenance of order by the final suppression of brigandage. (The Russian Plenipotentiary was good enough to offer to concert the requisite measures on behalf of the Protecting Powers with his Western colleagues.) A Finance Commission was at the same time appointed, which sat from February, 1857 to May, 1859, and which settled that Greece should annually pay the sum of 900,000 drachms towards the extinction of her debt. The sum was paid once; four years later the debt had risen to 115,000,000 drachms. The consideration by the Greek Government of financial reforms connected with her whole administrative system and with the needs of her predominantly agricultural population was not carried to any definite conclusion by this Commission, though its findings were fully reported to the British Government[1].

Such had been the course and close of the attempt of Greece, in which King—and Queen—and people had been virtually at one, to take advantage of the Russian War and join in the attack upon the Ottoman Power. Greece had not, in consequence, suffered any very great loss either in money or in men; but she had revealed her lack of leaders both in the field and in council, and her general political insignificance, to Europe at large, to the Protecting Powers between whom she had made an unfortunate choice, and to those Christian nationalities who might in a different event have accepted her lead in a general revolt against the Turkish dominion. Such a revolt had in itself become a remote contingency, and the foundation of a new Byzantine Empire, with which it was to have ended, a mere phantasm. Even the Ionian Islanders, who continued to clamour for Union with the kingdom of Greece, stimulated by the Italian aspirations which were before long to approach partial fulfilment, could not found any serious expectation of the satisfaction of their desires on the licence

[1] See *General Report of Commissioners appointed at Athens*, presented to House of Commons, 1860, in *Parliamentary Papers*, LXVIII. 529 sqq.; and cf. *Papers relating to arrangement concluded at Athens in June*, 1860, *respecting the Greek loan*, presented to House of Commons, 1864, in *ibid.*, LXVII, *Greece*, No. 2. Lord John Russell to Wyse, August 22nd, 1859.

they enjoyed of chronically expressing them. This licence, however, had continued to be extended, especially since the grant of a Constitution in 1849, which threw the executive into the hands of a governing class mainly Italian in origin and hostile to British influence while leaving to the representative Assembly at large, which was elected by all but universal suffrage, those Constitutional liberties (of speech and comment) on the value of which the British Government had so constantly insisted in Hellenic politics. The Ionian Islands—Corfu itself—had only a secondary interest for Great Britain as a naval position in comparison with Malta; and, in short, while on the part of the Islanders there was little but ill-will towards the British Protectorate, the British Government—including the Colonial Office—and public felt little or no desire for its continuance.

In February, 1858, Lord Palmerston, suddenly placed in a minority in the House of Commons on the Conspiracy Bill, resigned office and the Tories came into power. One of the majority in the division was Mr Gladstone[1]. At the suggestion of Lord Carnarvon, then Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, the Colonial Secretary, who was, no doubt, anxious to connect both Mr Gladstone with the Government and his own name with an enterprise not devoid of literary glamour, invited him to accept a mission as Lord High Commissioner Extraordinary to the Ionian Islands, for the purpose, not of putting an end to the British Protectorate, but of examining the relations between it and the Ionians.

In the existing disposition of the Ionians towards the British Protectorate, it would have been surprising indeed if their hopes should not have been raised to expecting some result beyond a proposal of reforms from this Extraordinary Mission; and the choice of the statesman charged with it, whose Philhellenism, though of a peculiar type, was not to be ignored. But, as it chanced, the success of the Mission was frustrated at the outset. On his way out, at Vienna, Mr Gladstone learnt that a despatch to the Colonial Office in London from Sir John Young, the Lord High Commissioner at Corfu, had been stolen. This despatch advised the incorporation, with the assent

[1] Lord Malmesbury, the Foreign Secretary, had previously judiciously rejected the suggestion (of Sir Robert Phillimore) that Mr Gladstone should be invited to undertake an Extraordinary Mission to *Naples*! See Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, I, ch. x, where "Mr Gladstone and the Ionian Islands," gives an account of the antecedents of the Mission, as well as a most interesting narrative of its course. The papers concerning the Mission will be found, at great length, in *Parliamentary Papers*, LXVII. *Ionian Islands*, presented to Parliament 1861.

of the Protecting Powers, of either the whole of the Heptanesos, or at least of the five southern Islands, in the Greek kingdom, Corfu and the small Paxos to be in the latter case converted into a British colony. Sir John, who seems to have been out of sympathy with the desire for simple Union of all the Islands to Greece, though his administration had been mild and conciliatory, had a few days later, in a private letter, withdrawn these recommendations; but the unaltered despatch, having been stolen and published in the *Daily News*, stood on record, and, of course, while it made his own position impossible, rendered Gladstone's Mission really unworkable. At Vienna, Gladstone saw Count Buol, whom he informed that his Mission had no concern with any proposal of annexing the Ionian Islands, either as a whole or in part, and who in return declared Austria's Eastern policy to be in the strictest sense conservative.

Though thus more than hampered at the outset, Gladstone began his visitation of the Islands (November), of which he can have possessed little or no previous knowledge, and having completed it on January 25th, was appointed Lord High Commissioner in the place of Sir John Young, whose recall he had recommended. He now began to consider the reforms which his enquiries had suggested to him; but the Assembly, which had been summoned to discuss them, opened its proceedings by a vote declaring Union with Greece to be the absolute will (*θέλησις*) of the Ionian people. Gladstone endeavoured to persuade himself that the expressive word used could not signify more than a disposition to change the Constitution to which the Assembly owed its existence, and that this disposition could only be notified to the British Government as the Protecting authority in the form of a petition to the Queen. By allowing this petition, which the Queen was neither able to grant nor to favour, there can be no doubt that Gladstone encouraged the Ionians to look forward to the ultimate fulfilment of their prayer. For the moment, however, he busied himself with Constitutional reforms in his capacity as Lord High Commissioner, till the arrival (February 14th, 1859) of Sir Henry Storks as his successor, it having been found necessary for him to return precipitately in order to resume his seat before it was formally declared vacant. Thus, this episode, which may well have seemed to the Ionians difficult to understand, came to an end with its various picturesque and characteristic incidents; and Gladstone's visit to Homeric regions remained with no tangible result, his reforms being buried in a voluminous series of reports which

were never to see the light of publicity. Its effect on the Islanders, whom the display of his personality and powers had charmed into momentary enthusiasm, had been to confirm their "disposition," though not to give effect to their "will"; and the opportunity had not yet presented itself for accomplishing their desire, which British policy had ceased to regard as adverse to its interests, while in avowed harmony with its principles[1].

Meanwhile, before the Ionian Islands at last saw their Union with the Greek kingdom become an accomplished fact, a change had taken place in the political life of the latter to which Palmerston had long looked forward. At first, after the disappointment of aspirations which the Russian conflict with Turkey had at first encouraged, a time of tranquillity followed, in which Greek commerce advanced and Ministerial servility found little reason for interference with Court rule. But in 1859, as has been hinted, public opinion in Greece began to be impressed by the course of events on the other side of the Adriatic, and to oppose itself to the sympathy with Austria manifested by the Court. When some unrest was the consequence, and the French Government, with the support of both the British and the Russian, intimated to the Greek that no act of hostility must be attempted against Turkey, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Rhangabé), admitted, awkwardly enough, that "under the pressure used" Greece felt it her duty to observe a strict neutrality. In 1860 and 1861 the course of events in Italy could not fail to strengthen the opposition to the policy of the Court. A dissolution of the newly-elected Chamber and a change of Ministry followed; and, early in 1861, another election, in which the Government so recklessly used its influence on behalf of the Ministerial candidates (mainly petty officials) that the new Chamber was called "the Chamber of Demarchs," besides illegally packing the Senate, proved that King Otho and his high-spirited consort still had no thought of yielding. In vain Sir Thomas Wyse warned them of the risk they were running. Certain Ministerial changes took place; but the spirit of public disaffection was intensified by a growing disorganisation in the Army, shown by the share taken by officers of it in a plot discovered against the dynasty. In addition, the interests of the Court itself were divided. King Otho was supposed to wish that he should be succeeded on the throne by another

[1] Lord John Russell's well-known declaration to the British Minister at Turin, in his despatch of October 27th, 1860 (cf. *ante*, p. 448) undoubtedly encouraged Greek aspirations for unity. *Ionian Islands, Parliamentary Papers*, LXVII. (1861). Sir H. Storks to the Duke of Newcastle, January 18th, 1861.

member of the Bavarian family; but the followers of Queen Amalia hoped, by supporting her, to bring about a change of dynasty by the Succession of an Orthodox Sovereign. The question of the Succession (as is so often the case when personal considerations play their part) had long taken a most prominent place in Greek political life, especially since in 1844 the Constitution had provided that the successors to the Crown must profess the Orthodox religion; and a Decree of the National Assembly of the same year had appointed the Queen Regent if King Otho's successor should be a minor. The Article of the Constitution in question and the Decree, though unwelcome to King Otho and the Bavarian Court, had been embodied in a Treaty between the Protecting Powers and Greece in 1852, to which Bavaria had, with a reservation, acceded. When acting as Regent during the King's absence in Germany in the latter part of 1861, Queen Amalia had lost her popularity; and, though an attempt at assassinating her (September) momentarily revived it, the spread of revolutionary agitation was shown by fanatical manifestations in some quarters of approval of the crime.

The veteran Admiral Kanares having failed to form an effective Ministry, the King seemed left master of the situation in dealing with his distracted people; but self-deception only could have persuaded him that the reins were actually in his hands. In April, 1862, the royal troops succeeded in suppressing a revolt of the garrison of Nauplia; but other risings followed, and the Court, divided in itself on the question of the Succession, had no card left to play for the recovery of even an ephemeral popularity, except the encouragement of declamations of enmity against the arch-enemy, the Ottoman Porte, and professions of sympathy with the Ionians in their chronic aspirations for Union. Now, anti-Turkish demonstrations were in opposition to the present policy of the British Government and cession of the Islands to its treaty obligations; and the result was that invectives against Great Britain had become part of the ordinary pabulum offered to its readers by the Athenian Press, with the approval of the King and his Court.

IV

It was in these circumstances that after the death of Sir Thomas Wyse in April, 1862, the Hon. (afterwards Sir) Henry George Elliot, who in 1859 had been appointed Envoy Extraordinary to the King of the Two Sicilies, "to congratulate him on his accession to the

throne," and whose duties had come to an end at Naples in 1860, was sent by his brother-in-law Earl Russell on a Special Mission to Athens[1]. His Instructions[2] were vague, but while they bore on all the main causes of the prevailing discontent they made it clear that the British Government had resolved to adhere firmly to their engagements whether to Greece or to Turkey. The words of warning which the Envoy publicly administered to the King and for which he was thanked as "excellent advice" by the King's Private Secretary, Wendlandt, proved perfectly useless. King Otho changed his Ministry, of which step Elliot before leaving Athens in June was authorised by Russell to declare his approval, though one of the most prominent members of the new Cabinet, the War Minister Spiro Melios, was an advocate of aggressive policy against Turkey. No change ensued in the relations between the Court and public feeling was effected by the new (Kolokotronis) Ministry, as the King would not dissolve the servile Chamber of Demarchs and preserved a stolid trust in the continuance of things, sustained by the Queen's high spirit and her scorn of British counsels. Thus, when on October 13th, 1862, the royal couple had started on a tour in their kingdom, and an insurrection broke out in Acarnania and Aetolia, nobody was surprised. A Provisional Government was started at Patras, and formally proclaimed under Bulgaris, Kanares and Rouphos on October 23rd, before the King and Queen could land at the Piraeus which they had reached on their sudden return. The reign of King Otho was declared at an end, the provision for the Regency of Queen Amalia abolished, and the speedy convocation of a Constituent National Assembly announced. On the following day, the King took his departure on a small British ship of war, without, in the Proclamation which he issued, announcing his abdication.

To the Protecting Powers this catastrophe was anything but unexpected, and least of all so to the British Government, which had

[1] To Elliot he had written on November 12th, 1860: "the triumph of Italy is death to your Mission" (*Life of Lord John Russell*, II. 438, note). Sir Henry Elliot's reminiscences, edited by his daughter under the title of *Some Revelations and other Diplomatic Experiences*, have appeared as this work was passing through the press. They tell with perfect frankness the story of a diplomatic career, which might be held to owe something to the accident of birth, but which at a critical point brought upon him unmerited discredit. (See below as to the "Bulgarian Atrocities of 1876.") Sir Henry Elliot's cheerful sincerity and candour seem never to have deserted him, and account for the personal goodwill with which he met at Naples and Athens as well as Vienna. To his courtesy at Constantinople I may venture to bear incidental testimony.

[2] See *Some Revelations and other Diplomatic Experiences*, pp. 114 sqq.

long warned the Greek Court of its imminence. On Elliot's departure P. Campbell Scarlett (who had had a varied diplomatic experience and was especially familiar with Petrograd) had been appointed British Minister at Athens, and to him Russell, on November 6th, felt able to communicate his opinion, both that the Greeks had had "good and sufficient cause" for overthrowing King Otho's rule and that, as an independent nation, they had a right to change their governing dynasty accordingly. Her Majesty's Government disclaimed any desire of influencing their decision, but felt bound to remind them that "according to the agreements and engagements of 1832 no person connected with the royal or imperial families of the three (Protecting) Powers could be placed on the throne of Greece[1]." Consequently, the candidature of either Prince Alfred of Great Britain or of the Duke of Leuchtenberg, which had alike been mentioned, became an impossibility.

This communication and reminder clinched the action of the British Government in the matter, which had throughout, both on its own part and on that of its Representative at Athens, been perfectly straightforward. It had lost no time in asking the Russian and French Governments to join in a declaration excluding members of their reigning families from the Greek throne, in accordance with their engagements of 1827 and 1830. For itself, it had cherished no designs in favour of a British candidature either open or secret; but the Provisional Government, in which the most effective influence was exercised by Rouphos—reputed one of the wealthiest men in Greece —had made no secret as to the quarter where it hoped to find the most effective support for the new phase which had opened for the political annals of the country; and the population at large, with more than its habitual impulsive responsiveness to a definite suggestion, had seized with the utmost rapidity on the notion of the candidature of the second son of the Queen of Great Britain[2]. Russian

[1] Russell to Scarlett, November 6th, 1862. *Correspondence respecting the Revolution in Greece*, October, 1863, in *Parliamentary Papers*, LXXIII. (The Duke of Leuchtenberg was the grandson of Eugene de Beauharnais, the first Duke, and son of the third, who married a daughter of the Emperor Nicholas and received the title of Imperial Highness for himself and his descendants. The third Duke had in 1844 been held up as a sort of bugbear to King Otho by the Orthodox. The fourth Duke, Nicholas Maximilianovitch, succeeded his father in 1852 and was created Prince Romanoffsky. He was a General in the Russian service.)

[2] It should perhaps be noted that the name of Prince Alfred had become known in Greece in 1859 on the occasion of a wild Ionian scheme for a separate kingdom of the Ionian Islands, Epirus and Albania. This seems to be the same as that imputed by Lenormant (cited by Finlay, *u.s.* VII. 377, note) to Lord John Russell, as an intrigue begun by Lord John Russell in that year with Corfu as its focus.

statesmanship, which for the moment had believed, or professed to believe in the existence of a British Government scheme in favour of Prince Alfred, displayed considerable caution till no doubt remained as to the veto of the National Assembly; and delayed a distinct adherence to the declaration proposed by Great Britain, or even a statement whether or not the Duke of Leuchtenberg was considered a member of the imperial family in the sense in question. On November 6th, Russell put forth the Declaration of his policy to Greece noted above; on the 20th, the French Government, with a not very ingenuous reservation, signified its willingness to join in the Declaration; and on the 28th the British Government definitively informed the Russian that its objections to the candidature of the Duke of Leuchtenberg could only be met by his being distinctly excluded, definitively instructing Scarlett, on the following day, that "it was Her Majesty's final determination not to consent to acceptance of the Greek Crown by Prince Alfred or any other of her sons[1]." The situation had by this time become clear to all concerned; and, on December 4th, Baron Brunnow had the satisfaction—for it must have been such—of informing the British Government that Russia maintained in all its force the engagement by which all members of the reigning families of France, Great Britain and Russia were excluded from the Greek throne; so that the election of Prince Romanoffsky, the nephew of the Emperor of Russia, to it, should it take place, would be null and void[2]. A joint declaration of the Three Powers to the same effect, but including a corresponding announcement as to Prince Alfred, was presented to the Greek Provisional Government on December 13th. In the National Assembly, which on the 3rd had proclaimed its responsibility for the election of the King, the voting had begun on the 6th, on the 15th it came to a close with the choice of Prince Alfred by an absolutely overwhelming majority[3]. On February 3rd, 1863, the National Assembly ratified the election, without paying any attention to the Declaration of the Protecting Powers.

While it would be quite erroneous to attribute the result of this series of transactions to the diplomatic skill or persistency of Russell

[1] Russell to Scarlett, November 29th, 1862. *Correspondence respecting the Revolution in Greece*, presented to Parliament, 1863, in *Parliamentary Papers*, LXXIII.

[2] Brunnow to Russell, December 4th, 1862. *Ibid.*

[3] According to Finlay, *u.s.* VII. 280, out of 241,202 votes 230,016 had been given to Prince Alfred and 2400 to the Duke of Leuchtenberg. The rest were more or less "scattering." According to Elliot, the Duc d'Aumale had three supporters, and the ex-King Otho one.

and his agents—for it was nothing more or less than a victory of popular feeling, mainly dictated no doubt by a popular sense of the country's interest—yet it had vindicated the British Government's loyalty to its undertakings, and the candour and the courage with which it and its agents had upheld the only existing basis of the independence of Greece. They had deserved well of Great Britain's reputation for good faith and steadfast championship of national independence; and, though what was to follow was not throughout in full accordance with the principles her policy had helped her to assert, she was enabled by this assertion to make a contribution of her own to the beginning of a more hopeful period in Hellenic political life.

With this object in view, Mr Henry Elliot was, before the year 1862 was out, sent to Athens on a second Extraordinary Mission. He informed the Provisional Government that, if Greece undertook to uphold Constitutional monarchy and refrained from all acts of aggression against her northern neighbour, and if they chose a king acceptable to the British Government as prepared to rule in accordance with their principles and policy, the Queen would hand over the Ionian Islands to the new kingdom of Greece, provided that the neutrality of the Islands was recognised by the Great Powers and the fortifications of Corfu demolished. Palmerston had concurred in this offer, both the conditions of which were in the end observed[1]. But there seems no reason why it should have been so swiftly made, unless it was intended as a recognition of the international goodwill shown by the election of Prince Alfred, which had actually become an impossibility. On the question of the desideranda in the person of the new King the British Government were not called upon to pronounce; and the recommendations with which it began did not imply any close study of the problem[2].

[1] E. Ashley, *Life of Palmerston*, II. 186.

[2] According to Sir H. Elliot's recently published *Recollections* (pp. 140 ff.), though his Instructions on his second Mission were perfectly explicit as to the choice of a King and the contingent surrender of the Ionian Islands, such was not the case with the intimation they contained that it was desirable to improve the relations between Greece and Turkey, and that, if he saw any probability of effecting this, he was to proceed to Constantinople for the purpose. In London he learnt that it was desired to induce the Sultan to cede Thessaly and Epirus to Greece, and Palmerston told him that "Turkey would no doubt do this, if we advised it." Elliot perceived that "the ground for such a proceeding had not been felt"; and, though the notion had not remained a secret either at Athens or at Constantinople, it was "quietly dropped." As it stands, the circumstances of this informal addition to the Envoy's Instructions are hardly to the credit of the Foreign Office.

The first choice made by the Greek political managers and approved by the British Government before the consent of the Prince on whom it had fallen had been secured, was singularly unfortunate. The titular King Ferdinand of Portugal, widower of Queen Maria II, by birth a Saxe-Coburg-Gotha Prince[1] and ancestor of the Coburg-Braganza series of Portuguese Kings, satisfied the requirements defined by Russell to Scarlett as being "a Prince of mature years and some experience in the world" (he was forty-six years of age and had acted as Regent for a short time on his Consort's death). But as a Roman Catholic he could not be welcome to the Orthodox in Greece or to Russia nor could the choice of him as member of a House so intimately connected with the British Court, and already once, and nearly twice, before called upon to furnish an occupant of the Greek throne[2], be regarded without jealousy by France. There were other objections besides the religious question, and the vague fear that Great Britain's desire was to make Greece a vassal State to herself; but, fortunately, though the offer to King Ferdinand had the fervent sympathy of Queen Victoria, he showed no hesitation in declining it.

After some more or less futile negotiations with other Princes, Elliot was able to hold out a prospect at Athens of his being able to announce that the candidature would be accepted by another Coburger

[1] He was the son of Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (brother of Duke Ernest) and Antoinette Kohary, an Austrian title conferred in 1815.

[2] On December 1st, writing to his nephew, Duke Ernest II, King Leopold opined that, while it was very natural that the Greeks should have wished to secure, with Prince Alfred, a good deal of British money and probably the Ionian Islands, it would have occasioned great complications for Great Britain. What might have been possible in 1830, if Wellington and Aberdeen had not spoilt the situation, would have been far more difficult now (Ernest II, *Aus meinem Leben*, III. 249). ("If the English had granted the Arta-Volo frontier, I should have been caught," *ibid.* p. 258.) As to the proposed candidature for the Greek throne in 1830 of Prince Leopold of Coburg (afterwards King of the Belgians), cf. *ante*, p. 104, note, and cf. below p. 612, note. It may, perhaps, be added here that Prince Leopold's reasons for his inconsistent action in 1830 cannot reasonably be connected with any prospects of his in the possible event of a regency in Great Britain; while the statement of Mendelssohn-Bartholdy (IV. 185) that the abandonment of the Greek candidature implied that of a scheme, formed by the leading Whigs, of a transfer of the Ionian Islands to the Greek Crown, seems to rest on an unconfirmed supposition. In a letter to his nephew (*Aus meinem Leben*, I. 56) King Leopold states that in 1831–2 he suggested the choice of his brother Duke Ernest I of Coburg, who made the same conditions which he (Leopold) had laid down in 1830, and that the negotiations were broken off by the pressure put upon the Powers by King Lewis of Bavaria on behalf of Prince Otho. The history of the offer to Duke Ernest II himself is given by the latter with frankness and lucidity in *Aus meinem Leben*, III. 246 sqq.

—but this time one not only of special personal pretensions, but who might possibly before long exchange dominions with his nephew and heir-presumptive, the much-desired Prince Alfred of Great Britain. Duke Ernest II of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was a Prince of high ambitions, great imaginative power, with Liberal tendencies and unmistakable political capacity; but it is useless to speculate what would have been the fate of Greece under his rule. He had at one time been believed to have aspired to be chosen "by acclamation" Head of the Germanic empire of the future; but of late (1862–3), in the period preceding the Frankfort *Fürstentag*, he had ranged himself for the time on the Austrian side in German politics and had perhaps helped to point British diplomacy for a time in the same direction in its attitude towards German affairs. In any case, however, he after some hesitation made up his mind to decline the offer. By the beginning of December, 1862, it had become manifest that the question of the selection of any candidate belonging to any of the families of the Great Protecting Powers was at an end; while Prince Alfred could not accept, though all but unanimously desired by the Greeks, and neither the Duke of Leuchtenberg nor any other candidate connected with Russia or France would find support even in Greece itself. Palmerston, therefore, in a Memorandum addressed to Queen Victoria on January 2nd, 1863, and promptly approved by her declared for Duke Ernest II, more especially as he held it to be indispensable that the candidate chosen should be a man of experience in government and therefore of relatively mature age and of Liberal Constitutional principles. The highly interesting correspondence between Duke Ernest and his uncle King Leopold who (if the expression may be used of a man of his temperament) kept a warm corner in his heart for Greece[1]), shows that the Duke was prepared to accept the offer in so far as to undertake the Regency of Greece, with the exercise of all Sovereign rights, until his successor should be of age and capable of independent rule, while in the meantime his own Sovereign rights in his German duchy should remain intact. This proposal found no favour in London, where Earl Russell was prepared to carry the Duke's Succession, if he accepted the candidature for the throne, but not to adopt the proposed compromise. Meanwhile, the Duke (as he declares) adhered to the demand of a previous

[1] At the close of a letter furnishing a remarkably complete exposition of the whole question of the Greek Succession Question (January 4th, 1863) King Leopold writes: "After all, Victoria is much flattered that you are called to a throne."

abdication by King Otho, whereas Russell (January 5th) would not agree to an implied denial of the right of the Greeks to depose a Sovereign to whom they objected. Thus, a Conference at Brussels, at which General Grey represented the British Government, separated *re infecta*, although, on December 27th, Russell had informed the Greek Provisional Government that the Duke would accept the offer of the Greek Crown if he might at the same time remain reigning Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. But, on February 2nd, he definitively declined; and, as the enthusiastic election of Prince Alfred, ratified on the following day was at once declared futile by the British Special Envoy, the Succession in this month once more became an open question.

There seems no necessity for cataloguing the names of other Princes favourably thought of by the British Government, or for adding that the claims of the Duc d'Aumale were for a time advanced by friends of France against the wishes of the Emperor. Nor is there any reason for amusing our fancy with other suggestions due to the enthusiasms, humours or calculations of the hour. One other name, however, should not be passed by which about this time occurred to the British king-makers; though to it the objection of religion most distinctly attached, and it is difficult to understand their having entertained such a suggestion. The name in question was no other than that of the younger brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph, Archduke Ferdinand *Maximilian* Joseph, already known by his enterprise and ability, but who had since his withdrawal from the Governor Generalship of Venetia in 1859 been living in retirement at Miramar. Before obtaining a reply from Vienna to his enquiry through Bloomfield, accompanied by a statement that all the influence of Her Majesty's Government would be in favour of the Archduke—convinced as it was that the Ionian Islands would be safe in his hands—Russell had obtained an assurance, through Cowley, that the French Emperor was quite favourable to the proposal. But Rechberg's answer was that the relations between the Austrian and Bavarian Courts placed an acceptance out of the question; and, when Bloomfield, in accordance with his Instructions, reluctantly secured an audience on the subject, the Emperor Francis Joseph could not be moved from this position: "*le côté du droit*," he said, "*est avec le roi Othon*." Inasmuch as the Archduke clearly viewed the question from the same point of view, it fell to the ground, though Russell, in his rapid way, thought it "a pity the Archduke did not accept the Greek Crown;

had he done so, there would have been greater security for Austria in the Adriatic[1]."

After the Duke of Coburg's and Archduke Maximilian's refusals—the chronological sequence of which is not quite clear and which would not appear to have been known at Athens—the British Government made only one further attempt to compass their object, though leaving out of sight its previous conditions of maturity and experience. Prince William of Denmark, who was now invited to accept the Greek Crown, was the second son of Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Glücksburg, who by the London Protocol had been declared heir to the Danish throne—to which he was to succeed, very soon, on November 13th, 1863—and the younger brother of Alexandra, since March 10th Princess of Wales. He was seventeen years of age and a Lutheran. But the Greeks still continued docile, and, so soon as they had learnt that the offer was accepted on behalf of the Prince at Copenhagen by his guardians (his father and the King of Denmark), were anxious to lose no time in settling the matter and making arrangements among the parties for the distribution of the governing power. On March 30th, Prince William was, under the name of George I, unanimously elected King by the National Assembly, it being at the same time decreed that his lawful heirs should profess the faith of the Eastern Orthodox Church. On June 27th, 1863, the new King was declared of age; but the vehemence of the strife of parties in the National Assembly and the utter disorganisation of the army which left the maintenance of public security in the hands of the National Guard prolonged the interval of civil conflict. The Ministers of the Protecting Powers, while, after an earlier frank protest, abstaining from interference in the struggle between the factions, and between the adherents of Assembly and army, at last, on July 2nd, brought about an Armistice for forty-eight hours, by threatening to retire on board their ships in the Piraeus if the fighting were renewed. On the following day, the National Assembly, under the protection of the National Guard, reconstituted the Ministry on wider lines, thus

[1] As to this episode, interesting from several points of view, see a valuable note by Mr H. Dawson, "The Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian and the Crown of Greece," in *The English Historical Review*, XXXVII. (January, 1922). From the private correspondence of Lord Bloomfield with Sir A. Buchanan, where the former says that the Court of Vienna did not smile upon the proposed candidature of the Duke of Coburg, though refraining, out of consideration for Queen Victoria, from raising any objection to it, we may safely conclude Bloomfield never to have thought that the Emperor Francis Joseph would assent to the candidature of his own Catholic brother, the Archduke. Bloomfield mentions other Princes whose names had been "started" for the doubtful prize.

making possible the withdrawal of the disorganised army (July 5th), and the gradual restoration of a state of public security in the capital and the country. King George arrived in Athens on October 30th, and after a period in which Ministers had succeeded one another in all but innumerable sequence, the National Assembly could now address itself to the task of preparing the new Constitution of the kingdom.

Before finally indicating the nature of the consummation thus reached by the Revolution to which Greece owed the beginning of the new chapter in the history of her independence—a chapter of which, even at the present day, there would be sufficient reasons for declining to attempt a conclusive summary—it is necessary to recall the steps by which the Protecting Powers, largely responsible as they were for the recent course of events, had sought to safeguard the new position of things. On May 27th, 1863, they agreed to a Protocol declaring that King Otho and his dynasty having lost their rights to the Greek throne by events over which they (the Powers) had no control, they were released from their undertakings to him and his, but that, nevertheless, they were resolved, in the general interest of order and peace, to watch over the maintenance of tranquillity in the Greek kingdom. The responsibility thus assumed by them they met with notable promptitude on June 5th, after being notified by Prince Christian of the acceptance of the Greek Crown by his son Prince William, on condition that the Ionian Islands should be united to Greece, by recognising him as King George I, the elected Sovereign of the Greek people; and the following engagements were entered into the Protocol announcing his election and recognition[1]. Great Britain undertook to recommend the Ionian State, before voting for the Union to appropriate £10,000 to the increase of the new King's Civil List. The three Protecting Powers severally agreed to bestow upon him an annual sum of £4000 a year for his private expenditure, to be deducted from the composition of one million drachms owing by Greece, in accordance with the Convention of 1860 for the interest due on the loan of 1832. The manifest object of these conditions was to secure to the nominee of the Powers some additional income; but they had no right to appropriate this without the consent of the representatives of the Greek people of which the Ionians were to form part, and whose fulfilment of its obligations the Powers had no claim to control. These financial arrangements were therefore

[1] *Protocol*, June 5th, 1863, *Papers relating to Greece*, No. 2 (1863). In *Parliamentary Papers*, LXVII and LXXIII (1863).

constitutionally objectionable, though they might commend themselves to the personal interests of the King. A further condition, binding the successors of the Crown to profess the creed of the Orthodox Eastern Church, was, of course, intended to conciliate national feeling; but it was, nevertheless, a usurpation of the right to assert what the representatives of the nation alone had power to determine. A Declaration followed to the effect that the Crowns of Greece and Denmark should never be united in the same head; and the Protocol ended by engaging the Protecting Powers to endeavour to obtain the adherence to it of all States with which they were in relations of amity. The Treaty of London of July 13th, 1863, between the three Protecting Powers and Denmark recognised the succession of George I and the union of the Ionian Islands with the Kingdom of Greece under the guarantee of the Protecting Powers[1].

V

It remains to recall briefly the process by which, within little more than five years since Gladstone's visit to the Ionian Islands, when he had so coyly resisted the *θέλησις* of the population to put an end to its political dependence on Great Britain, that "will" or "wish" had reached fulfilment. The petition to the Queen had been rejected; and Gladstone's proposals of Constitutional reforms had been ignored by all parties in the Assembly. It met again, early in 1861, to concentrate its action once more upon an attack on the British Protectorate. An Address to the Governments and peoples of Europe at large against its continuance was placed on the Order of the day; and, when the Lord High Commissioner had sent down a message requiring the obliteration of the proposal, a majority refused, and he could only have recourse to a prorogation of the Assembly for six months (March 11th)[2]. On May 7th following, Gladstone, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, declared that the abandonment of the Ionian Protectorate would be a crime against the safety of Europe. In other words, nothing would justify this step but a complete change in the general aspect of Greek affairs, of which there seemed no immediate likelihood.

[1] This Treaty is printed in Hertslet's *Map of Europe by Treaty*, II. 1545 ff., the Protocols preceding it. The Treaty renews the Guarantee of the Three Powers, in the Guarantee of May 7th, 1832, of Greece as an Independent Monarchy, and includes in this Guarantee the Ionian Islands when united with the kingdom.

[2] Sir Henry Storks to the Duke of Newcastle, March 11th and 12th, 1861. *Papers and Correspondence in Reference to or in Connection with the Prorogation of the Legislative Assembly of the Ionian Islands*, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, April 1861, in *Parliamentary Papers*, LXVII (1861).

But the opportunity was not long in coming, and the British Government was quick in seizing it, so as to testify to its sympathy with national feeling in a case which admitted of no dispute, and at the same time to take part in contributing to the settlement of the future of the Greek kingdom after a fashion which must add to the goodwill towards Great Britain that was about to find so nearly unanimous an expression there. Before the Greek Revolution broke out in October, 1862, the Ionian Assembly had (in May) communicated its unaltered view to the Great Powers and to the British Parliament; and, in December, 1862, the Provisional Government was informed that if the King elected by the Greeks to their vacant throne should be approved by her, the Queen of Great Britain would take measures for uniting the Islands to the kingdom. The offered cession was stoutly opposed by Lord Derby and Mr Disraeli in the debates on the Address which took place in February, 1863, at the opening of the session; but in neither House was any division taken. The unanimous election of King George by the National Assembly on March 30th fulfilled the conditions required by Great Britain, and a Protocol recognising his accession having been signed by the Protecting Powers on June 5th, Russell in a long despatch to Bloomfield and our diplomatic Representatives at the Courts of the other Great Powers, dated June 10th, supplied a historical summary of the relations of the Ionian Islands and Great Britain; and a unanimous vote of the Ionian Assembly, specially summoned for the purpose, having on October 7th signified its assent, a Protocol was signed by the Five Great Powers on November 14th for transferring the Ionian Islands to Greece and regulating the conditions of the transfer. Inasmuch as Austria and Prussia had not yet recognised King George, the Protecting Powers undertook to conclude the Treaty with Greece for carrying the above Protocol into effect and to communicate it to the two German Powers. The final Treaty was signed in London on March 29th, 1864, after negotiations which owed their final success largely to the conciliatory efforts of Baron Brunnow. This Treaty[1] declared that Greece, including the Ionian Islands, should form a monarchical, independent and Constitutional State under the rule of King George and under the guarantee of the three Governments of Great Britain, France and Russia. It further declared that the Islands of Corfu and Paxos should, after their union with the Hellenic Kingdom, enjoy the advantage of perpetual neutrality, which the King of Greece, on his part, engaged

[1] Printed in Hertslet, *u.s.*, III. 1589 sqq.

to maintain. The Greek protests against the demolition of the fortifications of Corfu had only partially succeeded, and the engagement of neutrality had been restricted to the two Islands instead of covering the entire group[1]. The provisions for the King's Civil List and personal delation remained as settled by the Protecting Powers; for the rest, the Ionian Islands retained their existing system of private law, taxes and duties. The whole negotiation, which Russia did not allow to close without a confirmation on behalf of King George of his successor's obligation to profess the creed of the Orthodox Eastern Church, was thus brought to a close; though it was not till April 8th, 1865, that the Sultan acceded to the Treaty by an Act signed at Constantinople[2].

On May 28th, 1864, Sir Henry Storks, the last of the Lord High Commissioners, delivered up the Ionian Islands to the Greek Commissioner; in the following month, King George received the homage of his new subjects, and in July eighty-four Ionian deputies took their seats in the National Assembly at Athens. If it may be said that in the long and not very self-consistent story of the relations between the British Government and the Ionian Islands while under its Protectorate, nothing became it better than the closing page, the remark may be added that the accession of strength derived by the Hellenic kingdom from the cession was not inconsiderable, and that the facility with which, when made, it was carried out proves it to have been a judicious measure, as well as one reflecting honour on the Liberal spirit of British policy which was its principal motive[3].

The Constituent National Assembly met at Athens on December 22nd, 1862; but when King George arrived in his capital at the end of October, 1863, he found that, owing to the party conflicts and tumults to which reference has been made, little or nothing had been accomplished towards the accomplishment of its main task. For the better part of a year progress had been slow, and the Assembly had

[1] The long correspondence on the questions of neutrality and demolition of fortifications between the Greek Foreign Minister, P. Delyannis and Charilaos Tricoupis, who was sent to London as Plenipotentiary on the Cession Conferences with the Protecting Powers, will be found in S. Xenos, *East and West*, II. 1–160. C. Tricoupis was Secretary of Legation under his father.

[2] For the Sultan's accession to the Treaty, and the terms of the Treaty itself, see *Correspondence relative to the Affairs of Greece*, presented to Parliament 1865, in *Parliamentary Papers*, LVII.

[3] The University of Athens, I venture to think, must have been a gainer by the incorporation of that of Corfu, which had already displayed much activity. The eminent Philhellene, Lord Guildford, it will be remembered, had taken great interest in its foundation, and been its first Chancellor (1824).

already begun to lose public confidence. On September 1st, 1864, Count Sponneck, a Danish ex-Minister who had accompanied King George to Greece in order to assist him with his counsel, but who though an experienced statesman[1] on this occasion showed little tact, approached the new British Minister-Plenipotentiary Mr E. M. Erskine, with a singularly ill-put request. Would he appeal to Russell to employ the legitimate influence of the British Government in Greece for inducing the National Assembly, and especially the so-called English Party, to proceed at once to discuss and settle the Constitution? In reply, the British Foreign Minister, while scorning the imputation of relations between Her Majesty's Government and any political party in Greece, stated that he had no objection to an expression of opinion by Mr Erskine to any deputy in favour of an early settlement of the Constitution[2]. This despatch, with a copy of which the King and Count Sponneck had been furnished by Mr Erskine, found its way into a French paper (*La Grèce*) published at Athens, in a highly embroidered—or what Russell termed a "grossly perverted,"—form[3], and necessitated the publication of the original, Sponneck apologising for his inadvertence and the agitation which it had caused in the Austrian papers and *The Times*. But, in the meantime, the King had acted on Sponneck's advice. On October 18th he had invited the National Assembly to vote the remainder of the Articles of the Constitution during the next ten days, promising to ratify all the Articles already adopted by the Assembly. Well aware that public opinion was in favour of such a course, the Assembly, however reluctantly, approved the proposal, and signified its acceptance to the King on October 31st. On the 14th, his Danish adviser persuaded him to take a further step, by announcing to the Assembly that he accepted the Constitution as now completed, but without the power of revision as proposed in it, and inviting the Assembly to vote the Budget of 1865 without further ado. This latter proposal was as unreasonable as it was unconstitutional (for there would have been ample time for summoning an ordinary Assembly for voting supplies), and, being negatived together with the modification as to revision, had to be abandoned. On November 28th, King

[1] He had been a colleague of Bluhme.

[2] See his despatch, dated September 1st, 1864, with the subsequent letters, in *Correspondence relative to the Affairs of Greece*, presented to Parliament 1865, in *Parliamentary Papers*, LVII.

[3] He had been represented as deprecating any anarchical demonstration, and promising to proceed, if necessary in concert with France and Russia, to effective measures for establishing order and the new dynasty in Greece.

George ratified the Constitution essentially as drafted and with the original clause as to revision included, and dissolved the National Assembly. On December 2nd, Count Sponneck had to quit the country.

There is no need to carry this outline further; for the test of the efficiency of the Constitution which the Greek National Assembly had called into life lay, it cannot be gainsaid, in response to Great Britain's constant insistence on this as the sovereign remedy for the country's ills—in a future which was not that of the morrow.

The Constitution of 1864, though not in essentials very different from that which it superseded, represented a sincere attempt to increase the power of municipal and local authority at the expense of that which by corruption and other means the central administrative authority had under Otho sought to secure; but the end was secured rather as the result of actual subsequent practise than by the declaration of the equality of all Greeks under the law, which the Constitution once more placed in its forefront. In other respects, it settled the relation between the powers of the people and of the Sovereign on a basis only partly democratic; for, while it declared the judiciary irremovable by the will of the King, and his power of pardoning political offences conditional on the assent of the Assembly, it failed to establish the principle of Ministerial responsibility to the Assembly representing the people, and laid it down that no public official could be prosecuted without the permission of the King's Government. For the rest, the representative Assembly, as a genuinely popular body, was to consist of not less than 150 members elected by universal suffrage and allowed a salary of 2000 drachms[1] for each session, from which paid officials—even the democrats on whose servility King Otho had so successfully depended—were excluded, together with officers of the Army and Navy, though these were granted important privileges in the naming of candidates[2]. The Senate of 1844, which had become a servile body of higher officials, had come to an end in the Revolution of 1862; but the Committee of the Constituent Assembly, itself largely consisting of superior officials, attempted, with Sponneck's support, to reestablish it, but without success; and the Council of State once more substituted for it had little beyond drafting functions. The royal income was settled on the lines demanded by the Protecting Powers; and the freedom of the Press was safeguarded except in the case of attacks upon religion or upon the person of the King.

The problems of which Greece, with her new Constitution, thus awaited the solution under the watchful eyes of the Great Powers

[1] A little over £80.

[2] Attention may be directed to the anomaly of the representation of Greek citizens living abroad, accorded on a liberal scale, but in Finlay's opinion unsatisfactory in its results, as forming the election of Government officials. Thus, the elder Tricoupis was elected at Manchester after failing at Mesolonghi.

were good order, free government and the cessation of the rule of faction which had proved inseparable from that of corruption at home and abstinence from aggression beyond her frontiers. Was the desire for recurrence to the latter—a recurrence in other words to the active championship of the Hellenic nationality, where still under Turkish sway—to continue dominant, or was the Peace of Europe for the present in no danger from this point of view? Though the relations of the dynasty both with the British and the Russian Court continued of the friendliest (in October, 1867, King George married the Grand Duchess Olga, the niece of Tsar Alexander II) there was always an element of uncertainty in the irrepressible tendencies of national feeling. Nor was it to be long before one of the Great Powers themselves took the initiative in affording the Greeks an opportunity of reviving the "grand idea" of Hellenic expansion. In 1866, an insurrection broke out in Candia, and, early in 1867, the French Government, fired by one of those impulses to which the Napoleon régime was subject, quite unexpectedly proposed the cession of the island to Greece. Lord Stanley, then at the Foreign Office in his Father's Government, would not listen to the proposal; and, in 1869, with the aid of a Conference, the difficulty was settled by a compromise leaving the hopes of the Greek Government, which had openly aided the Cretan insurgents unfulfilled. But these events and transactions lie beyond the range of the present chapter. As Lord Stanley (who was believed to have himself refused the throne of Greece) wrote to the second Lord Lyons, then our Ambassador at Constantinople[1], the old Philhellenism was dead. The transfer of the Ionian Islands remained an isolated instance of Great Britain's willingness to meet the aspirations of the kingdom for whose weakness she was largely responsible, and the destinies of the future of Hellas in the Near East were still left uncertain.

[1] See Lord Newton's *Lord Lyons*, I. 163.

Appendixes to Vol. II

APPENDIX A

See Chapter I, p. 38, note 2

LORD CASTLEREAGH'S CONFIDENTIAL STATE PAPER OF MAY 5TH, 1820

THIS State Paper was partially printed in 1823, but only in a very truncated form. It has been thought well, therefore, to give it here *in toto*. *All suppressed passages are enclosed within square brackets.*

The Paper was drawn up by Castlereagh, in order to define his policy with regard to Spain, on May 5th, 1820, and then circulated to the Principal Governments in Europe. It was recognised at once by Gentz (*Dépêches Inédites*, II. 56–7) as of considerable importance. But what entitles it to even greater consideration is that Canning always declared it to have been the origin of his own policy (see above, p. 53) and published some extracts from it as a Parliamentary Paper in the spring of 1823[1]. He referred to it at length in Parliament on April 14th, 1823. "It was not with the intention of separating himself in any degree from those who preceded him...nor with the desire of claiming to himself any merit that belonged to them, that he now felt himself called upon to repeat what he had stated on a former day and what had been much misunderstood—narrowed by some, and extended by others—that, applicable to the considerations on which the Congress was to be employed, he had found in the records of his office (and it was also in the records of the country, and known to all the world) a state paper, laying down the principle of non-interference, with all the qualifications properly belonging to it. When, therefore, with whatever degree of courtesy, it had been ascribed to him, that he had applied new principles to a

[1] The question has been raised as to whether Canning influenced Castlereagh in drawing up this State Paper. Its sentiments bear a striking resemblance to those uttered by Canning in the Cabinet in October, 1818 (see above, p. 54 note, and Castlereagh's *Despatches*, XII. 56–7). Canning certainly claimed at the time to have had some influence upon it (*vide* Poole's *Life of Stratford de Redcliffe*, I. 291). But this evidence is not sufficient to take the main responsibility from Castlereagh. Probably, Stapleton is right when he says (*Political Life of Canning* (1831), I. 141): "Whether or not Mr Canning had any hand in the drawing up of this particular paper cannot be positively affirmed; but Lord Londonderry himself would perhaps scarcely have denied that there had been occasions on which he received assistance from Mr Canning."

new case, he had thought it but just to remind the House of a fact of which it was indeed already in possession. The principle of non-interference with the independence of foreign States, was laid down in the document to which he alluded, as broadly, clearly, and definitely as it was possible for any statesman to wish to lay it down" (*Speeches*, v. 5–6). Canning in these words definitely claimed this State Paper as the basis of his own foreign policy. It will be found of value to compare this State Paper in its entirety with the more guarded Circular of January 19th, 1821, which was made public *in toto* at the time (see above, p. 37 note)[1].

The text that follows is from *Parliamentary Papers*, vol. x. pp. 71–4; while the suppressed passages are supplied from F.O. Austria, 7/148 through the kindness of Professor Webster.

The Events which have occurred in Spain have, as might be expected, excited, in proportion as they have developed themselves, the utmost anxiety throughout Europe. [The Russian Despatch of March the 3rd, written when the first News of the Military Insurrection in Andalusia had reached St Petersburgh, invites the Allied Powers confidentially to discuss what measures they should adopt, or what attitude they should assume:

1st. In case the King's Government should be unable to suppress the Revolt.

2nd. In case the King should spontaneously solicit the support of his Allies.

3rd. In case the Insurrection should be protracted. The Despatch from Mr Rose of the 31st March, referring to a later period of the Insurrection, reports that the Russian Minister at Berlin, M. Alopeus, had suggested to the Prussian Government the necessity of referring the whole Question of Spain to the consideration of the Allied Ministers at Paris, including the Minister of France.

Prince Hardenberg in a Letter to Lord Castlereagh of the 31st ult. refers to M. Alopeus's suggestion and appears to approve of the discussion being referred to Paris. It is also understood that the Language held at Paris by some of the Allied Ministers is that the Moment is arrived when the sovereigns themselves should assemble, under the extraordinary Provisions of the Treaty of Alliance.]

The British Cabinet upon this, as upon all other occasions, is ever ready to deliberate with those of the Allies, and will unreservedly explain itself upon this great Question of common interest; but as to the form in which it may be prudent to conduct these Deliberations, they conceive, they cannot too early recommend that course of deliberation which will excite the least attention or alarm, or which can least provoke jealousy in the minds of the Spanish Nation or Government. In this view, it appears

[1] A good deal of commentary on the State Paper of May 5th, 1820, is to be found in F.O. Austria, 7/148; and for the January Circular and its result see F.O. Austria, 7/158.

to them advisable, studiously to avoid any reunion of the Sovereigns;—to abstain, at least in the present stage of the Question, from charging any ostensible Conference with commission to deliberate on the affairs of Spain. They conceive it preferable that their intercourse should be limited to those confidential Communications between the Cabinets, which are, in themselves, best adapted to approximate ideas, and to lead, as far as may be, to the adoption of Common Principles, rather than to hazard a discussion in a Ministerial Conference, which, from the necessarily limited powers of the Individuals composing it, must ever be better fitted to execute a purpose already decided upon, than to frame a course of policy under delicate and difficult circumstances.

There seems the less motive for precipitating any step of this nature in the Case immediately under consideration, as, from all the information which reaches us, there exists in Spain no Order of Things upon which to deliberate; nor as yet any Governing Authority with which Foreign Powers can communicate.

The King's Authority, for the moment at least, seems to be dissolved. His Majesty is represented, in the last Despatches from Madrid, as having wholly abandoned Himself to the tide of events, and as conceding whatever is called for by the Provisional Junta and the Clubs.

The authority of the Provisional Government does not appear to extend beyond the two Castilles and a part of Andalusia:—Distinct Local Authorities prevail in the various Provinces, and the King's Personal Safety is regarded as extremely liable to be hazarded, by any step which might lay Him open to the suspicion of entertaining a design to bring about a Counter-Revolution, whether by internal or external means.

This important subject having been referred to, and considered by, the Duke of Wellington, his Memorandum accompanies this Minute. His Grace does not hesitate, upon his intimate experience of Spanish affairs, to pronounce, that the Spanish Nation is, of all the European People[1], that, which will least brook any interference from Abroad: he states the many instances in which, during the last War, this distinguishing trait of national character rendered them obstinately blind to the most pressing considerations of public safety: he states the imminent danger in which the suspicion of Foreign interference, and more especially of interference on the part of France, is likely to involve the King;—and he further describes the difficulties which would oppose themselves to any military operations in Spain, undertaken for the purpose of reducing, by force, the Nation to submit themselves to an order of things, to be either suggested or prescribed to them from without.

Sir Henry Wellesley has, in coincidence with this opinion, reported the alarm which the intended Mission of M. de La Tour du Pin had excited at Madrid, the prejudice which, in the opinion of all the Foreign Ministers at Madrid, it was calculated to occasion to the King's interests and possible safety. He also reports the steps which it was in contemplation to have adopted, on the part of the King, to endeavour to prevent the French

[1] (*Sic.*)

Minister from prosecuting his journey to Madrid, when the intelligence of the abandonment of the Mission was received from Paris.

At all events, therefore, until some Central Authority shall establish itself in Spain, all notion of operating upon her Councils seems utterly impracticable; and calculated to lead to no other possible result, than that of compromising either the King or the Allies, or probably both.

[The Emperor of Russia, in the several Cases which H.I.M. has successively suggested for deliberation is altogether silent upon the particular case which has really occurred: It may therefore be inferred that His Imperial Majesty's Reasoning is not meant to be applied to that total Change in the order of Things previously existing in Spain, which has been effected with the avowed concurrence and under the formal Sanction of the King. This Change, no doubt forced by Circumstances, has been regularly notified by His Majesty to all Foreign Powers, and is apparently acquiesced in, if not adopted by, the great Body of the Nation.

In these Circumstances can the other States of Europe, in prudence proceed publickly to deliberate upon the King's Acts, much more to call them into Question? If not, would it be wise to give advice, wholly unasked, which, is very little likely to contain any suggestion for the salutary modification of the Constitution of 1812 other than such as will readily occur to those publick Men within the Country who have good Intentions, and whose influence and means of effectuating an amelioration of the Constitution are likely to be weakened rather than strengthened by an interference from abroad?]

The present state of Spain, no doubt, seriously extends the range of political agitation in Europe, but it must nevertheless be admitted, that there is no portion of Europe of equal magnitude, in which such a Revolution could have happened, less likely to menace other States with that direct and imminent danger, which has always been regarded, at least in this Country, as alone constituting the Case which would justify external interference. If the case is not such as to warrant such an interference;—if we do not feel that we have at this moment either the right or the means to interfere with effect by force;—if the semblance of such an Interference is more likely to irritate than to overawe, and if we have proved, by experience, how little a Spanish Government, whether of King or Cortes, is disposed to listen to advice from Foreign States, is it not prudent at least to pause, before we assume an attitude which would seem to pledge us in the eyes of Europe to some decisive proceeding? Before we embark in such a Measure, is it not expedient at least to ascertain with some degree of precision, what we really mean to do? This course of temperate and cautious policy, so befitting the occasion and the critical position in which the King is personally placed, will in no degree fetter our action, when, if ever, the case for acting shall arise.

In the mean time, as Independent States, the Allied Powers may awaken, through their respective Missions at Madrid, with not less effect than would attend any joint representation, a salutary apprehension of the consequences that might be produced by any violence offered to the King's

Person or Family, or by any hostile Measures directed against the Portuguese Dominions in Europe, for the protection of which Great Britain is bound by specifick Treaty.

In conveying any such intimation, however, the utmost delicacy should be observed; and though it is to be presumed that the views and wishes of all the Allied Powers must be essentially the same, and that the sentiments they are likely to express cannot materially differ, it does not follow that they should speak either in their Corporate Character, or through any Common Organ,—both which expedients would be calculated rather to offend, than to conciliate or persuade.

There can be no doubt of the general danger which menaces more or less the stability of all existing Governments, from the Principles which are afloat, and from the circumstances that so many States of Europe are now employed in the difficult task of casting anew their Governments upon the Representative Principle;—but the notion of revising, limiting, or regulating the course of such experiments, either by Foreign Council or by Foreign Force, would be as dangerous to avow, as it would be impossible to execute; and the illusion too prevalent on this subject, should not be encouraged in our intercourse with the Allies.—That circumstances might arise out of such experiments in any Country directly menacing to the safety of other States, cannot be denied, and against such a danger, well ascertained, the Allies may justifiably, and must in all prudence, be on their guard: but such is not the present case.—Fearful as is the example which is furnished by Spain, of an Army in revolt, and a Monarch swearing to a Constitution which contains in its frame hardly the semblance of a Monarchy, there is no ground for apprehension that Europe is likely to be speedily endangered by Spanish Arms.

[The Argument against any ostensible step whatever being taken by the Allies to interpose even their good offices in the affairs of Spain and the serious difficulties that must present themselves to an armed Interference under any Circumstances in that Country, have been so forcibly detailed in the Duke of Wellington's Paper as to exhaust that part of the Question.

It remains to be considered what Course can best be pursued by the Allies in the present Critical State of Europe, in order to preserve in the utmost Cordiality and vigour the Bonds which at this Day so happily unite the great European Powers together, and to draw from their Alliance should the Moment of Danger and Contest arrive, the fullest extent of Benefit of which it is in it's nature susceptible.][1]

In this Alliance, as in all other human Arrangements, nothing is more likely to impair, or even to destroy its real utility, than any attempt to push its duties and its obligations beyond the Sphere which its original conception and understood Principles will warrant.—It was an Union for the re-conquest and liberation of a great proportion of the Continent of Europe from the military dominion of France; and having subdued the Conqueror, it took the State of Possession, as established by the Peace,

[1] (* — * scratched through in pencil.)

under the protection of the Alliance.—It never was, however, intended as an Union for the Government of the World, or for the Superintendence of the Internal Affairs of other States.

[It provided specifically against an infraction on the part of France of the state of possession then created: It provided against the Return of the Usurper or of any of his Family to the throne: It further designated the Revolutionary Power which had convulsed France and desolated Europe, as an object of it's constant solicitude, but it was the Revolutionary power more particularly in its Military Character actual and existent within France against which it intended to take Precautions, rather than against the Democratic Principles, then as now, but too generally spread throughout Europe.

In thus attempting to limit the objects of the Alliance within their legitimate Boundary, it is not meant to discourage the utmost frankness of communication between the Allied Cabinets; their Confidential Intercourse upon all Matters, however foreign to the Purposes of the Alliance, is in itself a valuable expedient for keeping the current of sentiment in Europe as equable and as uniform as may be: It is not meant that in particular and definite Cases, the Alliance may not (and especially when invited to do so by the Parties interested) advantageously interpose, with due Caution, in matters lying beyond the Boundaries of their immediate and particular Connection; but what is intended to be combated as forming any part of their Duty as Allies, is the Notion, but too perceptibly prevalent, that whenever any great Political Event shall occur, as in Spain, pregnant perhaps with future Danger, it is to be regarded almost as a matter of course, that it belongs to the Allies to charge themselves collectively with the Responsibility of exercising some Jurisdiction concerning such possible eventual Danger. One objection to this view of our Duties, if there was no other, is, that unless We are prepared to support our interference with force, our judgment or advice is likely to be but rarely listened to, and would by frequent Repetition soon fall into complete contempt. So long as We keep to the great and simple conservative principles of the Alliance, when the Dangers therein contemplated shall be visibly realized, there is little risk of difference or of disunion amongst the Allies.

All will have a common Interest: But it is far otherwise when We attempt, with the Alliance, to embrace subordinate, remote, and speculative cases of danger; all the Powers may indeed have an interest in averting the assumed danger, but all have not by any means a common faculty of combating it, in it's more speculative Shapes, nor can they all without embarrassing seriously the internal administration of their own Affairs be prepared to show themselves in jealous observation of transactions, which, before they have assumed a practical character, public opinion, would not go along with them in counteracting.

This principle is perfectly clear and intelligible in the case of Spain: We may all agree that nothing can be more lamentable, or of more dangerous example, than the late revolt of the Spanish Army: We may all agree that nothing can be more unlike a monarchical Government, or less suited to the wants and true interests of the Spanish nation, than the Constitution

[of the year 1812; We may also agree, with shades of difference, that the consequence of this state of things in Spain may eventually bring danger home to all our own doors, but it does not follow, that We have therefore equal means of acting upon this opinion: For instance, the Emperor of Russia, from the nature of his authority, can have nothing to weigh, but the physical or moral difficulties external from his own Govt. or Dominions, which are in the way of his giving effect to his Designs; If H.I.M.'s Mind is settled upon these points, His Action is free and His Means are in his own hands. The King of Great Britain, from the nature of our Constitution, has on the contrary all His means to acquire through Parliament, and He must well know that if embarked in a War, which the Voice of the country does not support, the efforts of the strongest Administration which ever served the Crown would soon be unequal to the prosecution of the Contest. In Russia there is but little public sentiment with regard to Spain, which can embarrass the decision of the Sovereign; In Great Britain there is a great deal, and the Current of that Sentiment runs strongly against the late Policy of the King of Spain.

Besides, the People of this Country would probably not recognise (unless Portugal was attacked) that our Safety could be so far menaced by any State of things in Spain, as to Warrant their Government in sending an Army to that Country to meddle in it's internal affairs; We cannot conceal from ourselves how generally the Acts of the King of Spain since His Restoration have rendered His Government unpopular, and how impossible it would be to reconcile the People of England to the use of force, if such a Proceeding could for a moment be thought of by the British Cabinet for the purpose of replacing Power in His hands, however he might engage to qualify it. The principle upon which the British Government acted in the discussions with respect to the Colonies, (viz: never to employ forcible means for their reduction) would equally preclude them from any intervention of such a character with regard to Old Spain. The interposition of our good offices, whether singly, or in concert with the Allied Govts., if uncalled for by any authority within Spain, even by the King Himself, is by no means free from a like inconvenience as far as regards the Position of the British Government at home. This species of Intervention especially when coming from five great Powers, has more or less the air of dictation and of menace, and the possibility of it's being intended to be pushed to a forcible intervention is always assumed or imputed by an adverse party. The grounds of the intervention thus become unpopular, the intention of the parties is misunderstood, the public Mind is agitated and perverted, and the General Political situation of the Government is thereby essentially embarrassed.

This Statement is only meant to prove that We ought to see somewhat clearly to what purpose of real Utility our Effort tends, before We embark in proceedings which can never be indifferent in their bearings upon the Government taking part in them. In this country at all times, but especially at the present conjuncture, when the whole Energy of the State is required to unite reasonable men in defence of our existing Institutions, and to

[put down the spirit of Treason and Disaffection which in certain of the Manufacturing Districts in particular, pervades the lower orders, it is of the greatest moment, that the public sentiment should not be distracted or divided, by any unnecessary interference of the Government in events, passing abroad, over which they can have none, or at best but very imperfect means of controul. Nothing could be more injurious to the Continental Powers than to have their affairs made matter of daily Discussion in our Parliament, which nevertheless must be the consequence of Their precipitately mixing themselves in the affairs of other States, if We should consent to proceed pari passu with them in such interferences. It is not merely the temporary inconvenience produced to the British Government by being so committed, that is to be apprehended, but it is the exposing ourselves to have the public Mind soured by the effects of a meddling policy, when it can tend to nothing really effectual, and pledged perhaps, beforehand against any exertion whatever in Continental Affairs; the fatal effects of such a false Step might be irreparable when the moment at which we might be indispensably called upon by Duty and Interest to take a part should arise.

These considerations will suggest a doubt whether that extreme degree of unanimity and supposed concurrence upon all political subjects would be either a practicable or a desirable principle of action among the Allied States, upon Matters not essentially connected with the main purposes of the Alliance. If this Identity is to be sought for, it can only be obtained by a proportionate degree of inaction in all the States. The position of the Ministers at Paris for instance can never be altogether uniform, unless their language upon Public affairs is either of the most general description, or they agree to hold no public language whatever. The latter Expedient is perhaps the most prudent, but then the Unanimity of the Sentiment, thus assumed to be established, will not be free from inconvenience to some of the parties, if the Cabinets of other States by their public documents assign objects to that Concert, to which, at least as described by them, the others cannot conveniently subscribe.

The fact is that we do not, and cannot feel alike upon all subjects. Our Position, our Institutions, the Habits of thinking, and the prejudice of our People, render us essentially different. We cannot in all matters reason or feel alike; we should lose the Confidence of our respective Nations if we did, and the very affectation of such an Impossibility would soon render the Alliance an Object of Odium, and Distrust, whereas, if we keep it within its *common Sense* limits, the Representative Governments, and those which are more purely Monarchical, may well find each a common Interest, and a common facility in discharging their Duties under the Alliance, without creating an Impression that they have made a surrender of the first principles upon which their respective Governments are founded. Each Government will then retain it's due faculty of independent Action, always recollecting, that they have all a common Refuge in the Alliance, as well as a common Duty to perform, whenever such a Danger shall really exist, as that against which the Alliance was specially intended to provide.

[There is at present very naturally a widespread apprehension of the fatal Consequences to the publick tranquillity of Europe, that may be expected to flow from the dangerous principles of the present Day, at work more or less in every European State. Consequences which no human foresight can presume to estimate. In all dangers the first Calculation of Prudence is to consider what we should avoid and on what we should endeavour to rely:—In considering Continental Europe as divided into two great Masses, the Western, consisting of France and Spain, the Eastern of all the other Continental States still subsisting with some limited exceptions, under the form of their ancient Institutions, the great Question is, what System of general and defensive Policy (subject of course to special Exceptions arising out of the Circumstances of the particular Case) ought the latter States to adopt with a view of securing themselves against those dangers, which may directly or indirectly assail them from the former. By the late Proceedings at Vienna, which for all purposes of internal tranquillity bind up the various States of Germany into a single and undivided Power, a great degree of additional simplicity as well as Strength has been given to this Portion of Europe. By this Expedient there is established on that side of Europe, instead of a multitude of dispersed States, two great Bodies, Russia and Germany, of the latter of which Austria and Prussia may for purposes of internal tranquillity be regarded as component parts. In addition to these there remain but few Pieces on the Board to complicate the Game of public Safety.

In considering then how the Game can best be played, the first thing that occurs for our consideration is, what good can these States hope to effect in France or Spain by their mere Councils? Perhaps it would not be far from the truth to say, None whatever:—When the chances of Error, Jealousy and National Sentiment are considered, the Probability of mischief would be more truly assigned to the System of constant European Interference upon these volcanic Masses.

Of this truth the Duke de Richelieu seems fully satisfied, as appears by the manly and earnest entreaties which he has lately addressed to certain of the Allies' Courts, that, they would keep their Ministers quiet at Paris, and that abstaining themselves from all advice or interference, They would leave the French Government to combat for themselves and upon their own views of things, the dangers which surround them.

What could the Allied Powers look to effect by their Arms, if the supposition of an armed interference in the internal affairs of another State could be admitted? Perhaps as little; Because in supposing them finally triumphant, We have the problem still to solve, how the country in which such Interference had been successful was to provide for its self-government after the Allied Armies shall have been withdrawn, without soon becoming an equal source of danger to the tranquillity of neighbouring States; but when we consider how much danger may arise to the internal Safety of the rest of Europe, by the absence of those Armies which must be withdrawn to overrun the Country in which the supposed Interference was to take place,—what may be the danger of these Armies being con-

[taminated, what may be the incumbrances to be added by such renewed exertions to the already overwhelming Weight of the debts of the different States,—what the local irritation which must be occasioned by pouring forth such immense armies pressing severely as they must do upon the resources of Countries already agitated and inflamed,—no rational Statesman surely would found his prospects of Security on such a calculation; He would rather be of opinion, that the only necessity which could in wisdom justify such an attempt is, that which, temperately considered, appears to leave to Europe no other option, than that of either going to meet that danger which they cannot avoid, or having it poured in the full tide of military invasion upon their own States. The actual Existence of such a Danger may indeed be inferred from many Circumstances short of the visible preparations for attack, but it is submitted that on this basis the conclusion should always be examined.

If this position is correctly laid down, it may be asserted, that the case supposed, not only does not at present exist, but the chances of such a danger have latterly rather declined in proportion as both France and Spain are almost exclusively and deeply occupied by their own internal embarrassments: The military Power in France at this day is circumscribed within those limits which are not more than competent to the necessary duties of the Interior; That of Spain is upon even a more reduced Scale, whilst the military Establishments of all the other European States, and especially that of Russia, were never perhaps at any period of their history upon a footing of more formidable efficiency both in point of discipline and Numbers; Surely then, if these states can preserve harmony among themselves, and exercise a proper degree of vigilance with respect to their interior Police, there is nothing in this state of things which should prevent them from abiding with patience and with firmness the result of the great political process to which circumstances have given existence in the States to the Westward of their Frontiers. They may surely permit these Nations to work out by their own means, and by the lights of their own Councils, that result which no doubt materially bears upon the general Interests of the World, but which is more especially to decide their own particular destinies, without being led to interfere with them, at least so long as their own immediate Security is not directly menaced, or until some Crisis shall arise which may call for some specifick intelligible and practicable interposition on their part. The principle of one State interfering by force in the internal affairs of another, in order to enforce obedience to the governing authority, is always a question of the greatest possible moral as well as political delicacy, and it is not meant here to examine it. It is only important on the present occasion, to observe that to generalize such a principle and to think of reducing it to a System, or to impose it as an obligation, is a Scheme utterly impracticable and objectionable. There is not only the physical impossibility of giving execution to such a System, but there is the moral impracticability arising from the inaptitude of particular States to recognize or to act upon it. No Country having a Representative System of Govt. could act upon it,—and the sooner such

[a Doctrine shall be distinctly abjured as forming in any Degree the Basis of our Alliance, the better; in order that States, in calculating the means of their own Security may not suffer Disappointment by expecting from the Allied Powers, a support which, under the special Circumstances of the National Institutions they cannot give:—Great Britain has perhaps equal Power with any other State to oppose herself to a practical and intelligible Danger, capable of being brought home to the National Feeling:—When the Territorial Balance of Europe is disturbed, she can interfere with effect, but She is the last Govt. in Europe, which can be expected, or can venture to commit Herself on any Question of an abstract character.

These Observations are made to point attention to what is practicable and what is not. If the dreaded moral Contagion should unfortunately extend itself into Germany and if the flame of Military Revolt should for example, burst forth in any of the German States, it is in vain for that State, however anxiously and sincerely we deprecate such a Calamity, to turn it's Eyes to this Country for the means of effectually suppressing such a Danger:—If external means are indispensable for it's Suppression, such State must not reckon for assistance upon Govts. constituted as that of Great Britain but it is not therefore without it's Resource.

The Internal peace of each German State is by Law placed under the protection of the Army of the Empire:—The Duty which is imposed by the Laws of the Confederacy upon all German States, to suppress, by the Military Power of the whole mass, Insurrection within the Territories of Each and Every, of the Co-Estates, is an immense Resource in itself, and ought to give to the Centre of Europe a sense of Security which previous to the Reunion of Vienna was wholly wanting;—The Importance of preventing the Low Countries, the Military Barrier of Europe, from being lost, by being melted down into the general Mass of French Power, whether by Insurrection, or by Conquest, might enable the British Govt. to act more promptly upon this, than perhaps upon any other Case of an internal Character that can be stated; But upon all such Cases we must admit ourselves to be, and our Allies should in fairness understand that we are, a Power that must take our Principle of action, and our Scale of acting, not merely from the Expediency of the Case, but from those Maxims, which a System of Government strongly popular, and national in it's character, has irresistibly imposed upon us.]

We shall be found in our Place when actual danger menaces the System of Europe; but this Country cannot, and will not, act upon abstract and speculative Principles of Precaution. The Alliance which exists had no such purpose in view in its original formation.—It was never so explained to Parliament; if it had, most assuredly the sanction of Parliament would never have been given to it; and it would now be a breach of faith, were the Ministers of the Crown to acquiesce in a construction being put upon it, or were they to suffer themselves to be betrayed into a course of Measures, inconsistent with those Principles which they avowed at the time, and which they have since uniformly maintained both at Home and Abroad, [and which were more fully developed in a confidential Memorandum

delivered in by the British Plenipotentiaries to those of the Allies, at Aix la Chapelle, bearing date in October 1818, to which Memorandum they now refer as more fully Illustrative of their Sentiments].

APPENDIX B

(See Chapter II, pp. 67–8 and notes)

THE SUPPRESSED PARTS OF THE POLIGNAC MEMORANDUM, OCTOBER 9TH, 1823

THE published part of the Conference between Canning and Polignac is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1823–24, vol. XI, pp. 49–53, but described as "an extract." It was laid before Parliament on March 4th, 1824. The actually published parts of the Memorandum are only here given in so far as necessary in order to make clear the meaning of the suppressed parts. *These latter are enclosed within square brackets*[1].

The Memorandum begins by Canning stating that the forcible recovery of the Spanish American Colonies by the Mother Country was hopeless, but that Great Britain would facilitate any negotiation between Spain and her Colonies; that, however,

the junction of any Foreign Power, in an enterprize of Spain against the Colonies, would be viewed by them as constituting an entirely new question; and one upon which they must take such decision as the interests of Great Britain might require....

Great Britain disclaimed any desire for territorial advantage or exclusive commercial privileges. British recognition of the Colonies might be delayed or precipitated by circumstances, but could not be made dependent on that of Spain.

It (Great Britain) would consider any Foreign interference, by force or by menace, in the dispute between Spain and the Colonies, as a motive for recognising the latter without delay.

Great Britain regarded the Ancient Coast and Commercial Laws of Spain for the Colonies as "tacitly repealed." Great Britain was not prepared to go into "a joint deliberation upon the subject of Spanish America, upon an equal footing with other Powers whose

[1] France, Embassy Archives, F.O. 146/56. The corrected Draft is enclosed in Desp. no. 84 of November 9th, 1823, Canning *to* Sir Chas. Stuart. The original draft was destroyed. There is no copy of this Memorandum in F.O. France 27/285. References to the Memorandum are also to be found in Paris, *Affaires Etrangères, Angleterre*, Tome 617, f. 162, and in Vienna, *Staats-Archiv, Weisungen nach Frankreich*, 1823. Metternich à Vincent, Nov. 26th, 1823.

opinions were less formed upon that question and whose interests were less implicated in the decision of it:

She (Great Britain) thought it fair therefore to explain beforehand, to what degree Her mind was made up, and Her determination taken [so far as Mr Canning had explained it]."

The Prince de Polignac declared that France thought forcible recovery by Spain impossible, and disclaimed exclusive territorial or commercial advantages for France;

Lastly, that She (France) abjured, in any case, any design of acting against the Colonies by force of arms.

[Mr Canning having alluded to certain reports in the newspapers, of some attack, or intended attack, by a French Naval Force against the Independents in Columbia, the Prince de Polignac said, that so far from intending any hostile act, the French Government had recalled the only line of battleship in those seas, the "Jean Bart," which is on its return to France.]

Polignac suggested that he preferred a Conference to settle the whole question.

In observing upon what Mr Canning had said, with respect to the peculiar state of Great Britain, in reference to such a Conference [Concert][1], the Prince de Polignac declared [that] he saw no difficulty to prevent England from taking part in the Conference [Congress][1] however she might now announce the difference in the view She took of the question, from that taken by the Allies.

The Prince de Polignac added that in the interest of humanity, and especially in that of the Spanish Colonies, it would be worthy of the European Governments to concert together the means of calming, in those distant and scarcely civilised Regions, passions blinded by party spirit, and to endeavour to bring back to a principle of Union in Government, whether Monarchical or Aristocratical, People among whom absurd and dangerous theories were now keeping up agitation and disunion.

Mr Canning, without entering into any discussion upon [these] abstract principles, contented himself with saying that—however desirable the establishment of a Monarchical form of Government, in any of those *Provinces*, *might be*, on the one hand, or whatever might be the difficulties in the way of it on the other hand—his Government would not take upon itself to put it forward as a condition of their Recognition.

The words following "*Provinces*, *might be*," are only a summary. The following is the full text:

[He (Mr Canning) saw great difficulties in the way of it, nor could his Government take upon itself to recommend it.

Mr Canning further remarked that he could not understand how an

[1] These words were altered because Canning admitted that Great Britain might enter a Conference (i.e. of subordinate Ministers) but would not take part in a Congress (i.e. of leading statesmen).

[*European* Congress could discuss Spanish American Affairs without calling to their Counsels a Power so eminently interested, as the United States of *America*, while Austria, Russia and Prussia, Powers, so much less concerned in the subject, were in consultation upon it.

The Prince de Polignac professed himself unprovided with any opinion of His Government upon what respected the United States of America, but did not *for himself* see any insuperable difficulty to such an association. He added, that he saw the less difficulty in a Congress upon this subject, as such a mode of treating it had been proposed at Verona by the Duke of Wellington.

Referring to the Convention said to have been concluded between the Government of Buenos Ayres and Commiss^rs from Spain, and especially to the declaration of the Buenos Ayres Legislature accompanying that Convention which promised a subsidy to Spain in the War against France, the Prince de Polignac was not prepared to say, how far such a declaration might be considered by his Government as an act of hostility against France:—But, upon Mr Canning's observing that the declaration was only eventual and conditional, that it depended for its confirmation on two circumstances: 1st the ratification of the Convention by the King of Spain; and 2ndly the acceptance of the live terms and the conclusion of similar conventions with Spain by *all* the other States of Spanish America, neither of which had yet occurred, and further that, even if carried into effect, such a subsidy would have done no more against France than the Colonies might have been bound to do, if still under the control of the Mother Country:—The Prince de Polignac was willing to admit that this case was not one which would be expected to change practically the views of his Government, with respect to the general question of Spanish America, or much to influence the general principles of Policy, by which the question must be decided.

But upon this point the Prince de Polignac said, that he was speaking only his own individual opinion, and that opinion not formed upon mature reflection.

P.S. Oct. 15th, 1823.

Mr Canning, in transmitting to the Prince de Polignac a copy of the foregoing Minute (according to agreement) on the day after it was written, accompanied it with an official note in which he observed "that he had not yet had an opportunity of looking back to the Prince of Wellington's correspondence at Verona, but that the impression on Mr Canning's mind was not that any proposal was made by the Duke of Wellington for treating the subject of Spanish America in Congress, but that the Duke of Wellington certainly communicated (or offered to communicate) to the Plenipot^ries there assembled the views and opinions of his Govern^t upon that subject, which were then in substance no other than they are now, except so far as time and events have since contributed to mature and confirm them."

Having afterwards referred to the Duke of Wellington's correspondence at Verona, Mr Canning addressed on the 15th October the following note to the Prince de Polignac: "Mr Canning having referred to the Duke of

[Wellington's correspondence at Verona has the honour to state to His Excellency the Prince de Polignac, that the impression which was upon his mind at the moment of his Conference with the Prince de Polignac on Sunday as to the nature of the Duke of Wellington's Communications to the Congress at Verona on the subject of Spanish America is by that reference entirely confirmed.—The Prince de Polignac will see by the enclosed extracts from the Duke of Wellington's note of the 24th of November and from the Procès Verbal of the 28th of November 1822 that both the substance of the Duke of Wellington's declaration on that subject and the sense in which it was made and understood were conformable to Mr Canning's recollection."

Extract.

His Majesty has apprized the Government of His Catholic Majesty of these measures, and in the true spirit of the union existing between Him and His Allies, having before had occasion to communicate to them what had passed between Him and Spain upon this occasion has directed that these additional circumstances should be made known to them.

Verona, Nov. 24th, 1822.

Extract.

Procès Verbal de la Conférence du 28 Novembre 1822.

A la fin de la discussion qui s'est engagée sur ces pièces M. le Duc de Wellington a declaré que les Mesures que son gouvernement desiroit adopter dans cette affaire étoient le resultat nécessaire de la position où il se trouvait placé par les relations multipliées des sujets de S. M. Brit^{que} avec les Pays en question.

Que ses Mesures ont toujours été limitées par la nécessité et qu'elles n'ont aucun rapport avec les questions des droits relatives à ces Pays. M. le Duc ne se dissimule pas, que cette espèce de relations établies, ou à établir, entre le Gouv^{t} de S. M. Brit^{que} et les nouveaux Gouvernements de l'Amérique pourra nuire aux démarches que le Gouv^{t} Espagnol seroit encore dans le cas de l'entreprendre pour les ramener à la mère Patrie.

Mais il a observé en même temps que cet inconvénient est une suite des circonstances et ne peut point être attribué au Gouv^{t} Brit^{que}, Sa Majesté le Roi ayant au contraire constament (*sic*) exprimé, et conservant encore le désir de favoriser autant qu'il est en lui la reconciliation de l'Espagne avec ses Colonies.

Signé
METTERNICH
(etc.)]

Certain comments by Canning, not contained in the Polignac Memorandum, are subjoined.

The published passage, *State Papers* XI. 50–1, that: "It (the British Government) would consider any Foreign Interference, by force or by

menace, in the dispute between Spain and the Colonies, as a motive for recognizing the latter without delay," was explained by Canning in his desp. no. 84 of 9 November[1] as "inserted to obviate an apprehension of the Prince de Polignac, that the mere assembling of a Congress in which he might refuse to join, without any reference to the nature of the propositions entertained by it, would be held by us to be a case calling for our instant recognition of the Spanish Provinces...." The words (v. *State Papers* XI. 53): "however desirable the establishment of a Monarchical form of Gov^{t}. might be," contain an admission of what is undoubtedly the opinion entertained by His Majesty's Gov^{t}, as to what would probably be the most satisfactory arrangement of the Gov^{t} in some, at least, of the New Provinces, and perhaps in Mexico especially, the one most suitable to the state of civilization, the wants and the habits of the People.

The other additions are only to the Prince de Polignac's part of the conversation, and the sentiments being those which he really expressed I could make no objection to their being recorded.

Such as the Paper now is, it may be considered as M. de Villèle describes it as a full and free explanation of the views of both Courts on this most important subject: and if the French Gov^{t} have therein declared themselves as unreservedly and mean to adhere to their declaration as sincerely as we do, the danger of collision between this Country and France upon a question which perhaps more than any appeared to threaten it is, I trust, almost entirely done away.

With respect to the proposal of a Congress, Your Excellency will maintain the same caution and reserve as hitherto; keeping the determination of your Gov^{t} entirely unpledged until that proposal shall, if ever, be brought forward in a regular shape, and with whatever accompaniments and qualifications may belong to it.

Canning wrote to Sir Charles Stuart, Desp. No. 85 of November 9th, 1823[1], in answer to Villèle's enquiry as to whether the sentiments of Great Britain applied to Brazil, as well as to Spanish America, as follows:

Our sentiments are the same, "though the case is different." Any attempt at force by the mother country "will be productive of a danger in Brazil which does not equally belong to Spanish America, that of risking the existence of a monarchical form of government....We attach great importance to [its] continuance in Brazil....By consenting in the first instance to leave the province independent in Brazil the Monarchy might be preserved in that country in his person, and a federal union established between that country and Portugal which might perpetuate the descent of both Crowns in the Royal House of Braganza."

[1] F.O. France, Embassy Archives, 146/56.

APPENDIX C

I

(See Chapter IV, 1, pp. 164 sqq.)

MEMORANDUM ON THE TURKISH QUESTION SENT BY STRATFORD CANNING TO LORD PALMERSTON

F.O. Turkey, vol. 211.

Paris, Dec. 19, 1832.

The Turkish Empire has reached, in its decline, that critical point, at which it must either revive and commence a fresh era of Prosperity, or fall into a state of complete dissolution. To Great Britain, the fate of this Empire can never be indifferent. It would affect the interests of her trade and East Indian Possessions, even if it were unconnected with the maintenance of her relative Power in Europe. Nearer and more pressing Duties may forbid H.M. Government to take an active part in the Contest which now agitates Turkey; but the issue of a struggle so likely to prove decisive of the Sultan's independence can hardly be overlooked and left to chance on any sound Principle of English Policy....

The principal difficulties with which the Sultan has to contend in directing his operations against Mehemet Ali, arise out of the distant and insulated position of Egypt, the ease with which Syria can be defended against an army invading it from the North, and the disadvantage of having a Fleet, which though superior in numerical Force to that of Egypt, is by no means so well manned and manoeuvred.

With the assistance of the British Squadron, there is great reason to believe, that the Sultan would easily surmount these obstacles. Instead of attacking the Egyptian forces in Syria, he might send an expedition by Sea against Egypt itself. To the East of Damietta the coast affords Facilities for landing Troops, and an invasion properly directed on that side would not only compel Ibrahim Pasha to retreat, but would also menace Cairo, and bring into the field all those, who, secretly attached to the Sultan's cause, are nevertheless kept down at present by the want of support and fear of Punishment....

It is obvious that, as far as Great Britain is concerned, the only ground on which this Plan could be recommended, is the necessity of interfering to rescue the Turkish Empire from a War, which threatens to lay it at the feet of a Power already too great for the General Interests and liberties of Europe[1]....

In one respect, however, the prospect is clear. Let Mehemet Ali succeed in constituting an Independent State, and a great and irretrievable step is made towards the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. That Empire may fall to pieces at all events; and he must be a bold man who would undertake to answer for its being saved by any effort of human policy. But His Majesty's Government may rest assured that to leave it to itself is to leave it to its Enemies.

[1] [In the margin of this paragraph there is a pencilled note by Palmerston: "This is most just and true."]

F.O. Turkey, vol. 234. PALMERSTON *to* PONSONBY.

Foreign Office, Feb. 15, 1834.

The Prince of Lieven having communicated to me a Copy of the Treaty concluded between Russia and the Porte, on the 8th of July, 1833, together with its separate article, I now transmit to your Excellency, for your information, Copies of these Documents in the shape in which His Majesty delivered them to me; and I have to direct the attention of your Excellency to the remarkable difference which exists between the Copies of the Instruments in question thus communicated by the Russian Ambassador, and those which were delivered to your Excellency by the Ministers of the Ottoman Porte. No other instance can, I apprehend, be found, in which two Contracting Parties to a Treaty have respectively communicated to a Third Power separate Copies of their mutual engagements exhibiting such important discrepancies.... [Palmerston knew quite well that the copy of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi of July 8, 1833, which the Porte communicated to the British Government, was defective. On July 12, 1833, Ponsonby had, from unofficial sources, transmitted a true copy both of the Patent Treaty and the Secret Article (F.O. Turkey, vol. 224, Dispatch No. 35). Palmerston, of course, could not refer to this unofficial copy in his correspondence with the Porte. But he insisted upon the doubtful points in the Porte's version of the Treaty being elucidated, in order to bring home to the Porte the fact that Great Britain knew them to have become vassals of Russia.]

F.O. Turkey, vol. 394. PONSONBY *to* PALMERSTON.

Therapia, June 23, 1840.

I am entirely convinced that it will be most easy to destroy the power of Mehemet Ali, and that it is necessary to destroy it to avoid the many dangers, particularly to the preservation of peace, that must spring from concessions to him in the spirit of French Policy.

It may, perhaps, not be thought as important by others as it is by me, to preserve some English influence in this Country, but still it is my duty to declare my Conviction that it will be reduced lower than zero by the success of the French in obtaining for Mehemet Ali what they have demanded. The French by their Agents, MM. Cor and others, including an Armenian Banker Doz Aglon, have been incessant in urging to Reshid Pasha and to all influential Turks, that England is *too* weak to protect or to give aid to Turkey—that England will hereafter, as hitherto, give nothing but words—that unless Mehemet Ali be not conciliated, Turkey will be his victim, unless saved by France.

All who know the Turks know that they bow to success, that they are ignorant and do not distinguish between the real and the apparent sources of it. They will see Mehemet Ali triumphant, and will conclude that he has baffled the power of England and Austria, and even Russia. He will be an irresistible hero in their eyes, and all will be prostrate at his feet. His will and pleasure must govern the Divan, and the Sultan be a Puppet—but

the fact must be that he, Mehemet, shall be the tool of France—his position must be such as to make the support of France necessary for the preservation of that position which it will have obtained for him, and through him, France will govern.

No country is over [?] moderate in the exercise of power, and France has never shown peculiar abstinence from the exertion of hers. There are great ends of ambition to be aimed at, perhaps to be attained—there is vanity to be gratified, a thousand things to forbid the meek carrying of authority, and it would be unreasonable to expect that Russia and Austria and even England would see with content this vast Empire absolutely governed by French counsels.

Could jealousies fail to spring up—could they be allayed—could they escape the universal fate of aggravation and embitterment? Must not vital and great interests speak as well as pride and passion? Will Europe be dead to the destruction of the balance of power by the vast increase of the strength and influence of France, or will all submit?—It has been said to me that these my notions are absurd—but I am so confident that they are true, as to consider it to be my duty to offer them to your Lordship's consideration.

Every one of my acquaintance, who is by his position here and other things, entitled to have his opinion about this country respected, thinks upon this question as I do—and I include in the number my colleagues of Austria, Prussia and Russia.

Ibid. PALMERSTON *to* LORD WILLIAM RUSSELL.

Foreign Office, Nov. 30, 1832.

We have acknowledged Donna Maria as legitimate Queen.

II

(See Chapter IV, II, pp. 184–5 and notes)

TAHITI

E. BUCHANAN *to* THE LONDON MISSIONARY SOCIETY.

[E. Buchanan was the London Missionary Society's Schoolmaster.]

Tahiti, Nov. 8, 1843.

I avail myself of the French Admiral's return to Valparaiso to acquaint you with the circumstances which have lately transpired at this place.

On Oct. 1 Her Britannic Majesty's frigate the Dublin arrived from the Sandwich Islands. She was sent here by Admiral Thomas to protect Queen Pomare's person. She is under the command of Captain Tucker, and carries 50 guns. The Admiral is expected to follow her shortly.

On November 2d the French Admiral A. Du Petit Thouars arrived in the French frigate La Reine Blanche. The Ambuscade another French frigate was in the harbour.

On Sabbath the 5th the French hoisted their colours on a small island in the harbour, which was till then the military station or fort of Tahiti. At 8 a.m. when they hoisted their flag (*sic*) and at noon both the French frigates saluted it. At 2 p.m. the same day another French frigate having Commissary royal Bruat on board arrived, and at 4 p.m. another French

frigate cast anchor in the harbour. The four vessels were all decorated with colours, and all of them saluted the French flag at sunset. The French also fired a salute with the cannons upon the small island.

On the 7th they landed their marines, officers and band with two field-pieces. They marched to the Queen's residence, entered her courtyard, and demanded that her flag should be taken down. To this the Queen's representative replied, that it was the Queen's wish that her flag which was the symbol of her power should not be taken down. The officer commanding ordered the band to strike up while the man was speaking, so that I could hear no more of what he said, but I understand he appealed to H.B.M. Queen Victoria on behalf of the Queen of Tahiti. The French officer commanded the Tahitian flag to be struck and the French colours to be hoisted, which they saluted with the two field-pieces they had brought with them, and with the four frigates....

The British Consul then struck his flag, stating that he was not an accredited Consul to a French Colony, and solemnly protested against the whole of the proceedings of the French. The lowering of the British flag greatly distressed the Queen and chiefs who were present seeking protection from their invaders under its shadow....

This day (8th of Nov.) M. Bruat landed under a salute from his vessel and was received on shore by the French troops who escorted them to the late residence of Queen Pomare who is now reduced to a refugee living under the hospitable roof of the British Consul.

COMMITTEE OF PROTESTANT MISSIONARIES *to* THE REV. J. J. FREEMAN AND A. TIDMAN (Secretaries to the L.M.S.).

Point Venus, March 28, 1844.

We have escaped with our dear families, not knowing if we shall ever return or recover one *iota* of our property, the whole of which, even to our wearing apparel, we have been compelled to leave behind. Our friend Mr Pritchard has been in prison, but has been released.

[In a letter of the same date to the French Governor Bruat, the missionaries offer to try and induce the natives who had fled to the eastern part of the Island, to return, if the French authorities would grant terms of amity. To this the French Governor sent a friendly reply]:

Since you desire sincerely peace, my opinion is that the proceeding which would bring about most promptly this result will be that you come to see me, and frankly recognise my authority....You may promise to the chiefs who will come immediately to Papeete to make their full and entire submission to the French Government, that they will be neither arrested nor exiled.

THE COMMITTEE OF PROTESTANT MISSIONARIES *to* ADMIRAL SIR GEO. SEYMOUR.

Tahiti, August 15, 1845.

In the name of the Committee of the London Missionary Society upon Tahiti and Cimes, I have the honour to lay before you a statement of some

of the difficulties in which the altered circumstances of the Government have involved us, and invite your kind attention, as we have every reason to believe that the numerous annoyances which we have had to endure will be greatly increased on your departure from Tahiti.

1. The first subject to which we would draw your attention is the tenure of Mission property. We have refrained from obtaining documents (which would have been willingly granted) that we might in the early history of the Mission incur no suspicion of wishing to possess ourselves of the land. The only tenure of our property hitherto has been the goodwill of the people; but the altered circumstances of the Government call upon us now to bring the subject under your notice that we may obtain a guarantee of our rights, and have our property secured, particularly as one of our Mission houses has been wrested from us....

THE SAME TO THE DIRECTORS OF THE L.M.S.

Jan. 19, 1848.

"The Churches all round Tahiti have been re-established, and are visited regularly....Many members who were suspended at the time of the wars, have returned and have been admitted."

[On Feb. 9, 1848, the French Authorities recognised] "the properties at present occupied by them [the Lond. Miss. Soc.] as 'inalienable national properties exclusively for the exercise of Protestant worship, the education of the people, and the residence of the ministers of the Protestant religion.'"

III

(See Chapter IV, III, pp. 196 sqq.)

THE SPANISH MARRIAGES

F.O. Spain, vol. 694. PALMERSTON *to* BULWER.

Foreign Office, July 19, 1846.

[This is the celebrated "Despatch of July 19th" which precipitated the double marriages. Extracts from it are printed in "Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the Infanta of Spain," *Parliamentary Papers*, LXIX, 1847. The despatch offended Louis Philippe by its mention of the Coburg Candidature, and it offended the Spanish Government by its severe strictures on their unconstitutional conduct. These strictures were not for communication to the Spanish Government; but as Palmerston read the whole despatch to Count Jarnac and actually gave him a copy to take home, the French Government had cognisance of it, and through them, the Spanish Government (see Palmerston to Normanby, Sept. 22, 1846, in *Parliamentary Papers*, LXIX, 1847, p. 295). The strictures on the Spanish Government's unconstitutional conduct are printed in the extract in the *Parliamentary Papers*: but another offensive passage, which accuses General Narvaez of chiefly trying to amass money, and of engaging in speculations on the Stock Exchange, is not printed. In the manuscript copy Palmerston has drawn a pencilled line alongside the passage, and written "omit."]

Ibid. PALMERSTON *to* BULWER.

Foreign Office, Aug. 22, 1846.

[An extract of this is printed in *Parliamentary Papers*; but the following passage is omitted.]

It is said that there are strong personal objections which render the Duke of Cadiz entirely ineligible as Husband of the Queen. He is represented as being deficient in understanding, destitute of Instruction, devoid of Manly Habits, and ridiculous and mean in Personal appearance. In all these aspects he is the Reverse of what the Husband of a Queen of a great Country ought to be.

Ibid. PALMERSTON *to* BULWER.

Separate, same date.

[Palmerston points out that the British support of Isabel and the constitutional party was not due to chivalry or political sympathy, but meant to prevent a foreign Power from getting control of Spain.]

The British Government know that Foreign Influence can best be exerted over the Court of a despotic Monarchy, and that such Influence becomes far weaker, if not entirely paralysed when it has to act upon the constitutional Representatives of a free People.

The British Government therefore saw that in aiding the Spanish People to establish a Constitutional Form of Government, they were assisting to secure the Political Independence of Spain; and they had no Doubts that the maintenance of that Independence would be conducive to important British Interests.

F.O. Spain, vol. 699. BULWER *to* PALMERSTON.

[Secret and Confidential.] Madrid, Sept. 2, 1846.

When the Court [of Spain] began to fear that there were small probabilities of a Prince of Saxe-Coburg, it looked out for the means of conciliating the French Government. A negotiation, I have reason to believe, was then commenced, either directly through M. Isturitz, or indirectly through M. Mon, on this basis: if the Queen takes a Bourbon, Count Trapani, or, if that is impossible, Don Francisco de Asis, for instance, will France sustain me against Don Enrique, England and the Progressistas, by marrying the Duc de Montpensier to the Infanta?...

Thus at midnight was consummated this important act, consigning a young Queen of sixteen for the rest of her life, to a husband by whom, it was said but a month ago, that she was not likely to have children, and marrying her Royal Sister, in better health, and with fairer prospects, to the son of the Monarch of that powerful State, which has so long domineered over this country.

What M. de Talleyrand said in one case [*i.e.* in enticing the Royal Family to Valenzay] may be applied to the other—*ce n'est pas prendre une couronne, c'est l'escamoter.*

Ibid. BULWER *to* PALMERSTON.

Madrid, Sept. 22, 1846.

[Reports an interview with the Duke of Cadiz.]

I am inclined to form a more favourable opinion of him in some respects than is generally entertained.

APPENDIX D

(See Chapter V, III, p. 392, note 5)

LORD COWLEY'S MEMORANDUM RELATIVE TO THE PRESENT AND FUTURE STATE OF TURKEY. MARCH 1856

F.O. 27. 1125. Public Record Office.

Charles Greville writes in his Journal for 3 March 1856, at Paris:

I found Cowley. . . engaged in drawing up a statement of the comparative state of Russia, as to her aggressive power against Turkey before the war and now, after peace has been made. He is doing this for Clarendon and to assist him in making his case good in Parliament when the peace is attacked, as he says it is quite certain it will be.

In 1878 (March 2nd) Disraeli directed that the copy preserved by the Foreign Office should be shown to Lord Lyons. It returned with the endorsement, "Reverse the headings and we have very nearly the actual state of things resulting from the new treaty" [San Stefano].

Present State	Future State
1. Existence of onerous treaties imposed on Turkey by Russia, and so interpreted as to give Russia immense power within the Sultan's Dominions.	1. Admission of Turkey into the international engagements of Europe.
Refusal on the part of Russia to admit the intervention of any Foreign Power in her disputes with the Porte.	Abolition of all former Treaties with Russia.
	The Powers engage to respect the integrity and independence of Turkey, and in case of disputes between one of them and the Porte, to appeal to the others before having recourse to arms.

2. Black Sea all but a Russian lake. Difficulties thrown in the way of commerce. Sevastopol and the Fleet which it contained a standing menace to Turkey.

3. Russia claims and exercises a protective power in the P^ties.

No defences of any kind exist.

4. Mouths of the Danube in the hands of the Russ^ns and every difficulty made to its free navigation.

5. Russia claims right to interfere for the protection both of the religious and civil immunities of the Sultan's Greek Subjects.

6. The Aland Islands menace to become another Cronstadt.

7. This has been a subject of litigation for 27 years and might at any time have been converted into a serious quarrel.

Commerce all but prohibited.

2. Neutralisation of the Black Sea. It is open to the commercial Flag of every nation, but closed to Ships of war with the exception of six Russian and six Turkish Avisos of the length of 50 metres, at their water line, armed at the most with 4 guns each,—and of two small Ships of war, which each of the contracting powers may station at the mouth of the Danube.

No military or naval arsenals to be erected or restored in the Black Sea.

Renewal of Treaty of 1841.

3. The organisation of the P^ties.

Conversion of Russian protectorate or guarantee in the P^ties into general guarantee of Europe.

Defensive system in Principalities against foreign aggression assured.

Restitution of a part of Bessarabia to Moldavia and consequent annihilation of Russian Fortresses on the Danube.

4. Free navigation of the Danube and participation of contracting Powers in regulating the same.

5. Immunities granted by the Sultan to his non-Mussulman Subjects after consultation with his allies, to the exclusion of Russia.

Engagement of Contracting Powers not to interfere in internal administration of Turkey.

6. Engagement not to fortify the Aland Islands.

7. Mixed commission to revise line of frontier between Russia and Turkish possessions in Asia.

Freedom of commerce with Provinces East of the Black Sea.

8. Evacuation of Turkish Territory by Russian Troops.

9. Treaty between Austria, France and Great Britain guaranteeing integrity of Ottoman Empire and making any infraction by Russia of the stipulations of peace a *casus belli*

10. Treaty with Sweden.

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Cf. General Bibliography in vol. x of *The Cambridge Modern History*.

BOOK II

FROM THE SECOND PEACE OF PARIS TO THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION OF 1848–9. 1815–1848

CHAPTER I

THE CONCERT OF EUROPE, 1816–1822

Cf. Bibliography to Chapter I of vol. x of *The Cambridge Modern History* (The Congresses, 1815–1822).

A. Unpublished Authorities

SINCE the publication of *The Cambridge Modern History*, vol. x, the F.O. Records at the Record Office have been classified on a system making reference to them far simpler. Each series of volumes or bundles is numbered consecutively, *e.g.* the correspondence with the British Representatives in Austria is under F.O. 7, the volumes being arranged in order of date and numbered 1 to 269. A list of the F.O. Records to 1837 was issued by the Stationery Office in 1914 (*Lists and Indexes*, No. XLI). From this, however, the Correspondence connected with the Congresses and Conferences (F.O. 92: Continent—Treaty Papers) was omitted, and it may therefore be convenient to indicate here the contents of the volumes in this series covering the period under review. They are as follows:

F.O. 92: 31, 1816, Duke of Wellington, France; 32, 1817, Duke of Wellington, Paris; 33, 1818, Duke of Wellington, Aix-la-Chapelle; 34, 1818, September to December, Viscount Castlereagh, Aix-la-Chapelle, Drafts; 35, 1818, September to October, From Viscount Castlereagh, Aix-la-Chapelle, Nos. 1–13, 36, 1818, October and November, ditto, Nos. 14–22; 37, 1818, November, ditto, Nos. 23–32; 38, 1818, November, ditto, No. 33; 39, 1818, November, ditto, Nos. 34–42; 40, 1818, November, ditto, No. 43; 41, 1818, November and December, ditto; 42, 1818, September to December, Memoranda, Declarations, etc., Aix-la-Chapelle; 43, 1818, Copies of Treaties taken to Aix-la-Chapelle; 44, 1815, 1818, 1820, Circulars of 12 and 19 January, 1821—Treaty of Alliance between Naples and Spain; 45, 1821, September to November, Drafts from the Marquess of Londonderry, Hanover; 46, 1821, From the Marquess of Londonderry, Hanover; 47, 1821, September and October, To the Marquess of Londonderry, Hanover—Drafts, various.

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CHAPTER II

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF CANNING, 1822–1827

References to MSS. are given in the text. The titles of books mentioned in the Bibliographies in *The Cambridge Modern History*, vol. X, are very seldom repeated here. An asterisk (*) distinguishes exceptionally valuable books or those containing new documents.

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CHAPTER III

BELGIUM, 1830–1832

The Foreign Office Papers in the Record Office are the best source of information on the Belgian Question between 1830 and 1839: F.O. 10 (Belgium), vols. I *et seqq.* and F.O. 37 (Holland), vols. CLXX *et seqq.* The despatches from Brussels of Mr Cartwright, Lord Ponsonby, and Sir Robert Adair are of special interest. The Archives of Legations at Brussels (F.O. 123) and The Hague (F.O. 238) contain communications passing between the Foreign Office at London and the Legations in Belgium and Holland. De Lannoy, Les Origines diplomatiques de l'Indépendance Belge: La Conférence de Londres, Louvain, 1903, is a useful guide to these transactions. The author, however, occasionally shows a prejudice against Talleyrand.

Among the Records for 1856, F.O. 27 (France), 1140, is a collection of documents disclosing Prince Jules de Polignac's plan for the annexation of Belgium as part of a general reconstruction of Europe. After the Crimean War, relations between Great Britain and France were strained in consequence of difficulties connected with the execution of the Treaty of Paris of March 30th, 1856; and it appears from a despatch, of December 28th, 1856, from Lord Cowley, British Ambassador at Paris, to Lord Clarendon, that the Comte de Bois-le-Comte, who had been *Chef du Cabinet* in 1829, sent to the Emperor Napoleon III documents giving a complete account of Polignac's plan, with the suggestion that it might be revived as a means for checking the power of Great Britain. The Emperor, who disowned all thoughts of such territorial changes as Polignac had contemplated, lent them to Lord Cowley, who had them copied and sent to London. Baron Stockmar had apparently seen the documents, extracts from which are printed in his Memoirs (E. Tr.), I. 136–142. On this subject see also Ollivier, L'Empire libéral, and Louis Blanc, Histoire de Dix Ans. Cf. as to Polignac's "great design" A. Stern, Geschichte Europas, 1815–1871, III. 189 *seqq.* and the references on p. 190, note 1.

"Papers relative to the Affairs of Belgium" were presented to Parliament in 1833. They contain: A. Protocols of the Conference of London (with a translation into English). B. Communications with Ministers of Foreign Powers, and with British Ministers at Foreign Courts. Parliamentary Papers, 1833, XLII. 1.

There is no complete official report of the debates in the Belgian National Congress; but M. Huyttens, Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, compiled from various newspapers Discussions du Congrès National de la

Belgique, 1830–1831, which he published in five volumes, Brussels, 1844–1845. A list of members of the Congress is given in Balau, Soixante-Dix Ans d'Histoire Contemporaine, 4th edn. p. 399, Louvain, 1890. For the debates in the Belgian Chambers from 1831 to 1839 see Huymans, Histoire Parlementaire de la Belgique, 1831–1880, Brussels, 1877–1880.

Bulwer's Life of Palmerston (1879); the Correspondance diplomatique de Talleyrand: Ambassade de Talleyrand à Londres 1830–1834, Paris, 1891; the Memoirs of Metternich (1880), and of Stockmar (1872); and the volumes of Lord Grey's Correspondence, particularly his correspondence with the Princess Lieven (1890), furnish materials of the first importance. Among the papers of Earl Grey at Howick, there is a collection of hitherto unpublished letters, of which those to and from King Leopold, Lord Granville, and Lord Holland are most instructive. The Greville Memoirs, *passim* from vol. II. p. 41, and the Memoirs of the Duchesse de Dino (1910), throw some interesting light on the state of public feeling in London, between 1830 and 1834, on the Belgian Question.

Baron Nothomb's Essai historique et politique sur la Révolution Belge, Brussels, 1876, is the leading Belgian work. Other contemporary writings are Baron de Gerlache, Histoire du Royaume des Pays-Bas depuis 1814 jusqu'au 1830, Brussels, 1840; Bartels, Documents historiques sur la révolution belge, Brussels, 1836; L. de Potter, Souvenirs Personnels, Brussels, 1839; Lebeau, Souvenirs Personnels et Correspondance diplomatique, Brussels, 1833; Baron de Keverberg, Du Royaume des Pays-Bas, The Hague, 1834; Van Hogendorp, De Ontwikkeling 1830–1831, The Hague, 1831; Verstolk van Soelen, Recueil de pièces diplomatiques relatives aux affaires de la Hollande et de la Belgique 1830–1832, The Hague, 1831–1833; Bylandt, Verhaal van het oproer te Brussel 25 August 1830, The Hague, 1834; La Ville rebelle, ou les Belges au tribunal de l'Europe. [This is a virulent attack on the Belgians, published at The Hague in 1831 by Libry-Bagnano, a journalist of bad repute, who edited the National, a Government paper. His house was sacked by the mob at Brussels on the night of August 25th, 1830.] In 1835 Charles White published The Belgic Revolution, of which there is a French translation. [He acted as Lord Ponsonby's secretary, and wrote from personal knowledge of what happened down to 1833.]

Among later publications are Théodore Juste's well-known volumes, La Révolution Belge de 1830, Brussels, 1872, and Le Congrès National de Belgique, Brussels, 1880; Discailles, Charles Rogier, d'après des documents inédits, Brussels, 1902; Terlinden, Guillaume Ier, roi des Pays-Bas, et l'Église Catholique en Belgique 1814–1830, Brussels, 1906. This work, written from the Catholic standpoint, is the result of original research at Brussels, Malines, The Hague, Rome (Vatican) and London (British Museum). In 1919 M. de Ridder, of the Belgian Foreign Office, published, from materials found among the Archives at Brussels, La Belgique et la Prusse en Conflit 1834–1838, which gives an authentic account of the circumstances which involved Belgium in disputes with Prussia and Austria.

Henri Pirenne's Bibliographie de l'Histoire de Belgique, p. 226, and *The Cambridge Modern History*, vol. x. p. 848, enumerate the principal works

dealing with the general history of the Netherlands from 1814 to 1839. An exhaustive bibliography on the question of the Scheldt is appended to an article by Professor Terlinden in History (the quarterly journal of the Historical Association) for April, 1920, p. 9.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEAR EAST AND FRANCE, 1831–1847

I. The Egyptian Crisis and its Sequence, 1829–1841

Abundant information concerning the Eastern Question is contained in the volumes of Foreign Office Correspondence in the Public Record Office. A selection from these volumes has been published in three volumes of Parliamentary Papers: these are (1) 1839, vol. L. This contains despatches of Mandeville to Palmerston, relative to the pacification of Kutayeh in 1833, and also Colonel Campbell's correspondence in 1838 relative to Mehemet Ali's intention to renew hostilities against the Sultan. (2) 1841, vol. XXIX (Parts I, II). The whole of this volume is devoted to "Affairs of the Levant." It contains correspondence of Ponsonby, Hodges, Campbell, Beauvale, Granville, etc., and covers the period from February, 1839, to November 2nd, 1840. (3) 1841, vol. VIII (Correspondence relating to the Affairs of the Levant, Part III). This covers the period November, 1840, to April 9th, 1841.

For the history of the Eastern Question, 1831–1841, the most important sources on the English side are the despatches of Stratford Canning and of Lord Ponsonby, to Lord Palmerston. Stratford Canning's correspondence on the Eastern Question ceases, during this period, after the year 1832. Ponsonby's letters cover the rest of the period, and are full of interesting and valuable material. Included in Ponsonby's correspondence are letters of Count Pisani the Dragoman of the Embassy, and also of a French agent in Paris, M. Costé. The Private Papers of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe (F.O. 352) also contain useful information. Appendix C (p. 638) gives a brief selection from unpublished material in the Public Record Office, illustrating the arguments in the text of this Section.

A full account of the unpublished and published sources is to be found in three separate Bibliographies in *The Cambridge Modern History*, vol. X: viz. General Bibliography, pp. 785–6; the Orleans Monarchy, pp. 844–7; and Mehemet Ali, pp. 852–5.

II. Tahiti

The "affaire Pritchard" has been treated—rather summarily—by various French and English historians. For the French side of the question, see Guizot, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps, Paris, 1865, t. VII, and Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la Monarchie de Juillet, Paris, 1884, t. V. The English side is very fairly presented by Spencer Walpole, History of England since 1815, vol. V. Two books which give first-hand evidence on the subject are (1) George Pritchard, Queen Pomare and her

Country (1878), and (2) W. T. Pritchard (son of the former), Polynesian Reminiscences (1866). The whole affair was extremely controversial as it was a national question, stirring up the ancient jealousy of the French and English, an imperial question, involving the command of the Pacific, and a religious question, in which Catholicism and Protestantism were sharply brought up one against the other.

Fortunately a fairly complete documentary picture can be put together from the Foreign Office Correspondence which was published in two Parliamentary Papers, and from the archives of the London Missionary Society (see Appendix C II). The published correspondence will be found in (1) Parliamentary Papers, 1843, folio LXI. pp. 363–90, Correspondence relative to the Proceedings of the French in Tahiti, 1825–1843; and in (2) Parliamentary Papers, 1844, folio LI. pp. 95–106, Correspondence relative to the Society Islands, 1843. These volumes together cover the period, rather sketchily, to October 9th, 1843. The letters stop before the most important part of the Pritchard affair begins, *i.e.* before his seizure and expulsion by the French. This episode must be investigated in the archives of the London Missionary Society, which contain the reports of all the resident Protestant missionaries in Tahiti. There is, however, only one letter from Pritchard himself, probably because by holding the position of British Consul at Tahiti (1837 to 1843) he had ceased technically to be an agent of the London Missionary Society.

III. The Spanish Marriages, 1829–1846

There is a considerable amount of material concerning Spain and Portugal in the Foreign Office Correspondence deposited in the Public Record Office. A small selection of this will be found in two volumes of Parliamentary Papers: (1) 1839, vol. L (Papers relative to the War in Spain). This contains, among other things, Returns of Supplies of material and money furnished for the Queen of Spain by the British Government; correspondence with the Spanish Government concerning atrocities, 1830–1839; correspondence concerning officers of the British Legion. (2) 1847, vol. LXIX, correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the Infanta of Spain, 1842, 1847.

The relations between Great Britain and Spain are dealt with in the two volumes of Parliamentary Papers already mentioned: 1839, vol. L, and 1847, vol. LXIX. Palmerston's private correspondence is given in E. Ashley, Life of Viscount Palmerston, vol. II, 1879, but has very little on the Spanish Marriages. Bulwer's Life of Viscount Palmerston, vol. III, 1874, is rather a defence of the writer than an exposition of Lord Palmerston's policy; it contains numerous documents. Among general histories, Spencer Walpole's History of England (1890), vol. V, will be found to be extremely useful, being a full narrative, with numerous references to documents. Major John Hall's England and the Orleans Monarchy, 1912, is a good account, founded upon original research in the Public Record Office. On the French side the famous Revue Retrospective (documents copied from the Archives during the Revolution of 1848 and published by

Taschereau) and Guizot's Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps, are the most important. These and others will be found in the Bibliography in *The Cambridge Modern History*, vol. x. pp. 844–7. For Spanish and Portuguese sources see the same volume, pp. 808–11, and pp. 822–5.

CHAPTER V

INDIA AND THE FAR EAST, 1835–1849

A. Indian affairs and Anglo-Indian relations with Russia, Persia and Afghanistan

Cf. Bibliography to vol. xi, Chapter xxvi of *The Cambridge Modern History* (India and Afghanistan).

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2. *Published contemporary authorities: State Papers, Collections of Letters and Personal Memoirs.*

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CHAPTERS VI AND XII

THE UNITED STATES AND COLONIAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1815–1846

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

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FROM THE OUTBREAK OF THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION TO THE DEATH OF PALMERSTON AND RESIGNATION OF RUSSELL, 1848–1866

CHAPTER VII

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CHAPTER IX

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CHAPTER XIV

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CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY J. B. PEACE, M.A., AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

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